Christopher Gregory

From: Christopher Gregory
Sent: Thursday, August 20, 2026 8:52 PM
To: Shelly Bradbury; Jacquelyn Hutchins; John Frank; sboyd@cbs.com; Clark, Kyle; marshall@9news.com; bazi.kanani@cpr.org; colette.bordelon@denver7.com; jaguilar@denverpost.com; MichaelBrown@iheartmedia.com; Matt Schwartz; Ben Weiser; liptaka@nytimes.com; jack.healy@nytimes.com; nick.corasaniti@nytimes.com; georgewill@washpost.com; ews@ericsondermann.com; cjohnson2@npr.org; Jason Salzman; jesse@coloradosun.com; jon@i2i.org; david.migoya@gazette.com; Vince Bzdek; Michael Karlik; ernest.luning@coloradopolitics.com; Marianne Goodland; Dan Njegomir; luige.delpuerto@coloradopolitics.com
Cc: info@coloradodems.org; info@cologop.org; acp4co@gmail.com; info@ApprovalVotingParty.com; info@coloradocenterparty.org; Info@coloradoforwardparty.com; statechair@lpcolorado.org; info@nolabels.org; tjrcole@hotmail.com
Subject: RE: Gregory v. COJPE--CAR 21 Petition for Disqualification of Colorado Supreme Court
Attachments: Attachments.txt

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Good Evening,

Earlier tonight, I filed the attached C.A.R. 21(p) petition for rehearing with the Colorado Supreme Court. As explained in the petition, there are significant constitutional issues related to the Justices' refusal to disqualify themselves and their tolerance for prior restraints. Consequently, the next step will be to seek certiorari at the U.S. Supreme Court. This is a significant story that deserves attention in the press.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

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From: Christopher Gregory
Sent: Thursday, August 13, 2026 5:53 PM
To: 'Shelly Bradbury' <sbradbury@denverpost.com>; 'Jacquelyn Hutchins' <jhutchins@prairiemountainmedia.com>; 'John Frank' <john.frank@axios.com>; 'sboyd@cbs.com' <sboyd@cbs.com>; 'Clark, Kyle' <kyle.clark@9news.com>; 'marshall@9news.com' <marshall@9news.com>; 'bazi.kanani@cpr.org' <bazi.kanani@cpr.org>; 'colette.bordelon@denver7.com' <colette.bordelon@denver7.com>; 'jaguilar@denverpost.com' <jaguilar@denverpost.com>; 'MichaelBrown@iheartmedia.com' <michaelbrown@iheartmedia.com>; 'Matt Schwartz' <matt.schwartz@nytimes.com>; 'Ben Weiser' <weiser@nytimes.com>; 'liptaka@nytimes.com' <liptaka@nytimes.com>; 'jack.healy@nytimes.com' <jack.healy@nytimes.com>; 'nick.corasaniti@nytimes.com' <nick.corasaniti@nytimes.com>; 'georgewill@washpost.com' <georgewill@washpost.com>; 'ews@ericsondermann.com' <ews@ericsondermann.com>; 'cjohnson2@npr.org' <cjohnson2@npr.org>; 'Jason Salzman' <jason@coloradotimesrecorder.com>; 'jesse@coloradosun.com' <jesse@coloradosun.com>; 'jon@i2i.org' <jon@i2i.org>; 'david.migoya@gazette.com' <david.migoya@gazette.com>; 'Vince Bzdek' <vince.bzdek@gazette.com>; 'Michael Karlik' <michael.karlik@coloradopolitics.com>; 'ernest.luning@coloradopolitics.com' <ernest.luning@coloradopolitics.com>; 'Marianne Goodland' <marianne.goodland@coloradopolitics.com>; 'Dan Njegomir' <dan.njegomir@gazette.com>; 'luige.delpuerto@coloradopolitics.com' <luige.delpuerto@coloradopolitics.com>
Cc: 'info@coloradodems.org' <info@coloradodems.org>; 'info@cologop.org' <info@cologop.org>; 'acp4co@gmail.com' <acp4co@gmail.com>; 'info@ApprovalVotingParty.com' <info@approvalvotingparty.com>; 'info@coloradocenterparty.org' <info@coloradocenterparty.org>; 'Info@coloradoforwardparty.com' <info@coloradoforwardparty.com>; 'statechair@lpcolorado.org' <statechair@lpcolorado.org>; 'info@nolabels.org' <info@nolabels.org>; 'tjrcole@hotmail.com' <tjrcole@hotmail.com>
Subject: RE: Gregory v. COJPE--CAR 21 Petition for Disqualification of Colorado Supreme Court

Good Evening,

Last night, I filed the attached Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21. The Petition seeks the disqualification of the entire Colorado Supreme Court according to Colo. Const. Art. VI, Sec. 23(3)(f)(II), the formation of a special tribunal, and the immediate Colo. RJD 34 suspensions of all the Justices and Adams County Court Judge Leroy Kirby. As has been his practice, Attorney General Philp Weiser seeks to suppress my court filings from public access. This is a newsworthy story that impacts the 2026 general election.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
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Colorado Supreme Court 2 E 14th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Original Proceeding District Court, Denver County, 2026CV32668	DATE FILED August 18, 2026 CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268
In Re: **Plaintiff:** Christopher S.P. Gregory, **v.** **Defendants:** Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance, 1st Judicial District Performance Commission, 2nd Judicial District Performance Commission, 3rd Judicial District Performance Commission, 4th Judicial District Performance Commission, 5th Judicial District Performance Commission, 6th Judicial District Performance Commission, 7th Judicial District Performance Commission, 8th Judicial District Performance Commission, 9th Judicial District Performance Commission, 1Oth Judicial District Performance Commission, 11th Judicial District Performance Commission, 12th Judicial District Performance Commission, 13th Judicial District Performance Commission, 14th Judicial District Performance Commission, 15th Judicial District Performance Commission, 16th Judicial District Performance Commission, 17th Judicial District Performance Commission, 18th Judicial District Performance Commission, 19th Judicial District Performance Commission, 20th Judicial District Performance Commission, 21st Judicial District Performance Commission, 22nd Judicial District Performance Commission, 23rd Judicial District Performance Commission, Kent Wagner, Bill Cadman, John D. Dailey, Zara Degroot, Casey Martin, Keith Massey, Thomas Neville, Eric Olson, Erin Pressler, Tanja Wheeler, Robin Beattie, Sean Conrecode, Judith Goeke, Janel Guerrero, Christine Jensen, Susan Nickerson, Mark Richter, Leslie Schaefer, Leah Varnell, Thomas Walsh, Kendra Beckwith, Clarence Burton, Femado Guzman, Simone Montoya, Greg Movesian, Chris Reagen, John Simon, Adam Stem, Elise Topliss, Ashley Troxell, Antionette Gifford, Richard Ott, Mallory Revel, Mary Beth Searles,	Supreme Court Case No: 2026SA268

Gayle Young, Claude Appel, Alfredo Burciaga, Sheryl Hanisch, Lourae King, Azarel Madrigal, Sisto Maza, Lynette Robinson Bates, Keri Williams, Caitlin Young, David Blankinship, Sarah Brittain Jack, James Cara, Chineta Davis, Eric Hall, Ime Lopez, Aaron Salt, Anne Turner, Murray Weiner, Kathleen Brendza, Courtney Edwards, Erin Gigliello, Cipriano Gurrola Navarro, Jeffrey Huntley, Christopher Tomchuck, Sarah Vaine, Lisa Webster, Michael Wheeler, Jean Aaro, Frank Bowman, Molly Imber, Seana Lazur, Eric Naber, Todd Norvell, Kenneth Pace, Anthony Savastano, Avery Sheldon, Deborah Tully, Quinn Archibeque, Raymond Beck, Andrea Breiner, Julie Huffman, Katie Lewinger, Bo James Nerlin, Robert M. Ohayre, Mike Waters, Marketa Zubkova, Darin Atteberry, Taylor A. Clapp, Dana Englehardt, William Flowers, Brian Hardouin, Kevin Havelda, Lesley Osborn, Dianne Peterson, Braulio Rojas, Michael Ruttenberg, Mary Albaugh, Came Ford, Linda McKinley, Georgina Melby, Milton Mendez, Ben Rose, Samuel Rose, Michelle K. Schindler, Dana Charles, Christy Fidura, Tracy Gutierrez, Wesley Hassler, Cindy Lou Jones, Velia Rincon, Kate Shafer, Stacie Shirley, Michelle Wiseman, Laura Young, Jeanna Baition, Peter Hinga, Derek Irvine, Anne Jefferson, Lisa Kidwell, Ed Norden, Ehren Penix, Magdalena Rosa, Jim Stockbridge, George Dingfelder, Jesse A. Guerro, Anne Kelly, Micah Larson, Nicole Linder, Chelsea McNemey Martinez, Ava Paula Medina, Rebecca Rian, Michael Boyer, David Bute, Jeffrey Cure, Jake Hettinger, Dean Jarrett, Brian Landry, Greg Larson, Jarrod Munger, Natascha Drekonja, Ryan Dougherty, Zachariah Falconer Stout, Casey Quillen, Max Salazar, T. Wright Dickinson, Vicki Allen, Heather Nicole Gioffredi, Andrew Hayden, Nora Lindholm, Jennifer Mortimeyer, Jacob Peterson, Madeline Almond, James Bullock, Alex Egri, Randy Freed, Michelle Gardner, Lindsey Hart, Cris Menz, Donna Rohde, Caitlin Young, Harlan Bockman, Emily Fleishmann, Karl Hansen, Sara Haimidi, Penny Platnick, Jeffrey C. Ruebel, Logan Souder, Jacquelyn D. Stanton, Michelle Stermer, Dean Toda, Dan Deasy, Regina Edmondson, Torry Garland, Charles Gilford, Richard Holt, Annie Ollada, Don Sheehan, Linda Sunshine, Leanne Wheeler, Tommy Butler, Anthea L. Carrasco, Robert Casey, Tate Costin, Kirsten Daniel, Ashley Greene, Alicia Johnson, Syukar Manaf, Thomas Roche, Steve Wrenn, Elizabeth Callahan, Charlie Danaher, Renee E. Ezer, Rachel Friend, Jennifer Geiger, Dd Mallard, Mark Milliman, Michael Schreiner, Andrew Shoemaker, Sam Weaver, Tracy Badger, Matthew Breman, Damon Davis, William S. Deford, Cindy Enos Martinez, Beau Flores, Ken Haptonstall, Rose Moglia, Diane Schwenke, David A. Younger, Drew P. Buffington, Michael Costen, Michael J. Doyle, Jon L. Kelly, Valerie Maez, Sally Planalp, Shak Powers, Jeremy Reed, Drew Richman, Jane Cox, Michelle Fix Westfall, Paul King, Dan McMillan, Aaron Paul, Josefina Rapheal	

Milliner, William Smith, Kim Turnage, Denver County Court Commission on Judicial Discipline, Eric Artis, and Jeff Comstock.	
ORDER OF THE COURT	

Upon consideration of Petitioner's Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21 and Petitioners' Motion to Accept Filing of Supporting Document as Suppressed but to Immediately Allow Public Access, and being sufficiently advised in the premises,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

As an initial matter, the Court notes that Petitioner demands the formation of a special tribunal pursuant to article VI, sections 23(3)(f)(II) and (3)(h) of the Colorado Constitution and Rule 41 of the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline. None of those provisions, however, apply here. As pertinent here, those provisions concern the scenario in which a current or former justice of this Court is a respondent, complainant, or material witness in a judicial discipline proceeding. Notwithstanding Petitioner's assertions to the contrary, the underlying case is not a judicial discipline proceeding. It is a civil action brought by Petitioner against, among others, the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, its executive director, the Colorado State Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, every judicial district's Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, and every member of each of those Commissions. Accordingly, article VI, sections 23(3)(f)(II) and (3)(h) of the Colorado Constitution and Rule 41 of the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline do not apply and do not support the formation of a special tribunal in this private civil proceeding.

Petitioner next moves to disqualify all of the justice of this Court, based on his inclusion in his pleadings of allegations concerning the members of this Court. This Court need not reach

the merits of Petitioner's motion to disqualify because that motion must be **DENIED** under the rule of necessity.

Under the rule of necessity, which has long been recognized by both the federal courts and this Court, when all judges who are available and who have the authority to hear a particular case are disqualified and a litigant would otherwise be deprived of a judicial forum, the judges are required to hear the case, and none of them are disqualified. *See United States v. Will*, 449 U.S. 200, 213–17 (1980); *Pilla v. Am. Bar Ass'n*, 542 F.2d 56, 58–59 (8th Cir. 1976); *Off. of the State Ct. Admin'r v. Background Info. Servs., Inc.*, 994 P.2d 420, 426 (Colo. 1999). Here, this Court is the only tribunal with jurisdiction to hear a petition for an order to show cause under C.A.R. 21. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 3. No other court has jurisdiction over such matters, and no constitutional provision, statute, or rule authorizes the creation of a special tribunal for conflicts cases like the above-described provisions relating to judicial discipline proceedings. Accordingly, if all of the justices of this Court were to disqualify themselves, then no other tribunal would be available to address the present Petition. In these circumstances, the rule of necessity requires the Court to hear and resolve the present Petition. *See Off. of the State Ct. Admin'r*, 994 P.2d at 426.

Turning then to the merits of the present Petition, the Court **DENIES** Petitioner's petition for an order to show cause. In addition, the Court **GRANTS IN PART** and **DENIES IN PART** Petitioner's Motion to Accept Filing of Supporting Document as Suppressed but to Immediately Allow Public Access. Specifically, the supporting document is accepted for filing as suppressed, but the Court declines to allow public access to that document because it contains substantial information that is confidential by law.

In sum, Petitioner's request for the formation of a special tribunal is **DENIED** because it finds no support in law; Petitioner's motion to disqualify all of the justices of this Court is **DENIED** under the rule of necessity; Petitioner's petition for an order to show cause pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is **DENIED**; and Petitioner's motion to accept the filing of his supporting document as suppressed but to immediately allow public access to that document is **GRANTED** as to the request to accept the filing as suppressed but **DENIED** as to the request to allow immediate public access to that document because the document contains substantial information that is confidential by law.

BY THE COURT EN BANC, AUGUST 18, 2026.

Colorado Supreme Court 2 East 14th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone Number: 720-625-5150	DATE FILED August 20, 2026 8:07 PM FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, District Court, Denver County Case No. 26CV32668; Judge A. Bruce Jones	
In Re Christopher S.P. Gregory v. Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, et. al.	▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Attorney for Petitioner(s): Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq. The Gregory Law Firm, LLC 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont, CO 80501 Phone #: 970-648-0642 Fax #: 970-648-0643 Email: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net Atty. Reg. # 37095	Case Number: 2026SA268 Opinion By: Per Curiam, En Banc: Márquez, C.J., Berkenkotter, Blanco, Boatright, Gabriel, Hood, Samour, J.J. Opinion issued: August 18, 2026
PETIITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21(P) AND C.A.R. 40(C)(2)	

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 21, C.A.R. 28, C.A.R. 32, and C.A.R. 40, including all formatting requirements set forth in these rules.

Specifically, the undersigned certifies that:

The brief complies with C.A.R. 21, C.A.R. 28(g), and C.A.R. 32. It contains 1862 words (exclusive of the designation of the record / appendices which contains 1349 words). The brief further complies with the requirements set forth in C.A.R. 21(g)(4). The U.S. District Court suppressed Petitioner's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26, ECF Nos. 26-1 through 26-11. Additionally, the Denver District Court has temporarily suppressed Petitioner's "Motion to Allow Public Access to Exhibit 3 and Sub-Exhibits 3-1 through 3-11 of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint; Exhibit 1," filed in the related case, *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (June 12, 2026). Consequently, Petitioner accompanies this Petition with a motion to suppress under CJD 05-01 § 4.60 and further requests that the Special Tribunal demanded through this Petition immediately restore public access to the to these court records.

I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with the requirements of C.A.R. 21, C.A.R. 28, and C.A.R. 32.



Christopher S.P. Gregory, #37095
Pro Se Attorney for Petitioner

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1. Jurisdiction

In *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44, this Court disqualified itself and formed a special tribunal according to Colo. RJD 41 (a rule that this Court promulgated). Presented now with identical grounds for disqualification—i.e., the Justices' direct involvement in the collective approval and subsequent cover up of the $2.66-$2.75 million Masias hush money contract (and related judicial, attorney, and official misconduct)—the Justices unlawfully invoke the rule of necessity to deny Petitioner's demand for disqualification, the formation of a special tribunal, and the immediate suspensions of the Justices and Adams County Court Judge Leroy Kirby under Colo. RJD 34(b)(2).

Because this Court characterizes the underlying C.R.C.P. 106 action as a "private civil proceeding" rather than a "judicial discipline proceeding," copies of Petitioner's C.A.R. 21 Petition, the present Petition for Rehearing, and supporting documents are concurrently submitted to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) as a formal request for evaluation (RFE) of judicial conduct. Colo. RJD 2(w) (judicial discipline "proceedings" include "consideration of a request for evaluation of judicial conduct"); *see also* § 13-5.3-106(4), (6)(b), C.R.S. (mandating reporting of allegations of judicial misconduct and prohibiting claims of confidentiality and other retaliation as means of obstructing reporting). Petitioner

continues to demand that the CCJD and its Staff disqualify themselves, use a conflict-free mechanism to form a special commission, and that the special commission appoint special counsel. Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(b); § 13-5.3-102(3)(d)-(e), C.R.S.; Colo. RJD 3(c); Colo. RJD 3(d)(11).

This Court denied Petitioner's C.A.R. 21 Petition and affirmed the District Court's imposition of a facially unconstitutional prior restraint through a substantive three-page opinion permitting rehearing according to C.A.R. 21(p) and C.A.R. 40(c)(2). Even if this Court concludes reconsideration is unavailable, the issues may be reasserted through a renewed C.A.R. 21 Petition. Alternatively, C.A.R. 2 allows for suspension of the Rules in the interest of judicial efficiency, on motion or *sua sponte*. This Petition for Rehearing is timely and properly before the Court.

Petitioner files this Petition for Rehearing to raise federal questions sufficient to allow a direct and expeditious petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a); *Baldwin v. Reese*, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (simply labeling claim "federal" sufficient to preserve error and allow consideration of question in habeas corpus, certiorari, or other federal court proceedings); *Kansas v. Marsh*, 548 U.S. 163, 168 (2006) (28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) allows for certiorari review regardless of whether state court proceedings are concluded, "where the federal claim has been finally decided . . . but in which later review of the federal issue

cannot be had . . .") (quoting *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).

2. Points of Error

I. This Court overlooked or misapprehended its concurrent disqualification obligations under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25.

a. This Court overlooked or intentionally ignored its due process obligation to disqualify under the Fourteenth Amendment and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25.

On identical grounds and standards, this Court previously disqualified itself. *Coats*. Now, when the objective risk of actual bias is even greater, this Court refuses to recuse. Even apart from Canon Rule 2.11 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II), and Canon Rule 41, this Court's non-disqualification violates substantive due process protections under the Fourteenth Amendment and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25. *Rippo v. Baker*, 580 U.S. 285 (2017) (recusal required where prosecutor involved in investigation of judge's alleged bribery); *Williams v. Pennsylvania*, 579 U.S. 1 (2016) (Chief Justice's recusal required in capital appeal where he was trial-level prosecutor; Chief Justice's non-recusal recognized as structural error impacting entire Pennsylvania Supreme Court); *Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.*, 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009) (recusal required "when, objectively speaking, the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable"; justice's recusal required

because of substantial campaign contribution); *Tumey v. Ohio*, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (applying previous common law standard requiring recusal of judge with "a direct, personal, substantial, or pecuniary interest" in a case); *see also Sanders v. People*, 2024 CO 33, ¶¶ 27-32 (applying objective *Caperton* and *Tumey* standards as constitutional floor).

b. This Court misapprehends the rule of necessity, which does not apply when an alternative judicial decision maker is available, including the special tribunal created through Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) and Colo. RJD 41.

The rule of necessity applies only when ***all*** potential judicial officers have an interest in the proceeding and ***no*** alternative forum is available. *Office of State Court Adm'r v. Background Info. Servs., Inc.*, 994 P.2d 420, 426 (Colo. 1999) ("The rule of necessity requires judges to resolve a case when there is no other court with jurisdiction and responsibility where the litigants may seek finality."). Here, an alternate court exists—created by the Justices and ratified into the Colorado Constitution by a 73% majority of voters. On identical grounds, the Justices previously recused themselves (though via a special tribunal composed entirely of Court of Appeals judges, rather than the composition now required by Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II)). *Coats*. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25, Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II), (3)(h), and Canon Rule 2.11, the Justices must disqualify themselves; the rule of necessity does not apply.

c. In response to the filing of the underlying C.R.C.P. 106 action, 18th Judicial District Judge Bonnie McLean announced her resignation and retirement. While facing discipline for failing to file annual personal financial disclosures, McLean joined other CCJD members in retaliating against Petitioner to obstruct the judicial discipline process.

In dismissing, the Court intentionally overlooked the fact of Judge McLean's resignation (which was not publicly disclosed until after Petitioner filed his C.A.R. 21 Petition) and her collusion with co-defendants (including the Justices) in *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), to further retaliate against Petitioner for reporting her and Judge Kirby's continuing dishonesty and misconduct. *Contra* § 13-5.3-106(6)(b)(III), C.R.S.

d. This Court overlooked that its Justices and other attorneys alleged to have engaged in the underlying misconduct are subject to regulation by outside disciplinary authorities, including the United States Supreme Court.

Petitioner has inquired whether the individual Justices, CCJD members and staff, Attorney General Weiser and subordinates, and other attorneys are admitted to practice before the U.S. Supreme Court. Although Petitioner has not yet received a response, the U.S. Supreme Court's interest and exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction under U.S. Sup. Ct. R. 8 (authorizing discipline for "conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar of this Court") is another basis for certiorari under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). *See Theard v. United States*, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957) (state and federal judiciaries "have autonomous control over the conduct of their officers" who include attorneys);

In re Landerman, 7 F.Supp.2d 1202 (D. Utah 1998) (federal district court not bound by state supreme court's disciplinary actions).

II. This Court has overlooked or misapprehended Petitioner's rights/duties to freely and publicly report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct by allowing suppression of public access and a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 10.

a. Without applying C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5, Colo. RJD 6.5, Colo. RPC 1.13, the First Amendment, or Colo. Const. Art. II, § 10, this Court intentionally overlooked that Petitioner's disclosures regarding Judge Leroy Kirby are protected speech.

This Court affirmed suppression of the underlying Verified Complaint, asserting that it "contains substantial information that is confidential by law." Particularly given the CCJD's refusal to disqualify itself, Petitioner has an ethical duty to publicly disclose Judge Kirby's private censure and continuing pattern of dishonesty to the 17th Judicial District Judicial Nominating Commission, the 17th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance, the Colorado General Assembly, and voters. Colo. RPC 1.13 and 8.3; Canon Rule 2.15; Colo. RJD 6.5(d) (disclosure of CCJD records allowed "to fulfill the Commission's mandate under Rule 1(b) or . . . in the interest of justice or public safety"), (d)(2) (disclosure to government agencies as necessary to protect the public/judiciary or further the administration of justice), (d)(3) (disclosure to SCAO and nominating commissions), (d)(4) (disclosure to Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation); *Matter of Scipione*,

2024 CO 23, ¶ 28 fn. 9 (recognizing that the Court may become aware of private dispositions through nominating commissions or applications to the Senior Judge Program); § 24-51-1105(8), C.R.S. (judges with any private disciplinary history categorically barred from serving in the Senior Judge Program), C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5 (2) (legitimate personal privacy interest must outweigh public interest to suppress access); *Anderson v. Home Ins. Co.*, 924 P.2d 1123 (Colo. App. 1996) (applying C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5 standard); *Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia*, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978) ("The operations of the courts and the judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern."); Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(i) ("Nothing contained in this subsection (3) shall be construed to have any effect on article XIII of this constitution [(impeachment)]."); *see also* ABA Formal Op. 522 (duty of candor re: grounds for judicial disqualification); ABA Formal Op. 524 (explaining RPC 1.13 obligations when corruption is at the highest level of a governmental organization). The non-confidential nature of "private" discipline is reinforced by U.S. District Court Judge Eleanor Ross facing two impeachment resolutions after receiving a "private reprimand" for essentially the same conduct and dishonesty that Judge Kirby has admitted to. H.R. 1346, 119th Cong. (2026); H.R. 1351, 119th Cong. (2026). The Justices and the CCJD are intentionally covering up judicial misconduct which supports Judge Kirby's immediate suspension under Colo. RJD 34(b)(2) and ultimate removal under Colo. RJD 36(a).

b. Denver District Judge A. Bruce Jones imposed a facially unconstitutional prior restraint depriving Petitioner of his right to freely and publicly report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct.

After Petitioner filed the C.A.R. 21 Petition in this Court and in the District Court, Judge Jones granted Attorney General Weiser's motion to suppress it from public access. At Weiser's request, Judge Jones also imposed a "standing suppression order" requiring Petitioner to file all future court records as restricted from public access. By denying the C.A.R. 21 Petition and Petitioner's separate motion to remove suppression from the Verified Complaint, this Court affirmed Judge Jones's violations of the First Amendment and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 10. Prior restraints on publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement of First Amendment rights. *Near v. State of Minn. ex rel. Olson*, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (preemptive injunction barring newspaper from reporting allegations of official misconduct unconstitutional *per se*); *Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart*, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (pre-trial gag order in murder case recognized as unconstitutional prior restraint; p. 559: "[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment Rights."). The Tenth Circuit invalidated similar orders denying public access to a complaint and subsequent court filings. *Courthouse News Serv. v. New Mexico Admin. Off. of Cts.*, 53 F.4th 1245, 1263-66 (10th Cir. 2022) (applying First Amendment right of access standard).

3. Additional Supporting Documents

a. The CCJD's "Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's 'Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21,' and Renewed Request to Require Plaintiff to File Any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 13, 2026).

b. Exhibit A to "Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's 'Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21,' and Renewed Request to Require Plaintiff to File Any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 13, 2026).

c. "Proposed Order Granting Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's 'Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21,' and Renewed Request to Require Plaintiff to File Any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 13, 2026).

d. "Order: Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's 'Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21,' and Renewed Request to Require Plaintiff to File any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance w/attach," *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 14, 2026).

e. "Order: Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b)," *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 14, 2026).

f. The CCJD's "Reply in Support of Emergency Motion to (1) Seal Plaintiff's Complaint and (2) Require Plaintiff to File Any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance," *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud.*

Perform. Eval, et al., Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 17, 2026).

g. The CCJD's "Reply in Support of Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint," *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 17, 2026).

h. "Order: Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint," *Gregory v. Colo. Off. Jud. Perform. Eval, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (August 18, 2026).

i. Plaintiff's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26 (Suppressed).

j. Exhibit 1 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-1 (Suppressed).

k. Exhibit 2 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-2 (Suppressed).

l. Exhibit 3 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-3 (Suppressed).

m. Exhibit 4 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-4 (Suppressed).

n. Exhibit 5 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-5 (Suppressed).

o. Exhibit 6 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-6 (Suppressed).

p. Exhibit 7 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-7 (Suppressed).

q. Exhibit 8 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-8 (Suppressed).

r. Exhibit 9 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-9 (Suppressed).

s. Exhibit 10 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-10 (Suppressed).

t. Exhibit 11 to "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 26-11 (Suppressed).

u. Plaintiff's "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50.

v. Exhibit 1 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-1.

w. Exhibit 2 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-2.

x. Exhibit 3 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-3.

y. Exhibit 4 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-4.

z. Exhibit 5 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-5.

aa. Exhibit 6 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-6.

bb. Exhibit 7 to "Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel; Exhibits 1 through 7," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 50-7.

cc. Defendants' "Opposition to Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel, ECF No. 50," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 71.

dd. "Plaintiff's Reply in Support of His Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 85.

ee. Plaintiff's "Offer of Proof—March 26, 2026 Hearing," *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 87.

ff. "Memorandum and Order" (Denying ECF No. 50), *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 101.

gg. "Declaration of Christopher S.P. Gregory re: C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5; Exhibit 1," *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (April 24, 2026).

hh. Exhibit 1 to "Declaration of Christopher S.P. Gregory re: C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5; Exhibit 1," *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (April 24, 2026).

ii. "Motion to Allow Public Access to Exhibit 3 and Sub-Exhibits 3-1 through 3-11 of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint; Exhibit 1," *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (June 12, 2026) (Suppressed).

jj. Exhibit 1 to "Motion to Allow Public Access to Exhibit 3 and Sub-Exhibits 3-1 through 3-11 of Plaintiff's Verified Complaint; Exhibit 1," *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (June 12, 2026) (Suppressed).

kk. August 5, 2026 Email from Judge Bonnie McLean to Chief Justice Monica Márquez and Chief Judge Michelle Amico announcing her resignation/retirement, effective November 30, 2026.

Respectfully submitted,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, #37095
Pro Se Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 20, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETIITION FOR REHEARING PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21(P) AND C.A.R. 40(C)(2) and its accompanying Appendix were filed with the court and served via the ICCES system upon the following persons:

Kent Wagner, Executive Director
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, Suite 220 Denver, CO 80203
Statutorily Authorized Agent for all Defendants in Gregory v. Colo. Office of Jud. Performance Evaluation, et al., Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668
(via E-Mail--kent.wagner@judicial.state.co.us)

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Charles Kooyman, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Lane Towery, Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Attorneys for Defendants Kent Wagner, Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance, Thomas Neville, listed Defendants in August 18, 2026 "Notice of Waiver of Service on Behalf of Listed Defendants," and "Intervenor" Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
(via Colorado Courts E-File System)

Proposed Respondents: Denver District Court, Colorado Supreme Court, Chief Justice Monica Márquez, Justice Maria Berkenkotter, Justice Susan Blanco, Justice Brian Boatright, Justice Richard L. Gabriel, Justice William W. Hood, III, Justice Carlos Samour, Jr., and District Judge A. Bruce Jones (via case filings in the present case and in Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 through the Colorado Courts E-File System).

By: _____
Christopher S.P. Gregory, #37095

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street, Denver, CO 80202 CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, ET AL., Defendants.	DATE FILED August 18, 2026 6:34 PM FILING ID: 14C57D4CBE7A2B CASE NUMBER: 2026CV32668 ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Attorney for Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline: PHILIP J. WEISER, Attorney General CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, Senior Assistant Attorney General* Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, CO 80203 Telephone: 720-508-6633 E-Mail: charles.kooyman@coag.gov Registration Number: 43595 *Counsel of Record	Case No. 2026CV32668 Div.: 215

EMERGENCY MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF'S "PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21," AND RENEWED REQUEST TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE

Proposed Intervenor the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the "Commission"), by and through its undersigned attorney, moves to have the Clerk of Court place under seal Plaintiff's "Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21" on the basis that Plaintiff included information regarding judicial

misconduct proceedings that must be kept confidential pursuant to the Colorado Constitution. With this Motion, the Commission provides a proposed redacted version that may be publicly filed.

The Commission further ***renews its request*** that this Court order Plaintiff to file any filings that contain any discussion of judicial discipline regarding Colorado judges as suppressed until the Court and the Commission can confirm that the filings contain no confidential information. Without such relief, the Commission will need to continue to file these emergency motions, and expend additional state resources, as Plaintiff's repeated public filings gratuitously including confidential information show that he has no intention to abide by his obligations under Colorado law.

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 121, 1-15(8)

On August 13 via email, the Commission's counsel sought to confer with counsel for Plaintiff regarding the issues presented in this motion. Plaintiff has not responded to the email conferral as of the time of filing, but undersigned counsel presumes it to be opposed. Given the emergency nature of this request, the Commission proceeded to file this motion.

ARGUMENT

The Commission has already argued the reasons for sealing this information in both this action and Plaintiff's other state action, *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist.

Ct. Case No. 26CV31374. To ensure that the Commission meets its burden as to this latest filing, the Commission states as follows:

1. **Sealing of Plaintiff's C.A.R. 21 petition is proper.**

Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 121 § 1–5, a trial court may limit access to court files upon motion. "[A]n order limiting access is not to be granted except upon a finding that the harm to the privacy of a person in interest outweighs the public interest." *Doe v. Heitler*, 26 P.3d 539, 544 (Colo. App. 2001) (citing *In re Marriage of Purcell*, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994)). Applied here, the interests in sealing this confidential information far outweigh the public interest in private records.

The Commission is tasked with investigating complaints regarding judicial conduct, Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(e)(I), and in that role the Commission receives sensitive, confidential information regarding alleged misconduct by Colorado judges. Recognizing this role of trust, the Colorado Constitution specifically provides that proceedings before the Commission are confidential unless and until they result in formal proceedings. *Id.* § 23(3)(g) ("Prior to the commencement of formal disciplinary proceedings … all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on judicial discipline are confidential…."); *see also* Colo. RJD 6.5 ("The proceedings of the Commission … including all papers, investigative notes and reports, pleadings and other written or electronic records, shall be confidential unless and until the Commission files a recommendation [for formal proceedings]."). These confidentiality requirements continue even after an individual leaves the

Commission. *See* Colo. RJD 3.5(b)(5) (rules apply to "former Commission members and staff with respect to information to which they had access while serving the Commission.").

The importance of keeping investigations and certain judicial disciplinary proceedings confidential is well established. *See, e.g.*, *Clemmer v. Off. of Chief Judge*, 544 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("All 50 states, as well as the Federal Government, recognize the importance of keeping these investigation records confidential, and thus have similar privileges protecting the confidentiality of judicial investigation records."). A state's interest in the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings furthers important government interests, including insuring effective judicial review commissions, encouraging the filing of complaints and witness participation, protecting judges from frivolous complaints, and encouraging removal or remedial actions from judges at early stages of an investigation. *Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia,* 435 U.S. 829, 835-836, and 841 (1978); *Kamasinski v. Jud. Rev. Council*, 44 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994).

The Petition includes information about judicial conduct proceedings that must remain confidential to prevent harm to the State's interest in maintaining the integrity of its judicial discipline process. *See Landmark*, 435 U.S. at 835-836; *Kamasinski*, 44 F.3d at 110. Disclosure would signal to judges and witnesses that they cannot rely on the Colorado Constitution's guarantees of confidentiality when making complaints, impact witnesses' and judges' willingness to cooperate with

Commission investigations, and affect whether judges will accept informal disciplinary actions in lieu of formal proceedings. Moreover, the Commission's confidentiality obligations prevent it from addressing the accuracy of Plaintiff's sensationalized allegations. Ultimately, allowing disclosure would erode confidence in the judicial system.

2. An order requiring Plaintiff to file papers that contain discussion of judicial discipline regarding Colorado judges as suppressed in the first instance is necessary to prevent further harm.

Plaintiff's repeated inclusion of confidential information judicial misconduct proceedings is in direct conflict with—if not in contempt of—the Court's orders in the first *Gregory* state action. Moreover, his gratuitous inclusion of this information suggests that Plaintiff is abusing the privilege of public filing to publish information that he is required, by law, to keep confidential. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff's intent is to make the confidential information at issue here public as many times as possible, regardless of the legality of doing so and in derogation of court orders. He has admitted as much – actually arguing that his publication and dissemination of this information before the Court can seal it somehow moots the need for sealing. *See* Aug. 12, 2026 Opp'n ¶ 7.

Plaintiff's filings, made with the express intent to make public confidential information, only reinforces the necessity of an order requiring Plaintiff to file as suppressed any pleadings that contain information regarding Colorado State judicial discipline proceedings so that the Commission may file sealing motions as

appropriate without the information becoming public. Plaintiff should not be permitted to use court filings to flout his confidentiality obligations, even if he has also flouted those obligations by attempting to publicize information elsewhere.

Plaintiff has demonstrated an inability to exercise good faith in court filings, and his attempts to impugn judges by publishing information that may or may not be true is particularly damaging given the Commission's inability to set the record straight due to *its* obligation to comply with confidentiality requirements. Additionally, Plaintiff's actions harm victims who were previously assured of the confidentiality of Commission proceedings and result in the needless expenditure of State resources in defending the Commission's confidentiality obligations.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court grant the motion to seal Plaintiff's Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, and further order Plaintiff, and any attorney acting on his behalf, to file as suppressed any documents containing information regarding judicial discipline of Colorado judges until the Court and the Commission can review those filings for necessary redactions.

The Commission also seeks any other relief the Court deems reasonable and appropriate to address Plaintiff's unauthorized and inappropriate disclosure of confidential information.

DATED: August 13, 2026

PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman
CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, 43595*
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Revenue and Regulatory Law Section
Attorney for the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
*Counsel of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have filed and served this **EMERGENCY MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF'S "PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21," AND RENEWED REQUEST TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE** upon all parties of record via Colorado Courts E-Filing this 13th day of August 2026.

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman

Colorado Supreme Court 2 East 14th Avenue Denver, CO 80203 Phone Number: 720-625-5150	DATE FILED August 18, 2026 6:38 PM FILING ID: [illegible] CASE NUMBER: 2026CV32668
Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, District Court, Denver County Case No. 26CV32668; Judge A. Bruce Jones	
In Re Christopher S.P. Gregory v. Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, et al.	▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Attorney for Petitioner(s): Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq. The Gregory Law Firm, LLC 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont, CO 80501 Phone #: 970-648-0642 Fax #: 970-648-0643 Email: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net Atty. Reg. # 37095	Case Number:

PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21



CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with all requirements of C.A.R. 21, C.A.R. 28, and C.A.R. 32, including all formatting requirements set forth in these rules.

Specifically, the undersigned certifies that:

The brief complies with C.A.R. 21, C.A.R. 28(g), and C.A.R. 32. It contains 8,933 words (exclusive of the designation of the record / appendices and contact information for the attorneys appearing in the proceedings below, which collectively contain 648 words). The brief further complies with the requirements set forth in C.A.R. 21(g)(4). The District Court has temporarily suppressed Petitioner's Verified Complaint filed in the proceedings below. Consequently, Petitioner accompanies this Petition with a motion to suppress under CJD 05-01 § 4.60 and further requests that the Special Tribunal demanded through this Petition immediately restore public access to the Verified Complaint and its exhibit.

I acknowledge that my brief may be stricken if it fails to comply with the requirements of C.A.R. 21, C.A.R. 28, and C.A.R. 32.



Christopher S.P. Gregory, #37095
Pro Se Attorney for Petitioner

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1. Identification of the Petitioner(s) and Proposed Respondent(s) / Proceeding Below

Petitioner, Christopher S.P. Gregory is the Plaintiff in the proceeding below, *Gregory v. Colo. Office of Jud. Performance Evaluation, et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668. In addition to the proceeding below, Petitioner has filed the following related proceedings:

1. *United States and State of Colo. ex rel. Gregory, et al. v. Masias, et al.*, 1:25-cv-00190-KHV-GEB (D. Colo) (Sealed)[1];

2. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.);

3. *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374; and

4. Attorney and/or judicial misconduct complaints filed in every federal circuit.

[1] *Ex rel. Gregory* is sealed by statute to allow for a pre-intervention decision investigation. The Denver District Court and Judge A. Bruce Jones, however, have been provided with copies of the U.S. District Court's file to inform rulings in *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668. Those case filings are also being maintained under seal. The contents of the sealed case filings, however, remain relevant to the Denver District Court's awareness of grounds for disqualifying Attorney General Phil Weiser and his Office from representing any party in this or any of the related proceedings. Put as simply as possible, Attorney General Weiser is alleged to have committed extraordinary and substantial public fraud. As a candidate for Governor, however, Attorney General Weiser is using the resources of the Colorado Department of Law to defend himself and his co-conspirators against these allegations. The misuse of these public resources is itself an example of ongoing public fraud and obstruction of justice.

The proposed respondents are the District Court in and for City and County of Denver, the Colorado Supreme Court, Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser, Chief Justice Monica Márquez, Justice Maria Berkenkotter, Justice Susan Blanco, Justice Brian Boatright, Justice Richard L. Gabriel, Justice William W. Hood, III, Justice Carlos Samour, Jr., District Judge A. Bruce Jones, and all named-Defendants in Case No. 26CV32668.

The named-Defendants in Case No. 26CV32668 are:

- The Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation,
- The Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance,
- The 1st Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 2nd Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The Denver County Court Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 3rd Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 4th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 5th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 6th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 7th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 8th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 9th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 10th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 11th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 12th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 13th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 14th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 15th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 16th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 17th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 18th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 19th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,

- The 20th Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 21st Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 22nd Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- The 23rd Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance,
- Kent Wagner,
- Eric Artis,
- Bill Cadman,
- John D. Dailey,
- Zara DeGroot,
- Casey Martin,
- Keith Massey,
- Thomas Neville,
- Eric Olson,
- Erin Pressler,
- Tanja Wheeler,
- Robin Beattie,
- Sean Conrecode,
- Judith Goeke,
- Janel Guerrero,
- Christine Jensen,
- Mark Richter,
- Leslie Schaefer,
- Leah Varnell,
- Thomas Walsh,
- Kendra Beckwith,
- Clarence Burton,
- Fernando Guzman,
- Simone Montoya,
- Greg Movesian,
- Chris Reagen,
- John Simon,
- Adam Stern,
- Elise Topliss,
- Ashley Troxell,
- Antionette Gifford,

- Richard Ott,
- Mallory Revel,
- Mary Beth Searles,
- Gayle Young,
- Claude Appel,
- Alfredo Burciaga,
- Sheryl Hanisch,
- Lourae King,
- Azarel Madrigal,
- Sisto Maza,
- Lynette Robinson Bates,
- Keri Williams,
- Caitlin Young,
- David Blankinship,
- Sarah Brittain Jack,
- James Cara,
- Chineta Davis,
- Eric Hall,
- Ime Lopez,
- Aaron Salt,
- Anne Turner,
- Murray Weiner,
- Kathleen Brendza,
- Courtney Edwards,
- Erin Gigliello,
- Cipriano Gurrola Navarro,
- Jeffrey Huntley,
- Christopher Tomchuck,
- Sarah Vaine,
- Lisa Webster,
- Michael Wheeler,
- Jean Aaro,
- Frank Bowman,
- Molly Imber,
- Seana Lazur,

- Eric Naber,
- Todd Norvell,
- Kenneth Pace,
- Anthony Savastano,
- Avery Sheldon,
- Deborah Tully,
- Quinn Archibeque,
- Raymond Beck,
- Andrea Briener,
- Julie Huffman,
- Katie Lewinger,
- Bo James Nerlin,
- Robert M. O'Hayre,
- Mike Waters,
- Marketa Zubkova,
- Darin Atteberry,
- Taylor A. Clapp,
- Dana Englehardt,
- William Flowers,
- Brian Hardouin,
- Kevin Havelda,
- Lesley Osborn,
- Dianne Peterson,
- Braulio Rojas,
- Michael Ruttenberg,
- Mary Albaugh,
- Carrie Ford,
- Linda McKinley,
- Georgina Melby,
- Milton Mendez,
- Ben Rose,
- Samuel Rose,
- Michelle K. Schindler,
- Dana Charles,
- Christy Fidura,

- Tracy Gutierrez,
- Wesley Hassler,
- Cindy Lou Jones,
- Velia Rincon,
- Kate Shafer,
- Stacie Shirley,
- Michelle Wiseman,
- Laura Young,
- Jeanna Baitlon,
- Peter Hinga,
- Derek Irvine,
- Anne Jefferson,
- Lisa Kidwell,
- Ed Norden,
- Ehren Penix,
- Magdalena Rosa,
- Jim Stockbridge,
- George Dingfelder,
- Jesse A. Guerro,
- Anne Kelly,
- Micah Larson,
- Nicole Linder,
- Chelsea McNerney-Martinez,
- Ava Paula Medina,
- Rebecca Rian,
- Michael Boyer,
- David Bute,
- Jeffrey Cure,
- Jake Hettinger,
- Dean Jarrett,
- Brian Landry,
- Greg Larson,
- Jarrod Munger,
- Jeff Comstock,
- Natascha Drekonja,

- Ryan Dougherty,
- Zachariah Falconer-Stout,
- Casey Zuillen,
- Max Salazar,
- T. Wright Dickinson,
- Vicki Allen,
- Heather Nicole Gioffredi,
- Andrew Hayden,
- Nora Lindholm,
- Jennifer Mortimeyer,
- Jacob Peterson,
- Madeline Almond,
- James Bullock,
- Alex Egri,
- Randy Freed,
- Michelle Gardner,
- Lindsey Hart,
- Cris Menz,
- Donna Rohde,
- Caitlin Young,
- Harlan Bockman,
- Emily Fleishmann,
- Karl Hansen,
- Sara Haimidi,
- Penny Platnick,
- Jeffrey C. Ruebel,
- Logan Souder,
- Jacquelyn D. Stanton,
- Michelle Stermer,
- Dean Toda,
- Dan Deasy,
- Regina Edmondson,
- Torry Garland,
- Charles Gilford,
- Richard Holt,

- Annie Ollada,
- Don Sheehan,
- Linda Sunshine,
- Leanne Wheeler,
- Tommy Butler,
- Anthea L. Carrasco,
- Robert Casey,
- Tate Costin,
- Kirsten Daniel,
- Ashley Greene,
- Alicia Johnson,
- Syukar Manaf,
- Thomas Roche,
- Steve Wrenn,
- Elizabeth Callahan,
- Charlie Danaher,
- Renee E. Ezer,
- Rachel Friend,
- Jennifer Geiger,
- D.D. Mallard,
- Mark Milliman,
- Michael Schreiner,
- Andrew Shoemaker,
- Sam Weaver,
- Tracy Badger,
- Matthew Breman,
- Damon Davis,
- William S. Deford,
- Cindy Enos-Martinez,
- Beau Flores,
- Ken Haptonstall,
- Rose Moglia,
- Diane Schwenke,
- David A. Younger,
- Drew Buffington,

- Michael Costen,
- Michael J. Doyle,
- Jon L. Kelly,
- Valerie Maez,
- Sally Planalp,
- Shak Powers,
- Jeremy Reed,
- Drew Richman,
- Jane Cox,
- Paul King,
- Dan McMillan,
- Aaron Paul,
- Josefina Rapheal-Milliner,
- William Smith, and
- Kim Turnage.

2. Ruling, Action, or Failure to Act Complained Of / Explanation of Relief Sought

First and foremost, Petitioner seeks the disqualification of the entire Colorado Supreme Court from these proceedings and all related proceedings as mandated by Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II), (3)(h) and Colo. RJD 41. Additionally, sufficient grounds exist for the Special Tribunal to immediately suspend all the Justices and [redacted] according to Colo. RJD 34(b)(2), pending judicial discipline proceedings.

Once a special tribunal is formed, Petitioner requests that the Special Tribunal exercise the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to review the following rulings, actions, and failures to act in the proceedings below:

1. District Judge A. Bruce Jones's "Order," dated July 27, 2026, suppressing Petitioner's Verified Complaint and exhibit and requiring Petitioner to respond to Attorney General Philip Weiser's: 1) "Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint" and 2) "Emergency Motion to (1) Seal Plaintiff's Complaint and (2) Require Plaintiff to File Any Papers That Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance."
2. District Judge A. Bruce Jones's "Order: Proposed Temporary Restraining Order," dated August 4, 2026, denying Petitioner's "Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b)."
3. District Judge A. Bruce Jones's failure to deny Attorney General Weiser and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline's motion to intervene *sua sponte*.
4. District Judge A. Bruce Jones's failure to issue a *sua sponte* order disqualifying Attorney General Weiser and attorneys subject to his supervision and control from representing any of the named-Defendants in the proceedings below.

5. District Judge A. Bruce Jones's failure to disqualify himself from the proceedings below despite an apparent pattern of Judge Jones deliberately denying Petitioner his fundamental right to be heard.
6. The failure of the named-Defendants in the case below to direct COJPE Executive Director Kent Wagner to refrain from publishing the 2026 Colorado judicial performance evaluation reports prior to verification that the various performance commissions had complied with their mandated duty to continuously evaluate the "integrity" of each and every Colorado state court judge under § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S.
7. Attorney General Philip Weiser's refusal to disqualify himself and the Colorado Department of Law from appearing and/or representing any of the named-Defendants in the proceeding below and in the related proceedings (other than as himself being an individual-capacity Defendant).

3. Irreparable Harm and Unavailability of Other Adequate Remedies

Material information is being knowingly and willfully concealed from Colorado voters as they consider the qualifications of not only judges who are standing for retention in the 2026 general election but also the candidates for federal, statewide, and local offices. For reasons that remain unclear, many elected

office holders and the press have been complicit in covering up a largely admitted to and proven more-than-25-year pattern of ongoing public fraud and public corruption. Indeed, despite being fully aware of the underlying action and Petitioner's motion for a temporary order and preliminary injunction, *Colorado Politics* reporter Michael Karlik intentionally omitted reporting on the existence of the underlying action in his coverage of publication of the 2026 judicial performance evaluation reports.[2]

By failing to perform their mandated duty to continuously evaluate the "integrity" of all Colorado state court judges, the respective judicial performance commissions have already caused irreparable harm by publishing their legally incomplete and inaccurate 2026 judicial performance evaluation reports and producing a loss of public confidence both in Colorado's judicial performance evaluation structure and in the Colorado Judiciary. This and other irreparable harm will only amplify if the judicial performance commissions proceed to publish their inaccurate judicial performance evaluation reports in the 2026 Colorado State Ballot Information Booklet, encouraging voters to proceed to their ballots upon knowingly

[2] Michael Karlik, *3 Colorado Judges Receive Unfavorable Retention Recommendation as One Performance Commission Violates Rules*, COLORADO POLITICS, August 4, 2026; *see also* Michael Karlik, *Local Party Leaders, Incoming Judge Among Members of Judicial Performance Commission that Violated Law*, COLORADO POLITICS, August 7, 2026.

bogus information. Similarly, Colorado voters will be defrauded if they remain ignorant of the roles U.S. Senator John Hickenlooper, Congressman Joe Neguse, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser, Colorado Secretary of State Jena Griswold, 4th Judicial District Attorney Michael Allen, Colorado Joint Budget Committee Chair Jeff Bridges, Justice William Hood, III, Court of Appeals Judge Grant Sullivan, Jefferson County Court Judge Sara Garrido, Denver County Court Presiding Judge Kerri Lombardi, El Paso County Court Judge Meredith Patrick Cord, Adams County Court Judge Mariana Vielma, numerous Colorado state legislators, and other elected officials who are on the 2026 ballot have had in obstructing the administration of justice.

Petitioner has sought the disqualification of the entire Colorado Supreme Court, the formation of a special tribunal, and other injunctive relief through both the underlying C.R.C.P. 106 action against the judicial performance commissions and in his other related proceedings. Invariably, the Justices have refused to disqualify themselves and have endorsed Attorney General Weiser using public resources to represent himself (named in his individual capacity) and the other Defendants. Attorney General Weiser, through his subordinates, has sought to censor Petitioner's reporting of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. Such censorship has included opposing Petitioner's requests for the formation of a special tribunal and the appointment of another state's attorney general as a Special

Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado. The practical impacts of Attorney General Weiser's conflicted representation has been that Petitioner's underlying C.R.C.P. 106 action and all related proceedings have been delayed indefinitely without any path to formal discovery, including the opportunity to depose Attorney General Weiser, the Justices, and other material witnesses. In addition to defrauding Colorado voters, the obstruction and censorship that is occurring through Attorney General Weiser, the Justices, and the courts (both federal and state) prevents Petitioner from being afforded his fundamental right to be heard.[3] As explained in Comment 1 to Canon Rule 2.15 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), ignoring or denying known misconduct is itself a form of irreparable harm by diminishing public respect for the judiciary. Comment 1 states, in relevant part: "Ignoring or denying known misconduct among one's judicial colleagues or members of the legal profession

[3] On August 11, 2026, Senior U.S. District Judge Kathyrn H. Vratil issued a Memorandum and Order and entered final judgment dismissing *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, ECF Nos. 104 and 105, on a motion filed by Attorney General Weiser. This is the most extreme example of the Defendants being excused from answering while Petitioner was methodically denied any meaningful opportunity to be heard on the underlying allegations of judicial misconduct. Judge Vratil previously set aside the default entered against all Defendants, which was effectively a complete admission to the allegations of liability in Petitioner's Verified Complaint and Jury Demand, ECF No. 1.

undermines a judge's responsibility to participate in efforts to ensure public respect for the justice system."

Although C.R.C.P. 106 would ordinarily provide an adequate remedy, such a remedy does not exist here because of the rulings, actions, and failures to act complained of in this Petition. Unless a special tribunal is formed to exercise the Colorado Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to consider this C.A.R. 21 Petition, there are no adequate alternative remedies available to Petitioner or to the public.

4. Issues Presented

I. Whether Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II), (3)(h) and Colo. RJD 41 mandate the formation of a special tribunal where substantial evidence supports the initiation of judicial discipline proceedings against each Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court.

II. When Attorney General Philip Weiser (i) is implicated in approving over $4 million of taxpayer funded non-disclosure agreements between 2019 and 2022, (ii) is himself a defendant named in his individual capacity in related proceedings, and (iii) is aware that his subordinates had knowingly and willfully concealed material information from the Colorado State Auditor and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline for over two years, whether Attorney General Weiser must disqualify himself and his Office from representing any of the Defendants or intervenors in the present proceedings.

III. Whether denial of Petitioner's "Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b)" is causing irreparable harm to public confidence in the Colorado Judiciary, including facilitating the ongoing and prospective communication of legally incomplete and inaccurate information to Colorado voters.

5. Statement of Necessary Facts

In 2019, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court collectively approved a $2.66-$2.75 million sole-source, *quid pro quo* "hush money" contract with Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Chief of Staff Mindy Masias. This egregious judicial misconduct is admitted to and proven. *See generally Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44. The Justices—assisted by co-Defendants including Governor Jared Polis, Attorney General Phil Weiser, and members of the various judicial oversight entities—continue to engage in a more than 25-year pattern of obstructing justice. This pattern includes spending tens of millions of taxpayer-dollars annually to conceal judicial, attorney, and official misconduct through non-disclosure agreements, self-controlled investigations, and public relations schemes.

Petitioner's efforts to expose this corruption have invariably been met with intimidation, retaliation, and further obstruction. Petitioner is being deprived of the fundamental right to be heard when reporting crimes, ethical violations, and public fraud.

Retaliation against Petitioner traces to 2018, when the Justices, Attorney General Weiser, Governor Polis, and others knowingly and willfully concealed the negotiation and nature of the $2.66-$2.75 million Masias bribe from State Auditor Dianne Ray and from the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, on which Petitioner served as a member, Vice Chair, and Chair. The concealment included

hiding a memorandum (referred to as the Masias Memo) alleging judicial, attorney, and employee misconduct that Masias was directed to cover up, including by destroying records and evidence.

As Chair of the CCJD, Petitioner sought records related to the Masias Contract and the Masias Memo. Governor Polis retaliated by declining to reappoint Petitioner to a customary second term. The remaining CCJD members nevertheless hired Petitioner back to serve as Executive Director. After Petitioner achieved the historic first public censure of a Colorado Supreme Court Justice in *Matter of Coats*, Petitioner was again retaliated against and fired. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was pursuing accountability for the other Justices' roles in collectively approving, cancelling, and concealing the illicit Masias Contract.

Despite his termination, Petitioner has continued to pursue accountability through the underlying action and related proceedings described *supra*. Each has produced the same result: Petitioner is denied any opportunity to be heard, to publicly report judicial misconduct, and/or to conduct formal discovery. Courts have indefinitely delayed these matters, excusing the defendants and respondents from filing responsive pleadings and from being subject to discovery, including the production of public records and interviews/depositions of the Justices and other

material witnesses.[4] In particular, by allowing Attorney General Weiser to represent Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter and to file a motion to dismiss, Denver District Court Judge A. Bruce Jones has indefinitely delayed addressing Petitioner's requests for (i) formal referral of the Masias Controversy to conflict-free federal law enforcement and (ii) appointment of a SAAG to conduct a full, legitimate, and independent investigation. *Gregory v. Hunter*.

Through litigation and engagement with the Colorado General Assembly, Petitioner has attempted to create a public record memorializing the more than 25-year ongoing Colorado Judicial Scandal and its associated pattern of public corruption.[5] Petitioner summarizes that pattern below, as relevant to this Petition.

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[4] U.S. District Court Judge Kathyrn H. Vratil set aside the default entered in *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.* Denver District Judge A. Bruce Jones preemptively ordered the Clerk of Court not to enter a default in *Gregory v. Hunter*.

[5] The legislative record that Petitioner has developed can be found, as follows:

• January 21, 2026 SMART Act Hearing for the Colorado Judicial Department and Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline-- https://coleg.box.com/s/rjeotmshfl64jgs4d1sxw1424873wghl.

• February 9, 2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing for former Senator Bob Gardner to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline-- https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/28938.

• February 11, 2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on SB26-084-- https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/29188.

In 2002, then-Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey, knowing that then-3rd Judicial District Chief Judge Jesse Manzanares had engaged in serious judicial misconduct by falsely accusing fellow District Judge Claude Appel of being part of a cocaine ring, allowed Manzanares to quietly retire without accountability through judicial and/or attorney discipline. Discipline against Manzanares was not pursued even though Appel ultimately received a $100,000 settlement as part of a lawsuit he brought against the FBI for violation of the federal Privacy Act. In effect, Chief Justice Mullarkey had knowingly and willingly assisted another judge conceal and excuse substantial misconduct.

In 2007, Chief Justice Mullarkey again prostituted and abused her office by attempting to abort an investigation of Larry Manzanares (Chief Judge Jesse Manzanares's nephew) at its outset. Larry Manzanares retired as a Denver District Judge to become the Denver City Attorney. Shortly thereafter, a stolen Judicial Department laptop was traced to his home. When contacted by Denver Police, Manzanares denied possessing the laptop, but later returned it to the Denver District

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• March 12, 2026 House State, Civic, Military, and Veterans Affairs Committee Hearing on SB26-084-- https://leg.colorado.gov/summary_attachments/44862/download.

• May 4, 2026 House State, Civic, Military, and Veterans Affairs Committee Hearing on HJR26-1029-- https://coleg.box.com/s/j8z8y4vfumdkslea6dic0nd42zxw56tj.

Court Administrator. In a television interview, Manzanares claimed he bought the laptop from a fence in a parking lot near the Denver City and County Building. Rather than immediately turning the laptop over to law enforcement, the Judicial Department attempted to have its IT director crack Manzanares's password and inspect the laptop's contents. At the same time, the Denver District Court Administrator and SCAO Judicial Counsel Carol Haller lobbied the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office to treat the theft report as a "misunderstanding" and dismiss the investigation. After a supervisor intervened, the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office disqualified itself and the 1st Judicial District Attorney's Office was appointed as a special prosecutor, with then-District Judge Brian D. Boatright's brother, Russell Boatright, assigned as lead investigator. A forensic examination of the laptop later revealed that Manzanares deleted thousands of pornographic images during the less-than-24-hour period between the police contact and Manzanares returning the laptop. Investigator Boatright recognized some images as "age questionable" and submitted them to the national known child pornography database for comparison. After Investigator Boatright submitted an 80-page arrest affidavit, Manzanares was arrested and charged with three felonies. Within hours of his initial appearance on bond, Manzanares went to Eisenhower Park and committed suicide by shooting himself in the right temple with a revolver. His family promoted a narrative that a racially motivated prosecution caused

Manzanares's death. Despite contemporaneous press reporting, there was no investigation into the judicial, attorney, and employee misconduct involved in the Judicial Department's attempts to terminate the investigation at its outset. From 2007 onward, Brian Boatright—then a judge and later a justice—was fully aware of efforts within the Colorado Judicial Department to rug sweep the Larry Manzanares affair.

On December 31, 2008, the CCJD's Executive Director Rick Wehmhoefer was abruptly fired. Then-SCAO HR Director Mindy Masias and then-SCAO HR Deputy Director Eric Brown were installed as interim administrators. Masias and Brown had unfettered access to CCJD records and the opportunity to destroy them. Petitioner can attest to the absence and sparseness of the CCJD's records regarding the Appel-Manzanares and Larry Manzanares matters.

In July 2018, SCAO Controller Myra Dukes discovered that Masias, who had been promoted to SCAO Chief of Staff, may have altered a receipt submitted with a personal reimbursement request. Internal and external investigations substantiated Dukes's concerns. Dukes refused to sign SCAO's management letter attesting to the integrity of internal controls for the State Auditor's continuous single statewide audit. State Court Administrator Christopher Ryan then notified Masias that she would be terminated for cause. Rather than accepting her dismissal, Masias activated FMLA leave and, through HR Director Eric Brown, began negotiating her severance and a

leadership training services contract. During those negotiations, Brown presented the Masias Memo to Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats at a meeting with Coats, Ryan, and Counsel to the Chief Justice Andrew Rottman.[6] The Masias Memo functioned as an ultimatum—you cannot fire me when you directed me to cover up worse misconduct within the Colorado Judicial Department. After a rigged RFP process and further negotiations, Masias ultimately executed a separation agreement on March 15, 2019 containing a non-disclosure provision. Two days after the separation agreement was effective March 19, 2019, Masias presented her leadership training proposal to Chief Justice Coats, State Court Administrator Christopher Ryan, and Rottman. On March 25, 2019, Ryan provided the final version of the sole-source determination to Masias. On April 11, 2019, the Masias Contract was executed the first time, providing Masias at least $532,000 per year for five years—approximately three times an individual Justice's salary. Four days later, an anonymous Fraud Hotline complaint was sent to each Justice, to Governor Polis, and to Attorney General Weiser, alleging widespread fraud within the SCAO. State Auditor Dianne Ray contacted Chief Justice Coats to ask how the Judicial Department wanted to proceed. In a May 29, 20219 letter, Coats stated the Justices would refer the investigation to the Office of the State Auditor through Rottman.

[6] Andrew Rottman has since been promoted to succeed Terri Morrison as SCAO Judicial Counsel.

Nowhere in the letter, however, did Chief Justice Coats inform State Auditor Ray that the Masias Contract had been negotiated. Three business days later, on June 3, 2019--immediately after Myra Dukes retired—the Masias Contract was executed a second time. When the contract became public in July 2019, the Justices cancelled it and required Ryan and Brown to resign. Although Chief Justice Coats was publicly censured for his role, no other Justice has been held accountable for what amounts to collective approval of an attempted $2.66-$2.75 million taxpayer funded bribe.

The negotiation and execution of the Masias Contract coincided with other efforts by the Justices and judicial oversight entities to conceal material evidence of serious judicial, attorney, and official misconduct from the public.

First, Denver Juvenile Court Presiding Judge D. Brett Woods retaliated against and wrongfully terminated court staff who had internally reported his habitual alcoholism, including being intoxicated while on the bench. Judge Woods issued a termination letter to the court staff on June 3, 2019--the same day that the Masias Contract was signed a second time. Irrefutable evidence shows then-Justice Brian Boatright and other judges knew of Judge Woods's habitual alcoholism and retaliation but kept it secret for more than four years.

Second, concealment continues regarding [redacted]. In May 2019, Petitioner was Vice-Chair of the CCJD and [redacted].

[redacted] a complaint alleged a consensual but unreported sexual relationship with court staff (including encounters at the courthouse) that later became retaliatory when the relationship soured. Per the reporting party's request, the CCJD imposed a private censure. [redacted] was later identified by the *Denver Gazette* as one of 53 judges who likely committed a misdemeanor by failing to file required annual personal financial disclosure (PFD) statements.[8] In late 2023, Petitioner drafted a Colo. RJD 14(a) notice letter to [redacted] and recommended formal proceedings seeking [redacted] removal, but the letter was never sent. Instead, with full awareness of [redacted] history of concealment, the CCJD's members retaliated against and fired Petitioner. With no dissenting voices

[7] Prior to amendments, Question 47 read:

> Is there any circumstance or event in your personal or professional life which, if brought to the attention of the Commission, might tend to affect adversely your qualifications to serve on the court for which you have applied?

[8] David Migoya, *One in Six Judges Lack Financial Disclosures: Little Enforcement Even as a Misdemeanor Charge*, DENVER GAZETTE, August 13, 2023.

remaining, the CCJD resolved approximately 73 PFD complaints through dismissal or private discipline.[9] [redacted] remains on the bench after presumably lying to the [redacted] Judicial District Commission on Judicial Performance and to voters during the 2024 retention cycle.

Attorney General Phil Weiser—purporting to represent the CCJD, State Auditor Kerri Hunter, COJPE Executive Director Kent Wagner, the COJPE, and the Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance—now seeks to harass Petitioner and suppress [redacted] by asserting that information Petitioner learned as a CCJD member and Executive Director is "confidential." It deserves emphasis that [redacted] workplace misconduct and dishonesty is substantially similar to that of U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia Judge Eleanor Ross. Judge Ross currently faces two resolutions for her impeachment. H.R. 1346, 119th Cong. (2026); H.R. 1351, 119th Cong. (2026). As Defendants in *Gregory*, Governor Polis, Attorney General Weiser, the Justices, and the members of the CCJD are all aware of and are endorsing Attorney General Weiser's efforts to hide [redacted] misconduct and dishonesty from the public.[10]

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[9] *See* David Migoya, *Follow Up: 73 Judges Under Investigation for Violating State Law*, DENVER GAZETTE, January 13, 2024.

[10] In *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, Petitioner had filed an "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11," ECF No. 26. Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 144

Third, concealment involved former 17th Judicial District Court Judge Robert Kiesnowski. Like [redacted] Kiesnowski had an undisclosed romantic relationship with court staff; unlike [redacted] he married his paramour. Judge Kiesnowski directed his harassment and retaliation instead towards his judicial assistant, Emily Betts. He perceived that Ms. Betts had disclosed his unreported relationship with the court supervisor who later became his wife. The retaliation continued, even after Ms. Betts was reassigned to another judge's chambers and had reported the issues to the 17th Judicial District Court Executive and to SCAO's HR Department. Kiesnowski ultimately agreed to resign as part of a private censure. Before stepping down, however, he committed further misconduct by representing his brother-in-law, who was interviewed by law enforcement in an attempted murder investigation. Consistent with their handling of [redacted] the Justices struck the CCJD's recommendation for Kiesnowski's public censure following his subsequent misconduct and a trial before special masters. The Justices' order asserted that

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Affidavit mandated the disqualification of U.S. District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico from Petitioner's federal cases. A copy of the 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit was filed into *Gregory v. Hunter* as a suppressed document, Exhibit 3 to Petitioner's Amended Verified Complaint. Although the issue has been fully briefed, District Judge A. Bruce Jones has delayed ruling on Petitioner's pending motion to allow public access to the 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit. As Defendants, Governor Polis, Attorney General Weiser, and the Justices have been fully aware of the contents of the 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit since its filing on January 14, 2026, but they continue to obstruct and oppose allowing public access to it.

Judge Kiesnowski's private censure was "confidential" and could not be discussed by the appointed special masters or the CCJD in its recommendation. The concealment of Judge D. Brett Woods's and Judge Robert Kiesnowski's misconduct was simultaneously reported in the press.[11]

These matters—Woods, [redacted] and Kiesnowski—illustrate a pattern and methodical steps by the Justices, their subordinates, and others to intentionally disregard and conceal colleagues' misconduct within the legal profession.

While the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal has an extensive history, the procedural history of the current proceedings is straightforward. On July 22, 2026, Petitioner filed his "Verified Complaint for Mandamus, Prohibition, and/or Other Injunctive Relief Under C.R.C.P. 106; Exhibit 1." The Verified Complaint and its accompanying exhibit were immediately provided to COJPE via email. Petitioner pled two claims for relief, the first for relief in the form of mandamus and the second for relief in the form of prohibition.

[11] David Migoya, *Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice and Others Aware of Colleague's Drinking Problem, But Kept Silent*, DENVER GAZETTE, March 3, 2024 (discussing pending disciplinary proceedings against former Denver Juvenile Court Presiding Judge D. Brett Woods); David Migoya, *Case Against District Judge in Adams County Allegedly 'Slow Walked' to Discipline Commission*, DENVER GAZETTE, March 3, 2024 (discussing disciplinary proceedings against former Adams County District Court Judge Robert Kiesnowski).

The claim for mandamus relief specifically seeks an order requiring the defendant judicial performance commissions and commissioners to perform their duties to continuously evaluate the "integrity" of every Colorado state court judge under § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S. Secondarily, the claim for mandamus relief seeks an order enforcing the defendants' obligations to refrain from being represented by Attorney General Phil Weiser and, instead, to appoint a SAAG.

The claim for prohibition relief expressly "seeks an order prohibiting Defendants from publishing judicial evaluation reports until the Defendants have demonstrated to this Court that such judicial evaluation reports meaningfully examine the subject judges' 'integrity,' as mandated by § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S."

Before formal service was accomplished and almost immediately after Petitioner filed his Verified Complaint, Attorney General Weiser (under the auspices of representing the CCJD) filed a motion to intervene and censor Petitioner's public reporting of [redacted]. Rather than denying Attorney General Weiser's intervention motion *sua sponte*, District Judge A. Bruce Jones issued an "Order" dated July 27, 2026 that restricted public access to Petitioner's Verified Complaint and exhibit while allowing public access to a redacted version of the Verified Complaint submitted by Attorney General Weiser. Judge Jones's Order went on to set a 14-day deadline for Petitioner to respond to Attorney General Weiser's motions with a further directive imposing a

prior restraint and censoring Petitioner from "quot[ing] or otherwise includ[ing] the disputed information in either response."

When Petitioner served the Verified Complaint and summonses upon COJPE Executive Director Wagner (who is expressly recognized as an agent for all the judicial performance commissions and their commissioners by statute and by rule), Wagner attempted to selectively refuse service citing discussions with his "attorneys." As required by C.R.C.P. 4(e)(10)(C), a copy of the Verified Complaint and summonses was also served directly upon Attorney General Weiser.

On August 3, 2026, Petitioner filed his "Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b)." Knowing of Petitioner's objections and claim for mandamus relief requiring Defendants to appoint a SAAG, Executive Director Wagner proceeded to publish the 2026 judicial performance evaluation reports anyway. After the evaluation reports were published, on August 4, 2026, Attorney General Weiser, through Assistant Attorney General Lane Towery, filed an entry of appearance. The entry of appearance, however, asserted that Petitioner's service was only effective on four of the selectively identified Defendants: the COJPE, Executive Director Wagner, the State Commission of Judicial Discipline, and State Commission Chair Thomas Neville. Later in the day, Judge Jones issued an Order summarily denying Petitioner's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Order. Judge Jones did not

schedule a hearing and, in contrast to his response to Attorney General Weiser's motion to suppress Petitioner's case filings, did not order the Defendants to temporarily remove the evaluation reports from the COJPE website.

Mr. Wagner and Attorney General Weiser's gamesmanship regarding the sufficiency of service is only the latest tactic being used in the Justices' broader pattern of obstructing the administration of justice and excusing themselves from having to answer any of the various complaints that Petitioner has filed in this and in related proceedings.

Petitioner is entitled to the basic procedures of a civil case, which include filing a complaint with the defendants being required to answer the allegations of the complaint. Moreover, Petitioner is entitled to investigation and discovery, which includes the ability to obtain public records and to depose witnesses. Petitioner is also entitled to an evidentiary hearing as necessary to prevent imminent and irreparable harms. The District Court, however, is denying Petitioner all these basic procedures and is otherwise assisting other courts give these and other related proceedings a slow death through intentional delay and neglect.

6. Argument / Points and Authorities

I. The allegations that Petitioner made through requests for evaluation (RFEs) of judicial conduct, civil complaints, and federal judicial and/or attorney misconduct complaints meet the definitions of a complaint and a judicial discipline proceeding under Colo. RJD 2, Colo. RJD 13(b), and § 13-5.3-101(5), C.R.S. Accordingly, the formation of a special tribunal is

mandatory under Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) and (3)(h) and Colo. RJD 41.

The clear legislative intent behind SB22-201 was to create a reliable process to investigate and prosecute legitimate allegations of judicial misconduct. Likewise, the clear legislative intent behind HCR23-1001 (which referred Amendment H to voters) was to prevent the Justices from exerting undue influence and control over Colorado's judicial discipline system.

§ 13-5.3-101(5), C.R.S. defines a "complaint" which requires mandatory reporting within the Colorado Judicial Department and the judicial oversight entities as "information in any form from any source that alleges or from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that a judge committed misconduct or is incapacitated." Similarly, the threshold for recognizing a RFE or other information as a complaint requiring investigation under Colo. RJD 14 is whether "there is a reasonable basis for disciplinary or disability proceedings." Colo. RJD 13(b), (f).

This low bar for requiring further investigation and inquiry is consistent with the definitions of a "complaint," "informal proceedings," "misconduct," "proceedings," and "request for evaluation of judicial conduct" as defined in the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline.

> **"Complaint"** means allegations that provide grounds for the Commission to conduct disability or disciplinary proceedings.

"Grounds" means the basis for disciplinary proceedings in Rule 5 or for disability proceedings in Rule 33.5.

"Informal proceedings" means proceedings that could result in informal remedial action or the appointment of special counsel to advise the Commission regarding other options, including advice on whether there is probable cause to commence formal proceedings.

"Misconduct" means conduct by a Judge that does not comply with the Code or Colo. RJD.

"Proceedings" means informal or formal proceedings, including, but not limited to, consideration of a request for evaluation of judicial conduct; the investigation of a complaint; a meeting or hearing of or with the Commission, its staff, special counsel, or special masters; a disciplinary disposition; a disciplinary sanction; a disability disposition; or a communication with respect thereto.

"Request for evaluation of judicial conduct" or "request" means a request by a complainant for the Commission to consider whether there is a reasonable basis for the commencement of disciplinary or disability proceedings.

Colo. RJD 2(f), (l), (n), (r), and (w).

Recognized grounds for discipline are further defined by Colo. RJD 5. Such grounds include: 1) Willful misconduct in office and extrajudicial conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute or is prejudicial to the administration of justice, 2) Willful or persistent failure to perform judicial duties, 3.) Intemperance, 4) ***Any*** conduct that violates the Code, 4) Failure to cooperate in the judicial discipline

process, and 5) Failure to comply with orders issued through judicial discipline or disability proceedings.

The entire Colorado Supreme Court must recuse itself and a special tribunal must be formed whenever enumerated conflicts exist. The formation of a special tribunal is required through overlapping provisions of Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) and Colo. RJD 41. To the extent that the requirements of Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) conflict with Colo. RJD 41 by requiring a higher standard, the constitutional requirements govern. To the extent that Colo. RJD 41 provides additional grounds for disqualification, however, those grounds are enforceable.

The primary differences between Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) and Colo. RJD 41 are: 1) That the constitutional provision requires the formation of a special tribunal composed of district and court of appeals judges with no more than one judge appointed from the same court or judicial district (contrasted with Colo. RJD 41's provision for a pool of appointees selected exclusively from the Colorado Court of Appeals) and 2) That Colo. RJD 41 requires disqualification regardless of whether the conflict involves a current or a *former* justice.

Colo. Const. Art. VI § 23(3)(f)(II) requires disqualification of the entire Colorado Supreme Court and formation of a special tribunal:

> (A) When the proceedings involve a complaint against a Colorado supreme court justice;

> (B) When a Colorado supreme court justice is a complainant or a material witness in the proceeding;
>
> (C) When a staff member to a Colorado supreme court justice is a complainant or material witness in the proceeding;
>
> (D) When a family member of a Colorado supreme court justice is a complainant or material witness in the proceeding; or
>
> (E) When any other circumstances exist due to which more than two Colorado supreme court justices have recused themselves from the proceeding.

Additionally, Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(h) expressly prohibits judges and justices who are subject to judicial discipline proceedings from hearing their own cases. Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(h) states:

> A justice or judge who is a member of the commission, adjudicative board, tribunal, or supreme court shall not participate in any proceedings involving the justice's or judge's own removal or retirement.

Colo. RJD 41 requires disqualification of the entire Colorado Supreme Court and formation of a special tribunal:

> (1) When the proceeding involves a complaint against a current or former Supreme Court justice;
>
> (2) When a current or former Supreme Court justice is a complainant or material witness in the proceeding;

> (3) When a staff member to a current Supreme Court justice is a complainant or material witness in the proceeding;
>
> (4) When a family member of a current Supreme Court justice is a complainant or material witness in the proceeding;
>
> (5) When any other circumstances exist due to which more than two Supreme Court justices have recused themselves from the proceeding.

The fact that the CCJD refuses to disqualify itself from considering Petitioner's RFEs and further refuses to identify complaints under Colo. RJD 13(b), does not excuse the Justices from having to disqualify the entire Colorado Supreme Court and forming a special tribunal in this proceeding and as needed to address issues arising through the related proceedings. *See* Colo. RJD 2(r) ("proceedings" include "consideration of a request for evaluation of judicial conduct"). It would be up to the Special Tribunal to consider a petition to disqualify the CCJD from further involvement and evaluation of Petitioner's pending RFEs.

The Justices' involvement in the collective approval and subsequent concealment of the Masias Contract is enough to form a reasonable basis to suspect violation of the Code and to require identification of a complaint according to Colo. RJD 13(b). Plaintiff's filing of RFEs as well as the civil actions and disciplinary complaints in which the Justices are themselves defendants or respondents provides

a sufficient basis to require an investigation and initiation of judicial discipline proceedings.

Neither Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) nor Colo. RJD 41 confine the Justices' recusal obligations to judicial discipline proceedings but instead require disqualification from any "proceedings" in which the grounds for recusal are present. Here, Petitioner's various complaints are against one or more of the Justices, involve circumstances where the Justices and former Justices (i.e. former Chief Justice Nancy Rice, former Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats, former Justice Melissa Hart, and many other former Justices) are material witnesses, involve circumstances where the complaints involve a Justice's staff (where Andrew Rottman served as Counsel to the Chief Justice when the complaints were originally submitted), and involve circumstances where a former Justice's husband (i.e. U.S. DOJ-Denver Office Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos) is a material witness (when the RFE and complaint(s) were submitted while Justice Melissa Hart was still on the court).

Notwithstanding the existence of all these factors mandating disqualification of the entire Colorado Supreme Court, there is binding precedent that pre-dates the ratification of Amendment H. Under Colo. RJD 41, a special tribunal was required and formed to hear *Matter of Coats*.

Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) defines the process that must be followed when selecting the members of the Special Tribunal as follows:

> The state court administrator, or the administrator's designee, shall randomly select members of the tribunal from among all district judges and court of appeals judges who do not have a current disciplinary investigation or proceeding pending before the commission or adjudicative board; have not received a disciplinary sanction from the commission, adjudicative board, or supreme court; and are not otherwise required by law, court rule, or judicial canon to recuse themselves from the tribunal. A tribunal must not include more than one member who is a court of appeals judge and not more than one district judge from any one judicial district. The random selection of tribunal members is a purely administrative function.

The selection of the members of the Special Tribunal is somewhat complicated here because Colorado State Court Administrator Steven Vasconcellos was personally involved in the misconduct alleged by Petitioner and is a material witness to the alleged misconduct of the Justices and others. It is inappropriate for Vasconcellos to have any involvement in the selection of the Special Tribunal or to even select a designee. To avoid any further risks of appearances of impropriety in the selection of the Special Tribunal, Petitioner stipulates to having a judicial employee whom he trusts perform the required administrative function at a public hearing broadcast through the Judicial Department's livestream system. Accordingly, Petitioner nominates the Gunnison Combined Courts Clerk of Court Cirenda Fry.

Without considering the merits of the other parts of this Petition, this Court is constitutionally mandated to issue an order directing the formation of the Special

Tribunal according to Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) and authorizing Clerk of Court Cirenda Fry to perform the required administrative function. To ensure that an adequate record is made, this Court should further issue an order requiring all district court and court of appeals judges to certify whether they qualify for inclusion in the pool of judges to be considered for appointment. Once it is composed, Petitioner respectfully asserts that a sufficient record exists for the Special Tribunal to immediately issue an order temporarily suspending the Justices and [redacted] according to Colo. RJD 34(b)(2), pending judicial discipline proceedings.

II. By permitting Attorney General Philip Weiser to intervene in Petitioner's cases—purportedly on behalf of state agencies and officials—and by further restricting public access to reports of judicial misconduct, District Judge A. Bruce Jones may be complicit in retaliating against Petitioner, denying Petitioner the fundamental right to be heard, and otherwise obstructing Colorado's constitutionally defined judicial discipline process.

In a 2021 article, then-*Denver Post* reporter David Migoya exposed that the Colorado Attorney General's Office—through Assistant Solicitor General Grant Sullivan and First Assistant Attorney General LeeAnn Morrill—possessed a copy of the Masias Memo in 2019 but did not disclose it to Colorado State Auditor Dianne Ray or to the CCJD until February 2021, when the Justices released it publicly.[12] In 2022, Migoya, writing for the *Denver Gazette,* reported that more than $4 million in

[12] David Migoya, *Colorado Attorney General's Office Lawyers Knew about Judicial Misconduct Memo*, DENVER GAZETTE, February 12, 2021.

taxpayer funded non-disclosure agreements had been negotiated with the Attorney General's Office's approval.[13] In both matters, Attorney General Philip Weiser refused to respond to questions about what he knew and when.

Through *Gregory,* Petitioner has sued Attorney General Weiser in his individual capacity based on these and other alleged instances of public fraud. Weiser's involvement is also addressed in the sealed pleadings filed in *Ex rel. Gregory* and shared with the Denver District Court. The conflict is manifest: Weiser is using the resources of his Office to advance his personal interests and those of other defendants implicated in the Colorado Judicial Scandal.

The Colorado Attorney General's client is the State of Colorado as a whole and as an institution. *People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson*, 79 P.3d 1221, 1231 (Colo. 2003) ("[T]he Attorney General must consider the broader institutional concern of the state even though these concerns are not shared by an individual agency or officer."). Under Colorado law, the Attorney General is personally and categorically disqualified from representing himself, state agencies, public officials, and other individual capacity defendants when the Attorney General is himself alleged to have committed substantial public fraud and acts of public corruption. Here, the alleged public fraud and public corruption involve Attorney General Weiser's personal role

[13] David Migoya, *Nondisclosures Under Fire: State Confidentiality Agreements Cost Millions, Silence Whistleblowers*, DENVER GAZETTE, November 13, 2022.

in assisting the Justices conceal the existence and nature of the $2.66-$2.75 million Masias bribe and by allowing his Office to negotiate taxpayer-funded NDAs valued in excess of $4 million.

Weiser's personal disqualification arises from at least three independent and overlapping grounds: (1) a direct personal interest conflict under Colo. RPC 1.7(a)(2) because his concurrent representation of himself, other public officials, state agencies, and the other individual capacity defendants is materially limited by his own self interest in avoiding civil liability, reputational harm, and potential criminal exposure; (2) a structural prohibition under Colo. RPC 3.7 because he is a necessary witness to the very facts at issue; and (3) the fundamental principle that (other than appearing *pro se*) no attorney, particularly a government attorney, can simultaneously be both counsel and client in the same litigation.

Because the Attorney General is not a line attorney but the head of the office who supervises all legal services, determines all legal policies of the state, and must personally authorize every court appearance by every deputy and assistant attorney general, a meaningful ethical screen is structurally impossible. The standard for whole-office disqualification—whether the public would perceive continued representation by anyone in the office as improper and unjust—is satisfied here where Attorney General Weiser's insistence on using his Office's resources to defend himself and cover up the underlying misconduct transforms the entire office

into an instrument of his personal interest. *City of Cnty. of Denver v. Cnty. Ct. of Denver & Cnty. of Denver*, 37 P.3d 453, 457 (Colo. App. 2001).

Petitioner has already invoked the statutory remedy for the Attorney General Weiser's mandatory disqualification by seeking the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG through the State Auditor's authority under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. Attorney General Weiser, State Auditor Hunter, members of the Colorado General Assembly, and Judge A. Bruce Jones, however, are preventing the necessary appointment.

The egregiousness and complexity of the crimes and ethical violations involved in the Colorado Judicial Scandal are overwhelming. The relief that Petitioner seeks through the present proceedings and related proceedings, however, is straightforward. Through *Ex rel. Gregory*, *Gregory*, and *Hunter*, Petitioner has sought to have legitimate conflict-free outside law enforcement agencies (federal law enforcement and/or another state's attorney general) conduct a full and independent investigation of what is largely admitted to and proven public corruption. The judicial and/or attorney misconduct complaints that Petitioner has filed in every federal circuit similarly seek investigation through ethical oversight entities that are not controlled or influenced directly or indirectly by the Colorado Supreme Court. In the present proceedings, *Gregory v. COJPE, et al.*, Petitioner has merely sought to have the Colorado judicial performance commissions comply with their mandated

duty to continuously examine the "integrity" of each Colorado state court judge so that Colorado voters receive complete and accurate information prior to the 2026 general election.

Instead of enforcing due process guarantees and anti-corruption protections that should be beyond debate, Attorney General Weiser, his agents, and the other named Defendants have universally opposed and obstructed Petitioner's claims for relief. Ultimately, there is a legitimate question why those individuals who are interfering with the administration of justice, particularly Attorney General Weiser and the Justices, are not themselves being investigated and prosecuted for a range of crimes and civil violations, including but not limited to the following:

- Accessory to Crime (§ 18-8-105, C.R.S.);
- Attempt to Influence a Public Servant (§ 18-8-306, C.R.S.);
- Breach of Public Trust (§ 24-18-103, C.R.S.);
- False Claims (18 U.S.C. § 287 and 31 U.S.C. § 3729);
- False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001);
- Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503[14] and 18 U.S.C. § 1505[15]);
- First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.);
- Pattern and Practice of Civil Rights Violations (§ 24-31-113, C.R.S.);
- Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S);

[14] Specifically, the statutory prohibition against whoever "corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice."

[15] *See United States v. Hannah C. Dugan*, 2:25-cr-00089-LA (E.D. Wis.) (state court judge convicted of Obstruction of Justice for interfering with immigration enforcement arrest).

- Retaliating Against a Witness, Victim, or Informant (18 U.S.C. § 1513(e)); and
- Wire Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343).

III. By summarily denying Petitioner's "Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b)" without setting a hearing or allowing a path to injunctive relief, District Judge A. Bruce Jones is causing continuing and prospective irreparable harms, including loss of public confidence in the Colorado Judiciary.

Petitioner's purpose in filing the underlying proceedings is to ensure that the Colorado judicial performance commissions perform their statutory functions: 1) To provide the public with complete and accurate information as to the performance of Colorado judges and 2) To provide "[t]ransparency and accountability for judges and justices throughout the state of Colorado." To this end, Petitioner sought a preliminary injunction and temporary order requiring verification that the performance commissions have satisfied their additional mandated duty to continuously review the "integrity" of all Colorado state court judges before publishing the 2026 judicial performance evaluation reports online and in the 2026 Colorado State Ballot Information Booklet(s).

Despite having actual knowledge of the underlying proceedings since they were filed on July 22, 2026, COJPE Executive Director Kent Wagner proceeded to publish the 2026 evaluation reports on the COJPE website, anyway. Depriving Petitioner any opportunity for a hearing, District Judge A. Bruce Jones proceeded to summarily deny Petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary

order to restrain publication of the 2026 evaluation reports. As anticipated, the 2026 evaluation reports that have been posted online do not examine the conduct of any of the judges identified in 2023 as having failed to file required PFD statements or of any of the judges involved in the broader Colorado Judicial Scandal. This failure to address verifiable reports of judicial misconduct means that the 2026 evaluation reports are legally incomplete and inaccurate.

The COJPE and the respective judicial performance commissions have published evaluation reports that are likely to mislead voters in the 2026 general election. The opposition of the COJPE and the respective judicial performance commissions to demonstrating how they have examined integrity, as mandated by § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S., is irreparably harming the public's confidence in Colorado's system of judicial performance evaluation and in the Colorado Judiciary. Judge Jones's refusal to allow Petitioner a hearing and to issue a temporary order until the hearing can be held deprives Petitioner of his fundamental right to be heard. These actions are themselves violative of Canon Rules 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary), 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness), and 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to be Heard) of the Code. It is particularly concerning that there are no meaningful disciplinary consequences as Judge Jones has now announced his retirement effective January 13, 2027.

7. Supporting Documents Included in Separately Indexed Accompanying Filing

a. Attorney Misconduct Complaint, dated September 30, 2025, *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-003361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.) (Exhibit 1), ECF No. 1-1.

b. Verified Complaint for Mandamus, Prohibition, and/or Other Injunctive Relief Under C.R.C.P. 106, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, July 22, 2026 (Suppressed).

c. Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, July 23, 2026.

d. Exhibit A to Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, July 23, 2026.

e. Emergency Motion to (1) Seal Plaintiff's Complaint and (2) Require Plaintiff to File Any Papers That Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, July 23, 2026.

f. Order, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, July 27, 2026.

g. Return of Service—Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, et al. and supporting exhibit, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, August 1, 2026.

h. Entry of Appearance, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, August 4, 2026.

i. Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b) and supporting Declaration of Christopher S.P. Gregory, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, August 3, 2026;

j. Order: Proposed Temporary Restraining Order, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, August 4, 2026.

k. Response to Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, August 10, 2026.

l. Response to Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's Complaint and Require Plaintiff to File any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance, *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval.*, August 10, 2026.

8. The Names, Addresses, and Phone Numbers of the Parties in the Proceeding Below:

The names of the Defendants in the proceeding below are listed *supra*. COJPE Executive Director Kent Wagner is recognized by statute and by rule as the other Defendants' agent. § 13-5.5-103(3)(a), C.R.S. (executive director required to staff the various district commissions on judicial performance as "directed to do so by the state commission"); Colo. R. Gov. Comm'ns. on Jud. Perform. Rule 2(c) (executive director designated as single point of contact for all state and district commissioners) and Rule 8 (executive director required to assist commissions in performance of their duties, including "obtaining [and] distributing information"; executive director has exclusive authority to attend commission meetings, interviews, and deliberations "in an advisory capacity"). Executive Director Wagner, however, disputes the scope of his agency. Petitioner maintains that all the Defendants share the following official place of business and point of contact:

Kent Wagner, Executive Director
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center
1300 Broadway, Suite 220
Denver, CO 80203

Attorney General Philip Weiser has selectively entered an appearance on behalf of Kent Wagner, the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, the Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance, and State Commission Chair Thomas Neville. Contact information for the Defendants' counsel of record is:

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Lane Towery, Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
720-508-6470

Petitioner appears in the proceedings below as a *pro se* attorney with co-counsel. Contact information for Petitioner and his co-counsel below is, as follows:

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502
Phone: (970) 648-0642

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco, PLLC
Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq.
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601
Telephone: (303) 641-6812

Respectfully submitted,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, #37095
Pro Se Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on August 12, 2026, a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21 and its accompanying Appendix were filed with the court and served via the Colorado Courts E-File system (or as stated below) upon the following persons:

Kent Wagner, Executive Director
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center
1300 Broadway, Suite 220
Denver, CO 80203
Statutorily Authorized Agent for all Defendants in Gregory v. Colo. Office of Jud. Performance Evaluation, et al., Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668
(via E-Mail--kent.wagner@judicial.state.co.us)

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Charles Kooyman, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Lane Towery, Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Attorneys for Defendants Kent Wagner, Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance, Thomas Neville, and "Intervenor" Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
(via Colorado Courts E-File System)

Proposed Respondents: Denver District Court, Colorado Supreme Court, Chief Justice Monica Márquez, Justice Maria Berkenkotter, Justice Susan Blanco, Justice Brian Boatright, Justice Richard L. Gabriel, Justice William W. Hood, III, Justice Carlos Samour, Jr., and District Judge A. Bruce Jones
(via case filings in the present case and in Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 through the Colorado Courts E-File System)

By: _____
Christopher S.P. Gregory, #37095

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street, Denver, CO 80202	DATE FILED August 18, 2026 6:34 PM FILING ID: 14C57D4CBE4A2B CASE NUMBER: 2026CV32668
CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, ET AL., Defendants.	▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲ Case No. 2026CV32668 Div.: 215

ORDER GRANTING EMERGENCY MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF'S "PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21," AND RENEWED REQUEST TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE

This matter is before the Court on Colorado Commission for Judicial Discipline's Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's "Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21," and Renewed Request to Require Plaintiff to File any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance.

The Court, having reviewed the motion, and finding good cause to do so, hereby GRANTS the motion.

DATED: _____

_____
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

DISTRICT COURT, DENVER COUNTY, COLORADO Court Address: 1437 BANNOCK STREET, RM 256, DENVER, CO, 80202	
Plaintiff(s) CHRISTOPHER SP GREGORY v. **Defendant(s)** COLO OFFICE OF JUD PERFORM EVAL et al.	DATE FILED August 14, 2026 6:58 PM CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268 ⚠ **COURT USE ONLY** ⚠ Case Number: 2026CV32668 Division: 215 Courtroom:

Order:Emergency Motion to Seal Plaintiff's "Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21," and Renewed Request to Require Plaintiff to File any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance w/attach

The motion/proposed order attached hereto: GRANTED WITH AMENDMENTS.

The Petition is suppressed pending further order of the Court. However, the filing of the Petition here was primarily for notice purposes. This Court's order does not extend to any filing with the Supreme Court.

The Court further notes that Ex. A remains available as a public document so that, among other things, Plaintiff's accusations against the undersigned are open for review.

In its July 27, 2026 Order, this Court did not impose a standing suppression order on future filings by Plaintiff. It does so now for the reasons stated in the Commission's motion.

Issue Date: 8/14/2026

A BRUCE JONES
District Court Judge

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street, Denver, CO 80202	
CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, ET AL., Defendants.	▲ **COURT USE ONLY** ▲
Attorney for Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline: PHILIP J. WEISER, Attorney General CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, Senior Assistant Attorney General* Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, CO 80203 Telephone: 720-508-6633 E-Mail: charles.kooyman@coag.gov Registration Number: 43595 *Counsel of Record	Case No. 2026CV32668 Div.: 215

EMERGENCY MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF'S "PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21," AND RENEWED REQUEST TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Proposed Intervenor the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the "Commission"), by and through its undersigned attorney, moves to have the Clerk of Court place under seal Plaintiff's "Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21" on the basis that Plaintiff included information regarding judicial

misconduct proceedings that must be kept confidential pursuant to the Colorado Constitution. With this Motion, the Commission provides a proposed redacted version that may be publicly filed.

The Commission further ***renews its request*** that this Court order Plaintiff to file any filings that contain any discussion of judicial discipline regarding Colorado judges as suppressed until the Court and the Commission can confirm that the filings contain no confidential information. Without such relief, the Commission will need to continue to file these emergency motions, and expend additional state resources, as Plaintiff's repeated public filings gratuitously including confidential information show that he has no intention to abide by his obligations under Colorado law.

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 121, 1-15(8)

On August 13 via email, the Commission's counsel sought to confer with counsel for Plaintiff regarding the issues presented in this motion. Plaintiff has not responded to the email conferral as of the time of filing, but undersigned counsel presumes it to be opposed. Given the emergency nature of this request, the Commission proceeded to file this motion.

ARGUMENT

The Commission has already argued the reasons for sealing this information in both this action and Plaintiff's other state action, *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Ct. Case No. 26CV31374. To ensure that the Commission meets its burden as to this latest filing, the Commission states as follows:

1. **Sealing of Plaintiff's C.A.R. 21 petition is proper.**

Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 121 § 1–5, a trial court may limit access to court files upon motion. "[A]n order limiting access is not to be granted except upon a finding that the harm to the privacy of a person in interest outweighs the public interest." *Doe v. Heitler*, 26 P.3d 539, 544 (Colo. App. 2001) (citing *In re Marriage of Purcell*, 879 P.2d 468 (Colo. App. 1994)). Applied here, the interests in sealing this confidential information far outweigh the public interest in private records.

The Commission is tasked with investigating complaints regarding judicial conduct, Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(e)(I), and in that role the Commission receives sensitive, confidential information regarding alleged misconduct by Colorado judges. Recognizing this role of trust, the Colorado Constitution specifically provides that proceedings before the Commission are confidential unless and until they result in formal proceedings. *Id.* § 23(3)(g) ("Prior to the commencement of formal disciplinary proceedings … all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on judicial discipline are confidential…."); *see also* Colo. RJD 6.5 ("The proceedings of the Commission … including all papers, investigative notes and reports, pleadings and other written or electronic records, shall be confidential unless and until the Commission files a recommendation [for formal proceedings]."). These confidentiality requirements continue even after an individual leaves the

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Commission. *See* Colo. RJD 3.5(b)(5) (rules apply to "former Commission members and staff with respect to information to which they had access while serving the Commission.").

The importance of keeping investigations and certain judicial disciplinary proceedings confidential is well established. *See, e.g.*, *Clemmer v. Off. of Chief Judge*, 544 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("All 50 states, as well as the Federal Government, recognize the importance of keeping these investigation records confidential, and thus have similar privileges protecting the confidentiality of judicial investigation records."). A state's interest in the confidentiality of judicial disciplinary proceedings furthers important government interests, including insuring effective judicial review commissions, encouraging the filing of complaints and witness participation, protecting judges from frivolous complaints, and encouraging removal or remedial actions from judges at early stages of an investigation. *Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia,* 435 U.S. 829, 835-836, and 841 (1978); *Kamasinski v. Jud. Rev. Council*, 44 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994).

The Petition includes information about judicial conduct proceedings that must remain confidential to prevent harm to the State's interest in maintaining the integrity of its judicial discipline process. *See Landmark*, 435 U.S. at 835-836; *Kamasinski*, 44 F.3d at 110. Disclosure would signal to judges and witnesses that they cannot rely on the Colorado Constitution's guarantees of confidentiality when making complaints, impact witnesses' and judges' willingness to cooperate with

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Commission investigations, and affect whether judges will accept informal disciplinary actions in lieu of formal proceedings. Moreover, the Commission's confidentiality obligations prevent it from addressing the accuracy of Plaintiff's sensationalized allegations. Ultimately, allowing disclosure would erode confidence in the judicial system.

2. An order requiring Plaintiff to file papers that contain discussion of judicial discipline regarding Colorado judges as suppressed in the first instance is necessary to prevent further harm.

Plaintiff's repeated inclusion of confidential information judicial misconduct proceedings is in direct conflict with—if not in contempt of—the Court's orders in the first *Gregory* state action. Moreover, his gratuitous inclusion of this information suggests that Plaintiff is abusing the privilege of public filing to publish information that he is required, by law, to keep confidential. Indeed, it appears that Plaintiff's intent is to make the confidential information at issue here public as many times as possible, regardless of the legality of doing so and in derogation of court orders. He has admitted as much – actually arguing that his publication and dissemination of this information before the Court can seal it somehow moots the need for sealing. *See* Aug. 12, 2026 Opp'n ¶ 7.

Plaintiff's filings, made with the express intent to make public confidential information, only reinforces the necessity of an order requiring Plaintiff to file as suppressed any pleadings that contain information regarding Colorado State judicial discipline proceedings so that the Commission may file sealing motions as

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

appropriate without the information becoming public. Plaintiff should not be permitted to use court filings to flout his confidentiality obligations, even if he has also flouted those obligations by attempting to publicize information elsewhere.

Plaintiff has demonstrated an inability to exercise good faith in court filings, and his attempts to impugn judges by publishing information that may or may not be true is particularly damaging given the Commission's inability to set the record straight due to *its* obligation to comply with confidentiality requirements. Additionally, Plaintiff's actions harm victims who were previously assured of the confidentiality of Commission proceedings and result in the needless expenditure of State resources in defending the Commission's confidentiality obligations.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons described above, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court grant the motion to seal Plaintiff's Petition for Order to Show Cause Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, and further order Plaintiff, and any attorney acting on his behalf, to file as suppressed any documents containing information regarding judicial discipline of Colorado judges until the Court and the Commission can review those filings for necessary redactions.

The Commission also seeks any other relief the Court deems reasonable and appropriate to address Plaintiff's unauthorized and inappropriate disclosure of confidential information.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

DATED: August 13, 2026

PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman
CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, 43595*
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Revenue and Regulatory Law Section
Attorney for the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
*Counsel of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have filed and served this **EMERGENCY MOTION TO SEAL PLAINTIFF'S "PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 21," AND RENEWED REQUEST TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE** upon all parties of record via Colorado Courts E-Filing this 13th day of August 2026.

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman

Attachment to Letter 2026-SV32668

DISTRICT COURT, DENVER COUNTY, COLORADO Court Address: 1437 BANNOCK STREET, RM 256, DENVER, CO, 80202	
Plaintiff(s) CHRISTOPHER SP GREGORY v. **Defendant(s)** COLO OFFICE OF JUD PERFORM EVAL et al.	DATE FILED August 14, 2026 6:18 PM CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268 ⚠ **COURT USE ONLY** ⚠ Case Number: 2026CV32668 Division: 215 Courtroom:

Order:Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b)

The motion/proposed order attached hereto: ACTION TAKEN.

The Court declined to enter an *ex parte* TRO in this matter. It appears that the request for a preliminary injunction was tied to the TRO and is now moot. If Plaintiff disputes mootness, within 7 days he should contact the court clerk to set a hearing on the preliminary injunction, with appropriate notice to Defendants.

Issue Date: 8/14/2026

A BRUCE JONES
District Court Judge

Denver County District Court, **State of Colorado** 1437 Bannock Street, Room 256, Denver, CO 80202	
Plaintiff(s): Christopher S.P. Gregory v. Defendant(s): Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, et al.	▲COURT USE ONLY▲
Counsel for Christopher Gregory: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq. 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont, CO 80502 Phone: (970) 648-0642 Fax: (970) 648-0643 E-Mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net Atty. Reg. # 37095 Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco, PLLC Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq. P.O. Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601 Telephone: (303) 641-6812 Email: Ingrid.DeFranco@gmail.com Atty. Reg. # 31206	Case No: 26CV32668 Division: 215
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND FOR TEMPORARY ORDER PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 65(A) AND C.R.C.P. 65(B)	

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-15, ¶ 8 Certification: Plaintiff has not attempted to confer with Defendants Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation (COJPE), et al. because of the nature of this Motion. Plaintiff stated the grounds for the relief requested in his "Verified Complaint for Mandamus, Prohibition, and/or Other Injunctive Relief Under C.R.C.P. 106; Exhibit 1," filed July 22, 2026. An electronic copy of the initial pleadings in this case was promptly provided to COJPE Executive Director Kent Wagner on July 22, 2026 with notice that Plaintiff would proceed with formal service. When Executive Director Wagner and the other Defendants were served through him on July 31, 2026, however, Executive Director Wagner attempted to selectively refuse service. None of the Defendants have appeared in this action despite the Colorado Department of Law having separately filed a pending motion to intervene through the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) on July 23, 2026. Because of these

circumstances, any effort to meet and confer beyond providing Executive Director Wagner with notice of this Motion will be futile.

Plaintiff for himself and through is co-counsel, Ingrid J. DeFranco, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(b), respectfully moves the Court for a Temporary Restraining Order to be entered forthwith and without notice.

AS GROUNDS FOR THIS MOTION, Plaintiff states and shows the Court the following:

1. As shown in Plaintiff's Declaration,[1] imminent and irreparable harm will result to Plaintiff and to public confidence in the Colorado Judiciary, if the Defendants are allowed to publish judicial performance evaluation reports on August 4, 2026 when such reports do not meaningfully examine the "integrity" of the subject judges as mandated by § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S. *See also* Colo. RJD 34 (amended standard allowing judicial suspension "where there is a substantial threat of serious harm . . . to the administration of justice [or] to the integrity of the judiciary"); *Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Weld Cnty. v. Nineteenth Judicial Dist.*, 895 P.2d 545, 549 (Colo. 1995) ("when the action of another branch of government 'threatens . . . to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is reasonably necessary for 'the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.'"); *Matter of Kiesnowski*, 2024 CO 12, ¶ 4 (recognizing violation of Canon Rule 1.2 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Discipline and misconduct that "undermined [the] judicial office and the public's confidence in the judiciary" as basis for affirming subject judge's recommended public censure following his previously agreed resignation).

[1] As allowed according to C.R.C.P. 108 and § 13-27-101, et seq., C.R.S., this Motion is supported by a declaration in lieu of an affidavit.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

2. Plaintiff (as an attorney) hereby certifies to the Court in writing that Defendant Kent Wagner, as an agent for the other Defendants, has refused to respond to Plaintiff's repeated requests for the Defendants' voluntary compliance in performing their mandated duties—specifically to continuously evaluate the "integrity" of all Colorado judges and justices according to § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S. The refusal to perform these mandated duties in conjunction with the imminent publication of legally incomplete and inaccurate judicial performance evaluation reports will cause irreparable harm by providing Colorado voters with misleading information (even if the reports are later amended prior to the 2026 general election) and by diminishing public confidence in the Colorado Judiciary, including its judicial performance commissions.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that the Court enter its Temporary Restraining Order:

(a) Restraining and enjoining Defendants—the COJPE, et al., their agents, their employees and attorneys, and those persons having active participation with them and who receive actual notice of this Order, from publishing judicial performance evaluation reports without this Court first confirming that the Defendants have performed their mandated duty to verify the "integrity" of each subject judge according to § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S. The Temporary Restraining Order will remain in effect pending a hearing on an Order to Show Cause or until further Order of this Court; and

(b) Directing Defendants to appear before the Court within fourteen days and show cause why the Temporary Restraining Order should not be converted to a Preliminary Injunction.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Dated: August 3, 2026

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
Christopher S.P. Gregory, Reg. # 37095
Pro Se Attorney for
Christopher Gregory

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that, on August 3, 2026, I have sent a true and complete copy of the foregoing Motion for Preliminary Injunction and for Temporary Order Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 65(a) and C.R.C.P. 65(b), the accompanying Declaration of Christopher S.P. Gregory, and the proposed Temporary Restraining Order via E-Mail (or through means otherwise specified below) to:

Colorado Office of Judicial Performance
Evaluation—kent.wagner@judicial.state.co.us

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
Christopher S.P. Gregory

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street, Denver, CO 80202 CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, ET AL., Defendants.	DATE FILED August 17, 2026 2:43 PM FILING ID: 145347E402E02B CASE NUMBER: 2026CV32668 ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Attorney for Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline: PHILIP J. WEISER, Attorney General CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, Senior Assistant Attorney General* Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, CO 80203 Telephone: 720-508-6633 E-Mail: charles.kooyman@coag.gov Registration Number: 43595 *Counsel of Record	Case No. 2026CV32668 Div.: 215

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO (1) SEAL PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND (2) REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE

In its Emergency Motion to (1) Seal Plaintiff's Complaint and (2) Require Plaintiff to File any Papers that Contain Discussion of Judicial Discipline Regarding Colorado Judges as Suppressed in the First Instance ("Sealing Motion"), the Commission outlined that modest redactions of Plaintiff's Complaint are

necessary to prevent identification of a Colorado judge that was subject to private discipline. These redactions are necessary to comply with Colorado law mandating confidentiality of private judicial conduct proceedings, *see* Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(g)(I); Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline Rule 6.5(a), and to prevent harm to the State's interest in maintaining the integrity of its judicial discipline process. *Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,* 435 U.S. 829, 835-836, and 841 (1978); *Kamasinski v. Jud. Rev. Council*, 44 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994). The Sealing Motion further requests that, given Plaintiff's repeated public filings of information that he knows is confidential, the Court should order Plaintiff to file as suppressed any pleadings that contain information regarding Colorado State judicial discipline proceedings so that the Commission may file sealing motions as appropriate without the information first becoming public.[1] Plaintiff's Opposition does not rebut these arguments, and in fact only confirms the need for the Commission's requested relief.

First, Plaintiff argues that confidentiality should not attach because the judge at issue's misconduct is not limited to the private discipline recited in the Complaint, and that he has "continued to engage in dishonesty," including by

[1] On August 14, 2026, the Court entered an order in response to the Commission's emergency motion to seal Plaintiff's C.A.R. 21 Petition requiring Plaintiff to file all pleadings referencing judicial discipline of Colorado judges as suppressed. Because the Complaint was filed prior to the Court's August 14, 2026 Order and out of an abundance of caution, the Commission addresses the issue here.

"committing misdemeanors," and "withholding his disciplinary history . . . during a recent judicial retention cycle." Opp'n ¶ 3. Whether Plaintiff has a basis for these conclusory allegations and/or whether they amount to a separate ground for discipline, they do not change that a judge's private discipline is confidential under Colorado law and that Plaintiff should not be permitted to publicly share information that identifies the judge subject to private discipline.[2]

Second, Plaintiff argues that the Commission's Sealing Motion is "a facially unconstitutional effort to censor and impose prior restraints upon the content of Plaintiff's court filings and the public reporting of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct." Opp'n ¶ 4. Not so. Nothing is preventing Plaintiff from filing papers and/or litigating his claims so long as information on private judicial discipline that he learned while with the Commission is kept under seal. Plaintiff should not be permitted to use this action to violate his ongoing obligations to the Commission.

Third, Plaintiff seeks to incorporate by reference arguments he made against the Commission's intervention in *Hunter*. Opp'n ¶ 5. This Court should reject Plaintiff's improper attempt "to shift, from the litigant to the court, the task of

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[2] Plaintiff's reference to the private discipline of U.S. District Judge Eleanor Ross only confirms this analysis. Judge Ross was the subject of a private reprimand and subsequent discipline order that excluded identifying information such as her name, gender, and location. *See* Judicial Complaint No. 11-25-90212 (Order, Feb. 11, 2026), available at https://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicial_complaints/11-25-90212%20Judicial%20Council%20Order_0.pdf. Her name only became public through investigative reporting, not through any litigation or court action.

locating and synthesizing the relevant facts and arguments." *People v. Duran*, 382 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Colo. App. 2015). In any event, such arguments are fully briefed by the parties and pending this Court's ruling(s).

Fourth, Plaintiff argues that sealing is improper because "the subject judge has no legitimate privacy interest in concealing evidence of his continuing judicial misconduct while the public's interest in responding to judicial misconduct is substantial." Opp'n ¶ 6. Plaintiff misses the point. Sealing is not to protect just the judge at issue, but rather to protect the integrity of the entire judicial discipline process that promises confidentiality for both victims and judges so long as the proceedings are resolved through private discipline. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(g)(I); Colo. R.J.D. 6.5(c). Because the Commission is prevented by those same confidentiality provisions from giving context to or disproving Plaintiff's lurid allegations, the damage of his unchecked disclosures is magnified.

Plaintiff's reliance on *Anderson v. Home Ins. Co.*, 924 P.2d 1123, 1126-28 (Colo. App. 1996), is likewise misplaced. In *Anderson*, a third party sought access to the court files of a medical malpractice action that the parties thereto had settled and that the court had broadly sealed at the request of the parties. *Id.* at 1126. The appeals court vacated the trial court order, explaining that the doctor's privacy interest did not outweigh the public interest in open public records sufficient to seal all records. Unlike here, in *Anderson*, (1) the doctor was not subject to any private disciplinary proceeding that Colorado law requires to be maintained as confidential;

(2) the district court had entered a broad sealing order without conducting an individualized analysis of each document; and (3) the appeals court left open that "a less restrictive order, limiting access to certain, selected documents within the record" may be appropriate upon a proper showing. *Id.* at 1128.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that the Commission's efforts to seal are "moot" because "Plaintiff had already distributed the court filings to the entire Colorado General Assembly and to the press" such that "[t]he public is already aware of the subject judge's identity." Opp'n ¶ 7. This argument only reinforces the necessity of an order requiring Plaintiff to file as suppressed any pleadings that contain information regarding Colorado State judicial discipline proceedings so that the Commission may file sealing motions as appropriate without the information becoming public. (Plaintiff's argument also supports any additional relief the Court believes is appropriate to prevent Plaintiff from engaging in these improper filings). Plaintiff should not be permitted to use court filings to flout his confidentiality obligations, even if he has also flouted those obligations by attempting to publicize information elsewhere.

In sum, the Complaint should be sealed, and the Court should enter orders so to prevent Plaintiff's continued improper filings. Notably, Plaintiff is not permitted to file with any court the information the Commission seeks to redact, *even under seal*. There is no exception in either the Constitution or the Commission's rules for court filings by former Commission members or employees. Colo. Const. art. VI, §

23(g)(I); Colo. R.J.D. 6.5(c). The Commission merely seeks to seal these documents to lessen the damage caused by Plaintiff, and to ensure that any future filings do not publicly reveal information required to be confidential under Colorado law.

DATED: August 17, 2026

PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

/s/Charles J. Kooyman
CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, 43595*
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Revenue and Regulatory Law Section
Attorney for the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
*Counsel of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have filed and served this **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF EMERGENCY MOTION TO (1) SEAL PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT AND (2) REQUIRE PLAINTIFF TO FILE ANY PAPERS THAT CONTAIN DISCUSSION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REGARDING COLORADO JUDGES AS SUPPRESSED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE** upon all parties of record via Colorado Courts E-Filing this 17th of August 2026.

/s/Charles J. Kooyman

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street, Denver, CO 80202 CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, ET AL., Defendants.	DATE FILED August 17, 2026 2:43 PM FILING ID: 145347E402E02B CASE NUMBER: 2026CV32668 ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Attorney for Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline: PHILIP J. WEISER, Attorney General CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, Senior Assistant Attorney General* Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, CO 80203 Telephone: 720-508-6633 E-Mail: charles.kooyman@coag.gov Registration Number: 43595 *Counsel of Record	Case No. 2026CV32668 Div.: 215

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE OF RAISING CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMISSION INFORMATION FILED BY PLAINTIFF, INCLUDING TO SEAL COMPLAINT

Plaintiff fails to rebut the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline's (the "Commission") showing that it has a right of intervention under C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2) for the limited purpose of raising and protecting the confidentiality of information that Plaintiff learned as a member of the Commission and/or as its former executive

director. This Court has already addressed the identical issue in *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374, granting the Commission's motion to intervene and further denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. *See Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (June 15, 2026 Order: Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Reviewing and Seeking to Maintain Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff's Complaint as Sealed; June 18, 2026 Order: Motion for Reconsideration of Order Allowing Intervention). Plaintiff offers no good reason why this case is any different.

As an initial matter, and just as he did in the *Hunter* action, Plaintiff makes repeated references to Attorney General Weiser as if he is an intervening party. This Court explained in *Hunter* that Attorney General Weiser does not seek to intervene, the Commission does. *See Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (June 18 Order ("Notably, the Attorney General is not seeking to [intervene]; Plaintiff repeatedly conflates the Commission with the AG, to the point of stating that the AG is attempting to intervene 'through the CCJD,' when that is the opposite of the process.")). Indeed, pursuant to C.R.S. §§ 24-31-101 and 24-31-111, assistant attorneys general from the Colorado Attorney General's office serve as counsel to the Commission and appear in that capacity.

Second, Plaintiff seeks to improperly incorporate by reference arguments he made against the Commission's intervention in *Hunter*. Opp'n ¶ 2. This Court should reject Plaintiff's improper attempt "to shift, from the litigant to the court, the task of locating and synthesizing the relevant facts and arguments." *People v.*

Duran, 382 P.3d 1237, 1240 (Colo. App. 2015). In any event, this Court in the *Hunter* action granted the Commission's intervention, and further denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, explaining:

> [Plaintiff's arguments] lack merit. Plaintiff largely ignores that the Commission's requested intervention is for a limited purpose--to protect against the public disclosure of confidential Commission information. The Commission clearly has standing for this limited purpose and its motion satisfies Rule 24.

Hunter, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (June 18, 2026 Order).

Plaintiff's remaining arguments do nothing to rebut that, just like in the *Hunter* action, the Commission "clearly has standing for this limited purpose and its motion satisfies Rule 24." *Id.* For example, Plaintiff again appears mired in the bases of his claims and casts conclusory aspersions that the Commission and Attorney General are "conspiring to obstruct justice." *See* Opp'n 3-4. Setting aside these irrelevant and baseless assertions, the Commission's requested intervention for the limited purpose of raising and protecting the confidentiality of Commission information does not prevent Plaintiff from litigating the merits of his claims.

Plaintiff also asserts that the Commission lacks standing because the reputational interests of the judges subject to private discipline are not legally protectable and C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5 requires orders for sealing only upon motion, i.e., that he can simply file anything on the docket publicly after which time the Commission can seek sealing. Opp'n ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiff ignores that the information that he repeatedly has placed on public dockets is required to be kept confidential

pursuant to Colorado law. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(g)(I) (providing that "all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on judicial discipline are confidential"; Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline Rule 6.5(a) ("The proceedings of the Commission … including all papers, investigative notes and reports, pleadings, and other written or electronic records, shall be confidential unless and until the Commission files [formal proceedings.]"). As a result, the Commission is not seeking to assert a "privacy" interest that may be overcome simply by Plaintiff's assertions of public interest. *Cf.,* Opp'n ¶ 5. And Colorado's confidentiality requirements, provided by law, do not contain an exception for the public interest, much less one unilaterally asserted by a disgruntled former employee. Finally, Plaintiff is perfectly capable, and the C.R.C.P. allows, filing of documents on the docket in the first instance under seal to keep such information confidential pending a ruling by the Court. It is Plaintiff's complete abdication and repeated violations of his confidentiality obligations that requires the Commission's intervention.

The Commission therefore respectfully requests that the Court grant the Commission's limited intervention in this action.

DATED: August 17, 2026

PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman
CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, 43595*
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Revenue and Regulatory Law Section

Attorney for the Colorado Commission on
Judicial Discipline
*Counsel of Record

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have filed and served this **REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE OF RAISING CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMISSION INFORMATION FILED BY PLAINTIFF, INCLUDING TO SEAL COMPLAINT** upon all parties of record via Colorado Courts E-Filing this 17th day of August 2026.

/s/Charles J. Kooyman

DISTRICT COURT, DENVER COUNTY, COLORADO Court Address: 1437 BANNOCK STREET, RM 256, DENVER, CO, 80202	
Plaintiff(s) CHRISTOPHER SP GREGORY v. **Defendant(s)** COLO OFFICE OF JUD PERFORM EVAL et al.	DATE FILED August 18, 2026 6:15 PM CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268 ⚠ **COURT USE ONLY** ⚠ Case Number: 2026CV32668 Division: 215 Courtroom:

Order:Motion to Intervene for Limited Purpose of Raising Confidentiality of Commission Information Filed by Plaintiff, Including to Seal Complaint

The motion/proposed order attached hereto: GRANTED.

The Commission meets the requirements for intervention, particularly on the limited basis requested of the Court.

Plaintiff's response is both under- and over-stated, as well as off-putting. It is the latter in asserting that the attempt to intervene constitutes obstruction of justice, not just in a rhetorical sense, but in a penal one.

Regarding the former, Plaintiff fails to address the significance of his obtaining the disputed information in confidence and the potential impact on the judicial discipline process of the disclosure. Plaintiff also ignores the limited redactions/suppression requested by the Commission (approximately 3 paragraphs in a 283-paragraph complaint).

Plaintiff may have meritorious, or at least non-frivolous, arguments regarding the public interest and the information in question. But his unilateral claim that he is entitled to make the disclosure in the current context is far from apparent. The Commission is granted limited intervention to challenge that claim.

Issue Date: 8/18/2026



A BRUCE JONES
District Court Judge

DISTRICT COURT, CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLORADO 1437 Bannock Street, Denver, CO 80202 CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO OFFICE OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, ET AL., Defendants.	▲ **COURT USE ONLY** ▲
Attorney for Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline: PHILIP J. WEISER, Attorney General CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, Senior Assistant Attorney General* Ralph L. Carr Colorado Judicial Center 1300 Broadway, 10th Floor Denver, CO 80203 Telephone: 720-508-6633 E-Mail: charles.kooyman@coag.gov Registration Number: 43595 *Counsel of Record	Case No. 2026CV32668 Div.: 215

MOTION TO INTERVENE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE OF RAISING CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMISSION INFORMATION FILED BY PLAINTIFF, INCLUDING TO SEAL COMPLAINT

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the "Commission"), by and through its undersigned attorney, moves to intervene in the above-captioned matter for the limited purpose of raising and protecting the confidentiality of information that Plaintiff learned as a member of the Commission and/or as its former executive

director.[1] Plaintiff is well aware that his publicly-filed Complaint includes judicial discipline information that is confidential. Plaintiff included this same information in a federal action, which the federal court promptly sealed. He again included this same information in multiple filings in an action before this Court, in *Gregory v. Hunter*, 2026CV31374, and this Court has both granted the Commission's intervention and sealed the filings. For the same reasons as in the first action, intervention should be granted.

CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL PURSUANT TO C.R.C.P. 121, 1-15(8)

On July 23 and via email, the Commission's counsel sought to confer with counsel for Plaintiff regarding the issues presented in this motion. Plaintiff has not responded to the email conferral as of the time of filing, but undersigned counsel presumes it to be opposed. Given the emergency nature of this request, the Commission proceeded to file this motion.

ARGUMENT

I. The Commission has a right of intervention.

The Commission meets each of the "three substantive requirements" for intervention as of right under C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). *See Feigin v. Alexa Grp., Ltd.*, 19 P.3d 23, 28 (Colo. 2001).

[1] Concurrently with this Motion, the Commission files an emergency motion to seal Plaintiff's Complaint, and further provides a proposed redacted version.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

First, the Commission has "an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action" – i.e., the Commission has an interest in maintaining the confidentiality of judicial discipline proceedings before it, including those discussed in the Complaint. *See* C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2); *see also Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Meridian Serv. Metro. Dist.*, 266 P.3d 401, 404, 406 (Colo. 2011) (explaining that for this inquiry courts should not impose "formalistic constraints on the existence of an interest" and instead should use a "flexible approach" where "[t]he existence of an interest should be determined in a liberal manner." (quotations and citations omitted)).

Specifically, the Commission is charged with investigating requests for evaluation regarding the conduct of judges in Colorado. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3); § 13-5.3-102, C.R.S. "[A]fter such investigation as it deems necessary," the Commission may dismiss a request for evaluation, order informal remedial action, or order a formal hearing on discipline before a panel of the Adjudicative Board. Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(e)(I). Unless the Commission seeks to impose public discipline by initiating formal disciplinary proceedings, "all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on judicial discipline are confidential…." *Id.* § 23(3)(g)(I); Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline Rule 6.5(a) ("The proceedings of the Commission … including all papers, investigative notes and reports, pleadings, and other written or electronic records, shall be confidential unless and until the Commission files [formal proceedings.]").

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

Second, the Commission "is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede [its] ability to protect that interest" – i.e., the Commission has a strong interest in ensuring that private judicial conduct proceedings remain confidential, as required by the Colorado Constitution. C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2); Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(g). Allowing intervention will give the Commission notice of Plaintiff's filings and allow it to seek sealing of confidential Commission information. Intervention would also allow the Commission to seek appropriate orders from this Court preventing Plaintiff from filing on the public docket such confidential information, given that Plaintiff's public filing of this information causes immediate harm. *See Feigin*, 19 P.3d at 30 ("An intervenor's interest is impaired if the disposition of the action in which intervention is sought will prevent any future attempts by the applicant to pursue his interest.").

Third, the Commission's interest is not "adequately represent[ed]" by existing parties. *See* C.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). Plaintiff, as a former employee of the Commission, has an ongoing duty to maintain the confidentiality of information he learned at the Commission. *See* Colo. RJD 3.5(c)(5) (rules apply to "former Commission members and staff with respect to information to which they had access while serving the Commission."). Despite this obligation, Plaintiff seeks to act directly contrary, given his repeated filing of this confidential information across multiple actions. Nor do Defendants adequately represent the Commission's interest because they are not part of the judicial discipline process.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

II. The Commission is in a unique position to review Plaintiff's filings for confidentiality.

If the Court grants this expanded intervention, the Commission would review Plaintiff's filings to confirm that they do not contain information that should be maintained under seal because they include confidential information regarding judicial disciplinary investigations that Plaintiff learned of as an employee or member of the Commission. The Commission has unique knowledge regarding Colorado judicial conduct proceedings, and has a specialized interest in maintaining the confidentiality of its information.

Specifically, the Commission is tasked with investigating complaints regarding judicial conduct, Colo. Const. art. VI, § 23(3)(e)(I), and in that role the Commission receives sensitive, confidential information regarding alleged misconduct by Colorado judges. Recognizing this role of trust, the Colorado Constitution specifically provides that proceedings before the Commission are confidential unless and until they result in formal proceedings. *Id.* § 23(3)(g) ("Prior to the commencement of formal disciplinary proceedings … all papers filed with and proceedings before the commission on judicial discipline are confidential…."); *see also* Colo. RJD 6.5 ("The proceedings of the Commission … including all papers, investigative notes and reports, pleadings, and other written or electronic records, shall be confidential unless and until the Commission files a recommendation [for formal proceedings]."). As a result, the Commission is most knowledgeable of what information on judicial conduct investigations and/or proceedings is confidential and

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

can properly make a request for sealing. As outlined above, Defendants are not in a position to do so, and Mr. Gregory actively seeks to make this information public.

The Commission's interest in sealing reflects the importance of keeping Commission investigations and judicial disciplinary proceedings confidential, an interest that is well established. *See, e.g.*, *Clemmer v. Off. of C.J.*, 544 F. Supp. 2d 722, 728 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ("All 50 states, as well as the Federal Government, recognize the importance of keeping these investigation records confidential, and thus have similar privileges protecting the confidentiality of judicial investigation records."). The Commission has a distinct interest in maintaining the confidentiality of any information in Plaintiff's filings regarding judicial conduct proceedings to prevent harm to the integrity of its judicial discipline process that the Commission oversees. *See Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia,* 435 U.S. 829, 835-836, 841 (1978); *Kamasinski v. Jud. Rev. Council*, 44 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1994). Disclosure of confidential information would signal to judges and witnesses that they cannot rely on the Colorado Constitution's guarantees of confidentiality when making complaints against judges, impact witnesses' and judges' willingness to cooperate with Commission investigations, and would affect whether judges will accept informal disciplinary actions in lieu of formal proceedings. Ultimately, allowing disclosure of confidential information would erode confidence in the Commission and the judicial system.

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the Commission respectfully requests that the Court grants its motion to intervene so that the Commission receives immediate notice of Plaintiff's filings and can quickly seek to seal those that contain information regarding Colorado judicial conduct proceedings that must remain confidential pursuant to the Colorado Constitution art. VI, § 23(3)(g). The Commission would also be able to seek appropriate orders from this Court preventing Plaintiff from filing on the public docket such confidential information in the future.

DATED: July 23, 2026

PHILIP J. WEISER
Attorney General

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman
CHARLES J. KOOYMAN, 43595*
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Revenue and Regulatory Law Section
Attorney for the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
*Counsel of Record

Attachment to Order - 2026CV32668

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that I have filed and served this **MOTION TO INTERVENE FOR LIMITED PURPOSE OF RAISING CONFIDENTIALITY OF COMMISSION INFORMATION FILED BY PLAINTIFF, INCLUDING TO SEAL COMPLAINT** upon all parties of record via Colorado Courts E-Filing this 23rd day of July 2026.

/s/ Charles J. Kooyman

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

VERIFIED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL; EXHIBITS 1 THROUGH 7

Conferral Statement: The Defendants' Counsel have been aware of conflicts of interest preventing the state-funded representation of the Defendants through the Colorado Office of the Attorney General (COAG) since before this case was filed. In or about July 26, 2024, First Assistant Attorney General Dan Combs contacted the Plaintiff to arrange publicly-funded representation for the Plaintiff in a related *pro se* lawsuit in which the Plaintiff was named as a defendant based upon his official functions as the former Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD). *Dees, et al. v. William Hood, et al.*, 1:24-cv-00848-PAB-NRN (D. Colo.). During the Plaintiff's conversations and communications with Mr. Combs, the Plaintiff confided that he had been retaliated against in his role as Executive Director and that the current members and staff of the CCJD were intentionally suppressing legitimate grounds for judicial discipline (i.e. violating the CCJD's constitutional mandate as described according to Colo. RJD 1(b)). Mr. Combs responded by arranging for the appointment of private

counsel, Andrew Ringel[1] of Hall and Evans, LLC, as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) to provide impartial representation. Mr. Combs, however, denied the Plaintiff's contemporaneous request to have input in the selection of a SAAG. At that time, the appointment of a SAAG required the approval of Solicitor General Shannon Stevenson and would have been a matter warranting the attention of the COAG's senior staff, including First Assistant Attorney General LeeAnn Morrill, Deputy Attorney General Kurtis Morrison, Chief Deputy Attorney General Natalie Hanlon-Leh, and Attorney General Phil Weiser. A copy of the Plaintiff's email correspondence relevant to the appointment of a SAAG is provided as Exhibit 1. At the time, Mr. Combs knew that the COAG had previously provided the CCJD with a SAAG, when Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates unlawfully threatened the CCJD's Vice Chair Judge David Prince and the other attorney and judge members of the CCJD through a formal disciplinary letter dated February 6, 2023.

Collaterally, the Plaintiff has consistently and publicly called for the formal referral of the issues in this case to conflict-free federal law enforcement and for the Colorado General Assembly to direct Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to appoint another state's attorney general as a SAAG capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado (and the integrity of the institutions and offices which the individually named defendants occupy/represent). The request for the Colorado General Assembly to refer the Colorado Judicial Scandal to federal law enforcement was first made at the April 28, 2025 Senate Judiciary

[1] Incidentally, Mr. Ringel is listed as counsel in one of the example cases included in U.S. District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's response to the Senate Questionnaire, which he submitted upon his appointment to the district court. U.S. Senate Comm. on the Jud., *Questionnaire for Judicial Nominees (Daniel D. Domenico's Response)*, p. 27.

Committee hearing on the reappointment of Chair Mindy Sooter and Vice-Chair James Carpenter to the CCJD. The Plaintiff's requests for conflict-free representation of the State of Colorado's interests have most recently included development of the legislative record (including the submission of a proposed joint resolution to formally refer the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free law federal law enforcement and to direct the State Auditor to appoint a SAAG),[2] filing a Senate ethics complaint against the members of the Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee,[3] and filing complaints with the Colorado Independent Ethics Commission (IEC)

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[2] The legislative record that the Plaintiff has created can be found as follows:

> Joint Judiciary Committee 1/21/2026 SMART Act Hearing re: Colorado Judicial Department Presentation-- https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/28660;
>
> Senate Judiciary Committee 2/9/2026 Confirmation Hearing re: Appointment of former Senator Robert Gardner to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline-- https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/28938; and
>
> Senate Judiciary Committee 2/11/2026 Hearing re: SB26-084-- https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/29188.

The Plaintiff's February 25, 2026 supplement to the February 11, 2026 Senate ethics complaint submitted to Senate President James Coleman (included in the Plaintiff's written testimony opposing SB26-084 referenced *supra*) is provided as Exhibit 2. The proposed joint resolution is also separately provided as Exhibit 3. The legislative record also includes examples of the Plaintiff filing complaints seeking civil and criminal enforcement directly with the COAG. Like President Coleman's response to the Senate ethics complaint, the COAG has deliberately disregarded the filed complaints. Exhibit 4.

For reasons described in the motion itself, the Defendants are not privy to an unopposed motion that the Plaintiff filed in his parallel sealed case which requests this Court to issue protective orders and facilitate the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG through the authority of the Colorado State Auditor. *Sealed Case*, 1:25-cv-00190-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.), ECF No. 56.

[3] The February 11, 2026 Senate ethics complaint documents the Plaintiff's prior complaints submitted directly to the COAG, which requested an investigation of U.S. District Judge Daniel

challenging the Defendants' use of public resources in this case and Senate President James Coleman's deliberate disregard of the Plaintiff's Senate ethics complaint. The Plaintiff's IEC complaints, with individual complaints against the Defendants' Counsel of record (Clayton Ankney, Katharine Brown, and Dan Combs), are included in Exhibit 3.

Due to near-universal conflicts of interest and obstruction of justice, the Plaintiff has been unable to meaningfully engage with either federal law enforcement or state and local law enforcement regarding the many crimes and examples of public fraud that are established through the allegations of the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, ECF No. 1, and the Plaintiff's publicly-suppressed "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel," ECF No. 26; *see also* ECF No. 46 (entry of default as to all Defendants); *see, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). Indeed, the Colorado Office of the State Auditor (OSA) has refused to respond to the Plaintiff's request for the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG and has further refused to confirm whether it has consulted or is consulting with the COAG in the handling of the Plaintiff's 2024 and 2025 Fraud Hotline reports.[4]

Domenico's persistent refusal to recuse himself and an investigation of patterns and practices of civil rights violations within the Colorado Judiciary. Copies of these COAG complaints are provided as Exhibit 4.

[4] Circumstantial evidence causes the Plaintiff to have concerns that the COAG has used its statutory role as support for the OSA to undermine a legitimate investigation through the OSA's Fraud Hotline. After filing his "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel," ECF No. 26, the Plaintiff provided copies to the OSA and this Court's Committee on Conduct. Shortly afterwards, Mr. Combs informally communicated with District Judge Daniel D. Domenico via email to cause suppression of the Affidavit from public access. Exhibit 7, p. 41. The Plaintiff suspects that communications between the OSA and the

Despite the formal steps taken to appoint a SAAG in *Dees*, the Defendants (including those named in their individual capacities) responded to the present action by apparently agreeing to consolidated representation through the COAG, with Mr. Combs acting as lead counsel. When the Plaintiff raised concerns about the assignment of this case to U.S. District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico, Defendants' Counsel responded by disputing the Plaintiff's assertions of actual bias (as also stated in the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint and subsequent case filings). ECF No. 1 p. 6 fn.3, ECF Nos. 7, 12, 26; Exhibit 7, p. 31. The Defendants continued to dispute the need to assign this case to a judge from outside the District of Colorado even after Judge Domenico recused himself. Exhibit 7, p. 11. After the Plaintiff raised Mr. Combs's personal conflicts as part of meeting and conferral, he quietly substituted Second Assistant Attorney General Clayton Ankney as the Plaintiff's primary point of contact. *Compare* Exhibit 7, pp. 27-32 *with* Exhibit 7, pp. 21-26.

In response to the Plaintiff's successful application for a default to enter as to all Defendants, Defendants' Counsel continued to deny that the circumstances of this case require the COAG's disqualification. Exhibit 7, pp. 1-6. Indeed, the Defendants, through Mr. Ankney, categorically rejected the Plaintiff's overtures to discuss disqualification of counsel as a possible basis for a stipulated motion to set aside the default. Exhibit 7, p. 2; ECF No. 47, pp. 2-3. Finally, after the Defendants proceeded to file their "Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default," Mr. Ankney ignored the Plaintiff's email asking whether any further efforts to meet and confer

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COAG are what motivated Mr. Combs's efforts to suppress the Affidavit from public access. *See* Exhibit 6 (email requesting OSA to confirm existence of communications with the COAG as part of Plaintiff's Fraud Hotline complaints and why OSA has refused to respond to Plaintiff's requests for appointment of a SAAG).

regarding the present Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel would be useful. Exhibit 7, p. 1. Defendants' Counsels' consistent and persistent refusal to directly address these issues is reflective of a vexatious litigation strategy intended to delay the Defendants' obligations to provide a timely response to the merits of the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint. *See* F.R.C.P. 11(b); *see also* F.R.C.P. 55(c) (demonstration of good cause required to set aside default). The required good faith meeting and conferral on the issue of disqualification of counsel has not occurred.

Motions to disqualify counsel are generally disfavored. *See, e.g., Banks v. Jackson*, 20-CV-02074-NYW, 2022 WL 1451904, at *9 (D. Colo. May 9, 2022). This, however, is not a close case. No reasonable remedies short of disqualification will adequately protect the integrity and fairness of this Court's proceedings.

The Plaintiff, Christopher S.P. Gregory, for himself and through his counsel, Ingrid J. DeFranco, moves this Court to enter an order disqualifying the Colorado Department of Law / the COAG from further representation of any and all the Defendants in this case. In support of this motion, the Plaintiff states the following, upon his personal knowledge, information, and belief:

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from the Defendants' systematic efforts to censor or otherwise suppress the Plaintiff's constitutionally-and-statutorily protected right and professionally mandated obligation to freely and publicly report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. *See* U.S. Const. amend. I; Colo. Const. Art. II, §§ 10 and 25; Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(g), (i); Colo. Const. Art. XIII; Colo. RPC 8.3; Colo. RPC 8.4 (f); Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.15 and 2.16 of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code); Canons 1, 2(A)-(b), and 3 of the Code of

Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code). More specifically, the Plaintiff is seeking accountability for the retaliation that occurred and continues to occur with the specific intent of obstructing the Plaintiff's efforts to freely and publicly report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct.

If the allegations of the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint are proven by default or otherwise, there is indisputable evidence that, in addition to their civil violations, the Defendants have individually and collectively committed a spectrum of crimes. These crimes include, but are not limited to, Obstruction of Justice, False Statements, Obstruction of a Federal Audit, First Degree Official Misconduct, and Attempt to Influence a Public Servant. Ordinarily, state and federal law enforcement could be relied upon to receive complaints, to investigate, and to prosecute these crimes. Instead, Colorado's chief law enforcement officer, Attorney General Phil Weiser, has misused the resources of his office to provide publicly funded representation for both himself and the other Defendants so as to avoid and indirectly defend against the Plaintiff's allegations of public fraud and public corruption. Attorney General Weiser has and continues to misuse the resources of his official position to perpetuate, rather than prosecute and prevent, public fraud. Moreover, the consolidated representation of all the Defendants by the COAG ignores the fact that the individual interests of the defendants are not aligned.

Among the remedies sought in the Verified Complaint is restitution to the State of Colorado for reasonable attorney's fees and costs unjustly expended by the State in defending those individually-named defendants ultimately found civilly liable. The facts of this case are now further complicated by the entry of default against all defendants and circumstances where the attorneys representing the Defendants are now necessary witnesses for consideration of the

Defendants' own pending motion to set aside the default, as part of the litigation of the Plaintiff's anticipated Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, and at a prospective trial to determine the amount of damages awardable with the Defendants being joint and severally liable. Until and unless the default is set aside, liability has been proven and the allegations of the Verified Complaint are deemed admitted.

These circumstances require the disqualification of the entire COAG from further representation of any and all of the Defendants. Disqualification is necessary to protect the fairness and integrity of this Court's further proceedings. Only after assignment of this case to neutral and detached judicial officers from outside the District of Colorado has it become possible or realistic for the Plaintiff to make this Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel.

QUESTION PRESENTED

> Where the Colorado Attorney General has statutory obligations to receive complaints, investigate, and prosecute public fraud, civil rights violations, and other crimes, whether an inherent conflict of interest requiring disqualification exists when the Colorado Attorney General uses the resources of his own office to defend himself and others against legitimate allegations that the same laws that the Colorado Attorney General is charged with enforcing have been violated.

BACKGROUND

No damages are sought from the State of Colorado or for actions taken by the Defendants in their official capacities. ECF No. 1, pp. 7 through 10 ¶¶ 13-18, 28 ¶ 79, 31 through 33 ¶¶ 92-99. Instead, the remedies sought against the State of Colorado and its official capacity defendants are limited to equitable relief and secondary liability for attorney's fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. *See also* ECF No. 1, p. 28 ¶ 79. The State of Colorado has no legitimate interests in protecting the individual capacity defendants from personal liability and damages arising from the Plaintiff's legal (as opposed to equitable claims). On the contrary, as

Colorado's chief law enforcement officer, Attorney General Phil Weiser is obligated to impartially receive complaints, investigate, and prosecute allegations of civil rights violations, public fraud (including false claims), public corruption, and other forms of official misconduct. *See, e.g.,* § 24-31-101, C.R.S. (defining Attorney General's underlying authority prosecute and defend civil and criminal actions in the interests of the State of Colorado); § 24-31-106, C.R.S. (authorizing Attorney General to appoint a crime victims' services coordinator); § 24-31-111(4), C.R.S. (appearances of subordinates representing state agencies in state or federal court must be specifically authorized by the Attorney General); § 24-31-113, C.R.S. (authorizing Attorney General to bring civil action to stop patterns and practices of civil rights violations within government agencies); § 24-31-1204(1), C.R.S. (Attorney General required to "diligently investigate" violations of the CFCA). Importantly, § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S. expressly prohibits the Attorney General from using the resources of his or her Office to represent public employees named as defendants in actions brought personally under the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act (CWPA), §§ 24-50.5-101, et seq., C.R.S.[5] The anti-retaliation provisions of the CWPA are analogous to the retaliation provisions of the CFCA. *Compare* § 24-50.5-101, C.R.S. *with* § 24-31-1204(8), C.R.S. The violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct implicated by the actions and omissions of the Defendants and their Counsel include, but are not

[5] The Plaintiff's complaint in the parallel and related sealed case, includes a claim for violation(s) of the CWPA. *Sealed Case*, ECF No. 1, p. 196. With the possibility of the refiling of that claim into the present case, the COAG is statutorily prohibited from its continued representation of the Defendants. § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S. specifically provides: "[E]xcept that the attorney general ***shall not represent*** any such [public] employee in an action brought under section 24-50.5-105[.]" (Emphasis added).

limited to, Colo. RPC 1.7, 1.8, 1.10, 1.13(b), 3.3(b), 3.4(a), 3.5(a), 3.7, 4.1, 5.1, 5.2, 8.3, 8.4(a-1), (a-2), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h).

The conflicts of interest inherent in the COAG's representation of the Defendants in this case arise through an extensive, though constant, history. The primary conflict, of course, is that Attorney General Weiser is using state resources to personally defend himself and his current/former subordinates against verified allegations of official, ethical, and criminal misconduct.[6] These current or former subordinates (named as defendants in the present action or as respondents in the related federal attorney discipline complaint) include Ingrid Barrier, Gina Cannan, Kirsten Grooms, Alison Kyles, Natalie Hanlon-Leh, Anne Mangiardi, LeeAnn Morrill, Grant Sullivan, and a number of Attorney General Weiser's friends and significant political donors.

Conflicts of interest through the COAG, however, go back further. As explained in the Plaintiff's federal attorney discipline complaint, Comm. on Conduct Case No. 25-cc-3, the keystone of the Masias Controversy is that the Justices, Attorney General Weiser, former-State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Judicial Counsel Terri Morrison, 1st Assistant Attorney General LeeAnn Morrill, current-SCAO Judicial Counsel Andrew Rottman, and then-Assistant Solicitor General Grant Sullivan knowingly concealed information material to the State of Colorado's federally required single statewide audit (i.e. the contemplation of the $2.66-$2.75

[6] The provision of public representation to the Defendants is occurring in stark contrast to former Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Pete Lee's having had to personally spend approximately $68,000 to defend himself against retaliatory criminal charges which were ultimately dismissed. The sole charge on which Senator Lee was indicted was determined to have arisen from fabricated evidence produced by the Colorado Supreme Court's Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel.

million Masias Contract/bribe and the existence of the related Masias Memo). When the CCJD advocated for legislative reforms to Colorado's judicial discipline system, the COAG (through Deputy Attorney General Kurtis Morrison) responded by supporting the Justices' unethical lobbying efforts and opposition to SB22-201. Hanlon-Leh, Kurtis Morrison, and Morrill later continued their efforts to meddle with legislative reforms by obstructing the formation of the Office of Administrative Services for Independent Agencies created by SB23-228. Gina Cannan and Alison Kyles, presumably supervised by others, were directly involved in the premeditated retaliation that culminated in the Plaintiff's wrongful termination, in conjunction with the COAG / CCJD offering severance pay in exchange for a waiver of claims and non-disclosure agreement.

Beyond COAG attorneys being part of the underlying civil rights violations and retaliation alleged in this case, other current and former COAG attorneys are material witnesses in connection with the representation provided to the CCJD through the COAG in *Matter of Timbreza II*, 2023 CO 16 and *Matter of Scipione*, 2024 CO 23.

As it relates to the COAG's representation of the Defendants in this case, there are current conflicts which adversely impact the Plaintiff's right to fair, public, and impartial proceedings. These conflicts include the COAG's efforts to suppress the Plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit from public access and the facilitation of ongoing criminal conduct by the Defendants (including allowing the concealment of material information from the Colorado General Assembly and continuing intimidation of and retaliation against the Plaintiff that is intended excuse the Defendants from responding to the merits of this case). Additionally, and without justification, the Defendants' Counsel have opposed, and continue to oppose, the Plaintiff's efforts to seek a fair and impartial forum. Specifically, Defendants' Counsel

supported the assignment of this case to District Judge Domenico and, then, opposed the Plaintiff's repeated requests (ultimately granted) reassigning this case to judges from outside the District of Colorado. Defendants' Counsel have persistently refused to disqualify themselves and continue to do so even after they have received the Plaintiff's Senate and IEC ethics complaints. The non-disqualification of Defendants' Counsel is the principal reason for the entry of a default. Nevertheless, counsel continue to obstruct the Plaintiff's right to have this case heard before an impartial judge and, ultimately, an impartial jury (even if a trial limited to the calculation of damages as allowed in this Court's discretion). *See Frankart Distributors, Inc. v. Levitz*, 796 F. Supp. 75, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (recognizing trial court's discretion to allow jury trial on damages even after entry of default judgment); *see also* F.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) (allowing referral of application for a default judgment including to allow a jury trial if statutorily required).

DISCUSSION

LEGAL STANDARD GOVERNING DISQUALIFICATION

> Motions to disqualify are governed by standards developed under federal law as well as the Local Rules of this District, which incorporate the standards of professional responsibility in the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct ("Colo. RPC"), *see* D.C.COLO.LAttyR 2(a). *Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs.*, 43 F.3d 1373, 1384 (10th Cir. 1994). "It is well-established that control of attorneys' conduct in trial litigation is within the supervisory powers of the trial judge, and is thus a matter of judicial discretion." *Id.* (quotation omitted).
>
> Although the Court has discretion to disqualify counsel, motions to disqualify opposing counsel are generally disfavored. *See Chavez v. New Mexico*, 397 F.3d 826, 839-40 (10th Cir. 2005); *Fogani v. Young*, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) ("[C]ourts have historically been highly cynical of motions to disqualify opposing counsel, noting that such motions are often dilatory or tactical

> devices."). As the moving party, Plaintiffs have the burden of showing sufficient grounds for disqualification by alleging specific facts rather than relying on speculation or conjecture. *See Quark, Inc. v. Power Up Software Corp.*, 812 F. Supp. 178, 179 (D. Colo. 1992).
>
> *Vincenzetti v. Amazon.com Servs. LLC*, 21-CV-02681-RM-NRN, 2025 WL 3299383, at *1 (D. Colo. Sept. 29, 2025).

Two particular circumstances require the disqualification of counsel: a nonwaivable conflict which unfairly prejudices a party, and counsel's involvement in the facts and circumstances of a case to the point where he or she becomes a necessary witness. Both exist here and are substantiated by specific facts.

Disqualification is proper when counsel has a conflict which could reasonably be expected to prejudice a party. Prior representation of a client whose interests are antithetical to the party's or knowledge obtained in the course of a privileged relationship, which may prejudice the party, constitute grounds for disqualification. "A conflict of interest is traditionally a matter of concern where an attorney's interest conflicts with that of her own client – not that of the opposing party." *Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co.*, 2013 WL 4776054, at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 4, 2013) (quoting *Fognani v. Young*, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005)). While, as a general rule, courts do not address claimed violations of the ethical rules made by non-clients, the Colorado Supreme Court has created an exception to that rule, when "a potential ethical violation threatens to prejudice the fairness of the proceedings." *Fognani,* 115 P.3d at 1269.

When counsel possesses such evidence that she or he becomes a necessary witness, s/he may not properly occupy two roles at trial, due to the potential to confuse a jury.

> Before an advocate will be disqualified under Colorado Rule 3.7, it must be "likely" that the lawyer will be a "necessary" witness. Compare DR 5-101(B) (attorney must decline employment if the

> attorney "ought to be called" as a witness). The "necessary" witness standard is recognized as requiring "an even more specific showing of necessity" than the Code. *Security General. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court*, 149 Ariz. 332, 718 P.2d 985 (1986) (Rule 3.7(a) requires a showing that the proposed testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere). It has been held that the advocate's testimony must be necessary, and not merely cumulative, and that the court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can determine whether another witness can testify.
>
> *World Youth Day v. Famous Artists Merchandising Exch.,* 886 F.Supp. 1297, 1302, (D. Colo. 1994) (citing Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7, and analyzing its predecessor).

A. AAG Combs's Representation, and, by Extension, That of AAGs Ankeney and Brown, Will Necessarily Result in a Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct Which Will Prejudice the Fairness and Integrity of these Proceedings

The COAG's attorneys of record in this case, Dan Combs, Clayton Ankney, and Katharine Brown, are defending the personal interests of the individually-named Defendants, rather than impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado. *See Berger v. United States*, 295 U.S. 78, 99 (1935) (describing objective of government lawyer is not to win a case but to ensure "that justice shall be done"). By collectively representing both the institutional and individual Defendants, the COAG, AAG Combs, AAG Ankney, and AAG Brown are merely facilitating and endorsing the judicial, attorney, and official misconduct alleged in the Verified Complaint. Instead of representing the State of Colorado's interests in protecting public confidence in the Judiciary and the integrity of state government, the COAG is opposing the injunctive relief the Plaintiff seeks and knowingly concealing legitimate grounds for judicial discipline from the public, as expressed in the Plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit. It should be clear that the COAG's attorneys are knowingly interfering with the administration of justice in violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(d), (f), (h). AAG Combs's representation is particularly problematic

and conflicted given that he had discussed the merits of this case and other attorney-client sensitive information as part of the COAG's appointment of a SAAG for the Plaintiff in *Dees*.

B. AAGs Coombs, Ankeney, and Brown are Necessary Witnesses Who Will Be Called to Testify About Their Own Conduct, and that of Attorney General Weiser.

As described in the complaints that the Plaintiff has filed with the IEC, there are reasonable grounds to suspect that both the Defendants and their Counsel through the COAG have committed or are committing various crimes, which include Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516), Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.), First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.), and Attempt to Influence a Public Servant (§ 18-8-306, C.R.S.). The Defendants' Counsel's attempts to intimidate the Plaintiff, their persistent non-disqualification, and bad faith defense against this action support additional individual claims against Defendants' Counsel for retaliation as defined under the CFCA, § 24-31-1204(8)(b). Accordingly, there are now inherent attorney-witness conflicts that require the disqualification of the entire COAG according to Colo. RPC 1.7, 1.10(a), 3.7.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court enter an order disqualifying the Colorado Attorney General's Office from further representation of any of the defendants in this case and for a further order directing Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her authority under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to appoint another state's attorney general to impartially represent the interests of the State of Colorado as a Special Assistant Attorney General. The appointee should be chosen from amongst other states that have state-level false claims acts. The qualifying states and the District of Columbia are: California, Connecticut,

Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawai'i, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Vermont.

Dated: March 11, 2026

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq.
Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601
Telephone: (303) 641-6812
Email: Ingrid.DeFranco@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
Christopher S.P. Gregory, Esq.
The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502
Telephone: (970) 648-0642
E-mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
Pro Se Attorney for Plaintiff
Christopher S.P. Gregory

VERIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made in this Motion to Disqualify Counsel are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed at Boulder County, Colorado, this 11th day of March, 2026.

Christopher S. P. Gregory

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 11, 2026, I filed the above filing via email to the Clerk of the Court, who will docket it in CM/ECF. CM/ECF will send notification of this filing to any party who has entered an appearance in this matter to the e-mail addresses provided in CM/ECF.

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco

From: Ringel, Andrew D.
To: Christopher Gregory
Cc: Ringel, Andrew D.
Subject: Jennifer L. Dees et. al. v. William Hood et. al.
Date: Friday, August 9, 2024 12:47:36 PM
Attachments: HELogo-600_1647bba9-82b6-4878-b39e-e05e65e25e7e.png
mansfield-law-firm-participation-badge-3-2024-2025_527f14ea-3712-4c10-a668-03806a09fad7.png

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Mr. Gregory:

I have been retained by the State of Colorado Risk Manager to represent you in connection with the above matter. I believe you were informed of my retention by Dan Combs of the Office of the Attorney General.

I wanted to introduce myself and provide my contact information which is below.

I also wanted to schedule a time where we can meet by video conference or telephone conference next week to discuss this matter. Please let me know some dates and times that work for your schedule. I have decent availability next week.

Finally, I wanted to see if you would authorize me to waive service of the Complaint on your behalf. This will have you avoid personal service and will also give us added time to respond to the Complaint. I plan to file a motion to dismiss in response to the Complaint.

I look forward to working with you on this matter.

Thanks.

Andrew

Andrew D. Ringel | Member
ringela@hallevans.com
Tel: 303-628-3453

Hall & Evans, LLC
1001 Seventeenth Street, Suite 300
Denver, CO 80202

HALL&EVANS LLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
AZ | CO | ID | IL | MO | MT | NM | NV | UT | WY
website | bio | LinkedIn

Mansfield Rule Participating Law Firm 2024–2025

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 1

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From: Dan Combs (He/Him)
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: RE: Call
Date: Thursday, August 1, 2024 4:18:45 PM
Attachments: image001.png
image003.png

Hello Christopher,

Andrew Ringel from Hall & Evans, acting as a Special Assistant Attorney General, will be reaching out regarding representation.

Please feel free to call me tomorrow if you have any questions. I'll be out of the office on leave next week.

Thanks,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2024 10:45 AM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Subject: RE: Call

Hi Dan,

As I have thought about this more, I am not sure why I am not able to provide input as to the selection of the SAAG.

When past conflicts have arisen, it was up to the client (i.e. the Commission or individual Commissioners) as to who would be selected to provide outside representation as SAAGs. This process was followed when the Commission selected its outside special counsel for the *Coats* case and when individual Commissioners had to respond to criminal conduct by Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates (who used her official position to intimidate legislative witnesses). In having private attorney David Kaplan represent the Commission, judge/attorney Commissioners, and the Executive Director as a SAAG, I had to go through this same process with ultimate approval provided by then Solicitor General Eric Olson.

As I understand it, the authority to appoint a special assistant attorney general is derived from

Sec. 24-31-101(1)(g), C.R.S., but is limited by Sec. 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. (which allows agencies to appoint their own counsel if representation by the Attorney General is disputed / conflicted).

In any event, if you could help clarify the SAAG appointment process in this matter, I would greatly appreciate it. Thank you again for your help with this.

Warmest regards,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Sent: Monday, July 29, 2024 5:15 PM
To: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: RE: Call

Hi Christopher,

I'm glad we were able to talk Friday. Per our call, I'll be arranging for representation by a Special Assistant Attorney General ("SAAG"). Stay tuned for that info.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Sent: Friday, July 26, 2024 3:58 PM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Subject: RE: Call

Hi Dan,

Thanks for your message. If we don't have a chance to talk before, I hope that you have a good weekend.

Warmest regards,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Sent: Friday, July 26, 2024 3:34 PM
To: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: Call

Hello Christopher,

I saw you called back, when I was on another call. I'll try to call before 5:00 today, and if we're not able to talk I'll reach out first thing Monday.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

February 25, 2026

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Senate President James R. Coleman
Colorado State Senate
200 E. Colfax Ave.
Denver, CO 80203
Via E-Mail: james.coleman.senate@coleg.gov

Re: Supplement to Ethical Complaint Against the Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee Brought According to Senate Rule 43; Exhibit 1

Dear President Coleman:

On February 11, 2026, I submitted an ethics complaint against all involved members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Inexplicably, your Office has not provided any acknowledgment of receiving my complaint. Since the submission of my complaint, however, there have been some material developments that should be considered as you proceed with the process defined and required by Senate Rule 43.

According to § 24-31-1204(1), C.R.S., Attorney General Phil Weiser is obligated to "diligently investigate" violations of the Colorado False Claims Act (the CFCA) regardless of whether allegations are brought by a direct complaint to the Attorney General's Office, through the Office of the State Auditor's (the OSA) Fraud Hotline, or through a *qui tam* action. The State Auditor similarly has authority and obligations to investigate alleged false claims independently, in conjunction with the Attorney General, or otherwise. § 24-31-1204(2), C.R.S. Under the Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S., the State Auditor is further tasked with investigating reports of "occupational fraud." Occupational fraud is defined as "the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization's resources or assets." § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Although the State Auditor's investigations of false claims and Fraud Hotline complaints are ordinarily performed in conjunction with and through the support of the Attorney General's Office, § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. provides a mechanism through which the State Auditor can directly appoint a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) when there are conflicts of interest and the Attorney General's Office cannot perform such functions.

In addition to Attorney General Weiser's statutory obligations to investigate false claims and fraud, Attorney General Weiser is also obligated to investigate and civilly prosecute patterns of constitutional and civil rights violations within Colorado State Government. § 24-31-113, C.R.S.

Instead of performing his statutory and ethical obligations by stepping aside to allow the appointment of a SAAG by the State Auditor, Attorney General Weiser and his Office entered



their appearances to ***defend*** against the legitimate allegations of public fraud, retaliation, and civil rights violations pled in *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361—GPG (D. Colo.). Attorney General Weiser's use of his own Office's resources to defend against civil claims brought against him and the other Defendants individually meets the definition of occupational fraud provided in § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Such conduct and the Defendants' (including Attorney General Weiser's) persistent refusals to disqualify themselves also satisfies the elements of First Degree Official Misconduct. § 18-8-404, C.R.S.[1]

Essentially, Attorney General Weiser's strategy has been to obstruct and prevent litigation of the merits of *Gregory*, including avoiding the Defendants' obligations to timely and directly respond to the allegations of their unlawful conduct pled in the Verified Complaint. This obstruction has now culminated in the entry of a default against all Defendants. Exhibit 1. Until and unless the default is set aside under F.R.C.P. 55(c), the allegations of the Verified Complaint are treated as admitted / proven. *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). Despite these significant developments in court, the Senate Judiciary Committee has refused to confront Attorney General Weiser, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, Governor Jared Polis, and the members and staff of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline with their persistent refusals to disqualify themselves and the allegations made against them personally. In other words, there is no legislative oversight of our State's highest-ranking elected officials.

With these additional facts, the Senate Judiciary Committee's refusal to allow me a full opportunity to petition for grievances, its deliberate disregard for the legislative record that I created (including as to SB26-084), and its refusal to consider my request for a joint resolution directing the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado perpetuates ongoing public fraud and civil rights violations rather than providing meaningful accountability. Again, I respectfully submit that the conduct of the Senate Judiciary Committee substantially breaches the ethical standards enforceable through Senate Rule 43. I renew my request that you take action on my February 11, 2026 complaint, as supplemented by this letter.

---

[1] § 18-8-404, C.R.S. provides:

> (1) A public servant commits first degree official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit for the public servant or another or maliciously to cause harm to another, he or she knowingly:
> (a) Commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official function; or
> (b) Refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law; or
> (c) Violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his office.
> (2) First degree official misconduct is a class 1 misdemeanor.

According to § 18-1-901(3)(o), C.R.S., a "'Public servant' means any officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses."

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosure

EXHIBIT 1

Christopher Gregory

From: COD_ENotice@cod.uscourts.gov
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2026 3:50 PM
To: COD_ENotice@cod.uscourts.gov
Subject: Activity in Case 1:25-cv-03361-GPG Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The et al Clerk's Entry of Default

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U.S. District Court - District of Colorado

District of Colorado

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 2/23/2026 at 3:49 PM MST and filed on 2/23/2026

Case Name: Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The et al
Case Number: 1:25-cv-03361-GPG
Filer: Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The
Ingrid Barrier
David Beller
Maria Berkenkotter
Brian D. Boatright
Jill Brady
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Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, The
Colorado Supreme Court, The
Meredith Patrick Cord
Richard Gabriel
Robert Gardner
Sara Garrido
Kirsten Grooms
Melissa Hart
James Hartmann
Amanda Hollander

William Hood III
Alison Kyles
Bryon Large
Anne Mangiardi
Monica Marquez
Bonnie McLean
Colleen McManamon
Kristen Mix
Emily Tofte Nestaval
Reed Owens
Jared Polis
Jared (I) Polis
Carlos Samour
Mary V. Sooter
Aubrey C. Sullivan
Courtney Sutton
Jeff Swanty
Stefanie Trujillo
MaryAnn Vielma
Vincente Vigil
Jeffrey M. Walsh
Philip (I) J. Weiser
Philip J. Weiser

Document Number: 46(No document attached)

Docket Text:

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian D. Boatright, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, The, Colorado Supreme Court, The, Meredith Patrick Cord, Richard Gabriel, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, Melissa Hart, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, William Hood III, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Monica Marquez, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Reed Owens, Jared Polis, Jared (I) Polis, Carlos Samour, Mary V. Sooter, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Stefanie Trujillo, MaryAnn Vielma, Vincente Vigil, Jeffrey M. Walsh, Philip (I) J. Weiser, Philip J. Weiser, by Clerk. Text Only Entry (ccuen,)

1:25-cv-03361-GPG Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ingrid J. DeFranco ingrid.defranco@gmail.com, defrancoi@yahoo.com

Daniel Mitchell Combs dan.combs@coag.gov, LaTasha.Carter@coag.gov, danmcombs@gmail.com, lindaruth.carter@coag.gov

Katharine J. Brown katharine.brown@coag.gov, carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov, felicia.rei@coag.gov

Christopher Sydney Philip Gregory cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net, cspgregory@hotmail.com

Clayton Jeffrey Ankney clayton.ankney@coag.gov, Denise.munger@coag.gov, LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov

1:25-cv-03361-GPG Notice has been mailed by the filer to:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-GPG

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

To the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado:

As provided by Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory requests that this Court enter the default of the following Defendants for failure to plead or otherwise defend against this action in a timely manner:

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE,
The COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE,
The COLORADO SUPREME COURT,
MARY V. SOOTER, individually,
PHILIP J. WEISER, individually, and in his official capacity as the Colorado Attorney General,
JARED POLIS, individually, and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado,
MARIA BERKENKOTTER, individually,
BRIAN D. BOATRIGHT, individually,
RICHARD GABRIEL, individually,
MELISSA HART, individually,
WILLIAM HOOD, III, individually,
MONICA MÁRQUEZ, individually,
CARLOS SAMOUR, individually,
INGRID BARRIER, individually,
DAVID BELLER, individually,

JILL BRADY, individually,
GINA CANNAN, individually,
JAMES CARPENTER, individually,
NANCY COHEN, individually,
ROBERT GARDNER, individually,
SARA GARRIDO, individually,
KIRSTEN GROOMS, individually,
JAMES HARTMANN, individually,
AMANDA HOLLANDER, individually,
ALISON KYLES, individually,
BRYON LARGE, individually,
ANNE MANGIARDI, individually,
BONNIE MCLEAN, individually,
COLLEEN MCMANAMON, individually,
KRISTEN MIX, individually,
REED OWENS, individually,
MEREDITH PATRICK CORD, individually,
AUBREY C. SULLIVAN, individually,
COURTNEY SUTTON, individually,
JEFF SWANTY, individually,
EMILY TOFTE NESTAVAL, individually,
STEFANIE TRUJILLO, individually,
MARYANN VIELMA, individually,
VINCENTE VIGIL, individually, and
JEFFREY M. WALSH, individually.

As evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court, the above-named Defendants the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Supreme Court, Jared Polis, Philip J. Weiser, and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline were served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 12, 2025 and November 17, 2025. ECF Nos. 13 through 17. The remaining Defendants executed Waiver(s) of Service on December 1, 2025 and filed December 12, 2025. ECF Nos. 23, 23-1 through 23-34.

Originally, the applicable time limits for the above-named Defendants to appear and otherwise respond to this action were December 3, 2025, December 8, 2025, and January 30, 2026. Through an unopposed motion and order, the applicable time limits were first extended to

February 2, 2026. ECF No. 21. Through a second unopposed motion (but without issuance of an order confirming it), the applicable time limits were then extended to February 16, 2026, which has now expired. ECF No. 27.

The above-named Defendants have individually and collectively failed to plead or otherwise respond to the Verified Complaint and Jury Demand filed October 23, 2025. Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Clerk of Court perform his mandatory and ministerial function in entering the default. F.R.C.P. 55(a).

This request is supported by the attached Declaration of Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory.

Dated: February 18, 2026

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq.
Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601
Telephone: (303) 641-6812
Email: Ingrid.DeFranco@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
Christopher S.P. Gregory, Esq.
The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502
Telephone: (970) 648-0642
E-mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
Pro Se Attorney for Plaintiff
Christopher S.P. Gregory

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February 18, 2026, I filed the above filing via email to the Clerk of the Court, who will docket it in CM/ECF. CM/ECF will send notification of this filing to any party who has entered an appearance in this matter to the e-mail addresses provided in CM/ECF.

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-GPG

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY

Christopher S.P. Gregory, Colorado Atty. Reg. No. 37095 / U.S. Dist. Ct. Colo. Atty. No. 2136213, ("Declarant") being of lawful age, of sound mind, and first dually sworn upon oath, deposes and says the following:

1. Declarant is the Plaintiff in this action and this Declaration is based upon Declarant's personal knowledge and made in good faith.
2. Defendants the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Supreme Court, Colorado Governor Jared Polis, and Colorado Attorney Philip J. Weiser were served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 12, 2025, as evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court. ECF Nos. 13 through 16.
3. Defendant the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline was, likewise, served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 17, 2025, as evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court. ECF No. 17.

4. The remaining Defendants Mary V. Sooter, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian D. Boatright, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood, III, Monica Márquez, Carlos Samour, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Reed Owens, Meredith Patrick Cord, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Stefanie Trujillo, MaryAnn Vielma, Vincente Vigil, and Jeffrey M. Walsh executed waivers of service on December 1, 2025 that were filed with this Court on December 12, 2025.
5. The Defendants have collectively failed to serve or file a pleading or otherwise respond to the complaint. The applicable time limit for responding to the complaint, even as repeatedly extended upon agreement of the parties, has expired.
6. None of the Defendants are minors or incompetent persons.
7. None of the Defendants are currently in the military service, and therefore the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply.
8. I have attached to this declaration true and correct copies of the proofs and waivers of service on file for the above-named Defendants.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made in this Declaration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on February 18, 2026, in Longmont, Colorado.

Christopher S.P. Gregory

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Hannah S. (Front Desk Receptionist), who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

No last name provided.





Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* The Colorado Supreme Court was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Magdalene (Judicial Clerk III) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* The Colorado Supreme Court on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

Magdalene refused to provide last name.

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* Colorado Governor Jared Polis was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Tyler Goldstein (Staff Assistant), who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* Colorado Governor Jared Polis on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* The Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Judge Bryon M. Large , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* The Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

Judge Large stated that he wasn't sure he was authorized to accept service for the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee but did accept service.

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Scott Sosebee (Court Executive) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* Judge Jill Brady Member of CCJD The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline on *(date)* 11/17/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/17/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

HSH INVESTIGATIONS

Connie Mayhugh
HSH **Investigations, LLC**
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Mobile: 970-580-0779

DATE: 11/19/25

MEMORANDUM

On November 12th, I, Investigator Connie Mayhugh, arrived at the Ralph Carr Colorado Judicial Center to serve a Summons and Complaint to the following parties:

- Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser
- Justice Monica Marquez, Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court
- James Carpenter, Chair, Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
- Kristen Mix, Chair, Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee

Upon arrival, I spoke with the receptionist, who contacted Hannah S.. Hannah S. confirmed she could only accept service for Philip Weiser, but could accept courtesy copies for others. No response was received from the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline.

At the Supreme Court office, the clerk, Magdalene, accepted service for Justice Monica Marquez but declined for others.

Efforts to serve the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline at their official office were not successful.

At the Governor's office, Tyler Goldstein, staff assistant, accepted service for Governor Jared Polis without issue.

Later, Hannah S. advised me to visit Suite 210, but again, no response was received. I then proceeded to the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, where I spoke with the receptionist. The receptionist consulted with Judge Bryon Large, who subsequently met with me in person. Judge Large clarified that he was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, as he was not a member of the Commission. When asked about the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, Judge Large acknowledged his membership but expressed uncertainty regarding his authority to accept service for the Discipline Rulemaking Committee. After further discussion, Judge Large ultimately agreed to accept service for the Judicial Discipline

HSH INVESTIGATIONS

Rulemaking Committee, while reiterating his reservations about his authorization to do so. He refused to accept service on behalf of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline.

Upon returning to the reception area to inquire on whether Hannah was able to reach anyone with the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, she was in communication via phone with a female individual whose name was not provided. Hannah handed me the phone, and I spoke with this individual who identified herself as working within the Office of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline. She informed me that there was no one present in the office that day who could accept service but indicated that someone would be available the following day to accept service. I inquired if there was anyone available who could accept service on behalf of the Commission, explaining that I would not be able to return at a later time. The response was that there was no one present who was authorized to accept service.

On November 17th, I served Judge Jill Brady, a member of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, at the El Paso County Court House. Scott Sosebee, Court Executive, accepted service on Judge Brady's behalf.

This report was provided by Connie Mayhugh, Investigator at HSH Investigations, and is a true and accurate representation of information gathered.

Signature: Connie Mayhugh Date: 11/19/25

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Ingrid Barrier
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

David Beller
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jill Brady
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Monica M. Márquez
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Gina Cannan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Carpenter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Nancy Cohen
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Robert Gardner
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Sara Garrido
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kirsten Grooms
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Hartmann
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Amanda Hollander
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Maria E. Berkenkotter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Brian D. Boatright
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Richard L. Gabriel
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Melissa Hart
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

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Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

William W. Hood, III
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Carlos A. Samour, Jr.
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Alison Kyles
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bryon Large
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Anne Mangiardi
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bonnie McLean
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Colleen McManamon
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kristen Mix
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Reed Owens
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Meredith Patrick Cord
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mary V. Sooter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Aubrey C. Sullivan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Courtney Sutton
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeff Swanty
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Stefanie Trujillo
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mariana Vielma
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Vincente Vigil
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeffrey M. Walsh
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
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Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Emily Tofte Nestaval
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

David Beller
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jill Brady
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Monica M. Márquez
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Gina Cannan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Carpenter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY *Plaintiff* v. COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al *Defendant*	)	Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Nancy Cohen
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Robert Gardner
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Sara Garrido
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kirsten Grooms
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Hartmann
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Amanda Hollander
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Maria E. Berkenkotter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Brian D. Boatright
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Richard L. Gabriel
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Melissa Hart
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

William W. Hood, III
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Carlos A. Samour, Jr.
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Alison Kyles
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bryon Large
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Anne Mangiardi
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bonnie McLean
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Colleen McManamon
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kristen Mix
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Reed Owens
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Meredith Patrick Cord
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mary V. Sooter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Aubrey C. Sullivan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Courtney Sutton
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeff Swanty
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

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AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

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I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Stefanie Trujillo
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
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AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

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Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mariana Vielma
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
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AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

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Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Vincente Vigil
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

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(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

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Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeffrey M. Walsh
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

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Denver, CO 80203
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AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

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Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Emily Tofte Nestaval
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

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E-mail address

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If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

Attorney General.



Be It Resolved by the Senate of the Seventy-Sixth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, the House of Representatives concurring herein:

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Whereas credible evidence exists that whistleblowers, witnesses, and public officials within Colorado state and local governments are being systematically intimidated and retaliated against through the misuse of public resources and the selective prosecution / non-prosecution of the wrongdoers involved;

Whereas examples of the systematic misconduct involved include patterns of alleged corruption within the Colorado Judiciary, alleged interference with the 2024 presidential election, publicly funded self-investigations of various incidents of alleged official misconduct, non-disclosure and hush money agreements valued at over $4 million which have been negotiated by the Colorado Attorney General's Office and other agencies / public officials, and the allegedly invalid approval of an urban renewal authority estimated to divert $155 million of tax revenues over 25 years;

Whereas, these circumstances present probable cause and a reasonable basis to suspect violations of both Colorado and federal law;

Whereas, because of conflicts of interest, the Colorado Attorney General and the entire Colorado Department of Law are unable to impartially enforce Colorado's False Claims Act, Title 24, Part 12, C.R.S.;

Whereas, 22 other states and the District of Columbia have their own equivalent civil false claims acts. Those states and the District of Columbia are:

- California—Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12650 to 12656;
- Connecticut—Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-274 to 4-289;
- Delaware--Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201-1201;
- District of Columbia—D.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-381.01 to 2-381.10;
- Florida—Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 68.082 to 68.105;
- Georgia—Ga. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-120 to 23-3-120;
- Hawai'i—Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 661-21 to 661-31;
- Illinois—740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 175/1 to 175/8;
- Indiana—Ind. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-5.5-1 to 5-11-5.5-18;
- Iowa—Iowa Code Ann. §§ 685.1 to 685.7;
- Kansas—Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-7501 to 75-7511;
- Maryland—MD GEN PROVIS §§ 8-101 to 8-111;
- Massachusetts—Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, §§ 5A to 5O;
- Minnesota—Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 15C.01 to 15C.16;
- Nevada—Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 357.010 to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 357.250:
- New Jersey—N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:32C-1 to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-18;
- New Mexico—N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-9-1 to 44-9-14;
- New York—N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 188 to 194;
- North Carolina—N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-605 to 1-618;

- Oregon—Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 180.750 to 180.785;
- Rhode Island—9 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 9-1.1-1 to 9-1.2-9;
- Tennessee—Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-18-101 to 4-18-108; and
- Vermont--Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§ 630 to 642; and

Whereas, the U.S. Department of Justice—Denver Office and the U.S. Department of Justice—Wyoming Office also has conflicts of interest as to the individuals involved in the alleged public corruption and are unable to impartially investigate the factual circumstances;

Section 1. The Colorado General Assembly shall submit a formal request to the U.S. Department of Justice to assign an Office outside of the U.S. Department of Justice—Denver Office and the U.S. Department of Justice—Wyoming Office to complete a conflict-free investigation of the alleged public corruption within Colorado state and local government.

Section 2. As authorized by § 24-31-101(1)(g), C.R.S. and § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S., the Colorado General Assembly (through and as the Colorado State Auditor's supervising authority) shall designate and appoint another state's attorney general (from one of the 22 other states or the District of Columbia with equivalent civil false claims acts) as a Special Assistant Attorney General charged with investigating and representing the State of Colorado's interests as to alleged violations of Colorado's False Claims Act and other laws. The costs of the investigation and representation shall be paid through funds already appropriated through HB25-1321 and the Colorado Department of Law's annual budget, as provided by § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S.

Section 3. According to the authority provided through Colo. House R. 26(a)(2) and Colo. Senate R. 30(b)(2), an investigating committee comprised of members of both houses shall be formed to implement and effectuate this joint resolution.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 4

Phil Weiser
Colorado Attorney General

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

YOU'VE SUCCESSFULLY SUBMITTED COMPLAINT #C-000055313.

PRINT OR DOWNLOAD THIS SCREEN FOR YOUR RECORDS.

ABOUT YOU (COMPLAINANT INFORMATION)

YOUR NAME: Christopher Gregory
YOUR ADDRESS: 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont CO 80502
YOUR EMAIL: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
YOUR PHONE NUMBER: 9706480642

ABOUT THE COMPLAINT

COMPLAINT CATEGORY: Federal Agency (Police and Other Government Agencies)
DATE OF INCIDENT: January 14, 2026
LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Public (i.e., polling place, courthouse, street, etc.)
ADDRESS OF INCIDENT:
MATTER REPORTED TO ANOTHER AGENCY: Yes
REPORTED TO: The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
OUTCOME OR RELATED GUIDANCE: The misconduct remains ongoing.
OTHER KNOWN INCIDENTS:

ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT ACTOR

AGENCY:U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
TYPE OF AGENCY: Federal Agency
OTHER AGENCY TYPE: No other law enforcement
CITY OF AGENCY: Denver
COUNTY OF AGENCY: Denver

COMPLAINT NARRATIVE

PHYSICALLY PRESENT DURING THE INCIDENT?: No
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT PRESENT OR INVOLVED?: No
I have filed affidavits under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 that require the disqualification of U.S. District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico from cases assigned to him due to personal bias and/or prejudice. The affidavits require automatic disqualification under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 and prohibits the judge subject to disqualification from taking further action. Judge Domenico, however, continues to preside over the cases and to issue order(s). The two cases are Case No. 1:25-cv-00190--DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (sealed) and Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., 1:25-cv-03361--DDD. Attorney General Phil Weiser is a defendant in Gregory, named in both his official and individual capacities. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest involved, the Colorado Attorney General's Office is representing Weiser and all of the other Defendants in Gregory. The Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 (ECF No. 26) is a temporarily restricted filing, but already in the possession/actual knowledge of the Colorado Attorney General's Office. The attorneys involved and the Defendants they represent are facilitating Judge Domenico's judicial misconduct by allowing him to remain assigned to Gregory despite indisputable evidence of his actual bias.

I hereby certify I am the above listed individual and I have reviewed the preceding information and it is true to the best of my knowledge.

Created By: Christopher Gregory
Created On: 1/21/2026, 5:41 PM
Submitted via: complaints.coag.gov
Reference: C-000055313

Office of the Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Building
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
(720) 508-6000
(tel:+17205086000)

Contact the Office of the Attorney General

CONTACT (https://complaints.coag.gov/s/contact-us)

ACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT (https://coag.gov/colorado-office-of-the-attorney-general-accessibility-statement/)

DECLARACION DE ACCESIBILIDAD (https://coag.gov/declaracion-de-accesibilidad/)

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(https://bsky.app/profile/coattnygeneral.bsky.so

CORA (https://coag.gov/media-center/colorado-open-records-act-cora/) | WEBSITE PRIVACY POLICY (https://coag.gov/website-privacy-policy/)
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Phil Weiser
Colorado Attorney General

YOU'VE SUCCESSFULLY SUBMITTED COMPLAINT #C-000055316.

PRINT OR DOWNLOAD THIS SCREEN FOR YOUR RECORDS.

ABOUT YOU (COMPLAINANT INFORMATION)

YOUR NAME: Christopher Gregory
YOUR ADDRESS: 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont CO 80502
YOUR EMAIL: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
YOUR PHONE NUMBER: 9706480642

ABOUT THE COMPLAINT

COMPLAINT CATEGORY: Governmental Authority (Police and Other Government Agencies)
DATE OF INCIDENT: January 1, 2001
LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Statewide with most incidents occurring in Denver at the Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center and the Colorado Supreme Court venues that preceded it.
ADDRESS OF INCIDENT:
MATTER REPORTED TO ANOTHER AGENCY: Yes
REPORTED TO: The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
OUTCOME OR RELATED GUIDANCE: There is a pending civil case--Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al., 1:25-cv-03361--DDD (D. Colo.)
OTHER KNOWN INCIDENTS: Yes
The long history of incidents is detailed in the pending civil action, in which Attorney General Philip Weiser and the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court are named Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT ACTOR

AGENCY:THE COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE / THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT / THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE / THE COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE
TYPE OF AGENCY: Judicial branch
OTHER AGENCY TYPE:
CITY OF AGENCY: Denver
COUNTY OF AGENCY: Denver

COMPLAINT NARRATIVE

The pending lawsuit details a more than 25-year pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court conspiring with others to misuse public funds as hush money (NDAs), for self-controlled investigations, and for public relations schemes intended to cover up judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. The pattern and practice continues to wrongfully cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I HEREBY CERTIFY I AM THE ABOVE LISTED INDIVIDUAL AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE PRECEDING INFORMATION AND IT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE. I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE COLORADO

ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY SHARE MY COMPLAINT WITH OTHERS, INCLUDING THE ABOVE LISTED BUSINESS AND/OR ITS AGENTS AND SEEK A RESPONSE FROM THE BUSINESS REGARDING MY COMPLAINT. I AUTHORIZE THE BUSINESS AND ITS AGENTS TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF MY COMPLAINT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

Created By: Christopher Gregory
Created On: 1/21/2026, 6:17 PM
Submitted via: complaints.coag.gov
Reference: C-000055316

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Attorney General with your report about a government actor that deprived someone of his or her legal rights.

What Can I Expect to Happen Next?

The Colorado Attorney General may open a civil investigation when a governmental authority may have a pattern and practice of depriving persons of their legal rights. Pattern-and-practice cases address widespread misconduct by government entities, not isolated instances.

As a result, we will review the information contained in your report as part of our work to collect data and identify patterns or practices of unlawful conduct. We cannot respond to every report we receive. If we need further information about your complaint, we will contact you.

What If I Need Help with My Individual Case?

The Attorney General's Office does not have the legal authority to investigate or prosecute your individual case. If you seek a criminal or civil investigation or another remedy for your case on an individual basis, please contact your local law enforcement agency, district attorney's office, the United States Department of Justice, or a private attorney. The Colorado Bar Association provides assistance to people who are seeking attorneys at this website: https://www.cobar.org/Licensed-Lawyer (https://www.cobar.org/Licensed-Lawyer).

We appreciate the time and effort you took in bringing your concerns to our attention. Information from the public is vital in helping us document trends and, when appropriate, pursue investigations and file lawsuits on behalf of the public.

Office of the Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Building
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Contact the Office of the Attorney General

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office-in-colorado)
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Independent Ethics Commission – Formal Complaint Form

Before the Independent Ethics Commission
of the State of Colorado

For Commission Use Only
Received date:
Case. No.:

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Clayton Ankney
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 720-508-6604

Email address: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

Please see attached statement of facts.



Description of acts or things complained of (continued):

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I hereby acknowledge that the facts presented herein are true to the best of my knowledge, and I will cooperate in the process regarding this complaint and will appear at any proceeding of the Independent Ethics Commission if the complaint is scheduled for a hearing.

Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

Dated at Longmont (City), Colorado, this 4th day of March, 20 26.

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I filed a civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation lawsuit in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV (D. Colo.). In its simplest terms, *Gregory* alleges that the defendants have deprived me of my constitutional, statutory, and administrative rights to freely report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct without fear of retaliation. The most important remedies sought in *Gregory* are injunctive and equitable in nature, including my reinstatement as the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), the reformation of Colorado's judicial oversight entities, the invalidation of rulemaking, the prohibition against further use of appointment authority, and restitution to the State of Colorado for the reasonable attorney fees and costs publicly expended through the representation of the defendants in defense of misconduct that occurred in their individual capacities.

Notwithstanding the claim for restitution being pled in my Verified Complaint, consolidated and conflicted representation of the State of Colorado's interests and the personal interests of the individually named defendants has occurred through the Colorado Attorney General's Office. This persistent and conflicted representation combined with the defendants' avoidance of responding to the merits of *Gregory* has culminated in the entry of a default against all the defendants. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 39, 39-1, 46; *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). I respectfully submit that the verified, and now effectively-admitted, misconduct of the various defendants is probable cause to suspect the crimes of Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516), Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.), and First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.).

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(name)

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201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Ingrid C. Barrier
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Public Safety
700 Kipling, Suite 1000
Lakewood, CO 80215

Daytime telephone number: _____

Email address: cdps_hr@state.co.us

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

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201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Katherine Brown
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 720-508-6567

Email address: katherine.brown@coag.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

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1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
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Daytime telephone number: 720-506-6000

Email address: gina.cannan@coag.gov

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The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: James Carpenter
(name)

Mailing Address: Freestone Strategies, LLC
1415 Park Ave. West
Denver, CO 80205

Daytime telephone number: 720-346-4669

Email address: jim@freestone-strategies.com

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

Please see attached statement of facts.

Description of acts or things complained of (continued):

Advisement regarding remedies and penalties: Pursuant to Colo. Const. art. XXIX, § 6, a covered individual found to have breached the public trust for private gain is liable for double the amount of the financial equivalent of any benefits obtained by such actions. The manner of recovery and additional penalties may be provided by law. The Commission does not assess criminal penalties, award injunctive relief, or award damages to complainants.

I hereby acknowledge that the facts presented herein are true to the best of my knowledge, and I will cooperate in the process regarding this complaint and will appear at any proceeding of the Independent Ethics Commission if the complaint is scheduled for a hearing.

Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

Dated at Longmont (City), Colorado, this 4th day of March, 2026.

Created by Article XXIX of the Colorado Constitution, the Independent Ethics Commission may review and hold hearings on matters falling within its jurisdiction as outlined in Article XXIX.

I have filed a civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation lawsuit in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV (D. Colo.). In its simplest terms, *Gregory* alleges that the defendants have deprived me of my constitutional, statutory, and administrative rights to freely report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct without fear of retaliation. The most important remedies sought in *Gregory* are injunctive and equitable in nature, including my reinstatement as the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), the reformation of Colorado's judicial oversight entities, the invalidation of rulemaking, the prohibition against further use of appointment authority, and restitution to the State of Colorado for the reasonable attorney fees and costs publicly expended through the representation of the defendants in defense of misconduct that occurred in their individual capacities.

Notwithstanding the claim for restitution being pled in my Verified Complaint, consolidated and conflicted representation of the State of Colorado's interests and the personal interests of the individually named defendants has occurred through the Colorado Attorney General's Office. This persistent and conflicted representation combined with the defendants' avoidance of responding to the merits of *Gregory* has culminated in the entry of a default against all the defendants. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 39, 39-1, 46; *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). I respectfully submit that the verified, and now effectively-admitted, misconduct of the various defendants is probable cause to suspect the crimes of Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516), Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.), and First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.).

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James Carpenter is a professional lobbyist through his business Freestone Strategies, LLC. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over James Carpenter according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 3.

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(name)

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201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Dan Combs
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 720-508-6625

Email address: dan.combs@coag.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

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Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

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Dan Combs is employed as a First Assistant Attorney General at the Colorado Department of Law and is counsel of record in Case No. 1:25-cv-03361-KHV. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over Dan Combs according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 5(3)(a).

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Received date: _____
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The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Michael Dougherty
(name)

Mailing Address: 20th Judicial District Attorney's Office
P.O. Box 471
Boulder, CO 80306

Daytime telephone number: 303-441-3700

Email address: boulderda@bouldercounty.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

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Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

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Michael Dougherty is the elected 20th Judicial District Attorney. Mr. Dougherty, through his Assistant DA Kenneth Kupfner, obstructed my efforts to report suspected crimes involved to my local law enforcement agency, the Longmont Police Department. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over Michael Dougherty according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 5(3)(a).

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Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Kirsten E. Grooms
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 720-508-6432

Email address: kirsten.grooms@coag.gov

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Kristen Grooms is employed by the Colorado Department of Law. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over Kristen Grooms according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 5(3)(a).

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Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Alison F. Kyles
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 720-508-6000

Email address: alison.kyles@coag.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

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Description of acts or things complained of (continued):

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Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

Dated at Longmont (City), Colorado, this 4th day of March, 2026.

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Notwithstanding the claim for restitution being pled in my Verified Complaint, consolidated and conflicted representation of the State of Colorado's interests and the personal interests of the individually named Defendants has occurred through the Colorado Attorney General's Office. This persistent and conflicted representation combined with the Defendants' avoidance of responding to the merits of *Gregory* has culminated in the entry of a default against all the Defendants. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 39, 39-1, 46; *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). I respectfully submit that the verified, and now effectively-admitted, misconduct of the various Defendants is probable cause to suspect the crimes of Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516), Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.), and First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.).

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Alison Kyles is employed as an Assistant Solicitor General at the Colorado Department of Law. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over Alison Kyles according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 5(3)(a).

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Before the Independent Ethics Commission
of the State of Colorado

For Commission Use Only
Received date: _____
Case. No.: _____

The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Anne Mangiardi
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
1300 Broadway, Ste. 210
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 303-457-5134

Email address: a.mangiardi@jd.state.co.us

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

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The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Governor Jared Polis
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado State Capitol
200 E. Colfax Ave., Rm. 136
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 303-866-2471

Email address: governorpolis@state.co.us

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

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201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Aubrey C. Sullivan
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Civil Rights Division
1560 Broadway, Suite 825
Denver, CO 80202

Daytime telephone number: 303-894-2997

Email address: DORA_CCRD@state.co.us

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

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Mailing Address: Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
1300 Broadway, Ste. 210
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 303-457-5135

Email address: j.walsh@jd.state.co.us

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I hereby acknowledge that the facts presented herein are true to the best of my knowledge, and I will cooperate in the process regarding this complaint and will appear at any proceeding of the Independent Ethics Commission if the complaint is scheduled for a hearing.

Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

Dated at Longmont (City), Colorado, this 4th day of March, 2026.

Created by Article XXIX of the Colorado Constitution, the Independent Ethics Commission may review and hold hearings on matters falling within its jurisdiction as outlined in Article XXIX.

I have filed a civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation lawsuit in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV (D. Colo.). In its simplest terms, *Gregory* alleges that the defendants have deprived me of my constitutional, statutory, and administrative rights to freely report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct without fear of retaliation. The most important remedies sought in *Gregory* are injunctive and equitable in nature, including my reinstatement as the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), the reformation of Colorado's judicial oversight entities, the invalidation of rulemaking, the prohibition against further use of appointment authority, and restitution to the State of Colorado for the reasonable attorney fees and costs publicly expended through the representation of the defendants in defense of misconduct that occurred in their individual capacities.

Notwithstanding the claim for restitution being pled in my Verified Complaint, consolidated and conflicted representation of the State of Colorado's interests and the personal interests of the individually named defendants has occurred through the Colorado Attorney General's Office. This persistent and conflicted representation combined with the defendants' avoidance of responding to the merits of *Gregory* has culminated in the entry of a default against all the defendants. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 39, 39-1, 46; *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). I respectfully submit that the verified, and now effectively-admitted, misconduct of the various defendants is probable cause to suspect the crimes of Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516), Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.), and First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.).

In particular, First Degree Official Misconduct is relevant to the defendants' persistent refusal to disqualify themselves from official functions which are intertwined with their personal interests. Moreover, the defendants have unlawfully relied upon the Colorado Attorney General's Office to perpetuate rather than investigate and prosecute the allegations of public fraud and corruption I alleged in *Gregory* and through complaints filed with the Colorado Office of the State Auditor's Fraud Hotline. The representation of the individually named defendants (including Attorney General Phil Weiser himself) through the public resources of the Colorado Attorney General's Office further meets the definition of "occupational fraud" under the Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. and a "gift" as defined by Colo. Const. Art. 29, § 3(3). Court filings in *Gregory* are already part of the legislative record and can be found through the following links:

> 1/21/2026 Joint Judiciary Committee SMART Act Hearing for the Colorado Judicial Department--https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/28660;
>
> 2/9/2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Conformation Hearing for the Appointment of former Senator Bob Gardner to the CCJD--
> https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/28938; and
>
> 2/11/2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on SB26-084--
> https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/29188.

In submitting this complaint, I am mindful of conflicts within the IEC that require disqualification of IEC Chair Sarah Mercer, IEC member Cyril Vidergar, and the IEC's General Counsel through the Colorado Attorney General's Office, Gina Cannan. Chair Mercer was appointed to the IEC by defendant Justice Brian Boatright. Chair Mercer previously worked as Counsel to Chief Justice Michael Bender and would have been involved in or a witness to the more than 25-year pattern of judicial misconduct alleged in *Gregory*, including the retaliatory firing of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline's Executive Director Rick Wehmhoefer in 2008. Chair Mercer is also employed as a partner at Brownstein Hyatt Farber Shreck, which represents Loveland developer McWhinney / Realberry. IEC member Cyril Vidergar is currently employed as a Loveland Senior Assistant City Attorney. In my role as Special Counsel to the City of Loveland, I publicly asserted my findings of probable cause to prosecute members and former members of the Loveland City Council for their violation of the civil Colorado Open Meetings Law and parallel criminal provisions in the Loveland Municipal Charter and Loveland Municipal Code. My findings arose in connection with official misconduct that occurred when the involved Loveland City Council members opposed SB23-273 and approved an estimated 25-year, $155 million tax diversion as part of McWhinney's Centerra South Urban Renewal Authority. More recently, McWhinney/Realberry founder Chad McWhinney's inclusion in the Epstein files has been reported in the press. Noelle Philips, *Denver Developer Behind Union Station Project Identified in Epstein Files*, DENVER POST, February 12, 2026. General Counsel Gina Cannan is a defendant in *Gregory* directly responsible for the retaliation that occurred against me when I was wrongfully terminated as Executive Director of the CCJD.

Beyond the conflicts that require disqualification within the IEC, I further note that IEC Vice-Chair Daniel Wolf concurrently serves as a member of the Fifth Judicial District Judicial Performance Commission. The Performance Commission is statutorily charged with verifying defendant 5th Judicial District Judge Reid Owens' integrity as part of the 2026 judicial retention cycle.

As I have requested of Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter, the Colorado General Assembly, and the Denver County Court, it is appropriate for the IEC to formally refer the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and to exercise its discretion to directly appoint another state's attorney general to provide impartial legal representation and investigation support as a Special Assistant Attorney General according to § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. If the IEC arbitrarily refuses to recognize this complaint as non-frivolous under Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, § 5(3)(b), I will seek recourse in federal court.

Jeffrey M. Walsh is employed as Special Counsel of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, an independent state agency housed within the Colorado Judicial Department. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over Jeffrey Walsh according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 5(3)(a).

Independent Ethics Commission – Formal Complaint Form

Before the Independent Ethics Commission
of the State of Colorado

For Commission Use Only
Received date: _____
Case. No.: _____

The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Philip Weiser
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Department of Law
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 720-506-6000

Email address: philip.weiser@coag.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

Please see attached statement of facts.

Description of acts or things complained of (continued):

Advisement regarding remedies and penalties: Pursuant to Colo. Const. art. XXIX, § 6, a covered individual found to have breached the public trust for private gain is liable for double the amount of the financial equivalent of any benefits obtained by such actions. The manner of recovery and additional penalties may be provided by law. The Commission does not assess criminal penalties, award injunctive relief, or award damages to complainants.

I hereby acknowledge that the facts presented herein are true to the best of my knowledge, and I will cooperate in the process regarding this complaint and will appear at any proceeding of the Independent Ethics Commission if the complaint is scheduled for a hearing.

Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

Dated at Longmont (City), Colorado, this 4th day of March, 2026.

Created by Article XXIX of the Colorado Constitution, the Independent Ethics Commission may review and hold hearings on matters falling within its jurisdiction as outlined in Article XXIX.

I have filed a civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation lawsuit in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV (D. Colo.). In its simplest terms, *Gregory* alleges that the defendants have deprived me of my constitutional, statutory, and administrative rights to freely report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct without fear of retaliation. The most important remedies sought in *Gregory* are injunctive and equitable in nature, including my reinstatement as the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), the reformation of Colorado's judicial oversight entities, the invalidation of rulemaking, the prohibition against further use of appointment authority, and restitution to the State of Colorado for the reasonable attorney fees and costs publicly expended through the representation of the defendants in defense of misconduct that occurred in their individual capacities.

Notwithstanding the claim for restitution being pled in my Verified Complaint, consolidated and conflicted representation of the State of Colorado's interests and the personal interests of the individually named defendants has occurred through the Colorado Attorney General's Office. This persistent and conflicted representation combined with the defendants' avoidance of responding to the merits of *Gregory* has culminated in the entry of a default against all the defendants. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 39, 39-1, 46; *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). I respectfully submit that the verified, and now effectively-admitted, misconduct of the various defendants is probable cause to suspect the crimes of Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516), Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.), and First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.).

In particular, First Degree Official Misconduct is relevant to the defendants' persistent refusal to disqualify themselves from official functions which are intertwined with their personal interests. Moreover, the defendants have unlawfully relied upon the Colorado Attorney General's Office to perpetuate rather than investigate and prosecute the allegations of public fraud and corruption I alleged in *Gregory* and through complaints filed with the Colorado Office of the State Auditor's Fraud Hotline. The representation of the individually named defendants (including Attorney General Phil Weiser himself) through the public resources of the Colorado Attorney General's Office further meets the definition of "occupational fraud" under the Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. and a "gift" as defined by Colo. Const. Art. 29, § 3(3). Court filings in *Gregory* are already part of the legislative record and can be found through the following links:

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>
> 2/11/2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on SB26-084--
> https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/29188.

In submitting this complaint, I am mindful of conflicts within the IEC that require disqualification of IEC Chair Sarah Mercer, IEC member Cyril Vidergar, and the IEC's General Counsel through the Colorado Attorney General's Office, Gina Cannan. Chair Mercer was appointed to the IEC by defendant Justice Brian Boatright. Chair Mercer previously worked as Counsel to Chief Justice Michael Bender and would have been involved in or a witness to the more than 25-year pattern of judicial misconduct alleged in *Gregory*, including the retaliatory firing of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline's Executive Director Rick Wehmhoefer in 2008. Chair Mercer is also employed as a partner at Brownstein Hyatt Farber Shreck, which represents Loveland developer McWhinney / Realberry. IEC member Cyril Vidergar is currently employed as a Loveland Senior Assistant City Attorney. In my role as Special Counsel to the City of Loveland, I publicly asserted my findings of probable cause to prosecute members and former members of the Loveland City Council for their violation of the civil Colorado Open Meetings Law and parallel criminal provisions in the Loveland Municipal Charter and Loveland Municipal Code. My findings arose in connection with official misconduct that occurred when the involved Loveland City Council members opposed SB23-273 and approved an estimated 25-year, $155 million tax diversion as part of McWhinney's Centerra South Urban Renewal Authority. More recently, McWhinney/Realberry founder Chad McWhinney's inclusion in the Epstein files has been reported in the press. Noelle Philips, *Denver Developer Behind Union Station Project Identified in Epstein Files*, DENVER POST, February 12, 2026. General Counsel Gina Cannan is a defendant in *Gregory* directly responsible for the retaliation that occurred against me when I was wrongfully terminated as Executive Director of the CCJD.

Beyond the conflicts that require disqualification within the IEC, I further note that IEC Vice-Chair Daniel Wolf concurrently serves as a member of the Fifth Judicial District Judicial Performance Commission. The Performance Commission is statutorily charged with verifying defendant 5th Judicial District Judge Reid Owens' integrity as part of the 2026 judicial retention cycle.

As I have requested of Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter, the Colorado General Assembly, and the Denver County Court, it is appropriate for the IEC to formally refer the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and to exercise its discretion to directly appoint another state's attorney general to provide impartial legal representation and investigation support as a Special Assistant Attorney General according to § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. If the IEC arbitrarily refuses to recognize this complaint as non-frivolous under Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, § 5(3)(b), I will seek recourse in federal court.

Philip Weiser is the elected Colorado State Attorney General. The IEC has jurisdictional authority over Attorney General Weiser according to Colo. Const. Art. XXIX, §§ 2 and 5(3)(a).

Independent Ethics Commission – Formal Complaint Form

Before the Independent Ethics Commission
of the State of Colorado

For Commission Use Only
Received date: _____
Case. No.: _____

The Complainant is: Christopher S.P. Gregory
(name)

Mailing Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone number: 970-648-0642

Email address: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

The Respondent is: Senate President James
(name)

Mailing Address: Colorado Capitol Building
200 E Colfax RM 346
Denver, CO 80203

Daytime telephone number: 303-866-4864

Email address: james.coleman.senate@coleg.gov

When did the alleged violation occur: Ongoing

Describe the specific acts or things complained of, with facts that provide a full understanding of the alleged violation(s). If possible, cite the specific ethical standards alleged to have been violated and describe how the violation(s) occurred. Use additional pages if necessary. Attach any documentary evidence you wish to submit.

On February 11, 2026, I submitted a Senate ethics complaint against the involved members of the Senate Judiciary Committee to Senate President James Coleman. On February 25, 2026, I submitted a supplement to the original Senate ethics complaint. Both the original complaint and the supplement requested that President Coleman acknowledge receipt and process the complaint according to Senate Rule 43. A copy of the original Senate ethics complaint was submitted into the legislative record as part of the Senate Judiciary Committee's February 11, 2026 hearing on SB26-084. Both the complaint and the supplement were also distributed directly to all members of the Colorado General Assembly and to the press.

Description of acts or things complained of (continued):
Senate Rule 43(a) provides:

Any person who has knowledge concerning misconduct involving legislative duties by a member of the Senate, including but not limited to the alleged violation of the Rules of the Senate or of Section 40 of Article V of the state Constitution, may file a written, signed complaint with the President setting forth the facts that constitute the alleged misconduct and specifying the statutes, rules, constitutional provisions, or other ethical principles alleged to have been violated. The President shall provide the member complained against with a copy of the complaint. The President shall consult with the majority leader and the minority leader about the complaint. The President may ask the member complained against to provide an explanation of the member's understanding of the issues raised in the complaint for the purpose of assisting the President, the majority leader, and the minority leader in making a preliminary determination of whether the complaint should be dismissed. The President may also discuss the complaint with the complainant to obtain more details on the matter. The President, the majority leader, and the minority leader shall keep the fact that a complaint has been filed and any documents relating thereto confidential; except that the President, the majority leader, or the minority leader may discuss the complaint with the Office of Legislative Legal Services for the purpose of gathering information or receiving legal advice. If at least two of the three leaders conclude that the complaint is not meritorious or does not substantiate an ethical violation, the complaint shall be dismissed, and the complainant and the member complained against shall be so notified. If the complaint is dismissed, the President, the majority leader, and the minority leader shall keep the matter confidential. However, the President, the majority leader, and the minority leader may discuss evidence of a prior complaint previously filed by the same complainant against the same member but which had been dismissed.

Rather than processing my complaint according to his obligations under Senate Rule 43, including acknowledging receipt and consulting with the majority and minority leaders, President Coleman has simply ignored the complaint and supplement. My emails to President Coleman requesting the filing of the complaint and supplement are attached as supporting documents.

Advisement regarding remedies and penalties: Pursuant to Colo. Const. art. XXIX, § 6, a covered individual found to have breached the public trust for private gain is liable for double the amount of the financial equivalent of any benefits obtained by such actions. The manner of recovery and additional penalties may be provided by law. The Commission does not assess criminal penalties, award injunctive relief, or award damages to complainants.

I hereby acknowledge that the facts presented herein are true to the best of my knowledge, and I will cooperate in the process regarding this complaint and will appear at any proceeding of the Independent Ethics Commission if the complaint is scheduled for a hearing.

Signature: _____

Attorney (if applicable): Self-Represented

Dated at Longmont (City), Colorado, this 5th day of March, 20 26.

Created by Article XXIX of the Colorado Constitution, the Independent Ethics Commission may review and hold hearings on matters falling within its jurisdiction as outlined in Article XXIX.

Christopher Gregory

From: Christopher Gregory
Sent: ednesday, February 11, 2026 :21 AM
To: ' ames.coleman.senate@coleg.gov'
Subject: enate Ethics Complaint re: enate Judiciary Committee
tt chments: 260211 C PG JRC tr Ethics Complaint re JC.pdf

Good morning President Coleman,

Attached, please find an ethics complaint brought against the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee according to Senate Rule 43. Please accept my filing of this complaint, acknowledge receipt, and proceed as required under Senate Rule 43.

Sincerely,

Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

This e-mail transmission contains information from the Gregory Law Firm, LLC which may be confidential or protected by the attorney-client privilege. If you are not the intended recipient, you are hereby notified that you must not read this transmission and that any disclosure, copying, printing, distribution or use of any of the information contained in or attached to this transmission is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail and delete the original transmission.

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

February 11, 2026

Senate President James R. Coleman
Colorado State Senate
200 E. Colfax Ave.
Denver, CO 80203
Via E-Mail: james.coleman.senate@coleg.gov

Re: Ethical Complaint Against the Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee Brought According to Senate Rule 43; Exhibits 1-2

Dear President Coleman:

Perhaps the most fundamental right applicable to the legislative process is the right of citizens to address the Legislature and to petition for grievances under the First Amendment[1] and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 24.[2] As applied through the Colorado's Open Meetings Law, the expectation is that citizens have a meaningful opportunity to intelligently participate in the legislative process.

> The intent of the Open Meetings Law is that citizens be given the opportunity to obtain information about and to participate in the legislative decision-making process which affects, both directly and indirectly, their personal interests. A citizen does not intelligently participate in the legislative decision-making process merely by witnessing the final tallying of an already predetermined vote. As a rule, these types of statutes should be interpreted most favorably to protect the ultimate beneficiary, the public.
>
> *Cole v. State*, 673 P.2d 345, 349 (Colo. 1983).

[1] The First Amendment provides:

> Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

[2] Colo. Const., Art. II, § 24 provides:

> The people have the right peaceably to assemble for the common good, and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances, by petition or remonstrance.

As a former member, Vice Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), I have personal knowledge of an entrenched pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, as facilitated by others who include Attorney General Phil Weiser, Governor Jared Polis, and members/staff of the CCJD, committing occupational fraud intended to cover up substantial examples of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. I was also involved in the drafting and ultimate approval of Amendment H by 73% of Colorado voters in 2024. Importantly, Amendment H was intended to remove the Justices' control over the constitutional judicial discipline structure and strengthen its legitimacy. Even after being repeatedly retaliated against for my efforts to publicly expose this now more than 25-year pattern of ongoing public fraud and public corruption, I have persisted in my efforts to seek accountability. It has been my experience that almost invariably, those in positions with both a duty and the authority to administer justice have deliberately disregarded my concerns as a victim of the most egregious form of judicial misconduct—retaliation against the officer and entity constitutionally mandated to enforce the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code). *See* Canon Rules 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary), 1.3 (Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office), 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment) and 2.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities).

The latest example of a deliberate effort to conceal the pattern and practice of the Justices' fraud and retaliation occurred at the confirmation hearing for former Senator Bob Gardner as an attorney member of the CCJD. At the hearing held on February 9, 2026, written materials that I had submitted in advance were deliberately ignored by the Senate Judiciary Committee. *See* Colo. S.R. 36(a) ("Consideration of any such appointment by a committee of reference shall be listed on the Senate calendar prior to such consideration ***so as to permit public comment and information concerning such appointment to be submitted to the committee, its chairman, or the staff thereof.***"). Exhibits 1-2. The submitted materials were also not posted in advance of the hearing, which would have provided an opportunity for other members of the public to comment. Senate Judiciary Chair Mike Weissman refused to allow a motion to permit in-person or virtual public comment under Senate Rule 36(b), as was previously allowed for me to express my opposition to the reappointment of then-CCJD Chair Mindy Sooter and then-CCJD Vice Chair Jim Carpenter at the confirmation hearing held on April 28, 2025. In turn, the full Senate's rejection of Mindy Sooter's reappointment was the reason for Governor Jared Polis pivoting to appoint former Senator Gardner, an apologist for the Justices, as Sooter's replacement.

The other members of the Senate Judiciary Committee at the February 9, 2026 confirmation hearing were Vice-Chair Dylan Roberts, Senator John Carson, Senator Nick Hinrichsen, Senator Marc Snyder (temporarily substituting for Senator Lindsey Daugherty), Senator Katie Wallace, and Senator Lynda Zamora Wilson. In addition to denying me any meaningful opportunity to be heard, the Senate Judiciary Committee proceeded to conduct a *pro forma* vote forwarding former Senator Gardner's appointment to the Senate's consent calendar with an unanimously favorable recommendation. Submitting the appointment through the consent calendar all but ensures that there will be no meaningful scrutiny of former Senator Gardner's qualifications by the full Senate (as properly occurred with regard to Sooter and Carpenter's reappointments).

I have filed two federal cases to enforce my right to be heard as to the entrenched and pervasive corruption within the Colorado Judiciary. *Sealed Case*, 1:25-cv-00190—RBJ-STV (D. Colo.); *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361—RBJ (D. Colo.). I do not seek any damages from the State of Colorado, as that would conflict with the State's sovereign immunities. Both these cases require independent and impartial representation of the State's interests, including most importantly as to injunctive remedies (such as the conflict-free reformation of the CCJD and other judicial oversight entities). Instead, representation of the State of Colorado's interests is occurring through the Department of Law, which reports to Attorney General Phil Weiser, who is also named as a defendant in his individual capacity.

The solution to the need for independent and impartial representation of the State of Colorado's objective interests is simple. I have requested that the members of the General Assembly pass a joint resolution referring the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and direct Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her discretion to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. Like my comments opposing former Senator Bob Gardner's appointment, my request for a joint resolution has been deliberately ignored by the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee.

I respectfully submit that Chair Weissman and the other members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have violated my constitutional rights to petition for grievances and, more importantly, are knowingly assisting the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and others to break the law, including the Justices' duties under the Code. As explained in my written comments, by supporting former Senator Gardner's appointment to the CCJD, all the attorney members of the Senate will violate Rule 8.4(f) of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct and its prohibition against knowingly assisting a judge to violate the law, including the Code. I have not filed a separate complaint with the Independent Ethics Commission and, accordingly, I request that you consult with the majority and minority leaders about my complaint and form a committee on ethics to address the meritorious allegations that I raise. Colo. S.R. 43(a)-(b).

Although I understand that Senate Rule 43(a) provides confidentiality for your evaluation of my complaint, such confidentiality does not infringe upon my First Amendment and Colo. Const. Art. II, § 10 rights to publicly disclose this complaint as the complainant. Ultimately, I simply request that you protect my constitutional rights to legitimately, freely, and fully report instances of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct as part of the legislative process and the General Assembly's authority to provide legislative oversight as a co-equal branch of state government. The issues that I have raised could not be more critical to protecting and restoring the integrity of the Colorado Judiciary and Colorado's State Government.

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosures (2)

Senate Ethics Complaint
Exhibit 1

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

February 6, 2026

Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee
Colorado State Capitol
200 E. Colfax Ave.
Denver, CO 80203

Re: Appointment of Robert D. Gardner to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline

Dear Judiciary Committee Members:

In addition to being senators, Chair Mike Weissman, Vice-Chair Dylan Roberts, and Senator Lindsey Daugherty[1] are licensed attorneys with particular ethical duties under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. Similarly, the Governor's appointee to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (CCJD), former Senator Robert Gardner, is a licensed attorney with the same heightened ethical duties. As is critical to the rule of law, attorneys are expected to uphold and maintain the standards of professional conduct and the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), including by taking appropriate action when a judge or a fellow attorney breaks the law. Colo. RJD 8.3[2] and Colo. RJD 8.4(a-1), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h).[3]

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[1] As a member of the State Commission of Judicial Performance, Senator Daugherty's legal and ethical obligations are more pronounced. These heightened obligations include providing voters and the public with a legitimate, continuous, and ongoing assessment of the integrity of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and the Judges of the Colorado Court of Appeals. *See* § 13-5.5-107(1)(a), C.R.S. ("The evaluations must only include the following performance evaluation criteria: (a) Integrity, including but not limited to whether the justice or judge: (I) Avoids impropriety or the appearance of impropriety; (II) Displays fairness and impartiality toward all participants; and (III) Avoids ex parte communications. . ."). Voters were misled by the State Commission's inaccurate Bluebook recommendations made during the 2024 judicial retention elections of Justice Brian Boatright, Justice Monica Márquez, and Justice Maria Berkenkotter. The State Commission is legally obligated to correct its inaccurate recommendations through interim evaluations and as it conducts current/prospective regular performance evaluations, including the evaluations of Justice William Hood, III and Court of Appeals Judge Grant T. Sullivan, who are both subject to retention elections in 2026.

[2] Colo. RPC 8.3, provides in relevant parts:

> **(a)** A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct . . . that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's . . . honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer . . . in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
> **(b)** A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

[3] Colo. RPC 8.4 provides, in relevant parts:

> It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

Former Senator Robert Gardner has broken the law and continues to break the law by assisting the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and his colleagues on the CCJD to engage in a now more than 25-year pattern of misusing public resources as hush money (i.e. NDAs), for self-controlled investigations, and for public relations schemes intended to conceal substantial judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. The Justices' pattern of misconduct revolves around an enforced and "toxic" culture of silence in the Colorado Judicial Department reliant upon intimidation, retaliation, and taxpayer-funded bribery occurring with impunity. The Justices' scheme and pattern continues to wrongfully cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars annually. *See, e.g.* SB25-024 (adding 15 judgeships with a projected annual fiscal impact of $12 million as part of the Justices' bogus "Workplace Culture Initiative").

Former Senator Gardner is personally responsible for enabling and allowing retaliation against me for my efforts to expose this ongoing fraudulent scheme as a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the CCJD. There is probable cause to suspect that former Senator Gardner has committed or is committing various ethical violations and crimes through his acceptance of Governor Polis's appointment to the CCJD. These probable crimes include, but are not limited to, Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503),[4] First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.),[5] and Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706,

---

> **(a-1)** violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
> **(b)** commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
> **(c)** engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, except that a lawyer may advise, direct, or supervise others, including clients, law enforcement officers, and investigators, who participate in lawful investigative activities;
> **(d)** engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
> * * *
> **(f)** knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law;
> * * *
> **(h)** engage in any conduct that directly, intentionally, and wrongfully harms others and that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law[.]

[4] The elements of Obstruction of Justice are:

> 1. The defendant corruptly,
> 2. Endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice,
> 3. With knowledge and specific intent to obstruct.

[5] The elements of First Degree Official Misconduct are:

> 1. That the defendant,
> 2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
> 3. was a public servant, and

C.R.S.).[6] Former Senator Gardner's malfeasance is explained in detail through the pending federal civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation lawsuit that I have filed in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361—RBJ (D. Colo.).

The most recent development in *Gregory* is the recusal of U.S. District Judge Daniel D. Domenico in response to my "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 26, detailing the Justices' ongoing 25-year pattern of public corruption and public fraud. Because of gamesmanship by the Colorado Attorney General's Office (which currently purports to represent the Defendants, including Attorney General Phil Weiser) and Judge Domenico's unacknowledged actual bias, the Affidavit is a temporarily restricted filing available to the court and to the parties. Former Senator Gardner, however, was personally aware of the substance of the 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit before he testified to the Joint Judiciary Committee at the CCJD's SMART Act hearing on January 21, 2026. Former Senator Gardner was intentionally deceitful in his testimony on January 21, 2026 and is not being honest or candid in continuing to seek confirmation of his appointment to the CCJD.

I raised my overall concerns about public corruption within the Colorado Department of Law, the Colorado Supreme Court, the Colorado Judicial Department, and the CCJD as part of the respective SMART Act hearings held on January 20, 2026 and January 21, 2026. My written testimony was copied to both the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation (COJPE)

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4. with intent,
5. to obtain a benefit for himself or another or maliciously to cause harm to another, he,
6. knowingly,
7. refrained from performing a duty imposed upon him by law ***or*** committed an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official function ***or*** violated [a relevant statute, rule, or regulation] relating to his office.

Colo. Jury Instr., Criminal 8-4:06 through 8-4:08.

[6] The elements of Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim are:

1. That the defendant,
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
3. used a threat, an act constituting the crime of harassment, or an act of harm or injury upon any person or property,
4. directed to, or committed upon, a witness in any criminal or civil proceeding, a victim of any crime, an individual whom the defendant believed had been or would be called to testify as a witness in any criminal or civil proceeding or a victim of any crime, a member of the witness's family, a member of the victim's family, an individual in close relationship to the witness or victim, or an individual residing in the same household with the witness or victim,
5. as retaliation or retribution against the witness or victim.

Colo. Jury Instr., Criminal 8-7:08

and the CCJD. Neither the COJPE nor the CCJD acknowledged the issues that I have raised or has explained how either will address my underlying allegations of judicial misconduct.

Most importantly, I requested that a member of the Colorado General Assembly (preferably a member of the Joint Judiciary Committee or the Legislative Audit Committee) sponsor a proposed joint resolution referring the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and directing the Colorado State Auditor to exercise her discretion to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. I paired this request with a judicial discipline complaint filed separately with the Denver Judicial Discipline Commission (the DJDC). The complaint requested that the DJDC, through the authority of the Denver County Court, order an investigation by the Denver Police Department and appoint a conflict-free special prosecutor (other than 2nd Judicial District Attorney John F. Walsh, III, who was directly involved in the underlying pattern of misconduct).

The Joint Judiciary Committee, however, ignored my testimony and my request for a joint resolution. Moreover, the written materials that I submitted to the Joint Judiciary Committee were appended to the Committee Report stripped of their organizational structure, specifically the order of the documents and bookmarking features. Like the U.S. Department of Justice's production of the Epstein files, the disorganization of the materials I submitted would require the assistance of AI to summarize and understand their substance.

With my present written testimony, I am attaching the following documents:

- Exhibit 1—Written testimony of Christoper Gregory submitted to the Joint Judiciary Committee on January 19, 2026;
- Exhibit 2—Proposed joint resolution submitted to the members of the Joint Judiciary Committee on January 20, 2026;
- Exhibit 3—Oral testimony of Christopher Gregory read into the record of the Joint Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2026;
- Exhibit 4—DJDC Complaint, dated January 26, 2026;
- Exhibit 5—"Motion to Strike Defendants' Motion to Restrict Public Access" and Exhibits 1-3 (ECF No. 31) in *Gregory*;
- Exhibit 6—"Order Granting Request for Recusal" (ECF No. 32) in *Gregory*;
- Exhibit 7—Pattern and practice complaint submitted to the Colorado Attorney General's Office on January 21, 2026; and
- Exhibit 8—Unlawful acts by federal agent complaint submitted to the Colorado Attorney General's Office on January 21, 2026.

Separately, I am re-submitting the supporting materials that I provided the Joint Judiciary Committee, which have been combined into a single organized and bookmark-navigable pdf document. It is important for the public and legislators to have access to these materials in a usable format. Once my Affidavit supporting Judge Domenico's disqualification is no longer restricted, I will provide a copy of it for publication into the legislative record, as well.

If former Senator Robert Gardner is confirmed to the CCJD, the affirmative votes of any attorney-members of the Colorado Senate will be violative of the standards of professional conduct mandated through Colo. RPC 8.3(a), (b) and 8.4(a-1), (b), (c), (d), (f), (h). Affirmative votes will also be contrary to the fundamental importance of the rule of law and protecting public confidence in the Colorado Judiciary.

I respectfully request that this Committee forward former Senator Gardner's appointment to the full Colorado Senate with an unfavorable recommendation. Moreover, I implore the members of this Committee to sponsor and submit my proposed joint resolution for the referral of the Colorado Judicial Scandal (including the Justices being interrupted as they began paying the $2.66-$2.75 million sole source, *quid pro quo* Masias Contract / bribe) to conflict-free federal law enforcement and for the Colorado State Auditor to appoint another state's attorney general as a conflict-free SAAG, able to impartially represent the interests of the State of Colorado. It is also critical that the General Assembly fund and finally set up the Office of the Judicial Discipline Ombudsman (the OJDO) created through HB23-1205. The failure to set up the OJDO is only one more example of the dereliction of former Senator Gardner's ethical duties and his interference with the administration of justice in violation of the standards of professional conduct.

As I concluded my oral testimony before the Joint Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2026, there are difficult questions that need to be asked despite political inconvenience. I urge you to have the integrity and courage to do so.

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosures (8)

Cc: Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
Colorado State Auditor
Members of the Colorado General Assembly

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

EXHIBIT 1

January 19, 2026

Colorado Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee
Colorado State Capitol
200 E. Colfax Ave.
Denver, CO 80203

Dear Joint Judiciary Committee Members:

I am a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD). Because of my steadfast efforts to stop what amounts to a more than 25-year pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court using taxpayer funds as hush money (i.e. non-disclosure agreements (NDAs)), for self-serving "independent" investigations, and for public relations schemes, I was retaliated against and fired.

The Justices' pattern of intimidation, retaliation, and creating an enforced culture of silence has been facilitated by others, including Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser and Colorado Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates. The long and tortured history of the Colorado Judicial Scandal has included ARC Yates allowing the criminal prosecution of this Committee's former Chair Senator Pete Lee based upon admittedly and objectively false evidence fabricated by Yates's Office. The intimidation of Senator Lee transgressed this body's legislative privilege while this body provided no meaningful response to protect Senator Lee or the integrity of the legislative process. ARC Yates then proceeded to threaten the CCJD's judge and attorney members and me (as Executive Director) with a disciplinary letter sent on February 6, 2023. The disciplinary letter specifically sought to intimidate the CCJD from continuing its intrepid efforts to reform Colorado's judicial discipline structure. Again, this body (and the Colorado Supreme Court to whom she reports) did nothing to hold ARC Yates accountable for her official misconduct and intimidation of legislative witnesses. Indeed, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and the members of the Colorado Supreme Court Committees that oversee the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) have seemingly endorsed ARC Jessica Yates's unlawful intimidation of legislators and legislative witnesses.

This year's SMART Act hearings for the Colorado Department of Law, the Colorado Judicial Department, and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline are happening at an extraordinary moment in Colorado history when former Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats has been disciplined for his part in the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court having collectively agreed to a $2.66-$2.75 million publicly funded bribe being paid to then-State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Chief of Staff Mindy Masias, who was being fired at the time for financial misconduct and later-confirmed examples of occupational fraud. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44. More recently, another sitting Justice, Melissa Hart, resigned amidst the clouds of the Masias Controversy as well as Justice Hart's own unreported judicial misconduct. The Colorado

Judicial Department's top lawyer, SCAO Judicial Counsel Terri Morrison, has also resigned in response to the Masias Controversy. There is now a vacancy on the Colorado Supreme Court to be filled through an opaque and conflicted judicial selection process. Problems with Colorado's systems of judicial selection, retention, and discipline persist despite the adoption of Amendment H by 73% of Colorado voters in 2024 and accompanying reforms approved by a nearly unanimous Legislature.

I believe it is critical for the General Assembly to be aware of the context, including the pending lawsuit which I have filed in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.). Among other things, the lawsuit seeks to enjoin the appointment of Justice Hart's successor until a conflict-free nominating commission and conflict-free proxy for the Governor can be appointed. None of the relief requested in the lawsuit threatens adverse fiscal impacts to the State, rather the lawsuit seeks to stop tens of millions of dollars of ongoing public fraud. I have requested and filed an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144 requiring the mandatory and automatic disqualification of the federal District Court Judge assigned to the case, former Colorado Solicitor General Daniel D. Domenico, because of his manifest personal bias and prejudice against me and in favor of one or more Defendants.

I have attached the relevant court filings in *Gregory* for your review and inclusion in the legislative record. The federal attorney discipline complaint, Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 1-1) to the Complaint in *Gregory*, is the most important document for you to understand the significance of the judicial misconduct involved as well as the reasons behind Justice Melissa Hart's leave and ultimate resignation from the Colorado Supreme Court as well as SCAO Judicial Counsel Terri Morrison's resignation.

It also deserves emphasis that the General Assembly's constitutional impeachment authority exists separately and independently from Colorado's constitutional judicial discipline structure. *Compare* Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(i) *and* Colo. Const. Art. XIII.

The last time I appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I testified in opposition to then-Chair Mindy Sooter's and then-Vice-Chair Jim Carpenter's reappointment to the CCJD. As part of my testimony, I also called upon the General Assembly to pass a joint resolution requesting the referral of the Colorado Judicial Scandal to federal law enforcement for a conflict-free investigation. A majority of this Committee's members took my concerns seriously and forwarded the Governor's reappointments of Sooter and Carpenter to the full Senate with unfavorable recommendations. On the last day of last year's session, the full Senate voted 16-19 against Sooter's confirmation and 19-16 in favor of Carpenter's confirmation. Those Senators voting in favor of Carpenter's confirmation were:

- Amabile
- Baisley
- Ball
- Bridges

- Catlin (while voting against Sooter's confirmation)
- Coleman
- Cutter
- Danielson (while voting against Sooter's confirmation)
- Hinrichesen
- Jodeh
- Kipp
- Kolker
- Marchman (while voting against Sooter's confirmation)
- Michaelson Jenet
- Roberts
- Rodriguez
- Simpson
- Snyder
- Weissman

It remains unclear why these Senators did not recognize the need for accountability within the CCJD (including categorical intolerance for the institutionalized culture of intimidation, harassment, discrimination, and retaliation that exists within the broader Colorado Judicial Department) as well as the need to finally have a full, legitimate, and unobstructed investigation of the Colorado Judicial Scandal.

This year's SMART Act hearings provide a renewed opportunity to address the pervasive lack of integrity and accountability within Colorado's Judicial Branch. I, again, renew my requests for the General Assembly to adopt a joint resolution referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free law federal law enforcement and, under §§ 24-31-111(5) and 24-31-1204(2), C.R.S., to direct Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her discretion to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) to investigate the involved allegations of public fraud and false claims. Importantly, according to § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S., this Legislature has already appropriated the funds necessary for a legitimate investigation of the Colorado Judicial Scandal through the Department of Law's budget, inclusive of the $4 million of funding appropriated through HB 25-1321 (Support Against Adverse Federal Action). Moreover, the introduction of a joint resolution does not affect any legislator's bill limit for this legislative session. *Compare* Colo. House R. 26(g) *and* Colo. Senate R. 30(f)(1)(A) (both Rules distinguishing presumptive bill limit from presumptive resolution limit; requiring submission of joint resolutions at least 30-days prior to sine die). § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. provides:

> (5) Whenever the attorney general is unable, has failed, or refuses to provide legal services to a state agency, as determined by the governor if the agency is in the executive branch, or by the chief justice if the agency is in the judicial branch, or by the state auditor if the agency is the office of the state auditor, the agency may employ counsel of its choosing to provide such legal services. ***Any***

> ***expense incurred due to the employment of counsel pursuant to this subsection (5) is a lawful charge against appropriations for this purpose made by the general assembly to the department of law.*** (Emphasis added).

I have enclosed proposed language for a joint resolution to refer the issues involved in the Colorado Judicial Scandal, including suspected public fraud and false claims, to conflict-free federal law enforcement in conjunction with the State Auditor's appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG. Ideally, another state with similar demographics, geography, and an equivalent state false claims act (such as Oregon) will be willing to accept the SAAG appointment. The enclosed draft joint resolution further contemplates the creation of a joint legislative investigating committee to effectuate the referral to conflict-free federal law enforcement and the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG.

Ultimately, however, there is no excuse or rational justification for this Committee and this General Assembly not to approve the requested joint resolution and finally allow a full and legitimate investigation of the endemic public corruption found within the Colorado Judiciary and within Colorado State Government, more broadly.

With this background, I urge this Committee to raise the attached questions at the respective SMART Act Hearings and to address my request for a joint resolution on the record.

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosures (23)

Requested Questions

Colorado Department of Law—1/20/26 Hearing

Attorney General Phil Weiser:

- What was your role and the roles of attorneys subject to your supervision in the negotiation, approval, and payment of publicly funded non-disclosure agreements as reported by *The Denver Gazette* on November 13, 2022? David Migoya, *Non-Disclosures Under Fire*, DENVER GAZETTE, November 13, 2022.
- When did you first become aware that the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court were contemplating and negotiating the $2.66-$2.75 million contract with then-State Court Administrator's Office Chief of Staff Mindy Masias? Which other attorneys within the Colorado Department of Law subject to your supervision were aware of the contemplation and negotiation of the Masias Contract? When were they aware of it?
- When did you and attorneys subject to your supervision first become aware of the existence of the Masias Memo? Who knew about the existence of the Masias Memo and when did they know?
- The Attorney General's Office provided the investigation and litigation support for the Office of the State Auditor's 2019-2022 Fraud Hotline investigation. The existence of the Masias Memo was concealed from both the Colorado State Auditor and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline from December 2018 until February 2021. Who was responsible for concealing this material information?
- Similarly, with the Attorney General's Office providing investigation support, why wasn't evidence of occupational fraud immediately communicated to the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office as part of the Fraud Hotline investigation? Because of the non-reporting, the statute of limitations ultimately expired preventing a state-level prosecution of those individuals suspected of committing occupational fraud by the OSA. Why did you allow this to happen?
- There has been a call for the Colorado State Auditor to directly appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to complete a conflict-free investigation of the Masias Controversy. Why aren't you joining this request?
- Do you admit or deny the allegations of attorney misconduct against you stated in former Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline Christopher Gregory's complaint submitted to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct (1:25-cv-03361-DDD, ECF 1-1)? What specific allegations do you dispute?
- You have assigned attorneys from your Office to defend against *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.), including claims brought against you individually. How is this not a conflict of interest and a misappropriation of state resources for your personal benefit? Do you agree that you and any attorneys who represent you have an ethical obligation to stipulate to the disqualification of a judge where there is evidence that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice?

- If you know of attorneys or other employees subject to your supervision engaging in retaliation, what are your obligations? What is the appropriate consequence under the Department of Law's personnel rules?
- If your Office or a private sector law firm is used to defend against violations of the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act and/or the Colorado False Claims Act's retaliation provisions, shouldn't the individuals responsible for any ultimately proven retaliation be responsible for the value/cost of the defense?
- Have you or your Office investigated whether the use of "outside" or "independent" investigations as a means of political damage control and obstruction of ordinary law enforcement and regulatory processes is a fraudulent or unlawful use of taxpayer funds? Examples of such investigations include the ILG and RCT investigations that occurred as part of the Masias Controversy as well as Secretary of State Jena Griswold commissioning an investigation of the disclosure of voting machine passwords and her Office's response during the 2024 election. How are these self-controlled investigations distinguishable from the definition of occupational fraud under the Fraud Hotline Statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S.?
- How do you justify the ethics and legality of your Office and attorneys subject to your control defending against the civil claims and allegations of your own personal criminal conduct raised through *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.)?

Colorado Judicial Department—1/21/26 Hearing

Chief Justice Monica Márquez and State Court Administrator Steven Vasconcellos:

- Márquez: Do you admit or deny the allegations of judicial and attorney misconduct against you stated in Christopher Gregory's complaint submitted to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct (1:25-cv-03361-DDD, ECF 1-1)? What specific allegations do you dispute?
- Márquez: When did the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court first decide to offer/consider providing former SCAO Chief of Staff Mindy Masias a contract to provide leadership training to the Colorado Judicial Department? When was this decision communicated to the Colorado Office of the State Auditor?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When did you first become aware of the existence of the Masias Memo? When did the other Justices and other persons in SCAO become aware of the existence of the Masias Memo? Did you direct anyone to provide copies of the Masias Memo to the OSA and/or the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline? You admit that the existence of and a copy of the Masias Memo was withheld and not disclosed to the OSA and/or the CCJD from December 2018 until February 2021?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): Who was responsible for the delay in reporting evidence of occupational fraud to the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office? When the OSA drafted its Fraud Hotline Report (ultimately published on February 4, 2022), who was responsible for redacting the report and other delays in it being provided to the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office?

- Márquez: Why were the Justices' roles in the Masias Controversy not considered by the State Commission of Judicial Performance when you, Justice Brian Boatright, and Justice Maria Berkenkotter were subject to retention elections in 2024? Judiciary Committee member Senator Lindsey Daugherty is a member of the State Commission. Why didn't you, Justice Boatright, or Justice Berkenkotter voluntarily raise the issues involved with the State Commission during your retention cycles?
- Márquez: Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates abused her official authority by allowing the criminal prosecution of then-Senate Judiciary Chair Pete Lee to move forward through objectively and admittedly false information provided by Yates's Office. As further intimidation and obstruction of legislative reforms, Yates sent a February 6, 2023 disciplinary letter to the judge and attorney members and the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline threatening them with disciplinary action for their testimony and future testimony before this Legislature. You and your colleagues on the Colorado Supreme Court supervise Jessica Yates and she reports to you. You were aware of her official misconduct and violation of Senator Lee's legislative privilege but did nothing. Why not?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): Did Justice Melissa Hart self-initiate judicial disability proceedings when she went on personal leave October 28, 2025? Who approved the leave and did that person report the basis for it to the CCJD for consideration of disability proceedings?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When were you first aware that Justice Melissa Hart had been at fault in a significant automobile collision before she was appointed to the court? That she was involved in a civil case arising from the collision after being appointed to the court? *Hampton v. Hart*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 19CV34953.
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When were you first aware that Justice Melissa Hart is currently on probation supervised by the Denver County Court in a dog bite case? *People v. Melissa Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25GV100395.
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When were you first aware that Justice Melissa Hart failed to appear in Denver County Court on a careless driving ticket issued earlier in 2025? *People v. Melissa Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25T0087448.
- Márquez: Why didn't you and the other Justices disqualify yourselves from all matters involving judicial discipline (including pending cases, making appointments to judicial oversight entities, rulemaking, and engagement in the legislative reform process) after you received individual letters requesting your disqualification from the CCJD on June 13, 2022 and July 1, 2022? Why do you and the other Justices continue to sit on judicial discipline cases?
- Márquez: On December 14, 2023, then-Chief Justice Brian Boatright received a notification letter from the Commission on Judicial Discipline according to Colo. RJD 14(a). The letter conveyed allegations of judicial misconduct by all the Justices raised by former 10th Judicial District Court Chief Judge Dennis Maes. With knowledge of these allegations of misconduct and pending judicial discipline proceedings against Chief Justice Boatright, why didn't you and the other Justices disqualify yourselves from further hearing of *Anderson v. Griswold*, 2023 CO 63 and form a Special Tribunal according to Colo. RJD 41? Why, instead, did you and the other Justices proceed to issue and announce your opinion in *Griswold* on December 19, 2023?

- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): How is the Colorado Supreme Court's "Workplace Culture Initiative," including the creation of 15 new judgeships through SB25-024 not merely propaganda to conceal your role and the role of the other Justices in the Masias Controversy? Why don't the "Workplace Culture Initiative," the ILG, LLC investigation, and the RCT, Ltd. investigation meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under the Fraud Hotline statute--§ 2-3-110.5, C.R.S. ("'Fraud' means occupational fraud or the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization's resources or assets.").
- Márquez: Why haven't you recused yourself as the *ex officio* Chair of the Colorado Supreme Court Nominating Commission that will choose nominees for Justice Hart's successor?
- Márquez: As the default *ex officio* Chair, why haven't you raised conflicts of interest that some of the nominating committee members themselves have?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): The former Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, Christopher Gregory, has called for the formation of a Special Tribunal, a Special Adjudicative Board Panel, and a Special Commission on Judicial Discipline to consider grounds for your discipline and the discipline of the other justices and judges involved in the Masias Controversy. Do you support allowing for such a conflict-free process? If not, why not?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): How does Colorado's system of attorney discipline controlled by the Colorado Supreme Court comport with the prohibition against judicial fact investigations in Canon Rule 2.9(C) of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct? Why hasn't Colorado considered adopting an attorney discipline system similar to that followed in Oregon (O.R.S. § 9.010(2)) where attorney discipline occurs through an independent bar association authorized through the Legislature?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): The current process for the nomination and appointment of judges occurs through non-public meetings to determine who is interviewed, non-public interviews of judicial candidates, and non-public meetings to determine the nominees and the final appointees. Why aren't these meetings and these decisions made in public and through livestreamed proceedings on the record?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): In the past, Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court have spoken out about the need to increase diversity on the bench and to eliminate bias (institutional, implicit, and explicit) in judicial selection. Don't you agree that the best way to eliminate any form of bias is to ensure that judicial selection decisions occur in the open with a complete public record of how the judicial nominating commissions and the Governor make such decisions? There is no provision in Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 24 that exempts the judicial nominating commissions and the Governor's Office from the Colorado Open Meetings Law. Why aren't the meetings of the judicial nominating commissions, the Governor's judicial appointment committee, and all interviews of judicial candidates being livestreamed on the record?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): There has been a call for the Colorado State Auditor to directly appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to complete a conflict-free investigation of the Masias Controversy. Why aren't you joining this request?
- Márquez: How do you justify the ethics and legality of utilizing the Colorado Attorney General's Office and attorneys subject to co-defendant Attorney General Phil Weiser's

control to defend against the civil claims and allegations of your own personal criminal conduct raised through *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.)?

Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline—1/21/26 Hearing

Anne Mangiardi, James Carpenter, Bob Gardner:

- Ms. Mangiardi, you acknowledge that while at the Attorney General's Office, you supervised the ILG investigation commissioned by the Judicial Department? What was your role in providing such supervision? What access did you have to the records that were provided to ILG? What communications did you have with others in the Attorney General's Office and with the Justices and the Judicial Department over the course of the ILG investigation? How was the ILG investigation not a violation of Canon Rule 2.9(C)'s prohibitions against judicial investigations?
- All panelists: With violations of the public financial disclosure law, § 24-6-202, C.R.S., recognized as misdemeanor offenses punishable by a mandatory $1,000-$5,000 fine, why did the Commission resolve all the cases involving judges failing to file such disclosures with dismissals or private discipline? Even if the statute of limitations had passed for criminal prosecution, why didn't the Commission seek fines as a judicial discipline sanction?
- Carpenter & Mangiardi: Because the public financial disclosure violations were/are readily verifiable through public records, why wasn't there public discipline (such as, minimally, a public reprimand) in those cases? Was the motivation for dismissing these cases to allow the judges to later participate in the Senior Judge Program (which currently bars judges with any record of discipline, private or public)?
- All panelists: On what legal basis do you disclaim having jurisdiction to evaluate the conduct of senior judges, who include former Chief Justice Nancy Rice? Isn't it true that through the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee created by Amendment H, you can change the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline at any time? You can even make necessary changes retroactively because judicial discipline is civil and remedial in nature?
- Mr. Carpenter, there are allegations that you and the other Commissioners retaliated against the Commission's former Executive Director, Christopher Gregory, for pursuing suspected public fraud and legitimate grounds for judicial discipline. Do you deny these allegations? If so, on what grounds?
- Mr. Gardner, in your former role as a member of this Committee, you opposed amendments to HCR23-1001 and HB23-1016 that would have taken away the Colorado Supreme Court's authority to directly appoint members of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline and would have reinforced the independence of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee. Was your opposition to those amendments the result of lobbying by the Justices and their legislative liaison, Terry Scanlon?
- Mr. Gardner, why did you apply and why were you chosen by the Governor as an attorney member of the Commission, after the Colorado Senate rejected the reappointment of Commission Chair Mindy Sooter?

- Mr. Garnder, you were part of a committee formed to set up the Office of the Judicial Discipline Ombudsman created through HB23-1205. That Office still does not exist. Why not?
- All panelists: Former Executive Director Gregory has submitted a request for evaluation of conduct as to the Justices and other judges. The RFE further requests an evaluation of the conduct of the Commissioners and the Commission's Staff. What is being done to address that RFE in a conflict-free manner? Why hasn't the Commission voluntarily moved for the formation of a Special Tribunal, a Special Adjudicative Board Panel, and a Special Commission through a conflict-free selection mechanism to consider the RFE?
- All panelists: There has been a call for the Colorado State Auditor to directly appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to complete a conflict-free investigation of the Masias Controversy. Why aren't you joining this request?
- All panelists: How do you justify the ethics and legality of utilizing the Colorado Attorney General's Office and attorneys subject to co-defendant Attorney General Phil Weiser's control to defend against the civil claims and allegations of your own personal criminal conduct raised through *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.)?
- All panelists: Why should the people of Colorado have confidence in our judicial discipline system? Why shouldn't the public perceive judicial discipline as simply a protection racket that shields judges from accountability?

EXHIBIT 2

Be It Resolved by the Senate of the Seventy-Sixth General Assembly of the State of Colorado, the House of Representatives concurring herein:

Whereas credible evidence exists that whistleblowers, witnesses, and public officials within Colorado state and local governments are being systematically intimidated and retaliated against through the misuse of public resources and the selective prosecution / non-prosecution of the wrongdoers involved;

Whereas examples of the systematic misconduct involved include patterns of alleged corruption within the Colorado Judiciary, alleged interference with the 2024 presidential election, publicly funded self-investigations of various incidents of alleged official misconduct, non-disclosure and hush money agreements valued at over $4 million which have been negotiated by the Colorado Attorney General's Office and other agencies / public officials, and the allegedly invalid approval of an urban renewal authority estimated to divert $155 million of tax revenues over 25 years;

Whereas, these circumstances present probable cause and a reasonable basis to suspect violations of both Colorado and federal law;

Whereas, because of conflicts of interest, the Colorado Attorney General and the entire Colorado Department of Law are unable to impartially enforce Colorado's False Claims Act, Title 24, Part 12, C.R.S.;

Whereas, 22 other states and the District of Columbia have their own equivalent civil false claims acts. Those states and the District of Columbia are:

- California—Cal. Gov't Code §§ 12650 to 12656;
- Connecticut—Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 4-274 to 4-289;
- Delaware--Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, §§ 1201-1201;
- District of Columbia—D.C. Code Ann. §§ 2-381.01 to 2-381.10;
- Florida—Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 68.082 to 68.105;
- Georgia—Ga. Code Ann. §§ 23-3-120 to 23-3-120;
- Hawai'i—Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 661-21 to 661-31;
- Illinois—740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 175/1 to 175/8;
- Indiana—Ind. Code Ann. §§ 5-11-5.5-1 to 5-11-5.5-18;
- Iowa—Iowa Code Ann. §§ 685.1 to 685.7;
- Kansas—Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 75-7501 to 75-7511;
- Maryland—MD GEN PROVIS §§ 8-101 to 8-111;
- Massachusetts—Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, §§ 5A to 5O;
- Minnesota—Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 15C.01 to 15C.16;
- Nevada—Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 357.010 to Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 357.250:
- New Jersey—N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:32C-1 to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:32C-18;
- New Mexico—N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-9-1 to 44-9-14;
- New York—N.Y. State Fin. Law §§ 188 to 194;
- North Carolina—N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-605 to 1-618;

- Oregon—Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 180.750 to 180.785;
- Rhode Island—9 R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 9-1.1-1 to 9-1.2-9;
- Tennessee—Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 4-18-101 to 4-18-108; and
- Vermont--Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, §§ 630 to 642; and

Whereas, the U.S. Department of Justice—Denver Office and the U.S. Department of Justice—Wyoming Office also has conflicts of interest as to the individuals involved in the alleged public corruption and are unable to impartially investigate the factual circumstances;

Section 1. The Colorado General Assembly shall submit a formal request to the U.S. Department of Justice to assign an Office outside of the U.S. Department of Justice—Denver Office and the U.S. Department of Justice—Wyoming Office to complete a conflict-free investigation of the alleged public corruption within Colorado state and local government.

Section 2. As authorized by § 24-31-101(1)(g), C.R.S. and § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S., the Colorado General Assembly (through and as the Colorado State Auditor's supervising authority) shall designate and appoint another state's attorney general (from one of the 22 other states or the District of Columbia with equivalent civil false claims acts) as a Special Assistant Attorney General charged with investigating and representing the State of Colorado's interests as to alleged violations of Colorado's False Claims Act and other laws. The costs of the investigation and representation shall be paid through funds already appropriated through HB25-1321 and the Colorado Department of Law's annual budget, as provided by § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S.

Section 3. According to the authority provided through Colo. House R. 26(a)(2) and Colo. Senate R. 30(b)(2), an investigating committee comprised of members of both houses shall be formed to implement and effectuate this joint resolution.

EXHIBIT 3

This statement was read into the record following the 1/21/26 Judicial SMART Act Presentation.

Thank you Mr. Chair. Good morning Committee Members.

My name is Christopher Gregory and I appear as a citizen. I am a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline. Acknowledging the contributions of others, including members of this Committee, I regard the passage and approval of Amendment H by 73% of Colorado voters as my most important accomplishment. Amendment H was intended to remove control of judicial discipline from the Colorado Supreme Court to ensure that no one is above the law, regardless of their position. In addition, I achieved the historic discipline of former Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats for his role in approving what amounts to a $2.66-$2.75 million taxpayer funded bribe. I have further discovered and exposed a more than 25-year pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court using public resources as hush money, for self-controlled investigations, and for public relations schemes all intended to cover up judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. There is now a vacancy on the Colorado Supreme Court because of the systemic public corruption that I have exposed.

The stated purpose of the SMART Act is that "State Government be accountable and transparent in such a way that the general public can understand the value received for the tax dollars spent by the State." In advance of today's hearings for the Colorado Judicial Department and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline as well as yesterday's hearing for the Colorado Department of Law, I submitted written testimony with requested questions for the witnesses. In addition to submitting these materials to this Committee, I circulated them to all members of the General Assembly, to the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, and to the Press. In addition to my written testimony, I have called upon Legislators to sponsor and pass a joint resolution referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement, to form an investigating committee, and to direct the Colorado State Auditor to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General.

I am concerned that my written testimony and request for a joint resolution are being deliberately disregarded by this Committee. Please confirm on the record that you have received my written testimony and supporting materials and that these materials will be included in the legislative record as well as being made publicly available through this Committee's webpage.

There are difficult questions that need to be asked. I urge you to have the integrity and courage to do so.

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

EXHIBIT 4

January 28, 2026

Denver County Court, Judicial Discipline Commission
Denver City & County Building
1437 Bannock Street, Room 108
Denver, CO 80202

Re: Judicial Discipline Complaint, Request to Revoke Deferred Judgment, and Request for Law Enforcement Referral with Appointment of a Special Prosecutor; Exhibits 1-3

Dear Presiding Judge Lombardi and Commission Members:

INTRODUCTION

I am a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD). I am thoroughly familiar with the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline (Colo. RJD) and the Denver Rules of Judicial Discipline (D.R.J.D.). At its core, the Code holds judges to a higher standard and requires avoidance of even the appearances of impropriety. Despite the protections for freely reporting judicial misconduct guaranteed under the Code, the Colorado Constitution, and the U.S. Constitution, I continue to be personally and repeatedly retaliated against for publicly reporting overt violations of the Code.[1] Specifically, I have been retaliated against for my efforts to expose an ongoing and more than 25-year pattern and practice of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court misusing public resources as hush money (i.e. NDAs), for self-controlled investigations, and for self-serving public relations schemes engineered to cover up substantial

[1] I maintain that the ongoing retaliation is probable cause to suspect that the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, the members and staff of the CCJD, and others have committed or are committing various crimes, including Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S.) and First-Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S). My efforts to report these suspected crimes to local law enforcement have been systematically obstructed (consistent with an overall pattern of depriving me of my fundamental right to be heard). The commission of these suspected crimes is now being further facilitated and complicated by the Justices not disqualifying themselves and proceeding to grant certiorari in *Trujillo v. People*, Colo. S. Ct. Case No. 25SC209 (granting review on question of "Whether *People v. Hickman*, 988 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1999), created a rule that a person can commit retaliation against a victim or witness under section 18-8-706, C.R.S. (2025), when the victim or witness has not yet testified or been scheduled to testify." and other related issues). In addition to state crimes, there is probable cause to suspect the federal crime of Tampering with a Witness, Victim, or an Informant (18 U.S.C. § 1512). Through the authority of the Denver County Court, these circumstances should be referred to the Denver Police Department for investigation.

judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. The Justices' corrupt pattern and practice continues to wrongfully cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars annually.

In submitting this complaint, I am calling upon this Commission to address/prevent potential related and prospective judicial misconduct by members of the Denver County Court. I also request the initiation of proceedings to revoke former Justice Melissa Hart's court-supervised probation and deferred judgment in *People v. Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25GV100395. Importantly, I am requesting that this Commission formally refer the overall issues of the Colorado Judicial Scandal to a division of the U.S. Department of Justice (outside the DOJ—Denver Office and the DOJ—Wyoming Office) for a conflict-free federal law enforcement investigation. Additionally, I am requesting that this Commission, through the Denver County Court, order the Denver Police Department to investigate the various suspected crimes involved (both state and federal) and to further order the appointment of a conflict-free special prosecutor (other than 2nd Judicial District Attorney John F. Walsh, III, who was a participant in the underlying circumstances). I have publicly requested that the Colorado General Assembly pass a joint resolution similarly referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and to direct the Colorado State Auditor to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) according to § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. The Legislature, however, has yet to respond to my request.

I recognize that the circumstances I am raising through this complaint are *sui generis* and create heightened concerns as to reasonable appearances of impropriety, unfairness, partiality, and bias. Accordingly, I call upon you to individually and publicly disclose grounds for disqualification and, conversely, any justifications for non-disqualification according to D.R.J.D. 4(g)(1). Although D.R.J.D. 4(g)(2) only requires disclosure of commissioner disqualifications to the subject judge and to the Mayor, there is no reason why the disqualification should not also be communicated to the complainant and to the general public. Because Commissioner and 2nd Judicial District Court Judge Jay Grant was a subject judge in the CCJD's mishandling of various 2023-2024 cases involving judges' failures to file personal financial disclosure (PFD) statements, I am respectfully requesting that Judge Grant recuse himself from this complaint and the required judicial discipline proceedings that arise from it. David Migoya, *Despite Law, 1 in 6 Colorado Judges Doesn't Have Financial Disclosures Filed, Some for Years*, COLORADO POLITICS, August 12, 2023. Additionally, to the extent that this Commission's Rules and rulemaking process are invoked as barriers to transparency and this Commission's proceedings being made public, I ask for a detailed public written explanation of your individual disqualification or non-disqualification decisions. *See* David Migoya, *New State Judicial Discipline System Won't Include Denver County Judges*, COLORADO POLITICS, July 3, 2023; *see also* D.R.J.D.. 4(d)(3) (recognizing allowing external influences to impact independent judgment as an appearance of impropriety); *cf.,* D.C.Colo.LCivR 40.1(f) ("Recusal of an active judicial officer shall be only by written order setting forth the reasons."). It is appropriate for this Commission to apply D.R.J.D. 8(h) to maximize the proceedings and communications which will be made public in this matter.

BACKGROUND

In my roles as a member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the CCJD, I exposed an ongoing more than 25-year pattern and practice that has created a culture of enforced silence within the Colorado Judiciary. Despite being retaliated against (including through my non-reappointment as Commission Chair) and being obstructed in the performance of my official functions, I was responsible for the historic discipline of former Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44. Through abuse of their appointment authority, the Justices and Governor Jared Polis stacked the CCJD. Before I could seek further discipline as to the current Justices, I was again retaliated against and fired as Executive Director on January 19, 2024.

After being fired, I continued to pursue accountability. This has included my continued advocacy for Amendment H, which significantly reformed Colorado's judicial discipline system after being ratified by 73% of Colorado voters in 2024. In January 2025, I filed what remains a sealed case, 1:25-cv-00190—DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (Sealed). The U.S. District Court Judge assigned to it, former Colorado Solicitor General Daniel D. Domenico, demonstrated actual bias and made adverse rulings. In response, I filed a judicial discipline complaint with the 10th Circuit. As a further complication, 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jerome A. Holmes dismissed the judicial discipline complaint (despite having his own conflicts of interest and grounds for mandatory disqualification). I have filed a petition for review to the 10th Circuit Judicial Council and a separate judicial discipline complaint as to Chief Circuit Judge Holmes. Following the filing of the judicial discipline complaint against Judge Domenico, I filed an attorney discipline complaint with the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct (which now operates through reformed rules and a preponderant standard of proof (as compared with the CCJD, the Colorado Supreme Court's Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC), and this Commission's adoption of "clear and convincing evidence" standards). A copy of the federal attorney discipline complaint (25-cv-3) is attached as Exhibit 1. The federal attorney discipline complaint is premised upon the Justices and other attorneys licensed to practice in the federal courts having knowingly concealed material information (i.e. contemplation of a $2.66-$2.75 million publicly funded bribe (the Masias Contract) and the existence of the related Masias Memo) from Colorado State Auditor Dianne Ray (and the CCJD) as she performed a federal function—the required, continuous, and ongoing single statewide audit). The concealment of this material information was sustained for over two years and is incontrovertible evidence that the Justices and others committed multiple federal crimes. The uncharged federal felonies include but are not limited to: Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), and Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516).

Also, in response to Judge Domenico's adverse rulings and efforts by the Justices to undo the reforms mandated by Amendment H, I filed a second civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation action. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361—DDD (D. Colo.). A copy of the Verified Complaint in *Gregory* is attached as Exhibit 2. Despite my having raised Judge Domenico's actual bias in the Verified Complaint and subsequent filings, Judge Domenico accepted assignment to the case and has persistently refused to disqualify himself. Most recently, I filed an affidavit in *Gregory* to require Judge Domenico's

disqualification according to 28 U.S.C. § 144. The Affidavit, which is temporarily a restricted filing under D.C.Colo.LCivR 7.2(b), (e) accessible to the parties and the U.S. District Court until January 30, 2026, will be provided to this Commission immediately upon lifting of the public access restrictions. The Affidavit provides context for the present judicial discipline complaint and is relevant to this Commission's members' abilities to impartially consider the present complaint.

The filing of my federal attorney discipline complaint (Case No. 25-cc-3) on September 30, 2025, however, precipitated the resignation of the Colorado Judicial Department's Judicial Counsel Terri Morrison and, more recently, the resignation of Justice Melissa Hart. Through *Gregory*, I have requested various forms of injunctive relief, including my reinstatement as Executive Director, re-composition of the various judicial discipline oversight entities through conflict free processes, and a writ of prohibition enjoining Governor Jared Polis from appointing additional judges (including Justice Hart's replacement). I have also applied for Justice Hart's seat on the Colorado Supreme Court, with expressed intentions of filing additional lawsuits to recognize the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Supreme Court Nominating Commission, and the Governor's judicial appointment committee as each being a "state public body" subject to the Colorado Open Meetings Law, § 24-6-402, C.R.S.

As relevant to the Denver County Court and this Commission's jurisdiction, Justice Melissa Hart was the subject of two cases in 2025, a careless driving citation and a criminally charged dog bite case. Justice Hart failed to appear for the initial appearance in her careless driving case and ***is currently on probation*** directly supervised/reviewed by the Denver County Court as part of a deferred judgment in her dog bite case. When Justice Hart went on indeterminate leave on October 28, 2025 and when she ultimately resigned from the Colorado Supreme Court on December 19, 2025, she did not disclose the existence of the two 2025 Denver County Court cases or that she had been involved in a serious automobile collision in 2017 (prior to her appointment to the Colorado Supreme Court), which resulted in an also-undisclosed 2019 civil suit and settlement. It does not appear that Justice Hart or any of the assigned judicial officers reported any of her Denver County or District Court cases to the CCJD, the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation (COJPE), OARC, and/or the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Consequently, Justice Hart was able to present her leave of absence and resignation as the result of personal "medical" issues rather than being in response to my pending federal attorney discipline complaint and the filing of individual claims against her in *Gregory*.

Even with notice of and actual knowledge of the judicial, attorney, and official misconduct involved (specifically my 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit in *Gregory*), Chief Justice Monica Márquez, State Court Administrator Steven Vasconcellos, Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser, CCJD Executive Director Anne Mangiardi, CCJD Chair Jim Carpenter, and CCJD member Bob Gardner were allowed to testify at the Colorado Joint Judiciary Committee's January 20, 2026 and January 21, 2026 SMART Act hearings without any scrutiny or candor as to their individual roles in the Colorado Judicial Scandal or their retaliation against me for reporting suspected judicial misconduct. I have attached my written testimony and a transcript of the oral testimony that I read into the legislative record as Exhibit 3. The Colorado General Assembly has yet to respond to my call for a joint resolution referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to federal law

enforcement for a conflict-free investigation and directing the Colorado State Auditor (who reports to Legislative Audit Committee) to appoint another state's attorney general as a SAAG, allowing impartial representation of the State of Colorado's interests.

BASIS FOR JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS

This Commission's jurisdiction is limited to the conduct of Denver County Court Judges according to D.R.J.D. 5 and to make disciplinary recommendations as to Magistrates when requested according to D.R.J.D. 6. The Presiding Judge's exercise of supervisory authority over Magistrates, however, is also subject to the requirements of the Code and oversight by this Commission. *See* Canon Rule 2.12 (Supervisory Duties).

Ultimately, the Code charges all judicial officers with obligations to defend the rule of law and the integrity of the Judiciary. Canon Rule 1.2, in particular, requires judicial officers to promote public confidence in the Judiciary by avoiding both impropriety and the creation of appearances of impropriety. Impropriety includes violations of the law and obstruction of the judicial discipline process either for the benefit of the subject judge or for the benefit of another person. *See* Canon Rule 1.3 (Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office). Although Canon Rule 1.1 mandates the self-reporting and reporting of certain criminal convictions, the reporting obligations under Canon Rules 2.15 and 2.16 are broader and require "appropriate action" in response to the substantial likelihood of ***any*** violation of the Code. Canon Rules 2.3(C) and 2.16(B) expressly prohibit retaliation. In addition to the requirements of the Code, judicial officers who are also attorneys are required to report and take measures to stop themselves and others from engaging in judicial misconduct. Colo. RPC 8.3 and 8.4(d), (f), (h).

The non-reporting of Justice Melissa Hart's litigation history and the existence of traffic and criminal cases filed against her in 2025 allowed Justice Hart to misrepresent the reasons for her "personal leave" and her ultimate resignation in violation of Canon Rule 4.1(11), (12) ("Except as permitted by law, or by this Canon, a judge . . . shall not: . . . (11) knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the truth, make any false or misleading statement; [or] (12) make any statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court[.]"). As asserted in this complaint, Justice Hart's personal leave and ultimate resignation occurred in direct response to my federal attorney discipline complaint (Case No. 25-cc-3) against her and her husband, U.S. DOJ—Denver Office Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos, as well as the October 23, 2025 filing of *Gregory*. Justice Hart's narrative as to the basis for her resignation is misleading and reasonably impairs the fairness of the various pending and impending matters against her (most importantly my federal attorney discipline complaint).

In *People v. Melissa Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25T0087448, Justice Hart was charged with Careless Driving (D.R.M.C. § 54-158). The register of actions shows that the case was assigned first to Magistrate Greg Rawlings and, then, to Magistrate Melissa Annis. Justice Hart failed to appear for the initial arraignment hearing held before Magistrate Rawlings on April 24, 2025. On May 2, 2025, Justice Hart returned on bond and, appearing *pro se*, pled guilty to a lesser offense before Magistrate Annis. It is unclear whether Magistrate Rawlings and/or Magistrate

Annis were aware of Melissa Hart's status as a Justice of the Colorado Supreme Court. Nevertheless, there is no publicly-available evidence to suggest that Justice Hart self-reported her Careless Driving citation or the existence of Case No. 25T0087448 to the CCJD, the COJPE, the OARC, and/or the U.S. District Court. Likewise, there is no publicly available evidence to suggest that Magistrate Rawlings, Magistrate Annis, Denver City Attorney's Office Division Director Marley Bordovsky, or Assistant Denver City Attorney Taylor Brennan Leighton reported the existence of Case No. 25T0087448 to the CCJD, the COJPE, the OARC, and/or the U.S. District Court. What the Magistrates and attorneys knew, when they knew, and their reasons for non-reporting are critical questions that require further investigation.

The register of actions in *People v. Melissa Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25GV100395 shows that an initial arraignment on June 4, 2025 before Magistrate Trisha Matuszczak was vacated and that Justice Hart then appeared before Magistrate Michelle Kline on June 6, 2025. At the June 6, 2025 hearing, Justice Hart, again appearing *pro se*, accepted an offer under which she pled guilty to violating D.R.M.C. § 8-61 (Animal Attack or Bite) in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts and a 1-year deferred judgment. As a standard condition of the deferred judgment, Magistrate Kline ordered that "Defendant shall not commit or be convicted of any new law violations, except traffic violations that are 6 points or less." The deferred judgment is being supervised directly by the Denver County Court with no documentation filed that Justice Hart has notified the Court of the federal attorney discipline complaint filed against her or the pendency of *Gregory*. Justice Hart, however, has filed other proof of compliance into her case. The facts alleged in both the attorney discipline complaint and in *Gregory* provide a reasonable basis for initiation of proceedings to revoke Justice Hart's deferred judgment. Like Case No. 25T0087448, there is no publicly available evidence to suggest that Justice Hart self-reported the existence of Case No. 25GV100395. Moreover, there is no publicly-available evidence to suggest that Magistrate Matuszczak, Magistrate Kline, Assistant City Attorney Caleigh Schaff, ACA Schaff's supervisor, or any other judicial officer supervising/reviewing Justice Hart's deferred judgment reported the existence of Case No. 25GV100395 to the CCJD, the COJPE, the OARC, and/or the U.S. District Court. What the Magistrates, attorney(s), and other judicial officers knew, when they knew, and their reasons for non-reporting are critical questions that require further investigation.

CONCLUSION AND REQUST FOR INITIATION OF JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS

As recognized by D.R.J.D. 7(a), grounds for the discipline of Denver County Court Judges (and Magistrates) include:

> (1) Willful misconduct in office, including misconduct which, although not related to judicial duties, brings the judicial office into disrepute or is prejudicial to the administrat[ion] of justice; [and]
>
> * * *
>
> (4) Any conduct that constitutes a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

According to D.R.J.D. 15 and 17, if a complaint alleges "facts that, if true, would constitute one or more grounds for discipline of a Judge," this Commission is required to conduct a preliminary evaluation of the merits of the complaint and (with a preponderant determination of merit) proceed with an investigation. Given the depth and detail of evidence that supports this complaint, this Commission may not dismiss this complaint under D.R.J.D. 16(b) and, instead, must initiate judicial discipline proceedings, beginning with an investigation under D.R.J.D. 17(a), (c). As much as this complaint requests an inquiry into why Justice Melissa Hart's 2025 traffic and criminal cases were not publicly reported / disclosed to the respective disciplinary and judicial oversight authorities, this complaint seeks to ensure that the prospective conduct of Denver County Court judges, including the Presiding Judge, conforms to the Code.

In addition to initiating judicial discipline proceedings, I respectfully request that this Commission formally refer the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement (outside of the U.S. DOJ—Denver Office and the U.S. DOJ—Wyoming Office). Moreover, I request that this Commission, through the concurrent authority of the Denver County Court, order an investigation by the Denver Police Department and the appointment of a special prosecutor. Finally ordering a full, legitimate, impartial, and conflict-free investigation of the Colorado Judicial Scandal and its impacts upon the Denver County Court is consistent with the Presiding Denver County Court Judge's duties and enforcement obligations under Canon Rules 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in the Judiciary), 1.3 (Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office, 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness), 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment), 2.4 (External Influences on Judicial Conduct), 2.5 (Competence and Conduct), 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to be Heard), 2.9 (Ex Parte Communications), 2.10, (Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases), 2.11 (Disqualification), 2.12 (Supervisory Duties), 2.13 (Administrative Appointments), 2.14 (Disability and Impairment), 2.15 (Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct), 2.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities), 3.1 (Extrajudicial Activities in General), 3.2 (Appearances before Governmental Bodies and Consultation with Government Officials), 3.15 (Reporting Requirements), and 4.1 (Political and Campaign Activities of Judges in General).

If the rule of law and judicial ethics have any meaning in Colorado, the Presiding Judge and this Commission must defend the Code and order an investigation. Ordering a legitimate law enforcement investigation will also avoid the need for a § 16-5-209, C.R.S. petition to compel the prosecution of various misdemeanor crimes, particularly First Degree Official Misconduct under § 18-8-404, C.R.S., which crimes are within the jurisdiction of the Denver County Court.[2]

[2] To this point, there is a spectrum of factual theories that support First Degree Official Misconduct charges against the Justices, Attorney General Phil Weiser, Governor Jared Polis, and the members of the various judicial discipline oversight entities (including the CCJD). The simplest and most universal factual basis, however, is that each of these individuals have willfully refused to disqualify themselves despite grounds to reasonably question the individual's impartiality and personal bias. *See* Canon Rule 2.11(A). By refusing to disqualify themselves, these individuals are knowingly seeking to protect the Justices (i.e. to obtain a benefit for the Justices) and to maliciously harm others (including me as a reporting party / formerly a public official charged with enforcing the Code) through an abuse of their official authority. Because

I possess and I am willing to provide extensive additional evidence and documentation that supports the allegations asserted in this complaint. Since submitting my 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit, I obtained the court files in *Haeger v. FBI*, 1:03-cv-01542-CAB-CBS (D. Colo.) and *Appel v. FBI*, 1:03-cv-01967-CAB-CBS (D. Colo.) from the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. The court files confirm the existence and pervasiveness of the conflicts of interest involved in the Justices' now more than 25-year ongoing pattern of judicial misconduct. Additionally, in perhaps the most egregious example of witness tampering and witness intimidation, the CCJD, through the Colorado Attorney General's Office, seized a copy of my records as Executive Director (including my email correspondence). These records, which can be obtained with a warrant issued by the Denver County Court and executable by the Denver Police Department, will further verify the systemic judicial and official misconduct raised in this complaint and involved in the broader Colorado Judicial Scandal.

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosures (3)

Cc: Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation
U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado Committee on Conduct
U.S. Department of Justice

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the individual public servants' persistent refusal to disqualify is ongoing, the statute of limitations does not present an obstacle to prosecution. I respectfully submit that the elements of First Degree Misconduct are met through objective and incontrovertible evidence. § 18-8-404(1), C.R.S. defines the elements of the offense and provides:

> (1) A public servant commits first degree official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit for the public servant or another or maliciously to cause harm to another, he or she knowingly:
>
> (a) Commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official function; or
>
> (b) Refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law; or
>
> (c) Violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his office.

Even though First Degree Official Misconduct is merely a Class 1 Misdemeanor, uniform enforcement of this crime has profound implications upon the integrity of the Colorado Judiciary and Colorado State Government as a whole.

Colorado Office of the State Auditor / Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee / Colorado General Assembly

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Attorney Complaint No(s).:

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Complainant,

v.

MARIA BERKENKOTTER,
NATHAN B. COATS,
BRYAN FIELDS,
RICHARD GABRIEL,
NATIALIE HANLON-LEH,
MELISSA HART,
WILLIAM HOOD, III,
MONICA MÁRQUEZ,
LEEANN MORRILL,
ANDREW ROTTMAN,
CARLOS SAMOUR,
GRANT SULLIVAN, AND
KEVIN TRASKOS,

Respondent(s).

ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT COMPLAINT;
EXHIBITS 1-8

INTRODUCTION

"There is no kind of dishonesty into which otherwise good people more easily and frequently fall than that of defrauding the Government."–Benjamin Franklin

Regretfully, this attorney misconduct complaint and invocation of this Court's disciplinary jurisdiction under D.C.COLO.LAttyR 1(c) has become necessary because the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court have systematically undermined and obstructed Colorado's judicial disciplinary and attorney regulation structures. The ongoing Colorado





Judicial Scandal began in 2018 and its coverup has continued through the cascading misconduct of numerous judges, attorneys, and public officials/employees. The breadth of the conspiracy and the protection racket involved makes regulation of the underlying misconduct unwieldy. Consequently, this attorney misconduct complaint is intended to initiate the process of seeking accountability by focusing upon the keystone of the Colorado Judicial Scandal—attorneys admitted to practice before this Court and/or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit knowingly withheld material information from the Colorado Office of the State Auditor (OSA) as the OSA performed its continuous, ongoing, and federally-required single statewide audit. Through uncontroverted evidence, probable cause exists to suspect that the involved judges and attorneys committed various federal felony-level crimes, including but not limited to obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), and obstruction of a federal audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516). *See also United States v. Jones*, 41 Fed. Appx. 220, 223 (10th Cir. 2002) (recognizing private contractor performing required federal audit as a federal auditor completing an "official investigation"); 31 U.S.C.. §§ 7501-7507 (the federal Single Audit Act).

The involved attorneys, include but are not limited to the following individuals, who are admitted to practice before either or both this Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit:

> Maria Berkenkotter (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 596763; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Nathan B. Coats (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 591795, admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Richard Gabriel (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 682419; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Natalie Hanlon-Leh (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 704484; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Melissa Hart (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 1980828; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> William Hood, III (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 688626; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Monica Márquez (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 799305; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> LeeAnn Morrill (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 1828438; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Andrew Rottman (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 1896776; admitted to 10th Circuit),
> Carlos Samour (D. Colo. Atty Reg. # 703570),

Grant Sullivan (D. Colo. Atty. Reg. # 1850542; admitted to 10th Circuit), and Philip Weiser (Admitted to 10th Circuit).

At all times relevant, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian Boatright, Nathan Coats, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood III, Monica Márquez, and Carlos Samour were justices of the Colorado Supreme Court (referred to herein collectively as the "Justices"). Brian Boatright, however, is not admitted to practice before this Court or the 10th Circuit. Consequently, Justice Boatright is not listed as an attorney / respondent in this Complaint.

The attorney misconduct at issue has been further complicated by the failure of Assistant U.S. Attorney Bryan Fields, Assistant U.S. Attorney Kevin Traskos, and other federal attorneys to disqualify themselves and the Department of Justice (DOJ)—Denver Office from the investigation of and prosecution decisions made as to the Colorado Judicial Scandal. Mr. Traskos is Colorado Supreme Court Justice Melissa Hart's husband and currently serves as Chief of the DOJ-Denver Office's Civil Division (which oversees civil enforcement of public fraud and public corruption cases). In addition to violating the DOJ's internal disqualification standards, there is probable cause to suspect criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. § 208. *See also* 5 C.F.R. § 2635.501-503 (defining general grounds for disqualification to ensure appearances of impartiality); 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 (defining conflicts of interest in criminal investigations including political and personal relationships). Bryan Fields and Kevin Traskos are admitted to practice before both this Court and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

A criminal conviction (or a criminal charge) is not a prerequisite for judicial discipline and/or attorney discipline. *See, e.g., In re Cruikshanks*, 648 S.E.2d 19, 23 (W. Va. 2005) (neither conviction nor criminal charge prerequisite to judicial discipline where state supreme court had inherent authority and duty to "promote and protect the honor, integrity, dignity, and efficiency of

the judiciary and the justice system"); *People v. Parsley*, 109 P.3d 1060 (Colo. PDJ 2005) (criminal conviction not predicate to attorney discipline under Colo. RPC 8.4(b), (c); "Disbarment is the presumptive sanction for the commission of a serious crime involving dishonesty."). The criminal conduct involved here, however, supports recognition that the involved attorneys subject to this Court's and/or the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals' disciplinary jurisdiction have further violated other standards of conduct as adopted by this Court through the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. D.C.COLO.LAttyR 2(a); *accord* 10th Cir. R. Add. III, § 2.3 (10th Circuit's disciplinary jurisdiction includes enforcing "the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the highest court of any state to which the attorney is admitted to practice").

Ultimately, the Colorado Judicial Scandal involves a broader pattern of intimidation, retaliation, and an enforced culture of silence facilitated through publicly-funded hush money / non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), self-controlled "independent" investigations, and self-serving public relations strategies. The Colorado Judicial Scandal continues to wrongfully cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars.

This Complaint is also related to a separate judicial misconduct proceeding pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. The parallel judicial discipline proceeding has been docketed as Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90048 and is subject to a petition for review according to 10th Circuit JCD Rule 18(b). Because of circumstances described in Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90048 and in the accompanying materials,[1] this Complainant respectfully

[1] A former member of this Court's Committee on Conduct, John F. Walsh III, was directly involved in the alleged attorney misconduct. A current member of this Court's Committee on Conduct, Kathyrn Stimson, is, likewise, a material witness as to the allegations of misconduct

requests that this Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit address both apparent and actual conflicts of interest within the membership of this Court's Disciplinary Panel, this Court's Committee on Conduct, and the 10th Circuit's Judicial Council. D.C.COLO.LAttyR 6(a),

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asserted through this Complaint. There are also acknowledged grounds for the disqualification of this Court's entire Disciplinary Panel, including Chief District Court Judge Philip Brimmer. Exhibit 8 further provides grounds for 10th Circuit Court of Appeals Chief Judge Jeffrey Holmes to disqualify himself from consideration of this Complaint according to the procedures defined in 10th Cir. R. Add. III, § 4.3, 5.3. Because of circumstances described in Exhibit 2, it would also be "clearly inappropriate" for the 10th Circuit to appoint the Colorado Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel as disciplinary counsel in this case. 10th Cir. R. Add. III, § 4.4.

The Complainant further notes that during the fall of 2023, while still serving as the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (CCJD), he had applied for appointment to this Court's Committee on Conduct expressly because of the breakdown of Colorado's attorney regulation system. At the time, the Complainant was rightfully apprehensive of imminent retaliation for having internally raised the issues presented in this Complaint.

The following Exhibits are filed with this Complaint and incorporated by reference:

- Exhibit 1—Anonymous Fraud Hotline complaint submitted by the Complainant on October 20, 2024 and supplemental anonymous Fraud Hotline complaint submitted by the Complainant on November 4, 2024;
- Exhibit 2—Anonymous request for evaluation (RFE) of judicial conduct submitted by the Complaint to the CCJD on October 20, 2024;
- Exhibit 3—Appendices to the October 20, 2024 RFE;
- Exhibit 4—Dually filed public comments to the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee (CJDRC) and RFE with appendices submitted to the CCJD on August 25, 2025;
- Exhibit 5—First supplement to combined public comments and RFE submitted on September 12, 2025;
- Exhibit 6—Second supplement to combined public comments and RFE with appendix submitted on September 12, 2025;
- Exhibit 7—Third supplement to combined public comments and RFE with appendices submitted on September 30, 2025; and
- Exhibit 8—Complainant's email correspondence with the American Inns of Court and request for clarification as to 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jeffrey Holmes's involvement in the decision to award Justice Richard Gabriel the 2024 AIC 10th Circuit Professionalism Award.

(d); *see also* D.C.COLO.LAttyR 7(h) (addressing conflict mechanism for complaints brought against a sitting member of the Committee on Conduct); 10th Cir. R. Add. III, § 4.3 (Chief Judge or designee authorized to appoint Disciplinary Panel); *Cf.* 10th Cir. JCD Rules 25 (disqualification) and 26 (transfer to another Judicial Council).

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On July 15, 2018, Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Controller Myra Dukes discovered and internally reported evidence that SCAO Chief of Staff Mindy Masias had intentionally altered a receipt as part of a request for personal reimbursement. State Court Administrator Christopher Ryan immediately recognized Masias's suspected conduct as material to a continuous, recurring annual single statewide audit of the Judicial Department's internal controls conducted as a component for certification of the State of Colorado's Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR). Like other states and governments, Colorado is required to produce its ACFR as a condition of receiving federal funding and for its federally granted authority to issue bonds. Following internal and external investigations, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court collectively decided to terminate Masias's employment. As part of the notice provided to Masias, State Court Administrator Ryan explained the materiality of Masias's financial misconduct to the OSA's single statewide audit and the ACFR. Instead of accepting her termination or agreeing to the severance offer made by the Colorado Judicial Branch, Masias instead activated leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

In December 2018, Masias's colleague and successor as SCAO Human Resources Director, Eric Brown, began negotiating a multi-million-dollar, sole-source contract for Masias to provide leadership training services to the Judicial Department. As part of these negotiations,

Brown met with then-Chief Justice Nathan Coats, Counsel to the Chief Justice Andrew Rottman, and State Court Administrator Ryan to essentially present an ultimatum that Masias would release compromising information about the Department and the Justices if an agreement could not be reached. Brown's talking points (including Masias's allegations of covered up judicial, attorney, and employee misconduct) were reduced to writing in a document later referred to as the Masias Memo. SCAO Legal Counsel Terri Morrison was also contemporaneously aware of the Masias Memo and the meeting that occurred between Brown, Coats, Rottman, and Ryan.

Masias remained on FMLA leave until March 15, 2019, when she executed a separation agreement, effective March 19, 2019, that allowed her to keep her income from paid leave in exchange for a general release of claims and a non-disclosure agreement. Masias executed her separation agreement with the expectation of a 5-year, $2.66-2.75 million sole-source contract to provide leadership training services. To provide some perspective, under this contract Masias would have been paid approximately three-times the salaries of the individual Justices (i.e. $532,000 per year). Before State Court Administrator Ryan signed the sole-source determination on March 25, 2019, Chief Justice Coats informed all the other Justices of Masias' resignation and her proposal for the leadership training program. Through an April 4, 2019 email chain between Chief Justice Coats and Justice Melissa Hart about Masias applying to become the Utah State Court Administrator, Coats explained that Masias had signed an NDA and was negotiating the Masias Contract. With Coats's approval, State Court Administrator Ryan then circulated the $2.66-2.75 million Masias Contract for its first execution on April 11, 2019. On April 15, 2019, however, an anonymous complaint was submitted to the OSA's Fraud Hotline that alleged widespread occupational fraud within the SCAO and specifically involving additional financial

misconduct by Masias. The anonymous Fraud Hotline complaint was personally sent to each of the Justices, to Attorney General Phil Weiser, and to Governor Jared Polis. Upon receiving a letter from State Auditor Dianne Ray inquiring as to how the Judicial Department wished to proceed in response to the Fraud Hotline complaint, Chief Justice Coats confirmed that he had "look[ed] into th[e] allegations . . . in consultation with the Attorney General . . . and the Attorney General's Staff." In his response dated May 29, 2019, Chief Justice Coats, however, did not inform the State Auditor that the $2.66-2.75 million sole-source Masias Contract had already been approved or that the Masias Contract would be executed a second time three business days later—June 3, 2019—and one business day after SCAO Controller Myra Dukes retired. Chief Justice Coats further knowingly concealed the existence of the Masias Memo and its significance in negotiations of the Masias Contract from the OSA.

In July 2019, the existence of the Masias Contract became public and the Justices accepted State Court Administrator Ryan's offer to resign. At the time, the Justices, through an official statement made by the Colorado Judicial Department, confirmed that they had collectively approved and made the decision to cancel the Masias Contract. As part of his debriefing, Ryan met with 1st Assistant Attorney General LeeAnn Morrill and Assistant Solicitor General Grant Sullivan to discuss and turn over his copy of the Masias Memo.[2] At that time, SCAO Legal Counsel Terri Morrison also had access to a copy of the Masias Memo. In a July 19, 2019 email exchange with Andrew Rottman, Morrill acknowledged possession of the Masias Memo, its materiality to the OSA's Fraud Hotline investigation, and the need to preserve

[2] David Migoya, *Colorado Attorney General's Office Lawyers Knew About Judicial Misconduct Memo: Whether they could, should or did tell Attorney General, other authorities is unclear*, DENVER POST, February 22, 2021.

the document. Despite this email and later deposition testimony from Justice Melissa Hart confirming that the Justices were aware of the Masias Memo in 2019, the Masias Memo was intentionally withheld from the OSA (and from the CCJD) for over 1 ½ years until then-former State Court Administrator Ryan came forward and publicly revealed the document's existence. In the meantime, the OSA issued a December 2019 management letter as part of the ACFR audit and a November 18, 2020 SCAO Performance Audit Report that both recognized the breakdown of SCAO's internal controls and appearances of impropriety created by the Masias Contract.

In response to State Court Administrator Ryan's revelation of the Masias Memo's existence, the Justices and the other attorneys listed in this Complaint collaborated on damage control that included the Justices issuing separate public statements on February 4, 2021 and on February 8, 2021. The collaboration between the Justices, the attorneys listed in this Complaint, other public officials, and former U.S. Attorney for the District of Colorado John F. Walsh, III (who was then a partner at the national law firm WilmerHale) is documented through internal Judicial Department email chains created concurrently with the drafting of the public statements. The public statements, in turn, confirmed that the Justices and the other attorneys were fully informed by former Chief Justice Coats and were complicit in knowingly concealing material information from the OSA as it performed a federal function through its ACFR audit, its 2020 Performance Audit of SCAO, and its Fraud Hotline Investigation. These circumstances have been further proven through Chief Justice Coats's admissions and judicial discipline. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44, ¶¶ 4(9)-(14), (20)-(23), 6. A separate, though only partially disclosed, attorney regulation investigation of former Chief Justice Coats concluded with findings (upon

clear and convincing evidence) that he had failed to report the misconduct of subordinate attorneys, as required by Colo. RPC 5.1 and 8.3.[3]

When the OSA finally issued its Fraud Hotline Investigation Report on February 4, 2022 with referrals for prosecution, interference, obstruction, and delay of the Fraud Hotline investigation caused state statutes of limitations to lapse. The Justices, Andrew Rottman, Terri Morrison, Attorney General Phil Weiser, Chief Deputy Attorney General Natalie Hanlon-Leh, LeeAnn Morrill, and Grant Sullivan were all directly involved in this interference, obstruction, and forced delay.

At various times, the Complainant reported these circumstances to federal law enforcement (specifically Bryan Fields, the DOJ—Denver Office, the DOJ Public Integrity Section, and the FBI) and to the CCJD only to be intentionally ignored. Exhibits 4-6 further document how these circumstances are now being intentionally disregarded or suppressed by the Colorado State Commission on Judicial Performance, the Colorado Civil Rights Division, the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, and the CCJD. Moreover, there appears to be cultural resistance within the press, Colorado's political parties, and the Colorado General Assembly to holding the attorneys listed in this Complaint (particularly Attorney General Weiser) and others involved in the Colorado Judicial Scandal accountable.

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[3] The Colorado Legal Regulation Committee's public statement dated January 20, 2023, states, in relevant part:

> "Based on the evidence provided by outside counsel, the Committee believes that there is clear and convincing evidence that the former Chief Justice violated the rules with respect to his duty to report what appeared to be improper conduct of other lawyers which contributed to the ongoing consideration of awarding the [Masias] contract."

ANALYSIS

Attorneys admitted to practice before this Court are expected to abide by standards of professional conduct defined through the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct. Under the Colo. RPC, the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), and the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code), both judges and attorneys are required to report judicial or attorney misconduct and/or to otherwise take "appropriate action." Colo. RPC. 8.3; Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, 2.12, 2.15, 2.16 of the Code; Canons 1, 2(A)-(B), and 3(B)(6) of the federal Code. Similarly, non-compliance with the law (whether criminal, civil, or ethical rules) also violates the respective codes of conduct. In proceedings before this Court and the 10th Circuit, violations of the standards of professional conduct are proven through a preponderance of evidence. D.C.COLO.LAttyR 7(e)(1), (f). As previously noted, neither a criminal conviction nor even a criminal charge is prerequisite to recognizing violations of Colo. RPC 8.4(a-1), (b)-(d), (f), (h), Canon Rules 1.1 and 1.2 of the Code, and/or Canon 2(A) of the federal Code.

Despite a complex history of ancillary judicial, attorney, and employee misconduct, there are clear grounds for discipline of the respondent attorneys. The Justices and those who helped them were aware of information material to the OSA's federally required single statewide audit / ACFR audit (including the contemplation of the $2.66-2.75 sole-source Masias Contract and the existence of the Masias Memo) and, yet, intentionally withheld/concealed the material information from the OSA and the CCJD (which had exclusive constitutional authority to investigate judicial misconduct).

There is probable cause to suspect that the Justices and those helping them committed the crimes of obstruction of justice, false statements, and obstruction of a federal audit.

The elements of obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503) are:

1. The defendant corruptly,
2. Endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of justice,
3. With knowledge and specific intent to obstruct.

The elements of False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001) are:

1. The defendant, in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government,
2. Falsifies,
3. Conceals, or
4. Covers up by any trick, scheme, or device,
5. A material fact.

The elements of Obstruction of a Federal Audit are (18 U.S.C. § 1516) are:

1. The defendant,
2. With the intent to deceive or defraud the United States,
3. Endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede a federal auditor,
4. In the performance of official duties relating to an entity receiving in excess of $100,000, directly(a) or indirectly in any 1-year period.

"'Federal auditor' means any person employed on a full- or part-time or contractual basis to perform an audit or a quality assurance inspection for ***or on behalf of*** the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 1516(b)(1) (emphasis added).

The intentional withholding of material information from the OSA and the CCJD by the Justices and those helping them violated Canon Rules 1.1 (Compliance with Law), 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in Judiciary), 1.3 (Abusing Prestige of Office), 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness), 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment), 2.5 (Competence and Cooperation), 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to be Heard), 2.9(C) (Ex Parte Communications), 2.11 (Disqualification), 2.12 (Supervisory Duties), 2.15 (Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct), 2.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities), 3.1 (Extrajudicial Activities in General), 4.1 (Political and Campaign Activities of Judges) of the Code and Colo. RPC 1.7(a)(2) (Conflict of Interest), 1.13(b) (Organization as Client), 3.3(a) (Candor Toward the Tribunal), 3.4 (Fairness to Counsel), 3.5(a) (Impartiality of Tribunal), 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others), 5.1 (Responsibilities of Supervisory Lawyer), 6.4 (Law Reform Activities), 8.3 (Reporting Professional Misconduct), 8.4 (a-1), (b)-(d), (f), (h) (violation of RPC, commission of criminal act, dishonesty/fraud/deceit, conduct prejudicial to administration of justice, assisting judicial misconduct, wrongfully harming others).

By failing to disqualify themselves and the DOJ-Denver Office from the investigation of and prosecution decisions as to the Colorado Judicial Scandal, Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos and Assistant U.S. Attorney Bryan Fields similarly violated the law and should be subject to discipline for further violating their duties under Colo. RPC 1.7(a)(2), 1.10(a), 4.1, 5.1, 8.3, 8.4(a-1), (b)-(d), (f), (h). By intentionally disregarding the Complainant's reporting of suspected crimes and public fraud, there is also probable cause to suspect that Bryan Fields and

Kevin Traskos jointly and severally committed the crime of obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503) and that Kevin Traskos criminally violated 18 U.S.C. § 208.[4]

WHEREFORE, the Complainant respectfully requests that this Court, through a conflict-free Disciplinary Panel and Committee on Conduct, initiate an investigation and attorney discipline proceedings according to D.C.COLO.LAttyR 7. Concurrently, the Complaint respectfully requests that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit initiate attorney discipline proceedings under 10th Cir. R. Add. III.

Dated: September 30, 2025

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
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Pro Se Attorney Complainant
Christopher S.P. Gregory

[4] 18 U.S.C. § 208(a) provides, in relevant parts:

> **(a)** Except as permitted by subsection (b) hereof, whoever, being an officer or employee of the executive branch of the United States Government . . . participates personally and substantially as a Government officer or employee, through decision, approval, disapproval, recommendation, the rendering of advice, investigation, or otherwise, in a judicial or other proceeding, application, request for a ruling or other determination, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other particular matter in which, to his knowledge, he, ***his spouse***, minor child, general partner, organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee, or any person or organization with whom he is negotiating . . . has a financial interest--
> Shall be subject to the penalties set forth in section 216 of this title.
> (Emphasis added).

To the best of my knowledge, I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of Colorado that the foregoing facts and circumstances described in this Complaint are true and correct.

Executed on the 30th day of September 2025 at Longmont, Boulder County, Colorado.

Christopher S.P. Gregory

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No.

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE,
The COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE,
The COLORADO SUPREME COURT,
MARY V. SOOTER, individually,
PHILIP J. WEISER, individually, and in his official capacity as the Colorado Attorney General,
JARED POLIS, individually, and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado,
MARIA BERKENKOTTER, individually,
BRIAN D. BOATRIGHT, individually,
RICHARD GABRIEL, individually,
MELISSA HART, individually,
WILLIAM HOOD, III, individually,
MONICA MÁRQUEZ, individually,
CARLOS SAMOUR, individually,
INGRID BARRIER, individually,
DAVID BELLER, individually,
JILL BRADY, individually,
GINA CANNAN, individually,
JAMES CARPENTER, individually,
NANCY COHEN, individually,
ROBERT GARDNER, individually,
SARA GARRIDO, individually,
KIRSTEN GROOMS, individually,
JAMES HARTMANN, individually,
AMANDA HOLLANDER, individually,
ALISON KYLES, individually,
BRYON LARGE, individually,
ANNE MANGIARDI, individually,
BONNIE MCLEAN, individually,
COLLEEN MCMANAMON, individually,
KRISTEN MIX, individually,
REED OWENS, individually,
MEREDITH PATRICK CORD, individually,
AUBREY C. SULLIVAN, individually,

EXHIBIT
2

COURTNEY SUTTON, individually,
JEFF SWANTY, individually,
EMILY TOFTE NESTAVAL, individually,
STEFANIE TRUJILLO, individually,
MARYANN VIELMA, individually,
VINCENTE VIGIL, individually, and
JEFFREY M. WALSH, individually,

Defendants.

VERIFIED COMPLAINT AND JURY DEMAND
WITH EXHIBITS 1-3

INTRODUCTION

1. Christopher Sydney Philip Gregory (the "Plaintiff") brings this action against the Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 and § 28 U.S.C. 1651 with supplemental state claims brought under § 24-31-1204(8), C.R.S.

2. For more than six years, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court have engaged in a conspiracy intended to absolve themselves of ***any*** accountability for their proven and otherwise incontrovertible violations of various criminal laws and the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct ("the Code"). At the core of the Justices' misconduct was a prolonged scheme to knowingly conceal material information of a $2.66-2.75 million bribe / public fraud involving former Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Chief of Staff Mindy Masias[1] from the Colorado Office of the State Auditor (OSA) as the OSA performed its ongoing, continuous, and federally-required single statewide audit.[2] Further, the

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[1] At the time, Masias was being fired for suspected alteration of financial records, occupational fraud (later verified through a Fraud Hotline investigation), dishonesty, and other financial misconduct.

[2] The Justices' publicly admitted concealment of material information from the OSA as it performed a federal function is probable cause to suspect that the Justices have committed

Justices knowingly concealed the same material information of public fraud from the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), which has exclusive constitutional jurisdiction to investigate judicial misconduct and enforce the Code. *See Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44, ¶¶ 4(9)-(14), (20)-(23), 6 (stipulated admissions confirming that former Chief Justice Nathan Coats, in consultation with the other Justices, Attorney General Phil Weiser, other attorneys, and other Judicial Department employees knowingly concealed negotiation of the $2.66-2.75 million Masias Contract and the existence of the related Masias Memo from the OSA and the CCJD). This knowing concealment of information material to the performance of a federal function and to enforcement of the Code was sustained for more than two years (December 2018-February 2021). During that time, Plaintiff served as a member, Vice-Chair, and Chair of the CCJD.

3. Part of the Justices' scheme to suppress evidence of their substantial criminal and ethical misconduct has been to intimidate, to retaliate against, and to use public funds (for their personal advantage) to silence or marginalize the numerous whistleblowers / regulators who have had the courage to stand against public corruption. Plaintiff, in his roles as the CCJD's Chair and, later, as its wrongfully terminated Executive Director, is only one of these retaliated-against whistleblowers / regulators. As the

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multiple federal felony-level crimes, including but not limited to Obstruction of Justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503), False Statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), and Obstruction of a Federal Audit (18 U.S.C. § 1516) . By retaliating against the Plaintiff, the Justices have further obstructed the investigation of these probable crimes as a matter of judicial discipline under Canon Rules 1.1 (Compliance with Law), 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in Judiciary), 1.3 (Abusing Prestige of Office), 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness), 2.3 (Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment), 2.5 (Competence and Cooperation), 2.6 (Ensuring the Right to be Heard), 2.9(C) (Ex Parte Communications), 2.10 (Judicial Statements on Pending or Impending Cases), 2.11 (Disqualification), 2.12 (Supervisory Duties), 2.13 (Administrative Appointments), 2.15 (Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct), 2.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities), 3.1 (Extra Judicial Activities in General), and 4.1 (Political and Campaign Activities of Judges) as well as other provisions of the Code and the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct.

Plaintiff has continued to seek accountability for the Justices' misconduct, including their misuse of millions of dollars of taxpayer funds, the retaliation campaign against him has continued.

4. As relevant to this action, the Defendants have collectively conspired to censor and deliberately suppress Plaintiff's constitutionally and statutorily privileged reporting of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct (including very probable violations of the federal civil False Claims Act (FCA) and the Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA)). Moreover, the Defendants have imposed prior restraints preventing the Plaintiff from participating publicly in the judicial discipline rulemaking process as otherwise mandated through Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(k)(I).

5. Collaterally, Defendant Aubrey C. Sullivan has abused her official authority to prevent the Colorado Civil Rights Commission from hearing or considering the merits of Plaintiff's administrative claims for discrimination and unfair employment practices, specifically retaliation, under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA), Title 24, Art. 34, Pts. 3-8, C.R.S. *See* § 24-34-402(1)(e), C.R.S. (prohibiting retaliation and other facilitation of discriminatory or unfair employment practices).

6. In addition to prohibitions against retaliation contained in § 24-31-1204(8), C.R.S., the individual Defendants have conspired, under the color of state law, to deprive the Plaintiff of federal constitutional and statutory rights, thus providing for a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

7. Through this action, the Plaintiff seeks: 1) his immediate reinstatement as Executive Director of the CCJD; 2) injunctive and other equitable relief necessary to correct constitutionally and federally offensive deficiencies in Colorado's judicial selection, retention, and disciplinary structures; 3) compensatory damages and punitive damages, 4) two-times backpay with interest; and 5) reasonable attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to both 42 U.S.C. 1988 and § 24-31-1204(8)(d)(II)(C), C.R.S..

8. The allegations presented in this Complaint relate to circumstances that did, and continue to, undermine the public's confidence in the integrity of Colorado's Judiciary and Colorado's State Government. *See* Colo. RJD 1(b) (describing the CCJD's constitutional mandate and purpose of "maintain[ing] public confidence in the judiciary"); *see also* Colo. SB 22-201 § 1 (legislative declaration recognizing public confidence having been "significantly undermined" by the Masias Controversy as cause for legislative reforms).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9. This action arises under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871 / the Klu Klux Klan Act), § 24-31-1201, et seq., C.R.S. (the CFCA), and in equity. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Federal Questions) and § 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act). This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). § 24-31-1204(d)(I), C.R.S. further recognizes the severability and independence of causes of action brought under § 24-31-1204(f), C.R.S., including any potential or related *qui tam* actions brought under § 24-31-104(3), C.R.S. This Court also has jurisdiction and venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) and (c), because, at all times material and relevant, the Defendants' actions and conduct occurred in this District.

10. To the extent that the named Defendants are alleged to have liability for actions or omissions taken or made in their individual capacities, such actions or omissions have occurred outside the scope of any absolute or qualified privileges / immunities. *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988) (absolute or qualified judicial immunities do not extend to administrative decisions, such as demoting an employee); *Samuel v. Holmes*, 138 F.3d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1988) (judicial immunity does not extend to claims of retaliatory conduct by members of government board); *U.S. ex rel Citynet, LLC v. Gianato*, 962 F.3d

154, 159-60 (4th Cir. 2020) (qualified immunity does not apply to FCA claims in general). The objective wrongfulness and intentionality of the respective Defendants' conduct in depriving the Plaintiff of his constitutional, statutory, and administrative rights further meet the thresholds for overcoming any potential claims of qualified immunity. *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (qualified immunity unavailable when public official performs discretionary functions in manner that violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known"). Retaliation against the Plaintiff for his expressed intention to submit an anonymous, public, RFE probative of false claims, for attempting to perform his duty to enforce the CCJD's disqualification rules, for engaging in ethically mandated speech by pursing legitimate complaints of judicial misconduct, and for participating in the legislative/rulemaking process is a valid basis for Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Thomas v. City of Blanchard*, 548 F.3d 1317 (10th Cir. 2018) (threat of law enforcement report outside chain of command was constitutionally protected speech beyond exception to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims recognized through *Garcetti v. Ceballos*, 547 U.S. 401 (2006)).

11. Beyond the present case, the Plaintiff has brought related actions and proceedings, including a sealed case—Case No. 1:25-cv-00190 (D.Colo),[3] a judicial discipline complaint—Judicial Complaint No. 10-

[3] The following judicial officers have disqualified themselves from hearing Case No. 1:25-cv-00190: Chief Judge Phillip Brimmer, Magistrate Judge Cyrus Chung, Senior Judge William Martinez, Judge Regina Rodriguez, Magistrate Judge Kathyrn Starnella, and Judge Charlotte Sweeney. Additionally, Plaintiff has moved for U.S. District Court Judge Daniel Domenico's disqualification from the case due to actual bias. As this Court follows its process under D.C.COLO.LCivR 40.1(c), none of the already disqualified judicial officers nor Judge Domenico should be considered for assignment to this case.

25-90048 (10th Cir.), and a yet-to-be docketed attorney disciplinary complaint—(D. Colo. & 10th Cir.).[4] In some of these related proceedings, judicial officers and attorneys have collaterally conspired to deprive Plaintiff of his fundamental constitutional rights to freely report judicial/attorney misconduct and to be heard before an impartial federal court. Plaintiff anticipates filing an additional judicial disciplinary complaint with the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 351, *et seq.*, to further address the deprivations of his fundamental right to be heard by that court.

PARTIES

12. Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of Colorado. From January 3, 2022 until January 19, 2024, Plaintiff was the Executive Director of the CCJD. From May 15, 2017 until June 30, 2021, Plaintiff served as an appointed member of the CCJD, internally elected as the CCJD's Vice-Chair and Chair during parts of his term. The Plaintiff avers that he was wrongfully terminated from his position as Executive Director in retaliation for his duty-bound efforts to stop false claims and other substantial judicial and attorney misconduct violative of the Code. The Plaintiff brings this action based on his direct, independent, and personal knowledge as well as upon information and belief.

13. Defendant the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee (the "CJDRC") is a constitutionally created committee affiliated with the Colorado Judicial Department, and charged with promulgating administrative / procedural rules to implement Colorado's constitutional structure for judicial discipline as provided through Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3). The CJDRC shares the CCJD's official address at 1300 Broadway St., Suite 210, Denver, CO 80203. Plaintiff has named the CJDRC

[4] Plaintiff's attorney discipline complaints dually filed with this Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit are attached to this Complaint with their accompanying exhibits (sub-Exhibits 1-8) and incorporated by reference. Exhibit 1.

as a defendant for the limited purpose of obtaining injunctive relief, specifically to require that the CJDRC disband itself before being recomposed through a conflict-free appointment process and to enjoin rulemaking until the CJDRC is recomposed.

14. Defendant the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the "CCJD") is an independent commission affiliated with the Colorado Judicial Department, charged with oversight of the ethical conduct of Colorado state court judges, and authorized by Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3). The CCJD's official address is 1300 Broadway St., Suite 210, Denver, CO 80203. Plaintiff's former employer, the CCJD is named as a defendant for the limited purpose of obtaining injunctive relief, specifically Plaintiff's reinstatement as the CCJD's Executive Director and the removal of Defendants Anne Mangiardi and Jeffrey Walsh from their official positions. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks the removal of the CCJD's appointments to the CJDRC: Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Anne Mangiardi, and Jeffrey Walsh.

15. Defendant the Colorado Supreme Court has authority to appoint and to remove the judge members of the CCJD according to Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(a)-(b). Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court is the appointing authority for four members of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Advisory Board (the "CJDAB") and for at least four members of the CJDRC (which is also subject to indirect/redundant appointments through the CCJD and the CJDAB) under Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(c.5)(I), (k)(I). The Colorado Supreme Court's official address is 2 East 14th Avenue, Denver, CO 80203. The Colorado Supreme Court is named as a defendant for the limited purpose of obtaining injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks the removal of Defendants Jill Brady, Sara Garrido, Meredith Patrick Cord, and Reed Owens from the CCJD. Additionally, Plaintiff seeks the removal of Eric Eliff, Grechen Larson, Crista Newmyer-Olsen, and Vincente Vigil from the Colorado Judicial Discipline Adjudicative

Board (the "CJDAB"). Finally, and in turn, Plaintiff seeks the removal of Nancy Cohen, Richard Gabriel, Bryon Large, James Hartmann, and Vincente Vigil from the CJDRC.

16. Defendant Mary "Mindy" Sooter is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Mindy Sooter was an employee and an authorized agent of WilmerHale, LLP, an appointed member of the CCJD, and/or being considered for membership on the CCJD. Mindy Sooter is an attorney licensed to practice in Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with respective license numbers 35136 and 876717. Mindy Sooter is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

17. Defendant Philip J. Weiser is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Philip Weiser was employed by the Colorado Department of Law as the elected Colorado State Attorney General. To the extent that this Complaint seeks the removal of his subordinates/co-conspirators and/or limitations upon his appointment powers, Attorney General Weiser is named as a defendant in his official capacity. As to other actions and omissions occurring outside of the Colorado Attorney General's official capacity/performance of official functions and as described in this Complaint, Philip Weiser is named as a defendant in his individual capacity. Philip Weiser is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 38314. Philip Weiser is also admitted to practice before the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

18. Defendant Jared Polis is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Jared Polis was employed by the State of Colorado as its elected Governor. According to Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(a)-(b), the Governor has the authority to appoint and to remove the citizen and attorney members of the CCJD. Governor Polis also has appointment authority as to other judicial oversight entities, including members of the Colorado judicial performance

commissions, members of the Colorado judicial nominating commissions, and members of the CJDAB. Ultimately, Governor Polis is vested with the final authority to appoint all Colorado state court judges. With this authority, Governor Polis is named as a defendant in his official capacity for the limited purpose of obtaining injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks the removal of Defendants Ingrid Barrier, James Carpenter, Robert Gardner, Emily Netaval, Courtney Sutton, and Stefanie Trujillo from the CCJD. Plaintiff further seeks the removal of appointees Jeff Chostner, Laura Ellis, Tyrone Glover, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Jeff Swanty, Jeannie Valliere, and Leanne Wheeler, from the CJDAB. In turn, Plaintiff also seeks the removal of Defendants Ingrid Barrier, Amanda Hollander, Colleen McManamon, and Jeff Swanty from the CJDRC. Plaintiff, also seeks to enjoin further exercise of Governor Polis's judicial appointment powers and appointment powers as to all judicial oversight entities. As to other actions and omissions occurring outside of the Governor's official capacity/performance of official functions and as described in this Complaint, Jared Polis is named as a defendant in his individual capacity.

19. Defendant Maria Berkenkotter is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Maria Berkenkotter was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by the Colorado Judicial Department. Maria Berkenkotter is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 16781 and 765447, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Maria Berkenkotter from its list of active attorneys. Maria Berkenkotter is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

20. Defendant Brian D. Boatright is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Brian D. Boatright was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by

the Colorado Judicial Department. Brian Boatright is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 17731.

21. Defendant Richard Gabriel is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Richard Gabriel was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by the Colorado Judicial Department. At relevant times, Richard Gabriel was also a self-appointed member of the CJDRC. Richard Gabriel is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 19769 and 765447, respectively. Richard Gabriel is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

22. Defendant Melissa Hart is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Melissa Hart was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by the Colorado Judicial Department. Melissa Hart is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 34345 and 1980828, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Melissa Hart from its list of active attorneys. Melissa Hart is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

23. Defendant William Hood, III is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, William Hood, III was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by the Colorado Judicial Department. William Hood is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 19808 and 688626, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has

administratively removed William Hood from its list of active attorneys. William Hood is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

24. Defendant Monica Márquez is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Monica Márquez was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by the Colorado Judicial Department. Prior to her appointment as a Colorado Supreme Court Justice, Monica Márquez oversaw the State Services Division for then-Colorado Attorney General Ken Salazar. Monica Márquez is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 28950 and 799305, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Monica Márquez from its list of active attorneys. Monica Márquez is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

25. Defendant Carlos Samour is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Carlos Samour was a Colorado Supreme Court Justice employed by the Colorado Judicial Department. Carlos Samour is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 19955 and 703570, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Carlos Samour from its list of active attorneys.

26. Defendant Ingrid Barrier is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Ingrid Barrier was an appointed member of the CCJD or being considered for membership on the CCJD. At relevant times, Ingrid Barrier was an appointed member of the CJDRC. Ingrid Barrier is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 32126 and 913644, respectively. The U.S.

District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Ingrid Barrier from its list of active attorneys. Ingrid Barrier is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

27. Defendant David Beller is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times, David Beller was appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Practice of Law and/or the CJDRC. While a member of the CJDRC, David Beller represented former 13th Judicial District Court Judge Justin B. Haenlein in judicial discipline proceedings before the CCJD and the CJDAB. David Beller is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 35767 and 916696. David Beller is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

28. Defendant Jill Brady is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Jill Brady was a 4th Judicial District Court Judge employed by the Colorado Judicial Department, an appointed member of the CCJD, or being considered for membership on the CCJD. Jill Brady is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 38662 and 584282, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Jill Brady from its list of active attorneys. Jill Brady is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

29. Defendant Gina Cannan is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Gina Cannan was employed by the Colorado Department of Law and assigned to serve as general counsel to the CCJD. Gina Cannan is an attorney licensed to practice in Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with license numbers 45071 and

2397867, respectively. Gina Cannan is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

30. Defendant James Carpenter is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times, James Carpenter was a principal, employee, or agent of Freestone Strategies, LLC, was an appointed member of the CCJD or being considered for membership on the CCJD, and/or an appointed member of the Colorado Supreme Court Nominating Commission. At other relevant times since on or about May 30, 2024, James Carpenter was a member of the Colorado Judicial Institute's board of directors. Previously, James Carpenter worked as the Campaign Manager for Defendant Ken Salazar's 2004 U.S. Senate campaign. After Ken Salazar was elected, James Carpenter then worked as the State Director of Salazar's U.S. Senate Office from 2004 through 2006.

31. Defendant Nancy Lin Cohen is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times, Nancy Cohen was appointed to the Colorado Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on the Practice of Law and/or the CJDRC. Nancy Cohen previously represented former Denver Presiding Juvenile Court Judge David Brett Woods in judicial discipline proceedings before the CCJD and the Colorado Supreme Court. Nancy Cohen is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 11846 and 584911, respectively. Nancy Cohen is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

32. Defendant Robert S. Gardner is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times, Robert Gardner was a Colorado State Senator, an appointed member of the CCJD, or being considered for membership on the CCJD. Robert Gardner is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of

Colorado with registration numbers 18064 and 597134, respectively. Robert Gardner is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

33. Defendant Sara Garrido is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Sara Garrido was a Jefferson County Court Judge employed by the Colorado Judicial Department, an appointed member of the CCJD, or being considered for membership on the CCJD. Sara Garrido is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with attorney registration number 33320.

34. Defendant Kirsten Grooms is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Kirsten Grooms was employed by the Colorado Department of Law and assigned as general counsel to the CJDRC. Kirsten Grooms is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with attorney registration number 54756.

35. Defendant James Hartmann is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times James Hartmann contracted with the Colorado Judicial Department as a senior judge and/or was an appointed member of the CJDRC. James Hartmann is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 19353.

36. Defendant Amanda Hollander is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Amanda Hollander was an appointed member of the CJDRC.

37. Defendant Alison Kyles is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Alison Kyles was employed by the Colorado Department of Law and assigned to advise Defendants James Carpenter and Mindy Sooter. Alison Kyles is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration

numbers 21368 and 701663, respectively. Alison Kyles is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

38. Defendant Bryon Large is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Bryon Large was employed by the Colorado Supreme Court as the Presiding Disciplinary Judge and/or appointed by the Colorado Supreme Court as a member of the CJDRC. Bryon Large is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 38574 and 915873, respectively. Bryon Large is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

39. Defendant Anne Mangiardi is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Anne Mangiardi was either employed by the Colorado Department of Law as a Senior Assistant Attorney General or employed by the CCJD as its Executive Director. At relevant times, Anne Mangiardi was also an appointed member of the CJDRC. Anne Mangiardi is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the United States District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 44284 and 1916504, respectively. Anne Mangiardi is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

40. Defendant Bonnie McLean is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Bonnie McLean was an 18th Judicial District Court Judge employed by the Colorado Judicial Department and/or an appointed member of the CCJD. Bonnie McLean is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 31349.

41. Defendant Colleen McManamon is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Colleen McManamon was an appointed member of the CJDAB and/or

the CJDRC. Colleen McManamon is a Licensed Legal Paraprofessional with registration number 600085.

42. Defendant Kristen Mix is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Kristen Mix was an appointed member of the CJDAB and/or the CJDRC. Kristen Mix is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 15171 and 706160, respectively. Kristen Mix is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

43. Defendant Reed Owens is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Reed Owens was a 5th Judicial District Court Judge employed by the Colorado Judicial Department and/or an appointed member of the CCJD. Reed Owens is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 40557.

44. Defendant Meredith Patrick Cord is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times, Meredith Patrick Cord was an El Paso County Court Judge employed by the Colorado Judicial Department and/or an appointed member of the CCJD. Meredith Patrick Cord is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 33633.

45. Defendant Aubrey C. Sullivan is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At relevant times, Aubrey Sullivan was employed as the Director of the Colorado Division of Civil Rights. Aubrey Sullivan is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 42341.

46. Defendant Courtney Sutton is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Courtney Sutton was an appointed member of the CCJD or being considered for membership on the CCJD.

47. Defendant Jeff Swanty is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Jeff Swanty was an appointed member of the CJDAB and/or the CJDRC.

48. Defendant Emily Tofte Nestaval is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Emily Tofte Nestaval was an appointed member of the CCJD or being considered for appointment to the CCJD.

49. Defendant Stefanie Trujillo is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Stefanie Trujillo was an appointed member of the CCJD or being considered for appointment to the CCJD. From 2021-2023 Stefanie Trujillo was also a member of the Colorado Supreme Court's Outreach and Working Group Committee—Licensed Legal Paraprofessional Initiative.

50. Defendant MaryAnn "Mariana" Vielma is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Mariana Vielma was an Adams County Court Judge employed by the Colorado Judicial Department, an appointed member of the CCJD, or being considered for membership on the CCJD. Mariana Vielma is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 38584 and 2201475, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Mariana Vielma from its list of active attorneys.

51. Defendant Vincente Vigil is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Vincente Vigil was employed by the Colorado Judicial Department as a 19th Judicial District Court Judge, an appointed member of the CJDAB, and/or an appointed member of the CJDRC. Vincente Vigil is also an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts with registration number 40640.

52. Defendant Jeffrey M. Walsh is a citizen of the State of Colorado and a resident of the District of Colorado. At all relevant times, Jeffrey Walsh was employed by the CCJD as its Special Counsel and/or as its interim Executive Director. Jeffrey Walsh is an attorney licensed to practice before the Colorado state courts and the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado with registration numbers 33762 and 1870778, respectively. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, however, has administratively removed Jeffrey Walsh from its list of active attorneys. Jeffrey Walsh is also admitted to practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit.

BACKGROUND

53. On July 15, 2018, SCAO Controller Myra Dukes discovered and internally reported evidence that SCAO Chief of Staff Mindy Masias had intentionally altered a receipt as part of a request for personal reimbursement. State Court Administrator Christopher Ryan immediately recognized Masias's suspected conduct as material to a continuous, recurring annual single statewide audit of the Judicial Department's internal controls conducted as a component for certification of the State of Colorado's Annual Comprehensive Financial Report (ACFR). Like other states and governments, Colorado is required to produce its ACFR as a condition of receiving federal funding and for its federally granted authority to issue bonds.

54. Following internal and external investigations, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court collectively decided to terminate Masias's employment. As part of the notice provided to Masias, State Court Administrator Ryan explained the materiality of Masias's financial misconduct to the OSA's single statewide audit and the ACFR. Rather than accept her termination or agree to the severance offer made by the Colorado Judicial Branch, Masias instead activated leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA).

55. In December 2018, Masias's colleague and successor as SCAO Human Resources Director, Eric Brown, began negotiating a multi-million-dollar, sole-source contract for Masias to provide leadership training services to the Judicial Department. As part of these negotiations, Brown met with then-Chief Justice Nathan Coats, Counsel to the Chief Justice Andrew Rottman, and State Court Administrator Ryan to essentially present an ultimatum that Masias would release compromising information about the Department and the Justices if an agreement could not be reached. Brown's talking points (including Masias's allegations of covered up judicial, attorney, and employee misconduct) were reduced to writing in a document later referred to as the Masias Memo. SCAO Legal Counsel Terri Morrison was also contemporaneously aware of the Masias Memo and the meeting that occurred between Brown, Coats, Rottman, and Ryan.

56. Masias remained on FMLA leave until March 15, 2019, when she executed a separation agreement, effective March 19, 2019, that allowed her to keep her income from paid leave in exchange for a general release of claims and a non-disclosure agreement. Masias executed her separation agreement with the expectation of a 5-year, $2.66-2.75 million sole-source contract to provide leadership training services. To provide some perspective, under this contract Masias would have been paid approximately three-times the salaries of the individual Justices (i.e. $532,000 per year).

57. Before State Court Administrator Ryan signed the sole-source determination on March 25, 2019, Chief Justice Coats informed all the other Justices of Masias' resignation and her proposal for the leadership training program.

58. Through an April 4, 2019 email chain between Chief Justice Coats and Justice Melissa Hart about Masias applying to become the Utah State Court Administrator, Coats explained that Masias had signed an NDA and was negotiating the Masias Contract.

59. With Coats's approval, State Court Administrator Ryan then circulated the $2.66-2.75 million Masias Contract for its first execution on April 11, 2019.

60. On April 15, 2019, however, an anonymous complaint was submitted to the OSA's Fraud Hotline that alleged widespread occupational fraud within the SCAO, and specifically including additional financial misconduct by Masias. The anonymous Fraud Hotline complaint was personally sent to each of the Justices, to Attorney General Phil Weiser, and to Governor Jared Polis.

61. Upon receiving a letter from State Auditor Dianne Ray inquiring as to how the Judicial Department wished to proceed in response to the Fraud Hotline complaint, Chief Justice Coats confirmed that he had "look[ed] into th[e] allegations . . . in consultation with the Attorney General . . . and the Attorney General's Staff." In his response dated May 29, 2019, Chief Justice Coats did not inform the State Auditor that the $2.66-2.75 million sole-source Masias Contract had already been approved or that the Masias Contract would be executed a second time three business days later—June 3, 2019—and one business day after SCAO Controller Myra Dukes retired. Chief Justice Coats further knowingly concealed the existence of the Masias Memo and its significance in negotiations of the Masias Contract from the OSA.

62. In July 2019, the existence of the Masias Contract became public and the Justices accepted State Court Administrator Ryan's offer to resign. At the time, the Justices, through an official statement made by the Colorado Judicial Department, confirmed that they had jointly approved and made the decision to cancel the Masias Contract.

63. As part of his debriefing, Ryan met with 1st Assistant Attorney General LeeAnn Morrill and Assistant Solicitor General Grant Sullivan to discuss and turn over his copy of the Masias Memo.[5] At that time, SCAO Legal Counsel Terri Morrison also had access to a copy of the Masias Memo. In a July 19, 2019 email exchange with Andrew Rottman, Morrill acknowledged possession of the Masias Memo, its materiality to the OSA's Fraud Hotline investigation, and the need to preserve the document. Despite this email and later deposition testimony from Justice Melissa Hart confirming that the Justices were aware of the Masias Memo in 2019, the Masias Memo was intentionally withheld from the OSA (and from the CCJD) for more than eighteen months, until then-former State Court Administrator Ryan came forward and publicly revealed the document's existence. In the meantime, the OSA issued a December 2019 management letter as part of the ACFR audit and a November 18, 2020 SCAO Performance Audit Report that both recognized the breakdown of SCAO's internal controls and appearances of impropriety created by the Masias Contract.

64. In response to State Court Administrator Ryan's revelation of the Masias Memo's existence, the Justices and the other attorneys listed in this Complaint collaborated on damage control that included the Justices issuing separate public statements on February 4, 2021 and on February 8, 2021. The collaboration between the Justices, the attorneys listed in this Complaint, other public officials, and former U.S. Attorney for the District of Colorado John F. Walsh, III (who was then a partner at the national law firm WilmerHale) is documented through internal Judicial Department email chains created concurrently with the drafting of the public statements. The public statements, in turn, confirmed that the Justices and the other attorneys were fully informed by former Chief Justice Coats

[5] David Migoya, *Colorado Attorney General's Office Lawyers Knew About Judicial Misconduct Memo: Whether they could, should or did tell Attorney General, other authorities is unclear*, DENVER POST, February 22, 2021.

and were complicit in knowingly concealing material information from the OSA as it performed a federal function through its ACFR audit, its 2020 Performance Audit of SCAO, and its Fraud Hotline Investigation. These circumstances have been further proven through Chief Justice Coats's admissions and judicial discipline. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44, ¶¶ 4(9)-(14), (20)-(23), 6. A separate, though only partially-disclosed, attorney regulation investigation of former Chief Justice Coats concluded with findings (upon clear and convincing evidence) that he had failed to report the misconduct of subordinate attorneys, as required by Colo. RPC 5.1 and 8.3.[6]

65. The OSA finally issued its Fraud Hotline Investigation Report on February 4, 2022 with referrals for prosecution. The protracted delay of the Fraud Hotline investigation, interference, and obstruction caused state statutes of limitations to lapse. The Justices, Andrew Rottman, Terri Morrison, Attorney General Phil Weiser, Chief Deputy Attorney General Natalie Hanlon-Leh, LeeAnn Morrill, and Grant Sullivan were all directly involved in this interference, obstruction, and forced delay.

66. At various times, Plaintiff reported these circumstances to federal law enforcement (specifically Assistant U.S. Attorney Bryan Fields, the DOJ—Denver Office, the DOJ Public Integrity Section, and the FBI) and to the CCJD only to be deliberately ignored. More recently, the Colorado State Commission on Judicial Performance, the Colorado Civil Rights Division, the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Supreme Court, the Colorado Judicial Discipline

[6] The Colorado Legal Regulation Committee's public statement dated January 20, 2023, states, in relevant part:

> "Based on the evidence provided by outside counsel, the Committee believes that there is clear and convincing evidence that the former Chief Justice violated the rules with respect to his duty to report what appeared to be improper conduct of other lawyers which contributed to the ongoing consideration of awarding the [Masias] contract."

Adjudicative Board, and the CCJD have intentionally ignored and/or suppressed the Plaintiff's submission of renewed complaints, public comments, and two separate requests for evaluation of judicial conduct. Moreover, there appears to be cultural resistance within the press, Colorado's political parties, and the Colorado General Assembly to holding the attorneys listed in this Complaint (particularly Attorney General Weiser) and others involved in the Colorado Judicial Scandal accountable.

67. As relevant to the claims pled in this Complaint, the Defendants have a long history of conspiring to suppress evidence of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct through patterns of publicly funded hush money (i.e. NDAs), self-controlled investigations, and self-serving public relations strategies. This obstruction and persistently-repeated violations of the FCA and the CFCA have included repeated retaliation against the Plaintiff for his duty-bound pursuit of discipline against the Justices and for his having reported misconduct within the CCJD.

68. The obstruction of Colorado's constitutionally defined judicial disciplinary structure has included the methodical, coordinated, and overt abuse of appointment powers by Governor Jared Polis, Attorney General Phil Weiser, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, the members of the CJDAB, and the members / staff of the CCJD to stack the various judicial discipline oversight entities, including the CJDRC.

69. On October 20, 2024, the Plaintiff anonymously submitted a Fraud Hotline complaint to the OSA and a detailed RFE to the CCJD. *Exhibit 1, sub-Exhibits 1-3*. Even though the RFE specifically requested that the CCJD disqualify itself and allow an investigation through a conflict-free special commission and conflict-free staff, the CCJD instead summarily dismissed the RFE without any publicly expressed explanation of the grounds for dismissal.

70. As part of her testimony to the Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee on April 28, 2025, Defendant Mindy Sooter confirmed the CCJD's non-disqualification and summary dismissal of the October 20, 2024 anonymously filed RFE.

71. More recently, the Plaintiff sought to provide public comments as part of the CJDRC's required rulemaking process under Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(k)(I). Plaintiff did so by dually filing his public comments on proposed rule changes with an additional non-anonymous RFE. Those submissions are included in *Exhibit 1, sub-Exhibits 4-7*. Additionally, a 4th Supplement to the public comments and RFE with Plaintiff's scripted oral statements delivered at the CJDRC's October 3, 2025 public hearing are included in *Exhibit 2*.

72. As part of his 2nd Supplement (*Exhibit 1, sub-Exhibit 6*) and his 4th Supplement (*Exhibit 2*), Plaintiff expressly put the Defendants on notice that their attempts to impose prior restraints upon the rulemaking process and their refusal to accept or publish Plaintiff's public comments into the record violated the Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights to freedom of expression, to petition for redress of grievances, and to due process / equal protection.

73. Nevertheless, the Defendants have refused Plaintiff's repeated requests to disqualify themselves and to allow the various judicial selection, retention, and disciplinary processes to occur in a transparent and conflict-free manner. The Defendants have also persisted in their refusal to accept/publish Plaintiff's comments and RFE into the CJDRC's public record.

74. The Defendants have also obstructed Plaintiff's fundamental right to be heard as to misconduct within the CCJD, including complicity in Plaintiff's retaliatory termination as the CCJD's Executive Director. The circumstances of Plaintiff's retaliatory termination are described in detail though the Statement of

Discrimination that he submitted to the Colorado Division of Civil Rights, included in *Exhibit 1, sub-Exhibit 7, Appendix 2*.

75. Initially, the Civil Rights Division summarily dismissed Plaintiff's complaint on jurisdictional grounds without identifying the public official responsible for the dismissal decision. More recently, Defendant Aubrey C. Sullivan issued a letter summarily denying Plaintiff's administrative appeal of the dismissal to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. It is unclear what record, if any, Defendant Aubrey Sullivan provided to the Civil Rights Commission before communicating her declination to hear Plaintiff's appeal. Plaintiff's correspondence with the Civil Rights Division and Defendant Aubrey Sullivan is included in *Exhibit 3*.

76. Ultimately, and despite repeated requests to do so, all the individual Defendants have refused to disqualify themselves. Instead, the Defendants have continued to determinedly censor Plaintiff's compelled speech (i.e. the mandatory reporting of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct, including reasonably suspected false claims and other crimes), to facilitate retaliation against Plaintiff, and to obstruct Plaintiff's access to administrative and judicial remedies. In violation of both federal and Colorado law, the Defendants are protecting the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court from ***any*** accountability for their probable criminal conduct and their substantial violations of the Code.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

CLAIM 1
INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATIVE, ADMINSTRATIVE, AND JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE PROCESSES—42 U.S.C. § 1983

77. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

78. Plaintiff Christopher Gregory alleges that Defendants Mindy Sooter, Philip Weiser, Jared Polis, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian Boatright, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood, III, Monica Márquez,

Carlos Samour, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Reed Owens, Meredith Patrick Cord, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Stefanie Trujillo, Mariana Vielma, and Vincente Vigil acting either individually or in concert and under color of state law, conspired to deprive Plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. These Defendants (individually and collectively) acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Specifically, Defendants interfered with Plaintiff's fundamental right to be heard as well as his federal (U.S. Const., amends. I, V, and XIV) and state (Colo. Const. Art. II, §§ 3, 6, 10, 24, and 25 and Art. V, § 16) constitutional rights of access to the courts / administrative remedies / equality of justice, fundamental fairness, free speech, free participation in legislative and rulemaking processes (including the freedom to petition and non-interference with legislative privilege), due process, and equal protection under the law. Moreover, the speech that has been suppressed interferes unlawfully with Plaintiff's right and duty to freely and publicly report evidence of public fraud and official misconduct, including but not limited to false claims subject to remedies through the FCA (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et. seq.) and the CFCA. The Defendants have also intentionally stripped the Plaintiff of his right and ability to freely report evidence of other tortious, criminal, and ethical misconduct. By refusing to disqualify themselves, the Defendants have internally obstructed the various judicial oversight entities that should receive and legitimately investigate such reports of tortious, criminal, and ethical misconduct. The individual Defendants have violated Plaintiff's rights under federal law directly, through ratification of such violations, and/or through a failure to train and supervise. *See*, e.g., *Parker*

v. Blackwell, 23 F.4th 517, 525 (5th Cir. 2022) (summarizing elements of a failure to train and supervise claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); *Matthews v. Columbia County*, 294 F.3d 1294, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2002) (summarizing requirements for claim based upon ratification of unconstitutional actions).

79. Defendants the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, the Colorado Supreme Court, Governor Jared Polis, and Attorney General Philip Weiser are further named in their official capacities to facilitate injunctive relief and secondary liability for the attorney's fees and costs incurred in Plaintiff pressing this civil rights claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b); *Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei*, 491 U.S. 274, 280 (1989) (11th Amendment does not preclude award of attorney's fees and costs from a state to a plaintiff who successfully obtains injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988).

CLAIM 2
CONSPIRACY TO INTERFERE WITH CIVIL RIGHTS—42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3)

80. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

81. From about October 20, 2024 through the present, the Plaintiff was subjected to a conspiracy orchestrated by Defendants Mindy Sooter, Philip Weiser, Jared Polis, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian Boatright, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood, III, Monica Márquez, Carlos Samour, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Reed Owens, Meredith Patrick Cord, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Stefanie Trujillo, Mariana Vielma, and Vincente Vigil, which aimed to impede, hinder, obstruct, or defeat the due course of justice in the State of Colorado, with the intent to deny the Plaintiff the equal protection of the laws, to freely

participate in the legislative and administrative processes, or to injure the Plaintiff for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the equal protection of the laws.

82. The conspiracy was directed at the Plaintiff and others as individuals, and proof of the conspiracy does not require a showing of racial bias.

83. Alternatively and additionally, the Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. This conspiracy was aimed at preventing Plaintiff from exercising his constitutional rights under both the U.S. and Colorado Constitutions, resulting in harm and injury to Plaintiff.

CLAIM 3
ACTION FOR NEGLECT TO PREVENT—42 U.S.C. § 1986

84. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

85. From about October 20, 2024 continuing to the present, the Plaintiff was subjected to a conspiracy described in paragraph 81, which aimed to deprive the Plaintiff of his freedom of expression, his freedom to petition for grievances, his fundamental right to be heard, equal protection, and due process under both the U.S. and the Colorado Constitutions.

86. One or more valid claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3) is a prerequisite for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged the existence of a conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3) directed at the Plaintiff as an individual, and the Defendants' failures to prevent such conspiracy.

87. More specifically, even when expressly requested to do so, Defendants Mindy Sooter, Philip Weiser, Jared Polis, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian Boatright, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood, III, Monica Márquez, Carlos Samour, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon,

Kristen Mix, Reed Owens, Meredith Patrick Cord, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Stefanie Trujillo, Mariana Vielma, and Vincente Vigil refused to perform their official functions, to disqualify themselves, to investigate, or to address judicial misconduct and misconduct within the CCJD, the CJDAB, and the CJDRC.

88. The Defendants listed in paragraph 87 had knowledge of the conspiracy and had the power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the wrongs conspired to be done.

89. Despite having the power to prevent the conspiracy, the Defendants specified in Paragraph 87 neglected or refused to do so, thereby violating 42 U.S.C. § 1986.

CLAIM 4
RETALIATION IN VIOLATION OF § 24-31-1204(8), C.R.S.—
THE COLORADO FALSE CLAIMS ACT

90. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

91. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Mindy Sooter, Philip Weiser, Jared Polis, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian Boatright, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood, III, Monica Márquez, Carlos Samour, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Reed Owens, Meredith Patrick Cord, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Stefanie Trujillo, Mariana Vielma, and Vincente Vigil retaliated against Plaintiff for lawful acts done in furtherance of a potential cause of action and/or stopping what Plaintiff reasonably believes to be false claims / violations under the Colorado False Claims Act. § 24-31-1204 (8)(b), C.R.S. This retaliation included Plaintiff's non-reappointment to the CCJD, wrongful termination, harassment, intimidation, obstruction of justice, creation of a hostile work environment, blackballing, defamation, and other adverse employment

actions. Moreover, continuing retaliation includes the Defendants' individual and collective refusals to disqualify themselves from considering Plaintiff's repeated complaints of judicial misconduct and misconduct within the CCJD, the CJDAB, and the CJDRC. Similarly, Defendant Aubrey Sullivan has obstructed Plaintiff's access to allow the Colorado Civil Rights Commission to consider the merits of a collateral complaint brought under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The conflicted consideration and intentional disregard of Plaintiff's complaints has, and continues to, deprive the Plaintiff of his fundamental constitutional rights to be heard through fair and impartial tribunals (both administrative and judicial). *See* § 24-31-1204(8)(b), C.R.S. (defining what constitutes retaliation in broad terms that include retaliation and discrimination in the conditions of an individual's profession).

CLAIM 5
WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND PROHIBITION

92. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

93. Additionally, and alternatively, Plaintiff is entitled to Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition necessary to restore the integrity of Colorado's constitutional systems of judicial selection, retention, and discipline. The writs would issue to Defendants the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, Colorado Attorney General Philip Wesier (in his official capacity), and Colorado Governor Jared Polis (in his official capacity). Such relief includes Writs of Mandamus requiring the removal of conflicted officials with further requirement that the respective offices, boards, commissions, and committees are recomposed through conflict-free processes. Writs of Prohibition are necessary to prevent further conflicted rulemaking by the CJDRC and to prevent Governor Jared Polis from making additional conflicted judicial appointments.

94. Writs of Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate because no other specific legal remedy exists while justice and public policy demand action to preserve peace, order, and good governance. *See Marbury v.*

Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 168-169 (1803) (describing common law requirements for writ of mandamus including threshold that no adequate legal remedy otherwise exists).

CLAIM 6
EQUITABLE RELIEF FOR STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS

95. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

96. Under this court's traditional equitable jurisdiction, Plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief to prevent and restrain ongoing violations of administrative, statutory, and constitutional law (both state and federal) by the Defendants (in either their individual or official capacities). This jurisdiction exists independently from enforcement of the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause. Because such an action seeks simply to halt or prevent a violation of federal or state law rather than the award of money damages, it does not ask the court to imply a new cause of action. It is "long recognized" that a federal court may enjoin state actions / prospective actions, laws, and regulations that conflict with federal laws, privileges, and immunities. *Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc.*, 575 U.S. 320, 326 (2015); *see also Ex Parte Young*, 209 U.S. 123, 150-151 (1908) (distinguishing judicial authority to enjoin the actions of individual state officials from violating federal law as non-violative of the 11th Amendment). "The ability to sue to enjoin unconstitutional actions by state and federal officers is the creation of courts of equity, and reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal executive action, tracing back to England." *Armstrong* at 327.

CLAIM 7
EQUITABLE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE STATE OF COLORADO'S REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS FOR STATE-FUNDED REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS

97. The allegations of the preceding paragraphs are realleged as if fully set forth below.

98. The Colorado Supreme Court has established that unjust enrichment occurs when a party retains a benefit under circumstances that make it inequitable for it to retain the benefit without paying for it. *Martinez v. Colo. Dep't of Human Servs.*, 97 P.3d 152, 159 (Colo. 2003); *Spencer Invs. v. Bohn*, 923 P.2d 140, 144 (Colo. 1995).

99. Plaintiff seeks the disgorgement and reimbursement to the State of Colorado of reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred through the state-funded representation (whether through insurance or otherwise) of any of the individual Defendants ultimately found individually liable for any of the claims at law averred in this Complaint.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to enter judgment against the Defendants, as follows:

1. That the Court grant permanent injunctive relief to prevent any recurrence of violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the Colorado False Claims Act, and other laws for which redress is sought in this Complaint;

2. That this Court issue a Writ of Prohibition invalidating all interim rules or rule changes adopted by the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee and enjoining further rulemaking until a conflict-free Committee can be re-composed;

3. That this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus requiring the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline to reinstate Plaintiff as its Executive Director with authority for Plaintiff to, then, directly form a special commission as contemplated by Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 3(b) and Colo. RJD 3(c). The special commission shall be authorized to hear and continue to hear all cases pending or opened before a replacement Commission can be formed through conflict-free processes;

4. That this Court issue a further Writ of Mandamus requiring the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline to remove its current Executive Director, Anne Mangiardi, and its current Special Counsel, Jeffrey M. Walsh, from their official positions for cause;

5. That this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus requiring the Colorado Supreme Court to remove all its appointees to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, the Colorado Judicial Discipline Adjudicative Board, the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee (including indirect appointments from the CJDAB), the Colorado Judicial Performance Commissions, and the Colorado Judicial Nominating Commissions. The various boards, commissions, and committees should then be re-composed through a conflict-free process such as random selection from eligible pools;

6. That this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus requiring Governor Jared Polis to remove all his appointees to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, the Colorado Judicial Discipline Adjudicative Board, the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee (including indirect appointments from the CJDAB), the Colorado Judicial Performance Commissions, and the Colorado Judicial Nominating Commissions. The various boards, commissions, and committees should then be re-composed through a conflict-free process such as random selection from eligible pools;

7. That this Court issue a Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus prohibiting Governor Jared Polis from making further judicial appointments and, to instead, require that such appointments occur through a conflict-free designee;

8. That this Court issue a Writ of Mandamus requiring the Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser to remove all his appointees to the Colorado Judicial Nominating Commissions. The various boards, commissions, and committees should then be re-composed through a conflict-free process such as random selection from eligible pools;

9. For Claims 1-3, that this Court award compensatory and punitive damages to Plaintiff for the involved Defendants' harassment, retaliation, infringement of constitutional rights, violation of statutory protections, and actions resulting in Plaintiff being unlawfully excluded from the judicial discipline rulemaking and judicial disciplinary processes (including the CCJD's internal mechanisms for complaints against members and staff);

10. As provided under § 24-31-1204(8)(d)(II), C.R.S., that Plaintiff be granted all relief necessary to make him whole, including but not limited to reinstatement, two times his backpay with interest, his attorney's fees and costs, and other compensatory or special damages sustained as a result of the involved Defendants' harassment and retaliation;

11. That pre- and post-judgment interest be awarded, along with reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses which the Relator necessarily incurred in bringing and in pressing this case. § 24-31-1204(8)(d)(II)(C), C.R.S.; *see also* 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (authorizing award of attorney's fees and costs to prevailing plaintiff who brought action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, etc.);

12. To the extent that the State of Colorado provides legal representation to or advances costs (through insurance or otherwise) on behalf of any Defendants found to be individually liable, that this Court exercise its equitable powers to order restitution of reasonable attorney's fees and costs reimbursed to the State of Colorado;

13. As indicated in this complaint, the judge/attorney Defendants admitted to practice before this Court (regardless of administrative removal from this Court's list of active attorneys due to non-payment of biennial fees) are subject to disciplinary oversight through this Court and/or the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit. Upon proven facts establishing grounds to suspect

violations of the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct[7] (which this Court has adopted as its Standards of Professional Conduct), that this Court refer those judge/attorney Defendants for discipline according to D.C.Colo.LAttyR 1(c), 2, 3(b), 6, 7; and

---

[7] Colo. RPC 1.7 provides, in relevant part:

> **(a)** . . . [A] a lawyer shall not represent a client if . . . :
>
> * * *
>
> (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer.

Colo. RPC 8.3 provides, in relevant parts:

> **(a)** A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or that an LLP has committed a violation of the LLP Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's or LLP's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer or LLP in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
>
> **(b)** A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

Colo. RPC 8.4 provides, in relevant parts:

> It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
>
> (a-1) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
>
> **(b)** commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
>
> **(c)** engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[;]

14. That this Court award all such other and further relief in law and/or in equity as it deems proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff demands a jury trial on all the legal claims alleged herein.

Dated: October 23, 2025

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
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Christopher S.P. Gregory

> **(d)** engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
>
> * * *
>
> **(f)** knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law; [or]
>
> * * *
>
> **(h)** engage in any conduct that directly, intentionally, and wrongfully harms others and that adversely reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice law[.]

VERIFICATION

I hereby verify that the averments contained in this Verified Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge, information, belief, and ability to determine. I understand that each averment made herein is made subject to the penalties of perjury of the laws of the United States of America.

Executed at Boulder County, Colorado, this 23rd day of October, 2025

Christopher S. P. Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

January 19, 2026

Colorado Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee
Colorado State Capitol
200 E. Colfax Ave.
Denver, CO 80203

Dear Joint Judiciary Committee Members:

I am a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD). Because of my steadfast efforts to stop what amounts to a more than 25-year pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court using taxpayer funds as hush money (i.e. non-disclosure agreements (NDAs)), for self-serving "independent" investigations, and for public relations schemes, I was retaliated against and fired.

The Justices' pattern of intimidation, retaliation, and creating an enforced culture of silence has been facilitated by others, including Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser and Colorado Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates. The long and tortured history of the Colorado Judicial Scandal has included ARC Yates allowing the criminal prosecution of this Committee's former Chair Senator Pete Lee based upon admittedly and objectively false evidence fabricated by Yates's Office. The intimidation of Senator Lee transgressed this body's legislative privilege while this body provided no meaningful response to protect Senator Lee or the integrity of the legislative process. ARC Yates then proceeded to threaten the CCJD's judge and attorney members and me (as Executive Director) with a disciplinary letter sent on February 6, 2023. The disciplinary letter specifically sought to intimidate the CCJD from continuing its intrepid efforts to reform Colorado's judicial discipline structure. Again, this body (and the Colorado Supreme Court to whom she reports) did nothing to hold ARC Yates accountable for her official misconduct and intimidation of legislative witnesses. Indeed, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and the members of the Colorado Supreme Court Committees that oversee the Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC) have seemingly endorsed ARC Jessica Yates's unlawful intimidation of legislators and legislative witnesses.

This year's SMART Act hearings for the Colorado Department of Law, the Colorado Judicial Department, and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline are happening at an extraordinary moment in Colorado history when former Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats has been disciplined for his part in the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court having collectively agreed to a $2.66-$2.75 million publicly funded bribe being paid to then-State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Chief of Staff Mindy Masias, who was being fired at the time for financial misconduct and later-confirmed examples of occupational fraud. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44. More recently, another sitting Justice, Melissa Hart, resigned amidst the clouds of the Masias Controversy as well as Justice Hart's own unreported judicial misconduct. The Colorado

EXHIBIT
3

Judicial Department's top lawyer, SCAO Judicial Counsel Terri Morrison, has also resigned in response to the Masias Controversy. There is now a vacancy on the Colorado Supreme Court to be filled through an opaque and conflicted judicial selection process. Problems with Colorado's systems of judicial selection, retention, and discipline persist despite the adoption of Amendment H by 73% of Colorado voters in 2024 and accompanying reforms approved by a nearly unanimous Legislature.

I believe it is critical for the General Assembly to be aware of the context, including the pending lawsuit which I have filed in U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.). Among other things, the lawsuit seeks to enjoin the appointment of Justice Hart's successor until a conflict-free nominating commission and conflict-free proxy for the Governor can be appointed. None of the relief requested in the lawsuit threatens adverse fiscal impacts to the State, rather the lawsuit seeks to stop tens of millions of dollars of ongoing public fraud. I have requested and filed an affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144 requiring the mandatory and automatic disqualification of the federal District Court Judge assigned to the case, former Colorado Solicitor General Daniel D. Domenico, because of his manifest personal bias and prejudice against me and in favor of one or more Defendants.

I have attached the relevant court filings in *Gregory* for your review and inclusion in the legislative record. The federal attorney discipline complaint, Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 1-1) to the Complaint in *Gregory*, is the most important document for you to understand the significance of the judicial misconduct involved as well as the reasons behind Justice Melissa Hart's leave and ultimate resignation from the Colorado Supreme Court as well as SCAO Judicial Counsel Terri Morrison's resignation.

It also deserves emphasis that the General Assembly's constitutional impeachment authority exists separately and independently from Colorado's constitutional judicial discipline structure. *Compare* Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(i) *and* Colo. Const. Art. XIII.

The last time I appeared before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I testified in opposition to then-Chair Mindy Sooter's and then-Vice-Chair Jim Carpenter's reappointment to the CCJD. As part of my testimony, I also called upon the General Assembly to pass a joint resolution requesting the referral of the Colorado Judicial Scandal to federal law enforcement for a conflict-free investigation. A majority of this Committee's members took my concerns seriously and forwarded the Governor's reappointments of Sooter and Carpenter to the full Senate with unfavorable recommendations. On the last day of last year's session, the full Senate voted 16-19 against Sooter's confirmation and 19-16 in favor of Carpenter's confirmation. Those Senators voting in favor of Carpenter's confirmation were:

- Amabile
- Baisley
- Ball
- Bridges

- Catlin (while voting against Sooter's confirmation)
- Coleman
- Cutter
- Danielson (while voting against Sooter's confirmation)
- Hinrichesen
- Jodeh
- Kipp
- Kolker
- Marchman (while voting against Sooter's confirmation)
- Michaelson Jenet
- Roberts
- Rodriguez
- Simpson
- Snyder
- Weissman

It remains unclear why these Senators did not recognize the need for accountability within the CCJD (including categorical intolerance for the institutionalized culture of intimidation, harassment, discrimination, and retaliation that exists within the broader Colorado Judicial Department) as well as the need to finally have a full, legitimate, and unobstructed investigation of the Colorado Judicial Scandal.

This year's SMART Act hearings provide a renewed opportunity to address the pervasive lack of integrity and accountability within Colorado's Judicial Branch. I, again, renew my requests for the General Assembly to adopt a joint resolution referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free law federal law enforcement and, under §§ 24-31-111(5) and 24-31-1204(2), C.R.S., to direct Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her discretion to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) to investigate the involved allegations of public fraud and false claims. Importantly, according to § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S., this Legislature has already appropriated the funds necessary for a legitimate investigation of the Colorado Judicial Scandal through the Department of Law's budget, inclusive of the $4 million of funding appropriated through HB 25-1321 (Support Against Adverse Federal Action). Moreover, the introduction of a joint resolution does not affect any legislator's bill limit for this legislative session. *Compare* Colo. House R. 26(g) *and* Colo. Senate R. 30(f)(1)(A) (both Rules distinguishing presumptive bill limit from presumptive resolution limit; requiring submission of joint resolutions at least 30-days prior to sine die). § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. provides:

> (5) Whenever the attorney general is unable, has failed, or refuses to provide legal services to a state agency, as determined by the governor if the agency is in the executive branch, or by the chief justice if the agency is in the judicial branch, or by the state auditor if the agency is the office of the state auditor, the agency may employ counsel of its choosing to provide such legal services. ***Any***

> ***expense incurred due to the employment of counsel pursuant to this subsection (5) is a lawful charge against appropriations for this purpose made by the general assembly to the department of law.*** (Emphasis added).

I have enclosed proposed language for a joint resolution to refer the issues involved in the Colorado Judicial Scandal, including suspected public fraud and false claims, to conflict-free federal law enforcement in conjunction with the State Auditor's appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG. Ideally, another state with similar demographics, geography, and an equivalent state false claims act (such as Oregon) will be willing to accept the SAAG appointment. The enclosed draft joint resolution further contemplates the creation of a joint legislative investigating committee to effectuate the referral to conflict-free federal law enforcement and the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG.

Ultimately, however, there is no excuse or rational justification for this Committee and this General Assembly not to approve the requested joint resolution and finally allow a full and legitimate investigation of the endemic public corruption found within the Colorado Judiciary and within Colorado State Government, more broadly.

With this background, I urge this Committee to raise the attached questions at the respective SMART Act Hearings and to address my request for a joint resolution on the record.

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosures (23)

Requested Questions

Colorado Department of Law—1/20/26 Hearing

Attorney General Phil Weiser:

- What was your role and the roles of attorneys subject to your supervision in the negotiation, approval, and payment of publicly funded non-disclosure agreements as reported by *The Denver Gazette* on November 13, 2022? David Migoya, *Non-Disclosures Under Fire*, DENVER GAZETTE, November 13, 2022.
- When did you first become aware that the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court were contemplating and negotiating the $2.66-$2.75 million contract with then-State Court Administrator's Office Chief of Staff Mindy Masias? Which other attorneys within the Colorado Department of Law subject to your supervision were aware of the contemplation and negotiation of the Masias Contract? When were they aware of it?
- When did you and attorneys subject to your supervision first become aware of the existence of the Masias Memo? Who knew about the existence of the Masias Memo and when did they know?
- The Attorney General's Office provided the investigation and litigation support for the Office of the State Auditor's 2019-2022 Fraud Hotline investigation. The existence of the Masias Memo was concealed from both the Colorado State Auditor and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline from December 2018 until February 2021. Who was responsible for concealing this material information?
- Similarly, with the Attorney General's Office providing investigation support, why wasn't evidence of occupational fraud immediately communicated to the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office as part of the Fraud Hotline investigation? Because of the non-reporting, the statute of limitations ultimately expired preventing a state-level prosecution of those individuals suspected of committing occupational fraud by the OSA. Why did you allow this to happen?
- There has been a call for the Colorado State Auditor to directly appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to complete a conflict-free investigation of the Masias Controversy. Why aren't you joining this request?
- Do you admit or deny the allegations of attorney misconduct against you stated in former Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline Christopher Gregory's complaint submitted to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct (1:25-cv-03361-DDD, ECF 1-1)? What specific allegations do you dispute?
- You have assigned attorneys from your Office to defend against *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.), including claims brought against you individually. How is this not a conflict of interest and a misappropriation of state resources for your personal benefit? Do you agree that you and any attorneys who represent you have an ethical obligation to stipulate to the disqualification of a judge where there is evidence that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice?

- If you know of attorneys or other employees subject to your supervision engaging in retaliation, what are your obligations? What is the appropriate consequence under the Department of Law's personnel rules?
- If your Office or a private sector law firm is used to defend against violations of the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act and/or the Colorado False Claims Act's retaliation provisions, shouldn't the individuals responsible for any ultimately proven retaliation be responsible for the value/cost of the defense?
- Have you or your Office investigated whether the use of "outside" or "independent" investigations as a means of political damage control and obstruction of ordinary law enforcement and regulatory processes is a fraudulent or unlawful use of taxpayer funds? Examples of such investigations include the ILG and RCT investigations that occurred as part of the Masias Controversy as well as Secretary of State Jena Griswold commissioning an investigation of the disclosure of voting machine passwords and her Office's response during the 2024 election. How are these self-controlled investigations distinguishable from the definition of occupational fraud under the Fraud Hotline Statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S.?
- How do you justify the ethics and legality of your Office and attorneys subject to your control defending against the civil claims and allegations of your own personal criminal conduct raised through *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.)?

Colorado Judicial Department—1/21/26 Hearing

Chief Justice Monica Márquez and State Court Administrator Steven Vasconcellos:

- Márquez: Do you admit or deny the allegations of judicial and attorney misconduct against you stated in Christopher Gregory's complaint submitted to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct (1:25-cv-03361-DDD, ECF 1-1)? What specific allegations do you dispute?
- Márquez: When did the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court first decide to offer/consider providing former SCAO Chief of Staff Mindy Masias a contract to provide leadership training to the Colorado Judicial Department? When was this decision communicated to the Colorado Office of the State Auditor?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When did you first become aware of the existence of the Masias Memo? When did the other Justices and other persons in SCAO become aware of the existence of the Masias Memo? Did you direct anyone to provide copies of the Masias Memo to the OSA and/or the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline? You admit that the existence of and a copy of the Masias Memo was withheld and not disclosed to the OSA and/or the CCJD from December 2018 until February 2021?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): Who was responsible for the delay in reporting evidence of occupational fraud to the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office? When the OSA drafted its Fraud Hotline Report (ultimately published on February 4, 2022), who was responsible for redacting the report and other delays in it being provided to the 2nd Judicial District Attorney's Office?

- Márquez: Why were the Justices' roles in the Masias Controversy not considered by the State Commission of Judicial Performance when you, Justice Brian Boatright, and Justice Maria Berkenkotter were subject to retention elections in 2024? Judiciary Committee member Senator Lindsey Daugherty is a member of the State Commission. Why didn't you, Justice Boatright, or Justice Berkenkotter voluntarily raise the issues involved with the State Commission during your retention cycles?
- Márquez: Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates abused her official authority by allowing the criminal prosecution of then-Senate Judiciary Chair Pete Lee to move forward through objectively and admittedly false information provided by Yates's Office. As further intimidation and obstruction of legislative reforms, Yates sent a February 6, 2023 disciplinary letter to the judge and attorney members and the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline threatening them with disciplinary action for their testimony and future testimony before this Legislature. You and your colleagues on the Colorado Supreme Court supervise Jessica Yates and she reports to you. You were aware of her official misconduct and violation of Senator Lee's legislative privilege but did nothing. Why not?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): Did Justice Melissa Hart self-initiate judicial disability proceedings when she went on personal leave October 28, 2025? Who approved the leave and did that person report the basis for it to the CCJD for consideration of disability proceedings?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When were you first aware that Justice Melissa Hart had been at fault in a significant automobile collision before she was appointed to the court? That she was involved in a civil case arising from the collision after being appointed to the court? *Hampton v. Hart*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 19CV34953.
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When were you first aware that Justice Melissa Hart is currently on probation supervised by the Denver County Court in a dog bite case? *People v. Melissa Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25GV100395.
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): When were you first aware that Justice Melissa Hart failed to appear in Denver County Court on a careless driving ticket issued earlier in 2025? *People v. Melissa Hart*, Denver Cty. Ct. Case No. 25T0087448.
- Márquez: Why didn't you and the other Justices disqualify yourselves from all matters involving judicial discipline (including pending cases, making appointments to judicial oversight entities, rulemaking, and engagement in the legislative reform process) after you received individual letters requesting your disqualification from the CCJD on June 13, 2022 and July 1, 2022? Why do you and the other Justices continue to sit on judicial discipline cases?
- Márquez: On December 14, 2023, then-Chief Justice Brian Boatright received a notification letter from the Commission on Judicial Discipline according to Colo. RJD 14(a). The letter conveyed allegations of judicial misconduct by all the Justices raised by former 10th Judicial District Court Chief Judge Dennis Maes. With knowledge of these allegations of misconduct and pending judicial discipline proceedings against Chief Justice Boatright, why didn't you and the other Justices disqualify yourselves from further hearing of *Anderson v. Griswold*, 2023 CO 63 and form a Special Tribunal according to Colo. RJD 41? Why, instead, did you and the other Justices proceed to issue and announce your opinion in *Griswold* on December 19, 2023?

- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): How is the Colorado Supreme Court's "Workplace Culture Initiative," including the creation of 15 new judgeships through SB25-024 not merely propaganda to conceal your role and the role of the other Justices in the Masias Controversy? Why don't the "Workplace Culture Initiative," the ILG, LLC investigation, and the RCT, Ltd. investigation meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under the Fraud Hotline statute--§ 2-3-110.5, C.R.S. ("'Fraud' means occupational fraud or the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization's resources or assets.").
- Márquez: Why haven't you recused yourself as the *ex officio* Chair of the Colorado Supreme Court Nominating Commission that will choose nominees for Justice Hart's successor?
- Márquez: As the default *ex officio* Chair, why haven't you raised conflicts of interest that some of the nominating committee members themselves have?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): The former Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, Christopher Gregory, has called for the formation of a Special Tribunal, a Special Adjudicative Board Panel, and a Special Commission on Judicial Discipline to consider grounds for your discipline and the discipline of the other justices and judges involved in the Masias Controversy. Do you support allowing for such a conflict-free process? If not, why not?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): How does Colorado's system of attorney discipline controlled by the Colorado Supreme Court comport with the prohibition against judicial fact investigations in Canon Rule 2.9(C) of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct? Why hasn't Colorado considered adopting an attorney discipline system similar to that followed in Oregon (O.R.S. § 9.010(2)) where attorney discipline occurs through an independent bar association authorized through the Legislature?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): The current process for the nomination and appointment of judges occurs through non-public meetings to determine who is interviewed, non-public interviews of judicial candidates, and non-public meetings to determine the nominees and the final appointees. Why aren't these meetings and these decisions made in public and through livestreamed proceedings on the record?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): In the past, Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court have spoken out about the need to increase diversity on the bench and to eliminate bias (institutional, implicit, and explicit) in judicial selection. Don't you agree that the best way to eliminate any form of bias is to ensure that judicial selection decisions occur in the open with a complete public record of how the judicial nominating commissions and the Governor make such decisions? There is no provision in Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 24 that exempts the judicial nominating commissions and the Governor's Office from the Colorado Open Meetings Law. Why aren't the meetings of the judicial nominating commissions, the Governor's judicial appointment committee, and all interviews of judicial candidates being livestreamed on the record?
- (Both Márquez and Vasconcellos individually): There has been a call for the Colorado State Auditor to directly appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to complete a conflict-free investigation of the Masias Controversy. Why aren't you joining this request?
- Márquez: How do you justify the ethics and legality of utilizing the Colorado Attorney General's Office and attorneys subject to co-defendant Attorney General Phil Weiser's

control to defend against the civil claims and allegations of your own personal criminal conduct raised through *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.)?

Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline—1/21/26 Hearing

Anne Mangiardi, James Carpenter, Bob Gardner:

- Ms. Mangiardi, you acknowledge that while at the Attorney General's Office, you supervised the ILG investigation commissioned by the Judicial Department? What was your role in providing such supervision? What access did you have to the records that were provided to ILG? What communications did you have with others in the Attorney General's Office and with the Justices and the Judicial Department over the course of the ILG investigation? How was the ILG investigation not a violation of Canon Rule 2.9(C)'s prohibitions against judicial investigations?
- All panelists: With violations of the public financial disclosure law, § 24-6-202, C.R.S., recognized as misdemeanor offenses punishable by a mandatory $1,000-$5,000 fine, why did the Commission resolve all the cases involving judges failing to file such disclosures with dismissals or private discipline? Even if the statute of limitations had passed for criminal prosecution, why didn't the Commission seek fines as a judicial discipline sanction?
- Carpenter & Mangiardi: Because the public financial disclosure violations were/are readily verifiable through public records, why wasn't there public discipline (such as, minimally, a public reprimand) in those cases? Was the motivation for dismissing these cases to allow the judges to later participate in the Senior Judge Program (which currently bars judges with any record of discipline, private or public)?
- All panelists: On what legal basis do you disclaim having jurisdiction to evaluate the conduct of senior judges, who include former Chief Justice Nancy Rice? Isn't it true that through the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee created by Amendment H, you can change the Colorado Rules of Judicial Discipline at any time? You can even make necessary changes retroactively because judicial discipline is civil and remedial in nature?
- Mr. Carpenter, there are allegations that you and the other Commissioners retaliated against the Commission's former Executive Director, Christopher Gregory, for pursuing suspected public fraud and legitimate grounds for judicial discipline. Do you deny these allegations? If so, on what grounds?
- Mr. Gardner, in your former role as a member of this Committee, you opposed amendments to HCR23-1001 and HB23-1016 that would have taken away the Colorado Supreme Court's authority to directly appoint members of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline and would have reinforced the independence of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee. Was your opposition to those amendments the result of lobbying by the Justices and their legislative liaison, Terry Scanlon?
- Mr. Gardner, why did you apply and why were you chosen by the Governor as an attorney member of the Commission, after the Colorado Senate rejected the reappointment of Commission Chair Mindy Sooter?

- Mr. Garnder, you were part of a committee formed to set up the Office of the Judicial Discipline Ombudsman created through HB23-1205. That Office still does not exist. Why not?
- All panelists: Former Executive Director Gregory has submitted a request for evaluation of conduct as to the Justices and other judges. The RFE further requests an evaluation of the conduct of the Commissioners and the Commission's Staff. What is being done to address that RFE in a conflict-free manner? Why hasn't the Commission voluntarily moved for the formation of a Special Tribunal, a Special Adjudicative Board Panel, and a Special Commission through a conflict-free selection mechanism to consider the RFE?
- All panelists: There has been a call for the Colorado State Auditor to directly appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to complete a conflict-free investigation of the Masias Controversy. Why aren't you joining this request?
- All panelists: How do you justify the ethics and legality of utilizing the Colorado Attorney General's Office and attorneys subject to co-defendant Attorney General Phil Weiser's control to defend against the civil claims and allegations of your own personal criminal conduct raised through *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.)?
- All panelists: Why should the people of Colorado have confidence in our judicial discipline system? Why shouldn't the public perceive judicial discipline as simply a protection racket that shields judges from accountability?

This statement was read into the record following the 1/21/26 Judicial SMART Act Presentation.

Thank you Mr. Chair. Good morning Committee Members.

My name is Christopher Gregory and I appear as a citizen. I am a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline. Acknowledging the contributions of others, including members of this Committee, I regard the passage and approval of Amendment H by 73% of Colorado voters as my most important accomplishment. Amendment H was intended to remove control of judicial discipline from the Colorado Supreme Court to ensure that no one is above the law, regardless of their position. In addition, I achieved the historic discipline of former Chief Justice Nathan B. Coats for his role in approving what amounts to a $2.66-$2.75 million taxpayer funded bribe. I have further discovered and exposed a more than 25-year pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court using public resources as hush money, for self-controlled investigations, and for public relations schemes all intended to cover up judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. There is now a vacancy on the Colorado Supreme Court because of the systemic public corruption that I have exposed.

The stated purpose of the SMART Act is that "State Government be accountable and transparent in such a way that the general public can understand the value received for the tax dollars spent by the State." In advance of today's hearings for the Colorado Judicial Department and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline as well as yesterday's hearing for the Colorado Department of Law, I submitted written testimony with requested questions for the witnesses. In addition to submitting these materials to this Committee, I circulated them to all members of the General Assembly, to the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, and to the Press. In addition to my written testimony, I have called upon Legislators to sponsor and pass a joint resolution referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement, to form an investigating committee, and to direct the Colorado State Auditor to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General.

I am concerned that my written testimony and request for a joint resolution are being deliberately disregarded by this Committee. Please confirm on the record that you have received my written testimony and supporting materials and that these materials will be included in the legislative record as well as being made publicly available through this Committee's webpage.

There are difficult questions that need to be asked. I urge you to have the integrity and courage to do so.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RESTRICT PUBLIC ACCESS (ECF NO. 29) AND AMENDED MOTION TO RESTRICT PUBLIC ACCESS (ECF NO. 30); EXHIBITS 1-3.

Conferral Statement: As detailed through Exhibit 1, Plaintiff's Counsel, Ingrid DeFranco, made good faith attempts to meet and confer with Defendants' Counsel, Dan Combs, prior to Mr. Combs filing ECF Nos. 29 and 30. As part of the attempted conferral, Ms. DeFranco emphasized District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's mandatory obligations under 28 U.S.C. § 144 to disqualify himself before any further action can be taken by this Court. The email correspondence contained in Exhibit 1, confirms that Mr. Combs ignored Ms. DeFranco's concerns and proceeded to file ECF Nos. 29 and 30. Exhibit 1 further documents Mr. Combs's attempts to threaten or otherwise intimidate both Ms. DeFranco and the Plaintiff in response to their filing of ECF 26. Ms. DeFranco also provided Mr. Combs with an opportunity to withdraw ECF Nos. 29 and 30, which he declined. Mr. Combs, on behalf of the Defendants, opposes this Motion to Strike.

INTRODUCTION

This case arises from the Defendants' systematic efforts to censor or otherwise suppress the Plaintiff's constitutionally and statutorily protected right and professionally mandated obligation to freely and publicly report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. *See* U.S. Const. amend. I; Colo. Const. Art. II, §§ 10 and 25; Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(g), (i); Colo. Const. Art. XIII; Colo. RPC 8.3; Colo. RPC 8.4 (f); Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.15 and 2.16 of the

Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code); Canons 1, 2(A)-(b), and 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code). The Defendants in this action seek to suppress the Plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit (ECF No. 26), which otherwise mandates District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico's immediate recusal from this case. The Defendants, and their state-employed Counsel, are motivated by the fact that, in addition to requiring Judge Domenico's recusal, the allegations made in the Affidavit (once proven or admitted to) are sufficient to warrant the removal, impeachment, or resignation of at least some of the Defendants from their official positions. The federal courts cannot be used as a instrument to facilitate what is now a more than quarter-century ongoing pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and others abusing access to public resources and taxpayer funds (including a partially paid $2.66-$2.75 million bribe) to cover up judicial, attorney, and official misconduct through a culture of enforced silence.

Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory, and his Counsel, hereby move to strike ECF No. 29, Defendants' "Motion to (1) Restrict Affidavit of Judicial Bais or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 [ECF Nos. 26, 26-1-10]; and (2) Require Plaintiff to File Future Documents Under Level 1 Restriction in the First Instance" and to strike ECF No. 30, Defendants' "Amended Motion to (1) Restrict Affidavit of Judicial Bais or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 [ECF Nos. 26, 26-1-10]; and (2) Require Plaintiff to File Future Documents Under Level 1 Restriction in the First Instance." Defendants filed ECF Nos. 29 and 30 in bad faith and without any meaningful efforts to meet and confer, as required by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a). The filing of ECF Nos. 29 and 30 is consistent with the Defendants' ongoing pattern of unlawful non-disqualification, intimidation, retaliation, and censorship, as alleged in the Plaintiff's "Verified

Complaint and Jury Demand," ECF No. 1. The Defendants' conduct and the conduct of their Counsel is sanctionable and grounds for further legal and equitable remedies, including the relief requested in Plaintiff's Verified Complaint.

Ultimately, however, Defendants' Motions, ECF Nos. 29 and 30, and the present Motion to Strike should not be considered until District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico has, as is mandatory, disqualified himself from this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 144, ECF No. 26. Actions taken by Judge Domenico in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 144, including issuance of his Order (ECF No. 28) restricting public access to ECF No. 26, should be deemed null and void. There is no legal grounds for Judge Domenico's persistent non-disqualification from this case or for his intentional disregard of his mandatory and automatic recusal obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 144. Indeed, Judge Domenico continues to openly violate Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the federal Code as separately asserted in *Gregory v. Dist. Judge Daniel Domenico*, 10th Cir. Jud. Discipline Case No. 10-25-90048. Accordingly, the Clerk of Court should immediately restore public access to ECF No. 26 as provided for under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a)[1], (e). To the extent that this Motion

[1] D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a) states:

> **Policy.** Unless restricted by statute, rule of civil procedure, these rules, or court order, the public shall have access to all documents filed with the court and all court proceedings. However, pleadings or documents filed under restriction shall not be accessible or viewable electronically in CM/ECF. A person with the right to access a restricted pleading or document may request a paper copy from the clerk.

This policy is consistent with the well-established recognition that, absent compelling and legitimate privacy interests to the contrary, court proceedings must be open to the public.

> Even if one assumes there is a legitimate basis for permitting a party in litigation to maintain anonymity, the few cases which discuss the propriety of the practice or recognize it implicitly require a balancing of competing interests. We begin with the fundamental presupposition that it is the responsibility of judges to avoid secrecy, in camera hearings and the concealment of the judicial process from public view. Courts are public institutions which exist for the public to serve the public interest. Even a superficial recognition of our judicial history compels one to recognize that secret court proceedings are anathema to a free society.
>
> *M.M. v. Zavaras*, 939 F. Supp. 799, 801 (D. Colo. 1996) (citations omitted).

In a FOIA case involving similar privacy interests as the present action, a judge's claimed need for anonymity in seeking governmental records was flatly rejected.

> The plaintiff's memorandum brief reveals that he is a judge within the judicial system of the State of Colorado. He asserts that public revelation of his efforts to find out what information and documents the Drug Enforcement Administration has relating to him "would personally embarrass him and prejudicially affect his privacy rights which this suit is expressly designed to protect." He asks for a protective order shielding him from improper use of his identity. His most recondite argument is that as a Colorado judge he has a duty to promote public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary and hence wishes to refrain from identifying himself "in order to avoid casting a shroud of suspicion over his office." He correctly points out that by identifying himself in an action to find out what the Drug Enforcement Administration has in its files about him he may jeopardize public confidence.
>
> None of the cases cited by the plaintiff, including my own, supports his position. *Doe and Moe v. Deschamps, et al.*, 64 F.R.D. 652 (D.C.Mont.1974), however, contains an excellent articulation of the general rule:
>
> > As we view the matter, lawsuits are public events and the public has a legitimate interest in knowing the facts involved in them. Among the facts is the identity of the parties. We think that as a matter of policy the identity of

to Strike is denied either in whole or in part, the Plaintiff reserves the right to separately respond to the merits of ECF Nos. 29 and 30 within the 21-day deadline provided by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether District Judge Daniel D. Domenico has authority to take any further action in this case, including restricting public access to court filings under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(e), with the Plaintiff having filed his formally sufficient and timely "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144" (ECF No. 26).

2. Whether the Defendants' failure to meet and confer as required by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a) is sufficient grounds for sanctions, including but not limited to striking ECF Nos. 29 and 30.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

After District Judge Daniel D. Domenico made adverse rulings and refused to disqualify himself from a prior sealed case brought by the Plaintiff, 1:25-cv-190—DDD-STV (D. Colo.)

> the parties to a lawsuit should not be concealed except in the unusual case.
>
> *Doe v. U.S. Dep't of Justice*, 93 F.R.D. 483, 483–84 (D. Colo. 1982) (footnote omitted).

In a recent opinion, Magistrate Judge N. Reid Neureiter also discussed the importance of the public's right to open courts (regardless of the influential positions of the litigants). As Magistrate Judge Neureiter observed:

> Any request for court intervention or assistance [through a judicial] proceeding necessarily calls upon the public resources of a judicial officer to examine and decide the question presented. This is the basic functioning of the judicial process that the public has a right to see, understand, and criticize if they choose. Federal judges and their court staff are not legal pawns to be deployed in secret by wealthy disputants trying to get private answers to their problems.
>
> *Black v. Emerson*, 25-CV-01035-WJM-NRN, 2025 WL 1635264, at *5 (D. Colo. June 9, 2025).

(Sealed), the Plaintiff attempted to participate in the Defendant Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee's (CJDRC) public promulgation of rule changes. Plaintiff's public comments on the proposed rule changes were ignored by the CJDRC, which refused to publish them into the public record. In turn, Plaintiff brought the present action to enforce his constitutional rights to freely report judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. Despite Plaintiff asserting Judge Domenico's actual bias as part of the Verified Complaint in this action, ECF No. 1, p. 6 fn. 3, Judge Domenico accepted assignment to this case on October 24, 2025. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff responded by filing an additional motion (ECF No. 7) and notice (ECF No. 12) seeking Judge Domenico's voluntary disqualification. Despite these filings and the pendency of 10th Cir. Jud. Discipline Case No. 10-25-90048, Judge Domenico continued to ignore the requests for his disqualification. Consequently, Plaintiff filed an "Affidavit of Judicial Bais or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel" into the present case (ECF Nos. 26 and 26-1 through 26-11) and into the sealed case—1:25-cv-00190—DDD-STV. Plaintiff further notified the 10th Circuit's Judicial Council of the existence of the Affidavits. Exhibit 2 (with redactions applied to protect the integrity of the sealed case). Nevertheless, Judge Domenico simply ignored the filing of the Affidavits and the judicial discipline complaint against him, refusing to disqualify himself from these cases. Indeed, Judge Domenico has received communications from the Defendants' Counsel and issued his Order restricting public access to the Plaintiff's Affidavit and accompanying exhibits, ECF Nos. 26 and 26-1 through 26-11. As explained in Plaintiff's Affidavit, Plaintiff is contemporaneously filing the additional judicial discipline complaints (attached as Exhibit 3) against Judge Domenico and 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jerome A. Holmes to address their mutually persistent refusals to disqualify themselves

from these proceedings. ECF No. 26, pp. 4-5 fn. 2; 10th Cir. JCR 11(c)(2) (allowing filing of repeated complaints based upon new material information).

Because caselaw relating to the ability of a complainant to disclose records from federal judicial discipline proceedings exists based upon a statute that has been renumbered and the admissions of the D.C. Judicial Council (rather than a fully litigated dispute), the Plaintiff included a request in his Affidavit that the Affidavit and accompanying exhibits be filed as temporarily restricted (to allow for any objections to the disclosure of *actual records* from the federal judicial discipline proceedings to be raised to an impartial re-assigned judge, including any potential objections from Judge Domenico). ECF No. 26, p. 4 fn. 2; *see Rafferty v. Judicial Counsel for the Dist. of Columbia*, 131 F.3d 219, 221 (DC Cir. 1997) (case dismissed as moot where Judicial Council interpreted the prior codification of 28 U.S.C. § 360 (28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(14)) as applicable only to "judicial officers and staff such as courtroom deputies and reporters, and not to the complainant."). When Plaintiff's Counsel filed ECF Nos. 26 and 26-1 through 26-11, however, the EM/ECF system did not allow filing with restrictions. Plaintiff's Counsel contacted the Clerk of Court's Office and was informed that any decision to restrict the filing would be made by the assigned judge. Plaintiff's Counsel presumed that Judge Domenico would comply with 28 U.S.C. § 144 and immediately recuse himself from these cases.

Instead, Defendants' Counsel seized upon Plaintiff's request for a temporarily restricted filing to (without any prior meeting or conferral) email Judge Domenico's chambers directly and to accuse the Plaintiff and counsel of having publicly divulged unspecified "confidential" information. Defendant's Counsel's email to Judge Domenico's chambers was paired with a contemporaneous (though subsequent) email to Plaintiff's Counsel, which Defendant's Counsel

attempted to recall almost immediately, but which contained various threats directed towards Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel. Exhibit 1, pp. 9-13. Plaintiff categorically denies that his personal knowledge of examples and his status as a victim of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct is "confidential" information somehow protected from public disclosure. On the contrary, the Plaintiff interprets the communications from Defendants' Counsel as threats and further intimidation/retaliation intended to interfere with Plaintiff's mandated and constitutionally privileged obligations to report ethical and criminal misconduct. Without requesting Plaintiff's position, Judge Domenico proceeded to enter his Order applying a Level 1 Restriction (i.e. availability restricted to the court and the parties) effective until January 30, 2026. ECF No. 28. Plaintiff was afforded no opportunity to object to Judge Domenico continuing to hear this case.

Most recently, Defendant's Counsel's efforts to meet and confer as to ECF 29 and ECF 30 can be summarized as additional attempts to intimidate and threaten the Plaintiff and Plaintiff's Counsel. Exhibit 1, pp. 4-8. In his letter dated January 27, 2026, First Assistant Attorney General Dan Combs made the following explicit threat: "You are on notice that Defendants will vigorously defend themselves in this action and will seek fees, costs, and other appropriate relief under the law." Exhibit 1, p. 8. Defendants' Counsel has refused to respond to the Plaintiff's concerns regarding Judge Domenico's violation of 28 U.S.C. § 144 by continuing to hear this case, or the conflicts of interest that exist in Defendants' Counsel's continued representation of the Defendants as employees of the Colorado Department of Law (which is headed by individually-named Defendant Philip Weiser). Exhibit 1, p. 1, Additionally, Mr. Combs has refused to discuss the conflicts that arise from his prior communications with the

Plaintiff, through which the Plaintiff discussed the merits of the present case. Because of these communications, Mr. Combs personally arranged for the appointment of outside private-sector counsel as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) to represent the Plaintiff in a related case where the Plaintiff is a named defendant. *Jennifer L. Dees and Ethan D. Smith v. William Hood, et al*., 1:24-cv-00848-PAB-NRN. Defendants' Counsel's efforts to meet and confer also occurred in bad faith, where Defendant's Counsel failed to provide Plaintiff's Counsel with a reasonable opportunity to respond.

DISCUSSION

1. Upon the Plaintiff's filing of a timely Affidavit sufficient in form, 28 U.S.C. § 144 required District Judge Daniel D. Domenico "to proceed no further [in this action], but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding."

Provided that an Affidavit filed under 28 U.S.C. § 144 is timely and meets all requirements of form, judicial recusal is mandatory and automatic. In other words, the judge assigned to the case ***has no discretion*** but must recuse himself or herself for reassignment of the case to an impartial judge. 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides:

> ***Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit*** that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, ***such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.***
>
> The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is made in good faith. (Emphasis added).

Plaintiffs Affidavit satisfies all the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 144. Neither Judge Domenico nor Defendants' Counsel have cited any authority that would allow Judge Domenico to exercise discretion, to continue hearing this case, or take any other action herein. The fact that Defendants' Counsel persists in arguing that Plaintiff has not raised "valid" grounds for Judge Domenico's disqualification is yet another example of attorney misconduct, specifically knowingly and frivolously assisting a judge to violate his or her ethical duties under the Code / the federal Code with the objective of obstructing the administration of justice. Colo. RPC 8.4 (a-1), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h).

Because 28 U.S.C. § 144 divested him of further jurisdictional authority in this case, Judge Domenico's Order (ECF No. 28) restricting public access to Plaintiff's Affidavit (ECF No. 26) is necessarily null and void. *In re Armstrong*, 294 B.R. 344, 360 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2003), *aff'd*, 97 Fed. Appx. 285 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[O]rders entered prior to a recusal may be voided if the injured party can show that the judge should have recused herself and failed to do so."). If, despite this Motion to Strike, Judge Domenico continues to hear this case, Plaintiff has additional recourse to petition the 10th Circuit for a writ of mandamus. *See Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting writ of mandamus based upon grounds for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)).

2. The Defendants failed to meet and confer in good-faith as required by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a). This is sufficient grounds for sanctions, including but not limited to striking ECF Nos. 29 and 30.

The *pro forma* meeting and conferral that occurred prior to Defendants' Counsel filing ECF Nos. 29 and 30 does not comply with the requirements of D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a), which provides:

> **Duty to Confer.** Before filing a motion, counsel for the moving party or an unrepresented party ***shall confer or make reasonable, good faith efforts to confer*** with any opposing counsel or unrepresented party to resolve any disputed matter. The moving party shall describe in the motion, or in a certificate attached to the motion, the specific efforts to fulfill this duty. (Emphasis added).

The Uniform Civil Practice Standards of the United States Magistrate Judges further explain that the failure to comply with the duty to meet and confer is sanctionable through the respective motion being stricken or denied. D.C.Colo.MJ, Standard V provides, in relevant part:

> **1. Duty to Meet and Confer**
>
> Prior to filing a motion or initiating the discovery dispute process, parties have a duty to meet and confer or make "good faith efforts to confer." See D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a). When parties have substantive disagreements, such "good faith efforts" generally require meeting either face to face, over video conference, or by telephone, and not solely through email or written correspondence. ***Failure to comply may result in the motion being stricken or denied.*** (Emphasis added).

Judge Domenico's own Practice Standards for Civil Cases also recognize that failure to comply with D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a) is grounds for the court to deny the motion without prejudice or to strike the motion or filing. Practice Standard V(K)(1) states:

> Motions, objections, responses, replies, briefs, or other papers that are untimely, noncomplying, or filed without a certification when required under Local Civil Rule 7.1(a) or these Practice Standards **may be denied without prejudice or stricken *sua sponte*.** (Emphasis added).

When announcing his intentions to file ECF Nos. 29 and 30, Defendants' Counsel Dan Combs made no efforts to respond to the Plaintiff's concerns that Judge Domenico was obligated to recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and that it was improper for Judge Domenico to take any further action in this case, including entertaining the Defendants' requests to restrict

EM/ECF access. Mr. Combs also presented his communications as directives demanding an "immediate" response rather than providing Plaintiff's Counsel with a reasonable amount of time to respond (i.e. 24-hours). Mr. Combs's *pro forma* (and overtly coercive) communications were indicative of bad faith and a failure to meaningfully meet and confer. Accordingly, ECF Nos. 29 and 30 should be stricken or denied.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico immediately disqualify himself from taking further action in this case, as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 144. Judge Domenico's Order (ECF No. 28) restricting public access to ECF 26 should further be recognized as null and void, with the Clerk of Court immediately restoring public access to ECF No. 26, as required by D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a).

Dated: February 2, 2026

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq.
Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601
Telephone: (303) 641-6812
Email: Ingrid.DeFranco@gmail.com
Attorney for the Relator / Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
Christopher S.P. Gregory, Esq.
The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502
Telephone: (970) 648-0642
E-mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
Pro Se Attorney for the Relator / Plaintiff
Christopher S.P. Gregory

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February 2, 2026, I filed the above filing via email to the Clerk of the Court, who will docket it in CM/ECF. CM/ECF will send notification of this filing to any party who has entered an appearance in this matter to the e-mail addresses provided in CM/ECF.

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco

Christopher Gregory

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <defrancoi@yahoo.com>
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2026 7:45 AM
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Your email and motion

The Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303-641-6812; fax: 303.558.4294
www.atoughdefense.com

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2026 at 08:15:59 PM MST
Subject: RE: Your email and motion

Ingrid,

We disagree with your version of events or that restricting ECF No. 26 and Exhibits 1-10 is improper. We will not withdraw the Motion to Restrict Access, and further oppose any motion to strike. We also decline your demand for us to file a "a notice that [we] acknowledge Judge Domenico's mandatory judicial disqualification as required by 28 U.S.C. § 144, and that [we] and [our] Office withdraw from further representation of the Defendants in this case."

Regards,

Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General



Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2026 3:43 PM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Cc: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: Your email and motion

Dear Mr. Combs,

Unfortunately, you appear to miss the point of this case. Mr. Gregory is suing to uphold his 1st Amendment, Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25, Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(g), and Colo. Const. Art. XIII rights to freely and publicly report judicial misconduct and other suspected crimes without fear of intimidation and retaliation (as further protected against through the Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA), the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act, § 18-8-115, C.R.S., and other laws). Through your motion, you seek to have an objectively-biased U.S. District Court Judge act as the equivalent of the Soviet Bureau of Censorship, exercising prior restraints to restrict public access to Mr. Gregory's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 26, as well as all prospective court filings based upon generalized assertions of "confidentiality." In other words, through your threatening communications prior to filing your motion, you have engaged in exactly the types of intimidation and retaliation that are prohibited under § 24-31-1204(8)(b) of the CFCA. Moreover, you are now a participant and co-conspirator in the civil rights violations and retaliatory conduct averred in Mr. Gregory's complaint. Not only is your conduct and refusal to disqualify yourself and your Office constitutionally and civilly unlawful, but it is also unethical and an example of First Degree Official Misconduct under § 18-8-404, C.R.S.

It is understandable that you would take such unmeasured actions upon recognizing the reality and significance of the facts alleged in Mr. Gregory's Affidavit. Once those facts (which must be presumed as true for the purposes of Judge Domenico's disqualification) are proven and/or admitted to, your clients have no ethical choice but to immediately resign from their official positions and to concede the merits of Mr. Gregory's claims.

The intimidation tactics apparently intended by your motion, however, actually began with your failing to meet and confer before sending your *ex parte* email to Judge Daniel D. Domenico's chambers on January 16, 2026. Other than sending a contemporaneous email (which you attempted to recall), that threatened me and Mr. Gregory with allegations of breached "confidentiality," you made no efforts to discuss what 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires in this case. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides, in relevant part:

> Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, ***such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.***

It was improper for Judge Domenico to take ***any further action*** in this case, including issuing his order temporarily restricting public access according to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a), (b), (e). Mr. Gregory's intentions in asking to temporarily restrict public access in the Affidavit itself was to allow a conflict-free replacement judge to immediately and impartially consider any objections (including any potential objections raised by Judge Domenico) to the public disclosure of *actual records* from the pending federal judicial discipline proceedings against Judge Domenico and 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jerome A. Holmes (i.e. the Affidavit's exhibits). The intention was never to condone Judge Domenico continuing to preside over this case and to issue further orders. Additionally, at no point have you identified specifically what you allege is "confidential" or non-public information and the reasons supporting your positions. Mr. Gregory categorically denies that evidence of judicial misconduct, particularly a victim's personal knowledge of judicial misconduct, is ever "confidential" and outside of an individual attorney's mandated reporting obligations and constitutionally protected rights to free expression (including communications relevant to independent exercise of the Colorado General Assembly's impeachment authority under Colo. Const. Art. XIII).

I do not consider that a meaningful meet and confer can occur without your having provided a specific basis for your contention that the Affidavit should be kept hidden from public view, or without an appropriate opportunity to respond. Your apparent "directive" that I shall respond to you immediately does not constitute an appropriate opportunity. I realize that attorneys in your office rarely leave it, but that is not the case for other trial lawyers, and I do not sit at my desk awaiting communications from opposing counsel. I believe the generally-accepted response period is twenty-four hours. Due to the failure to meet and confer, we will be moving to strike your motion. We assume you oppose but request your confirmation.

With regard to Judge Domenico's mandatory disqualification, I would request you to direct me to any statutory basis for Judge Domenico exercising discretion and continuing to hear this case. I can find none. Recusal is mandatory, whether you subjectively believe Mr. Gregory established a "valid" basis, or not. It is a violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(a-1), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h) for you and your clients to frivolously disregard the law (i.e. 28 U.S.C. § 144) and support an objectively-biased judicial officer violating his duties under Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code).

With this context, I respectfully request that you withdraw your motion to restrict public access to the Affidavit, that you file a notice that you acknowledge Judge Domenico's mandatory judicial disqualification as required by 28 U.S.C. § 144, and that you and your Office withdraw from further representation of the Defendants in this case. If you do not take these requested actions, we will respond accordingly by filing the above-mentioned motion to strike, by filing additional federal judicial discipline complaints against Judge Domenico and Chief Circuit Judge Holmes as allowed through 10th Cir. JCR 11(c)(2), and by petitioning the 10th Circuit for a writ of mandamus (*see Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting writ of mandamus based upon application of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) disqualification standard)). Once an impartial judge is assigned to this case, we will proceed with filing the appropriate motion to disqualify you and your Office from further representation of the Defendants and to seek the injunctive relief otherwise pled in the Verified Complaint and Jury Demand, ECF No. 1. We will also refer your conduct (and the conduct of the other attorneys from your Office who are working on this case) to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct, which is already investigating the attorney discipline complaint contained in ECF No. 1-1.

Please advise as to how you would like to proceed in this matter.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco

PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

Christopher Gregory

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2026 4:40 PM
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Gregory v. CJDRC et al., No. 25-cv-03361 - conferral
Attachments: 26.01.27 Letter to DeFranco.pdf

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2026 at 04:19:23 PM MST
Subject: Gregory v. CJDRC et al., No. 25-cv-03361 - conferral

Dear Ingrid,

Attached is a letter dated 1/27/26. We await your immediate response.

Thank you,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

PHIL WEISER
Attorney General

NATALIE HANLON LEH
Chief Deputy Attorney General

SHANNON STEVENSON
Solicitor General

TANJA WHEELER
Associate Chief Deputy Attorney General

STATE OF COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF LAW

RALPH L. CARR
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1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, Colorado 80203
Phone (720) 508-6000

Civil Litigation and Employment Law Section

January 27, 2026

Ingrid J. DeFranco
Law Offices of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601-0128

Sent via email to: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com

RE: *Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee et al.*, Civ. No 25-cv-03361(D. Colo.)

Dear Ms. DeFranco:

I write regarding *Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee et al.*, Civ. No 25-cv-03361(D. Colo.), and in particular your failure to respond to my requests to meet and confer on two separate, serious issues. See January 12, 2026, email, January 16, 2026, email.

First, I have sought, and continue to seek, conferral on Defendants' impending motion to dismiss. *See* January 12, 2026, email. Judge Domenico requires conferral on such motions, *see* DDD Civ. P.S. III(G), and the Complaint in this action is a perfect example of what this conferral requirement seeks to remedy—namely having Defendants and the Court spend time sifting through voluminous papers and legal conclusions to divine what Plaintiff is attempting to assert. The Complaint is a kitchen sink of legal conclusions asserted indiscriminately against all forty Defendants, with no factual allegations explaining what it is that each Defendant allegedly did to Plaintiff or how Plaintiff was harmed. On its face, it fails to provide a "short and plain statement" as required by Rule 8, and fails to assert a plausible claim for relief as required by Rule 12(b)(6).

Both the form and content of the Complaint, which you and Mr. Gregory signed as attorneys of record, raise serious questions whether this action and its claims are warranted by any existing law and have evidentiary support. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (outlining representations to court made by attorney when signing any filing). For example, the Complaint appears to allege that Director Sullivan retaliated against Mr. Gregory by dismissing his Charge of Discrimination based on his termination from the CCRD for lack of jurisdiction. But as the Complaint's own exhibits show, the Charge did not include any allegations that Plaintiff was

discriminated against based on membership in a protected class as required by C.R.S. § 24-34-402(1)(a)(I), or was discriminated against for opposing any practice made a discriminatory or an unfair employment practice by CADA as required by C.R.S § 24-34-402(1)(e)(IV). *See generally* ECF No. 1-10, pp. 12–19. As another example, Mr. Gregory complains about how the CCJD and CJDRC handling his various filings, but "nothing in the First Amendment or in [the Supreme] Court's case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues." *Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight*, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). Your failure to engage in the conferral process has forced Defendants to prepare a lengthy Motion to Dismiss, which will outline multiple bases for dismissal.

Second, you publicly filed documents in this case which were in violation of your client's confidentiality obligations under Colorado law. *See* my January 16, 2026, email. In particular, Colorado Const. art. VI, section 23(3)(g) protects all files, investigations, proceedings, testimony, and notes of the CCJD, unless and until public disciplinary proceedings are filed, and even then, only certain documents become public. CJD Rule 3.5 imposes confidentiality obligations on all Commission staff and members, and both Section 23(3)(g) and Rule 3.5(c)(5) make clear that the confidentiality rules continue to apply post-employment. The Complaint includes allegations that refer to information that Mr. Gregory had access to only by virtue of his role with the CCJD. Mr. Gregory's Affidavit, ECF No. 26, and exhibits to that Declaration, go even further, including information regarding private discipline issued by the CCJD while Plaintiff was serving as the vice-chair of the CCJD, as well as details of investigative actions he took while serving as the CCJD's Executive Director. ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 43-44. Contrary to his assertions, Mr. Gregory does not have an "absolute privilege" to disclose the information under CJD Rule 6.5(d). CJD Rule 6.5(d) permits certain disclosures of otherwise confidential information by "the Commission or the executive director," but Mr. Gregory is neither the Commission nor its executive director – he was terminated on January 19, 2024. Mr. Gregory therefore possesses no right to disclose information that is subject to confidentiality provisions under Colorado law.

I asked you to confirm that you will take steps to restrict access to the Affidavit, and further review all filings drafted by Mr. Gregory prior to filing for confidential information, and take necessary steps to protect that information. You should be aware that pursuant to a settlement of claim with the CCJD, Mr. Gregory should not have any documents belonging to the CCJD. And he is violating his confidentiality obligations as a former employee of CCJD, by disclosing confidential documents and/or information from those documents in court filings, to legislators, the media or the public, which if continued may result in legal action against him.

Your failure to engage on these issues is causing Defendants to spend unnecessary time seeking dismissal of a Complaint which on its face fails to state a

plausible claim, and to monitor your voluminous filings for information that should be under seal and/or not in Mr. Gregory's possession. Your failure to engage also suggests that this action is not about actually litigating any specific claim that Mr. Gregory may be able to assert, but to flood the record with voluminous and sensational allegations. You are on notice that Defendants will vigorously defend themselves in this action and will seek fees, costs, and other appropriate relief under the law.

I am available to talk about these and other issues on Wednesday, January 28, between 1:00-2:00, and on Thursday, January 29th, between 3:00-4:00. Please let us know if one of these times work, or provide other available times to discuss.

Sincerely,

FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL



DANIEL M. COMBS
First Assistant Attorney General
Tort Litigation, Civil Litigation and
Employment Law
720-508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

cc: Clayton J. Ankney
Katharine J. Brown

Christopher Gregory

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 1:33 PM
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Recall: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: 'ingrid.defranco@gmail.com' <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 at 01:13:13 PM MST
Subject: Recall: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26

Dan Combs (He/Him) would like to recall the message, "Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26 ".

Christopher Gregory

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 1:33 PM
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 at 01:09:49 PM MST
Subject: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26

Hello Ingrid,

It's come to our attention that recent filings may have been in violation of your client's confidentiality obligations under Colorado law. In particular, Colo. Const. art. VI, section 23(3)(g) protects all files, investigations, proceedings, testimony, and notes of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, unless and until public disciplinary proceedings are filed, and even then, only certain documents become public. CJD Rule 3.5 imposes confidentiality obligations on all Commission staff and members, and both Section 23(3)(g) and Rule 3.5(c)(5) make clear that the confidentiality rules continue to apply post-employment. The Local Rules concerning restrictions of filings is found at D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2.

Our clients take their confidentiality obligations seriously, and we ask that you review all filings drafted by Mr. Gregory prior to filing for confidential information, and take necessary steps to protect that information.

Most pressing is the need to review Mr. Gregory's Affidavit, ECF No. 26, and exhibits to that Declaration. As mentioned in the email I sent to Chambers (on which you were copied), Mr. Gregory acknowledged confidentiality of the contents of that filing, and its being filed publicly appears to have been inadvertent. Furthermore, the cited bases for disclosure would not apply, because Mr. Gregory is not the executive director of the Commission and may not act on the Commission's behalf.

Please confirm receipt of this email and let me know *as soon as possible* whether you will take steps to restrict access to ECF No. 26.

Thank you,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

Christopher Gregory

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 1:33 PM
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: 1:25-cv-00361-DDD filing matter - ECF No. 26

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: Domenico_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov <domenico_chambers@cod.uscourts.gov>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 at 01:04:00 PM MST
Subject: 1:25-cv-00361-DDD filing matter - ECF No. 26

To Judge Domenico's Chambers,

It has come to our attention that the Plaintiff's (Christopher Gregory) most recent filing in case 1:25-cv-03361-DDD, ECF No. 26, and exhibits 1-11, are available to the public through PACER.

After reviewing the filings, Defendants believe that ECF No. 26 contains information required to be kept confidential under state law. Mr. Gregory apparently recognizes that the affidavit contains confidential information as well, stating in footnote 2, Paragraph 5, of ECF No. 26, that "Affiant files this Affidavit into the present case as suppressed …."

Given the Plaintiff's statement, made under penalty of perjury, that ECF 26 and its exhibits were being filed as "suppressed," the public filing appears to have been made in error.

To protect the confidentiality of information contained in ECF 26 and to reflect the Plaintiff's stated intent to file it as "suppressed," would the Court be able to direct the Clerk to immediately change ECF 26's status to "sealed" or restricted?

Very truly yours,

Dan Combs

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

Christopher Gregory

From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2026 8:43 PM
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
Cc: Clayton Ankney; Katharine Brown; Linda Ruth Carter; Carmen Van Pelt; Christopher Gregory
Subject: RE: Gregory lawsuit conferral on motion to extend time and MTD

Thanks Ingrid.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2026 5:22 PM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: Re: Gregory lawsuit conferral on motion to extend time and MTD

Dear Mr. Coombs,

Apologies; I did not receive your earlier email. My Gmail address duplicates into a secondary address, and it's not in either one. We do not object to an extension.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco Pllc
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

On Wednesday, January 14, 2026 at 04:28:35 PM MST, Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov> wrote:

Hello Ingrid,

I'm following up on the outreach from earlier in this week. Will you please confirm you received the email, and also please provide Mr. Gregory's position on the requested extension of time, when you're first able to?

Many thanks,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Dan Combs (He/Him)
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2026 4:21 PM
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com
Cc: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Gregory lawsuit conferral on motion to extend time and MTD
Importance: High

Hello Ingrid,

I'm reaching out to confer on two motions: (1) Defendants' motion for two additional weeks to respond to Mr. Gregory's Complaint—from February 2, 2026, to February 16, 2026; and (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss.

- Please respond as soon as possible on the request to extend time and let us know times, after Wed. of this week, in which you're available to talk through the planned Motion to Dismiss.

Requested extension of time: As mentioned below in more detail, as a response to the Complaint, we are preparing a single Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all Defendants, on various grounds. We'll be asking the Court for two additional weeks to file that Motion. That request reflects the need to finalize multiple arguments and ensure the 40 Defendant clients have sufficient time to review.

Conferral on Motion to Dismiss: The following is meant to start the discussion about conferral on our motion, under Judge Domenico's Practice Standards. Below are the general bases for our motion to dismiss. We'd like to set up a call this week or next to answer any questions and discuss whether you think the asserted deficiencies in the complaint are correctible by amendment, as Judge Domenico requires.

<u>Grounds for dismissal</u>

1. Request to dismiss all claims against the CSC, CCJD, and CJDRC based on sovereign immunity. Additionally, these entities are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

- Request to dismiss claims against individually named Defendants for violations of Colorado law, because such claims are barred under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and the Eleventh Amendment.
- Request to dismiss claims against Director Sullivan, who, in addition to governmental immunity, has absolute immunity from the asserted claims.
- Request to dismiss all claims for relief for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief, and failure to allege sufficient facts to support stated claims. This includes but is not limited to an argument to dismiss claims for failure to assert specific facts concerning individually named defendants, as well as arguments describing Mr. Gregory's failure to assert facts to plausibly state his enumerated claims for relief.
- Request to dismiss all claims based on generalized grievances for the "fundamental right to be heard," equal protection, and due process rights for lack of standing.
- Request to dismiss individual capacity claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
- Request to dismiss conspiracy claims based on failure to identify agreement between defendants and concerted action (1983, 1985), racial bias (1985(3)), or intent to deter court attendance or retaliate based on court attendance (1985(2)).
- Request to dismiss CFCA claim because it was not in effect when the alleged violation of the CFCA occurred. As such, Plaintiff cannot plead that he engaged in lawful acts in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to the CFCA or to stop a violation of the CFCA. Separately, Mr. Gregory's CFCA claim is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.
- Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under any additional theory, and Plaintiff is not entitled to any form of relief based on the various grounds for dismissal.

We appreciate your consideration on these motions, and your response on the motion for extension of time as soon as you're able to.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

January 15, 2026

Leslee Fathallah, Circuit Executive
United States Courts for the Tenth Circuit
Office of the Circuit Executive
1823 Stout Street
Denver, CO 80257
Judicial Misconduct Proceedings

Re: *Christopher Gregory v. District Judge Daniel Domenico*--Jud. Complaint No. 10-25-90048 (10th Cir.)—Notice of Supplemental Case Filings

Dear Ms. Fathallah:

Please advise the 10th Circuit Judicial Council that an "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 26, and accompanying Exhibits 1-11 have been filed into *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.). It is my understanding that the Judicial Council has direct access to these documents, which are relevant to the assignment of the above-referenced judicial misconduct complaint to an alternative circuit's judicial council according to 10th Cir. JCR 26. If you do not have access to the documents, please let me know so that I can provide the Judicial Council with a copy.

Additionally, please acknowledge receipt and filing of this Notice of Supplemental Information as well as the "Supplemental Grounds for Transfer of Proceeding to Alternative Circuit—10th Cir. JCR 26," which was mailed to you on November 11, 2025.

I greatly appreciate your assistance in this process. Please do not hesitate to let me know if you have any questions or if you need any additional information.

Sincerely,

Christopher S.P. Gregory

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 2

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

January 15, 2026

Leslee Fathallah, Circuit Executive
United States Courts for the Tenth Circuit
Office of the Circuit Executive
1823 Stout Street
Denver, CO 80257
Judicial Misconduct Proceedings

Re: *Christopher Gregory v. Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes*--Jud. Complaint No. 10-25-90070 (10th Cir.)—Notice of Supplemental Case Filings

Dear Ms. Fathallah:

Please advise the 10th Circuit Judicial Council that an "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 26, and accompanying Exhibits 1-11 have been filed into *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.). It is my understanding that the Judicial Council has direct access to these documents, which are relevant to the assignment of the above-referenced judicial misconduct complaint to an alternative circuit's judicial council according to 10th Cir. JCR 26. If you do not have access to the documents, please let me know so that I can provide the Judicial Council with a copy.

Additionally, please acknowledge receipt and filing of this Notice of Supplemental Information as well as the "Supplemental Grounds for Transfer to Alternate Circuit's Judicial [Council]," which was mailed to you on November 11, 2025.

I greatly appreciate your assistance in this process. Please do not hesitate to let me know if you have any questions or if you need any additional information.

Sincerely,

Christopher S.P. Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

January 20, 2026

Leslee Fathallah, Circuit Executive
United States Courts for the Tenth Circuit
Office of the Circuit Executive
1823 Stout Street
Denver, CO 80257
Judicial Misconduct Proceedings

Re: *Christopher Gregory v. District Judge Daniel Domenico*--Jud. Complaint No. 10-25-90048 (10th Cir.)—Notice of Supplemental Case Filings

Dear Ms. Fathallah:

Please advise the 10th Circuit Judicial Council that an "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 65, and accompanying Exhibits 1-11 have been filed into 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (sealed). It is my understanding that the Judicial Council has direct access to these documents, which are relevant to the assignment of the above-referenced judicial misconduct complaint to an alternative circuit's judicial council according to 10th Cir. JCR 26. If you do not have access to the documents, please let me know so that I can provide the Judicial Council with a copy.

Additionally, please acknowledge receipt and filing of this Notice of Supplemental Information, my previous Notice of Supplemental Information (dated January 15, 2026), and the "Supplemental Grounds for Transfer of Proceeding to Alternative Circuit—10th Cir. JCR 26," which was mailed to you on November 11, 2025.

I greatly appreciate your assistance in this process. Please do not hesitate to let me know if you have any questions or if you need any additional information.

Sincerely,

Christopher S.P. Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

January 20, 2026

Leslee Fathallah, Circuit Executive
United States Courts for the Tenth Circuit
Office of the Circuit Executive
1823 Stout Street
Denver, CO 80257
Judicial Misconduct Proceedings

Re: *Christopher Gregory v. Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes*--Jud. Complaint No. 10-25-90070 (10th Cir.)—Notice of Supplemental Case Filings

Dear Ms. Fathallah:

Please advise the 10th Circuit Judicial Council that an "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 65, and accompanying Exhibits 1-11 have been filed into 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (sealed). It is my understanding that the Judicial Council has direct access to these documents, which are relevant to the assignment of the above-referenced judicial misconduct complaint to an alternative circuit's judicial council according to 10th Cir. JCR 26. If you do not have access to the documents, please let me know so that I can provide the Judicial Council with a copy.

Additionally, please acknowledge receipt and filing of this Notice of Supplemental Information, my previous Notice of Supplemental Information (dated January 15, 2026), and the "Supplemental Grounds for Transfer to Alternate Circuit's Judicial [Council]," which was mailed to you on November 11, 2025.

I greatly appreciate your assistance in this process. Please do not hesitate to let me know if you have any questions or if you need any additional information.

Sincerely,

Christopher S.P. Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

February 2, 2026

Circuit Executive Leslee Fathallah
Office of the Circuit Executive
United States Courts for the Tenth Circuit
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80257
Complaint of Misconduct

Dear Ms. Fathallah:

Enclosed please find a complaint of judicial misconduct as to U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado Judge Daniel D. Domenico. I acknowledge that the 7-page length of the statement of facts exceeds the 5-page limit provided by 10th Cir. JCR 6.1. Nevertheless, I have provided a "concise statement that details the specific facts on which the claim of misconduct . . . is based." Accordingly, I respectfully request that you exercise your discretion to accept the statement as proposed. *Id.*

Thank you for your assistance in filing this complaint. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or if you need additional information.

Sincerely,

Christopher S.P. Gregory, Esq.
Enclosure

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT 3

AO 310 (Rev. 03/16)

Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit

COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY

To begin the complaint process, complete this form and prepare the brief statement of facts described in item 4 (below). The RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, contain information on what to include in a complaint (Rule 6), where to file a complaint (Rule 7), and other important matters. The Rules are available in federal court clerks' offices, on individual federal courts' websites, and on www.uscourts.gov.

Your complaint (this form and the statement of facts) should be typewritten and must be legible. For the number of copies to file, consult the local rules or clerk's office of the court in which your complaint is required to be filed. Enclose each copy of the complaint in an envelope marked "COMPLAINT OF MISCONDUCT" or "COMPLAINT OF DISABILITY" and submit it to the appropriate clerk of court. **Do not put the name of any judge on the envelope.**

1. Name of Complainant: Christopher S.P. Gregory

Contact Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman, #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone: (970) 648-0642

2. Name(s) of Judge(s): Daniel D. Domenico

Court: The United States District Court for the District of Colorado

3. Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge(s) in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?

☑ Yes ☐ No

If "yes," give the following information about each lawsuit:

Court: The United States District Court for the District of Colorado

Case Number: 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV & 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

Docket number of any appeal to the _____ Circuit: _____

Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?

☑ Party ☑ Lawyer ☐ Neither

If you are (were) a party and have (had) a lawyer, give the lawyer's name, address, and telephone number:

Co-Counsel: Ingrid DeFranco, P.O. Box 128, Brighton, CO 80601, (303) 641-6812.

AO 310 (Rev. 03/16)

Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit

COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY

4. Brief Statement of Facts. Attach a brief statement of the specific facts on which the claim of judicial misconduct or disability is based. Include what happened, when and where it happened, and any information that would help an investigator check the facts. If the complaint alleges judicial disability, also include any additional facts that form the basis of that allegation.

5. Declaration and signature:

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made in this complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature:  Date: 02/02/2026

Print Save As... Reset

Statement of Facts

10th Cir. JCR 11(c)(2) allows for the filing of subsequent additional judicial misconduct complaints which contain "material information not previously considered and [that do] not constitute harassment of the subject judge."

Following District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's adverse rulings in Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (Sealed), Complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint docketed as *Christopher Gregory v. District Judge Daniel Domenico*, Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90048. Upon receiving it on or about August 7, 2025, the 10th Circuit Executive distributed the judicial misconduct complaint to Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes, Chief District Judge Philip A. Brimmer, and District Judge Daniel Domenico. The judicial misconduct complaint alleges that Judge Domenico violated Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code) by knowingly withholding grounds for his mandatory disqualification, by failing to disqualify himself, and by abusing his judicial authority to achieve a case outcome favorable to personal "friends" that Judge Domenico had previously self-identified in another high-profile case. *See Bella Health and Wellness, et al. v. Phil Weiser, et al.*, 23-cv-00939-DDD-SKC (D. Colo.), ECF No. 51, pp. 5:25-7:1.

After filing the judicial misconduct complaint, Complainant filed a F.R.C.P. 59(e) motion in Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV to seek relief from Judge Domenico's adverse rulings and objectively demonstrable actual bias. Even though Complainant's judicial misconduct complaint against Judge Domenico asserted grounds for Chief Judge Holmes's disqualification from its consideration, Chief Judge Holmes refused to recuse himself or to address Complainant's concurrent request for referral of the judicial misconduct complaint to a different circuit's judicial council according to 10th Cir. JCR 26. Rather, Chief Judge Holmes proceeded to engage

in *ex parte* communications with Judge Domenico and to ultimately issue a September 22, 2025 "Memorandum & Order" dismissing the judicial misconduct complaint without addressing the merits of Complainant's allegations of Judge Domenico's misconduct. As later discovered in another "Memorandum & Order" (issued on September 11, 2025 in an unrelated judicial misconduct case—Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90049), Chief Circuit Judge Holmes's practice of resolving judicial misconduct complaints through undisclosed *ex parte* communications with the subject judge is itself part of a pattern of Judge Holmes repeatedly violating Canon 3(A)(4) of the federal Code.[1]

Complainant responded to Judge Holmes's Memorandum & Order by filing an attorney discipline complaint with the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado's Committee on Conduct and the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on September 30, 2025. The attorney discipline complaint was filed against some of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and other involved attorneys admitted to practice before the U.S. District Court and/or the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. The District Court's Committee on Conduct has docketed the complaint as Case No. 25-cc-3, but neither the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals nor Chief Circuit Judge Holmes have acknowledged receiving the dually-filed complaint. After filing the attorney discipline complaint, Complainant brought a separate federal civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation action in the U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.). Shortly after bringing *Gregory*, Complainant also filed a timely petition for review under 10th Cir. JCR 18(a).

[1] Judge Holmes's practice of dismissing judicial misconduct on the representations of the subject judge alone is also inconsistent with the Judicial Conference Committee's Standard 5, which provides, in part: "[A]n allegation is not 'conclusively refuted by objective evidence' simply because the judge complained against denies it." Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 243 (app. 3) (2006).

Concurrently, Complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint against Chief Circuit Judge Holmes because of his refusal to disqualify himself from Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90048. *Christopher Gregory v. Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes*, Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90070.[2]

Despite Complainant specifically averring Judge Domenico's actual bias as part of the Verified Complaint and Jury Demand in *Gregory*, Judge Domenico again accepted assignment of the case and refused to voluntarily recuse himself. *Gregory*, ECF No. 1, p. 6 fn. 3; ECF No. 6. Judge Domenico's refusal to disqualify himself has persisted despite Complainant moving to require Judge Domenico to state the grounds for his disqualification in writing, as required by D.C.Colo.LCivR 40.1(f) and Complainant filing a notice of supplemental grounds for Judge Domenico's disqualification. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 7 and 12.

Most recently, Complainant filed "Affidavit[s] of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate[s] of Counsel" into both Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*. Upon the filing of a timely and formally sufficient affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a judge's disqualification is immediate, mandatory, and automatic. 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides in relevant part:

> Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, ***such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.*** (Emphasis added).

[2] Complainant notes that the benchmark 60-day deadline for initial action on this complaint has passed. Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 238-39 (app. 3—Standard 1) (2006).

Notice of the filing of the Affidavits was provided to the 10th Circuit Executive through letters dated January 15, 2026 and January 20, 2026. Although both letters requested acknowledgement of receipt, such acknowledgment has not been provided. Presumably, copies of the notice letters have been provided to Chief District Judge Brimmer, Judge Domenico, and Chief Circuit Judge Holmes. The Affidavits set forth grounds for the temporary assignment of an alternate Chief Circuit Judge and an alternate Circuit Justice to facilitate the assignment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit to hear Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*. *Gregory*, ECF No. 26, p. 3 fn. 1; *see* 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), (d) (defining mechanisms/procedures for the assignment of conflict-free district judges from an outside district or, alternatively, an outside circuit).

Despite an unequivocal duty to disqualify himself from both Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*, Judge Domenico continues to sit in those cases, including issuing an order limiting public access to the Affidavit filed in *Gregory*. *Gregory*, ECF No. 28. Motions by the Defendants seeking to continue restricting public access to the Affidavit and to prospectively censor and restrict Complainant's future case filings in *Gregory* are now pending. ECF Nos. 29 and 30. Complainant is responding with a motion to strike the motions to restrict based upon the lack of good faith conferral under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a) and the Defendants' knowing facilitation of Judge Domenico's violation of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b). Copies of the Affidavits and the Motion to Strike in *Gregory* are provided with the present judicial misconduct complaint for the convenience of the Judicial Council. Complainant, however, understands that the Judicial Council has access to the complete court filings in both Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*.

Because Judge Domenico continues in his persistent refusal to disqualify himself as otherwise required by Canons 1, 2(A)-(B), and 3(A)(4), 3(B)(6), 3(C)-(D) of the federal Code, 28 U.S.C. § 144, and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b), Complainant's only legal recourse will be to petition the 10th Circuit for a writ of mandamus. It deserves to be noted that, in the seminal case on this issue, Chief Circuit Judge Holmes (in his then-role as an Assistant U.S. Attorney) opposed the ultimately ordered disqualification of the district judge according to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). *Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995).

Both District Judge Domenico and Chief Circuit Judge Holmes are overtly defying their mandatory disqualification obligations under Canon 3(C)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b). District Judge Domenico is further disregarding his mandatory and otherwise automatic disqualification obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 144. The Judges' refusal to disqualify themselves further involves a lack of candor and their shared refusal to fully disclose the existence and nature of their relationships with Defendants and material witnesses involved in the underlying cases, Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*.

"In the public interest," Chief Circuit Judge Holmes has the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) to reassign the underlying cases to a district judge from another district within the 10th Circuit. Judge Holmes refused to exercise this authority. Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 292(d), Chief Circuit Judge Holmes has discretion to submit a "certificate of necessity" to request that Chief Justice John Roberts reassign the underlying cases to a district judge from outside of the 10th Circuit. Judge Holmes, has likewise, refused to exercise this discretion and/or to disqualify himself from exercising his authority and discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), (d). For reasons that also remain unclear, Chief Circuit Judge Holmes and the 10th Circuit Judicial Council have

not requested that Chief Justice John Roberts transfer Judicial Complaint Nos. 10-25-90048 and 10-25-90070 to another judicial council as allowed under 10th Cir. JCR 26.

Chief Circuit Judge Holmes's and District Judge Domenico's persistent refusals to disqualify themselves meet the definition of "Cognizable Misconduct" as "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 10th Cir. JCR 4(a); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (defining "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" as threshold for judicial misconduct complaints). Specifically, the persistent refusals to disqualify 1) violate specific standards of judicial conduct, including: using the judge's office to obtain special treatment for friends and engaging in improper *ex parte* communications with parties or counsel for one side in a case, 2) are abusive and harassing behavior, specifically treating litigants, attorneys, and others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner, 3) are a form of retaliation against Complainant for engaging in the complaint process and reporting judicial misconduct, 4) are interference and/or a failure to comply with the complaint process, and 5) are a failure to report, disclose, or appropriately respond to reliable information of judicial misconduct. 10th Cir. JCR 4(a)(1)(A),(C), 4(a)(2)(B), 4(a)(4), 4(a)(5), 4(a)(6).

The fact that Chief Circuit Judge Holmes and District Judge Domenico have each failed to candidly disclose grounds for their respective disqualifications suggests their refusals to disqualify arose from improper motives, which is a proper non-merits-related basis for judicial discipline. *Compare* 10th Cir. JCR 4(b)(1) (recognizing refusals to disqualify ordinarily as merits-related determinations) *with* Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 222, 239-40 (app. 3) (2006).[3] Chief Circuit

[3] The 2006 report quotes Standard 2 of the Judicial Conference's Committee Standards:

Judge Holmes has himself drawn this distinction between merits and non-merits related disqualification decisions in his Memorandum & Order dismissing Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90049. District Judge Domenico's intentional disregard of his mandatory obligation to recuse himself following Complainant's submission of a timely and formally sufficient affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144 is a further basis to recognize that the cognizable misconduct alleged in this supplemental complaint is non-merits related and simply Judge Domenico's refusal to comply with the law.

Respectfully, Complainant has satisfied his initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred. *See* 10th Cir. JCR 11(1)(D) (recognizing Chief Circuit Judge's discretion to dismiss a complaint based upon allegations that lack "sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred"). It is appropriate for the 10th Circuit Judicial Council to request that Chief Justice John Roberts transfer the present complaint, as well as Judicial Complaint Nos. 10-25-90048 and 10-25-90070 to another judicial council as allowed under 10th Cir. JCR 26. *See also* Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 214-215 (2006) (providing recommendations for circumstances where a transfer to another judicial council is appropriate). Further consideration of these Complaints by the 10th Circuit Judicial Council will create appearances of impropriety in violation of Canons 1 and 2(A) of the federal Code.

> A mere allegation that a judge should have recused is merits-related; the proper recourse is for a party to file a motion to recuse. ***The very different allegation that the judge failed to recuse for illicit reasons—i.e., not that the judge erred in not recusing, but that the judge knew he should recuse but deliberately failed to do so for illicit purposes—is not merits-related.*** Such allegations are almost always dismissed for lack of factual substantiation. (Emphasis added).

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

February 2, 2026

Circuit Executive Leslee Fathallah
Office of the Circuit Executive
United States Courts for the Tenth Circuit
1823 Stout Street
Denver, Colorado 80257
Complaint of Misconduct

Dear Ms. Fathallah:

Enclosed please find a complaint of judicial misconduct as to 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jerome B. Holmes. I acknowledge that the 7-page length of the statement of facts exceeds the 5-page limit provided by 10th Cir. JCR 6.1. Nevertheless, I have provided a "concise statement that details the specific facts on which the claim of misconduct . . . is based." Accordingly, I respectfully request that you exercise your discretion to accept the statement as proposed. *Id.*

Thank you for your assistance in filing this complaint. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or if you need additional information.

Sincerely,

Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosure

AO 310 (Rev. 03/16)

Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit

COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY

To begin the complaint process, complete this form and prepare the brief statement of facts described in item 4 (below). The RULES FOR JUDICIAL-CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL-DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS, adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, contain information on what to include in a complaint (Rule 6), where to file a complaint (Rule 7), and other important matters. The Rules are available in federal court clerks' offices, on individual federal courts' websites, and on www.uscourts.gov.

Your complaint (this form and the statement of facts) should be typewritten and must be legible. For the number of copies to file, consult the local rules or clerk's office of the court in which your complaint is required to be filed. Enclose each copy of the complaint in an envelope marked "COMPLAINT OF MISCONDUCT" or "COMPLAINT OF DISABILITY" and submit it to the appropriate clerk of court. **Do not put the name of any judge on the envelope.**

1. Name of Complainant: Christopher S.P. Gregory

Contact Address: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman, #1822
Longmont, CO 80502

Daytime telephone: (970) 648-0642

2. Name(s) of Judge(s): Chief Judge Jerome A. Holmes

Court: 10th Circuit

3. Does this complaint concern the behavior of the judge(s) in a particular lawsuit or lawsuits?

☑ Yes ☐ No

If "yes," give the following information about each lawsuit:

Court: 10th Circuit

Case Number: Judicial Complaint Nos. 10-25-90048 and 10-25-90070

Docket number of any appeal to the ____ Circuit: ____

Are (were) you a party or lawyer in the lawsuit?

☑ Party ☑ Lawyer ☐ Neither

If you are (were) a party and have (had) a lawyer, give the lawyer's name, address, and telephone number:

AO 310 (Rev. 03/16)

Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit

COMPLAINT OF JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT OR DISABILITY

4. Brief Statement of Facts. Attach a brief statement of the specific facts on which the claim of judicial misconduct or disability is based. Include what happened, when and where it happened, and any information that would help an investigator check the facts. If the complaint alleges judicial disability, also include any additional facts that form the basis of that allegation.

5. Declaration and signature:

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made in this complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Signature: [signature] Date: 02/02/2026

Print Save As... Reset

Statement of Facts

10th Cir. JCR 11(c)(2) allows for the filing of subsequent additional judicial misconduct complaints which contain "material information not previously considered and [that do] not constitute harassment of the subject judge."

Following District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's adverse rulings in Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (Sealed), Complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint docketed as *Christopher Gregory v. District Judge Daniel Domenico*, Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90048. Upon receiving it on or about August 7, 2025, the 10th Circuit Executive distributed the judicial misconduct complaint to Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes, Chief District Judge Philip A. Brimmer, and District Judge Daniel Domenico. The judicial misconduct complaint alleges that Judge Domenico violated Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code) by knowingly withholding grounds for his mandatory disqualification, by failing to disqualify himself, and by abusing his judicial authority to achieve a case outcome favorable to personal "friends" that Judge Domenico had previously self-identified in another high-profile case. *See Bella Health and Wellness, et al. v. Phil Weiser, et al.*, 23-cv-00939-DDD-SKC (D. Colo.), ECF No. 51, pp. 5:25-7:1.

After filing the judicial misconduct complaint, Complainant filed a F.R.C.P. 59(e) motion in Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV to seek relief from Judge Domenico's adverse rulings and objectively demonstrable actual bias. Even though Complainant's judicial misconduct complaint against Judge Domenico asserted grounds for Chief Judge Holmes's disqualification from its consideration, Chief Judge Holmes refused to recuse himself or to address Complainant's concurrent request for referral of the judicial misconduct complaint to a different circuit's judicial council according to 10th Cir. JCR 26. Rather, Chief Judge Holmes proceeded to engage

in *ex parte* communications with Judge Domenico and to ultimately issue a September 22, 2025 "Memorandum & Order" dismissing the judicial misconduct complaint without addressing the merits of Complainant's allegations of Judge Domenico's misconduct. As later discovered in another "Memorandum & Order" (issued on September 11, 2025 in an unrelated judicial misconduct case—Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90049), Chief Circuit Judge Holmes's practice of resolving judicial misconduct complaints through undisclosed *ex parte* communications with the subject judge is itself part of a pattern of Judge Holmes repeatedly violating Canon 3(A)(4) of the federal Code.[1]

Complainant responded to Judge Holmes's Memorandum & Order by filing an attorney discipline complaint with the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado's Committee on Conduct and the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit on September 30, 2025. The attorney discipline complaint was filed against some of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and other involved attorneys admitted to practice before the U.S. District Court and/or the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. The District Court's Committee on Conduct has docketed the complaint as Case No. 25-cc-3, but neither the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals nor Chief Circuit Judge Holmes have acknowledged receiving the dually-filed complaint. After filing the attorney discipline complaint, Complainant brought a separate federal civil rights and Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA) retaliation action in the U.S. District Court. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-DDD (D. Colo.). Shortly after bringing *Gregory*, Complainant also filed a timely petition for review under 10th Cir. JCR 18(a).

[1] Judge Holmes's practice of dismissing judicial misconduct on the representations of the subject judge alone is also inconsistent with the Judicial Conference Committee's Standard 5, which provides, in part: "[A]n allegation is not 'conclusively refuted by objective evidence' simply because the judge complained against denies it." Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 243 (app. 3) (2006).

Concurrently, Complainant filed a judicial misconduct complaint against Chief Circuit Judge Holmes because of his refusal to disqualify himself from Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90048. *Christopher Gregory v. Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes*, Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90070.[2]

Despite Complainant specifically averring Judge Domenico's actual bias as part of the Verified Complaint and Jury Demand in *Gregory*, Judge Domenico again accepted assignment of the case and refused to voluntarily recuse himself. *Gregory*, ECF No. 1, p. 6 fn. 3; ECF No. 6. Judge Domenico's refusal to disqualify himself has persisted despite Complainant moving to require Judge Domenico to state the grounds for his disqualification in writing, as required by D.C.Colo.LCivR 40.1(f) and Complainant filing a notice of supplemental grounds for Judge Domenico's disqualification. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 7 and 12.

Most recently, Complainant filed "Affidavit[s] of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate[s] of Counsel" into both Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*. Upon the filing of a timely and formally sufficient affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a judge's disqualification is immediate, mandatory, and automatic. 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides in relevant part:

> Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, ***such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.*** (Emphasis added).

[2] Complainant notes that the benchmark 60-day deadline for initial action on this complaint has passed. Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 238-39 (app. 3—Standard 1) (2006).

Notice of the filing of the Affidavits was provided to the 10th Circuit Executive through letters dated January 15, 2026 and January 20, 2026. Although both letters requested acknowledgement of receipt, such acknowledgment has not been provided. Presumably, copies of the notice letters have been provided to Chief District Judge Brimmer, Judge Domenico, and Chief Circuit Judge Holmes. The Affidavits set forth grounds for the temporary assignment of an alternate Chief Circuit Judge and an alternate Circuit Justice to facilitate the assignment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit to hear Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*. *Gregory*, ECF No. 26, p. 3 fn. 1; *see* 28 U.S.C. § 292(b), (d) (defining mechanisms/procedures for the assignment of conflict-free district judges from an outside district or, alternatively, an outside circuit).

Despite an unequivocal duty to disqualify himself from both Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*, Judge Domenico continues to sit in those cases, including issuing an order limiting public access to the Affidavit filed in *Gregory*. *Gregory*, ECF No. 28. Motions by the Defendants seeking to continue restricting public access to the Affidavit and to prospectively censor and restrict Complainant's future case filings in *Gregory* are now pending. ECF Nos. 29 and 30. Complainant is responding with a motion to strike the motions to restrict based upon the lack of good faith conferral under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(a) and the Defendants' knowing facilitation of Judge Domenico's violation of 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b). Copies of the Affidavits and the Motion to Strike in *Gregory* are provided with the present judicial misconduct complaint for the convenience of the Judicial Council. Complainant, however, understands that the Judicial Council has access to the complete court filings in both Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*.

Because Judge Domenico continues in his persistent refusal to disqualify himself as otherwise required by Canons 1, 2(A)-(B), and 3(A)(4), 3(B)(6), 3(C)-(D) of the federal Code, 28 U.S.C. § 144, and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b), Complainant's only legal recourse will be to petition the 10th Circuit for a writ of mandamus. It deserves to be noted that, in the seminal case on this issue, Chief Circuit Judge Holmes (in his then-role as an Assistant U.S. Attorney) opposed the ultimately ordered disqualification of the district judge according to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). *Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995).

Both District Judge Domenico and Chief Circuit Judge Holmes are overtly defying their mandatory disqualification obligations under Canon 3(C)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b). District Judge Domenico is further disregarding his mandatory and otherwise automatic disqualification obligation under 28 U.S.C. § 144. The Judges' refusal to disqualify themselves further involves a lack of candor and their shared refusal to fully disclose the existence and nature of their relationships with Defendants and material witnesses involved in the underlying cases, Case No. 1:25-cv-00190-DDD-STV and *Gregory*.

"In the public interest," Chief Circuit Judge Holmes has the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a) to reassign the underlying cases to a district judge from another district within the 10th Circuit. Judge Holmes refused to exercise this authority. Moreover, under 28 U.S.C. § 292(d), Chief Circuit Judge Holmes has discretion to submit a "certificate of necessity" to request that Chief Justice John Roberts reassign the underlying cases to a district judge from outside of the 10th Circuit. Judge Holmes, has likewise, refused to exercise this discretion and/or to disqualify himself from exercising his authority and discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 292(a), (d). For reasons that also remain unclear, Chief Circuit Judge Holmes and the 10th Circuit Judicial Council have

not requested that Chief Justice John Roberts transfer Judicial Complaint Nos. 10-25-90048 and 10-25-90070 to another judicial council as allowed under 10th Cir. JCR 26.

Chief Circuit Judge Holmes's and District Judge Domenico's persistent refusals to disqualify themselves meet the definition of "Cognizable Misconduct" as "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts." 10th Cir. JCR 4(a); *see also* 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (defining "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" as threshold for judicial misconduct complaints). Specifically, the persistent refusals to disqualify 1) violate specific standards of judicial conduct, including: using the judge's office to obtain special treatment for friends and engaging in improper *ex parte* communications with parties or counsel for one side in a case, 2) are abusive and harassing behavior, specifically treating litigants, attorneys, and others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner, 3) are a form of retaliation against Complainant for engaging in the complaint process and reporting judicial misconduct, 4) are interference and/or a failure to comply with the complaint process, and 5) are a failure to report, disclose, or appropriately respond to reliable information of judicial misconduct. 10th Cir. JCR 4(a)(1)(A),(C), 4(a)(2)(B), 4(a)(4), 4(a)(5), 4(a)(6).

The fact that Chief Circuit Judge Holmes and District Judge Domenico have each failed to candidly disclose grounds for their respective disqualifications suggests their refusals to disqualify arose from improper motives, which is a proper non-merits-related basis for judicial discipline. *Compare* 10th Cir. JCR 4(b)(1) (recognizing refusals to disqualify ordinarily as merits-related determinations) *with* Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 222, 239-40 (app. 3) (2006).[3] Chief Circuit

[3] The 2006 report quotes Standard 2 of the Judicial Conference's Committee Standards:

Judge Holmes has himself drawn this distinction between merits and non-merits related disqualification decisions in his Memorandum & Order dismissing Judicial Complaint No. 10-25-90049. District Judge Domenico's intentional disregard of his mandatory obligation to recuse himself following Complainant's submission of a timely and formally sufficient affidavit under 28 U.S.C. § 144 is a further basis to recognize that the cognizable misconduct alleged in this supplemental complaint is non-merits related and simply Judge Domenico's refusal to comply with the law.

Respectfully, Complainant has satisfied his initial burden of presenting sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred. *See* 10th Cir. JCR 11(1)(D) (recognizing Chief Circuit Judge's discretion to dismiss a complaint based upon allegations that lack "sufficient evidence to raise an inference that misconduct has occurred"). It is appropriate for the 10th Circuit Judicial Council to request that Chief Justice John Roberts transfer the present complaint, as well as Judicial Complaint Nos. 10-25-90048 and 10-25-90070 to another judicial council as allowed under 10th Cir. JCR 26. *See also* Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 214-215 (2006) (providing recommendations for circumstances where a transfer to another judicial council is appropriate). Further consideration of these Complaints by the 10th Circuit Judicial Council will create appearances of impropriety in violation of Canons 1 and 2(A) of the federal Code.

> A mere allegation that a judge should have recused is merits-related; the proper recourse is for a party to file a motion to recuse. ***The very different allegation that the judge failed to recuse for illicit reasons—i.e., not that the judge erred in not recusing, but that the judge knew he should recuse but deliberately failed to do so for illicit purposes—is not merits-related.*** Such allegations are almost always dismissed for lack of factual substantiation. (Emphasis added).

EXHIBIT
6

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Daniel D. Domenico

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD-NRN

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, *et al.*,

Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR RECUSAL

Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory moves for my disqualification from hearing this case and for a written order stating the reasons for my recusal. Doc. 7; Doc. 26. Because Mr. Gregory's recent filings raise broad allegations that appear to encompass events that took place during my tenure as Colorado Solicitor General, I conclude that a reasonable person might question my impartiality should I preside over the case. I therefore recuse myself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

LEGAL STANDARDS

Under 28 U.S.C. § 144, a district judge must recuse if a party "makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge . . . has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party." "The simple filing of an affidavit," though, "does not automatically disqualify a judge." *United States v. Bray*, 546 F.2d 851, 857 (10th Cir. 1976). Upon the filing of a Section 144 affidavit, the judge must assess its procedural and legal sufficiency, taking as true the factual allegations therein. *Id.*; *Hinman v. Rogers*, 831 F.2d 937, 939 (10th

Cir. 1987). But "[t]he affidavit is strictly construed against the affiant, and there is a substantial burden on the moving party to demonstrate the judge is not impartial." *Hinman*, 831 F.2d at 939; *accord United States v. Burger*, 964 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1992); *In re McCarthey*, 368 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Section 144 does not place "a burden on the judge to prove that he is impartial."). "Conclusions, rumors, beliefs, and opinions are not sufficient to form a basis for disqualification." *Burger*, 964 F.2d at 1070 (citing *Hinman*, 831 F.2d at 939). "A judge should not recuse himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation." *Hinman*, 831 F.2d at 939.

The other recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, lacks the procedural hurdles of Section 144 and is also broader in scope. *Id.* Under Section 455, a federal judge similarly must "disqualify himself . . . [w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party," and he must also "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned," unless he makes "a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification" and the parties to the proceeding waive the disclosed ground for disqualification. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1), (e). This means that a judge must recuse (or secure a waiver) "when there is the appearance of bias, regardless of whether there is actual bias." *Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo.*, 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir. 2002). "The test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality." *Id.* Section 455, however, "is not intended to give litigants a veto power over sitting judges, or a vehicle for obtaining a judge of their choice." *United States v. Cooley*, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993). A judge "'must ask how the[] facts would appear to a well-informed, thoughtful and objective observer,' who is 'an average member of the public,' not a 'hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.'" *United States v. Wells*, 873

F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting *Mathis v. Huff & Puff Trucking, Inc.*, 787 F.3d 1297, 1310 (10th Cir. 2015)). The statute "must not be so broadly construed that . . . recusal is mandated upon the merest unsubstantiated suggestion of personal bias or prejudice." *Cooley*, 1 F.3d at 993.

Courts have identified a number of factors that *do not* merit recusal under Section 144 or Section 455. *Id.*; *see also Estate of Bishop v. Equinox Int'l Corp.*, 256 F.3d 1050, 1058 (10th Cir. 2001). Such factors include "[r]umor, speculation, beliefs, conclusions, innuendo, suspicion, opinion, and similar non-factual matters"; "prior rulings in the proceeding, or another proceeding, solely because they were adverse" to the party seeking recusal; and "mere familiarity" with a party. *Cooley*, 1 F.3d at 993-94; *accord Bishop*, 256 F.3d at 1058. And a judge has "as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require." *Bryce*, 289 F.3d at 659 (quoting *Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347, 351 (10th Cir. 1995)) (Section 455); *accord Burger*, 964 F.2d at 1070 (Section 144).

DISCUSSION

After I dismissed Mr. Gregory's claims in a related sealed case, Mr. Gregory moved to vacate the judgment, arguing that my order dismissing his claims is invalid because I was required to recuse from that case. Mr. Gregory subsequently initiated this action, in which he reasserts some of the claims that were dismissed in the related case. *See* Doc. 1. He has filed Section 144 affidavits in both cases seeking my recusal on the same grounds. *See* Doc. 26; *see also* Doc. 1 at 6 n.1; Doc. 7; Doc. 12. As my colleague Judge Kane explained in a similar context, "I have strived in my review of [Mr. Gregory's] filing[s] to reflect thoughtfully and thoroughly on the assertions made, but cannot agree I have demonstrated, or that I hold, a . . . personal bias." *In re Maynard*, No. 09-

cv-2052-JLK-MEH, 2011 WL 1532049, at *1 (D. Colo. Apr. 21, 2011).[1] But as explained further below, some of the allegations Mr. Gregory raises in his recent filings may cause a reasonable person to question my impartiality in this case. I will therefore recuse myself.

I have worked in a variety of roles in the course of my legal career: in private practice, as a law clerk at the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the U.S. Department of the Interior, as the Colorado Solicitor General for nine years, as an adjunct law professor at the University of Colorado and the University of Denver, and in my current role as a U.S. District Judge for over six years. During that time, I have become familiar with many individuals, some of whom are or were, *inter alia*: employees of the Colorado Attorney General's Office; employees of the Colorado Judicial Department; justices, judges, and magistrate judges of the Colorado and federal courts; Colorado district attorneys; U.S. Attorneys and Assistant U.S. Attorneys; and members of committees or panels that serve the Colorado and federal courts. Given the breadth of the allegations Mr. Gregory is making here, it is not surprising that some such individuals are defendants in this case (*e.g.*, Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Monica Marquez and Attorney General Philip J. Weiser) or are persons Mr. Gregrory says have some other connection to the case (*e.g.*, former District Attorney Beth McCann, District Attorney Michael Dougherty, and Colorado Court of Appeals Judge Grant Sullivan).

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[1] I note that three of the District's seven active district judges and two of its seven full-time magistrate judges recused from the related case, and one senior judge exercised his prerogative to have the case redrawn, before it was randomly reassigned to me. One of the same active district judges recused from this case before it was randomly reassigned to me. Docs. 5, 6. Mr. Gregory appears to suggest that due to the nature of his claims, no Article III judge in this District is qualified to hear the case. *See* Doc. 26 at 3 n.1, 36. But where "allegations of bias are omnipresent, they cannot by themselves dissuade a judge from his duty to sit, lest no judge be able to sit at all." *Maynard*, 2011 WL 1532049, at *1.

See Doc. 26 at 7-9 & n.4, 24-25, 30-34; Doc. 12. Mr. Gregory contends that the mere existence of relationships between me and these individuals gives rise to both actual bias against him and in favor of those individuals, and a basis on which my impartiality in this case might reasonably be questioned.[2] Mr. Gregory is mistaken on this point.

While I worked with, against, and in front of a number of the individuals highlighted by Mr. Gregory, and consider some of them friends, none of the relationships in question is a close personal relationship. These relationships are, at most, professional friendships involving individuals I have worked with during my legal career; many are no more than acquaintanceships. Mr. Gregory's assertion that they are more than that is no more than unsupported speculation and suspicion.[3] *See* Doc. 26 at 30-31 (relying on "inferences drawn" and "presumed close relationships" that "[p]resumably . . . have crossed over to [my] current work"). As far as I recall, I have not worked with any of the individuals

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[2] I note that Mr. Gregory filed a judicial misconduct complaint with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit alleging that I violated the Code of Conduct for United States Judges by failing to recuse from the related case or to disclose the relationships in question to the parties in that case. Doc. 26-1. Mr. Gregory's complaint was dismissed on September 22, 2025. Doc. 26-3; *see also* Doc. 26-4 (petitioning for review of dismissal). The fact that he filed a misconduct complaint does not require my recusal from this case. *Smith v. Kan. Dep't of Corr.*, 455 F. App'x 841, 844 (10th Cir. 2011) (judge need not recuse based on current or previous misconduct complaint filed by litigant (citing *In re Mann*, 229 F.3d 657, 658-59 (7th Cir. 2000))).

[3] Mr. Gregory seizes on a statement I made in my order dismissing his claims in the related case that he contends is an "express admission of actual bias." Doc. 26 at 7-8. He argues that my prior statement "cannot be discounted as merely a scrivener's or grammatical error," but in fact it is exactly that: my statement that "I am personally familiar with some of the Defendants named in this case," but "these relationships are not sufficient to render me impartial in this matter" should state that "these relationships are not sufficient to render me partial" or "these relationships do not render me partial" in the matter.

in question or had any other social interaction with any of them since before I became a judge over six years ago, aside from occasionally encountering one of them at a professional event such as an Inn of Court meeting, another judge's investiture ceremony, a law-clerk reunion, or the like. "Friendship with an individual involved in a case alone is not enough to mandate recusal." *Scott v. County of Dona Ana*, No. CIV 09-00797-JB/GBW, 2011 WL 13284755, at *8 to *9 (D.N.M. Sept. 11, 2011) (R. & R.) (where judge considered defendant a friend but they had not "socialize[d] beyond conversing when they happen to see each other" since judge's appointment to the bench, plaintiff's assertions did not establish reasonable basis for questioning judge's impartiality (citing *Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Columbia*, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Mem. of Scalia, J., denying recusal); *Cooley*, 1 F.3d 985)), *adopted in relevant part*, 2012 WL 1132464 (D.N.M. Mar. 28, 2012), *aff'd*, 516 F. App'x 718 (10th Cir. 2013); *see also Maynard*, 2011 WL 1532049, at *4 ("The assertion that my attendance at public events and 'rubbing shoulders' with a limited number of public officials, judges, and attorneys whom [the plaintiff] contends have opposed her or have acted in concert to retaliate against her demonstrates neither actual bias nor reasonable appearance of bias, is wholly conclusory and speculative, and does not warrant my recusal.").

During my six-plus years on the bench, I have presided over multiple cases involving Mr. Weiser, Ms. McCann, Mr. Dougherty, Mr. Sullivan,[4]

[4] Mr. Gregory has pointed to statements I made at a hearing in another case, contending that I stated an actual bias favorable to Mr. Weiser, Ms. McCann, Mr. Dougherty, and Mr. Sullivan. *See* Doc. 26 at 8-9. This is not accurate. In the statements Mr. Gregory points to, I in fact stated the opposite: "I don't believe [these relationships] warrant a recusal," and "I think probably recusal would be inappropriate." Tr. of Prelim. Inj. Hr'g at 5-7, *Bella Health & Wellness v. Weiser*, No. 1:23-cv-00939-DDD-SBP (D. Colo. Apr. 24, 2023), ECF No. 51.

and other individuals with whom I have similar professional relationships. My pre-judicial career is of a public nature, making it unsurprising that I have prior professional relationships with various current or former employees of the Colorado Attorney General's Office and members of the Colorado Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Nor is it surprising that in my current role I have developed professional relationships with members of this Court. No party in any other case, aside from Mr. Gregory in the related case,[5] has ever suggested that I should, let alone must, recuse myself because of one of those relationships,[6] and I am confident that reasonable parties, counsel, and members of the public understand that my decisions in such cases are not influenced by such relationships. *See Bryce*, 289 F.3d at 659 ("The test is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality.").

My professional relationships with the individuals in question do not give rise to any personal bias or prejudice on my part, nor are they the

---

[5] Concurrently with this Order, for the same reasons discussed here, I am recusing from the related case, though I note that at the time I dismissed Mr. Gregory's claims in that case, the facts and allegations in the record did not require my recusal. I also note that, in light of the Notice of Related Cases filed by Mr. Gregory, Doc. 1-12, the judge to whom this case is randomly reassigned may wish to confer with the judge to whom the related case is randomly reassigned to determine whether both cases should be assigned to the same judicial officers pursuant to Local Civil Rules 3.2(d) and 40.1.

[6] One litigant has requested my recusal based merely on my prior service as Solicitor General and not on any specific personal relationship arising from that service; I denied that recusal request. *See Villecco v. Barela* No. 1:21-cv-02176-DDD-STV, 2022 WL 4349339, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 18, 2022); *Villecco v. Barela*, No. 1:22-cv-02403-DDD-STV, 2023 WL 11959305, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 17, 2023); *Villecco v. Barela*, Nos. 1:21-cv-02176-DDD-STV, 1:22-cv-02403-DDD-STV, 1:23-cv-01265-DDD-STV, 1:23-cv-02029-DDD-STV, 2023 WL 8642120, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 6, 2023).

sort of relationships that would cause a reasonable person to question my impartiality simply because those individuals are parties, attorneys, or witnesses in a case. And other than the fact that I developed some of the professional relationships in question while serving as Solicitor General, Mr. Gregory's claims, as asserted on the face of his complaint, do not appear to have any connection to that prior service. The allegations in Mr. Gregory's complaint stem from what he calls the "Masias Controversy," which began in mid to late 2018, Doc. 1 at 19-20, and subsequent events. *See id.* at 2-5, 7, 19-33 (alleging, *e.g.*, that "[a]t the core of the [Colorado Supreme Court] Justices' misconduct was a prolonged scheme to knowingly conceal material information of a $2.66-2.75 million bribe/public fraud involving . . . Mindy Masias," and that justices, employees of the Colorado Judicial Department, and Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser concealed the "Masias Contract" and "Masias Memo" from the Colorado Office of the State Auditor and Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, of which Mr. Gregory was a member between May 2017 and January 2024). These allegations thus concern events that began well after my tenure as Solicitor General ended in 2015. I have no independent knowledge of the events alleged in the complaint arising from my prior service as Solicitor General or from anything else.

Mr. Gregory's subsequent filings, however, expand substantially on the allegations in his complaint. His Section 144 affidavit contains wide-ranging allegations of "a 25-year sustained pattern of [misconduct by] the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court," Doc. 26 at 9, which period would necessarily encompass the time during which I served as Solicitor General. It also appears from his affidavit and other recent filings that he may be alleging misconduct by members of the Colorado Judicial Department or the Attorney General's Office that took place during that time. He now alleges, for example, that "a primary motive for the . . .

bribe referred to as the Masias Contract was to conceal material evidence that one or more justices of the Colorado Supreme Court had obstructed the law enforcement investigation" of Denver District Court Judge Larry Manzanares in 2007. Doc. 12 at 1-2. I do not recall having any personal involvement with the Manzanares case, nor do I recall any personal knowledge of or involvement with any other events alluded to in Mr. Gregory's recent filings that took place while I was Solicitor General. And it is somewhat unclear how events that predate the Masias Controversy tie in to the claims asserted in Mr. Gregory's complaint. I therefore do not believe Mr. Gregory's allegations create any actual bias or need for recusal under Section 144 or Section 455(b)(1). But because it appears that Mr. Gregory's allegations include events that took place within the Attorney General's Office while I was a senior member of that office, there is some risk that a reasonable person might question my impartiality in this case. Out of an abundance of caution, therefore, I conclude that I must recuse myself pursuant to Section 455(a).[7] *See Bryce*, 289 F.3d at 659 ("If the issue . . . is a close one, the judge must be recused.").

CONCLUSION

It is **ORDERED** that Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory's Motion for Specific Statement of Grounds for Recusal According to Local Civil Rule 40.1(f), **Doc. 7**, and request for my recusal in his Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144, **Doc. 26**, are

[7] I also note that, unlike the prior professional relationships with various individuals in the legal community discussed above, which nearly any judge is likely to have, this potential for the appearance of partiality is unique to my situation.

GRANTED, and the Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to reassign this case to another judge.

DATED: February 3, 2026

BY THE COURT:

Daniel D. Domenico
United States District Judge

EXHIBIT 7

Phil Weiser
Colorado Attorney General

YOU'VE SUCCESSFULLY SUBMITTED COMPLAINT #C-000055316.

PRINT OR DOWNLOAD THIS SCREEN FOR YOUR RECORDS.

ABOUT YOU (COMPLAINANT INFORMATION)

YOUR NAME: Christopher Gregory
YOUR ADDRESS: 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont CO 80502
YOUR EMAIL: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
YOUR PHONE NUMBER: 9706480642

ABOUT THE COMPLAINT

COMPLAINT CATEGORY: Governmental Authority (Police and Other Government Agencies)
DATE OF INCIDENT: January 1, 2001
LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Statewide with most incidents occurring in Denver at the Ralph L. Carr Judicial Center and the Colorado Supreme Court venues that preceded it.
ADDRESS OF INCIDENT:
MATTER REPORTED TO ANOTHER AGENCY: Yes
REPORTED TO: The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
OUTCOME OR RELATED GUIDANCE: There is a pending civil case--Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al., 1:25-cv-03361--DDD (D. Colo.)
OTHER KNOWN INCIDENTS: Yes
The long history of incidents is detailed in the pending civil action, in which Attorney General Philip Weiser and the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court are named Defendants in both their official and individual capacities.

ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT ACTOR

AGENCY:THE COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE / THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT / THE COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE / THE COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE
TYPE OF AGENCY: Judicial branch
OTHER AGENCY TYPE:
CITY OF AGENCY: Denver
COUNTY OF AGENCY: Denver

COMPLAINT NARRATIVE

The pending lawsuit details a more than 25-year pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court conspiring with others to misuse public funds as hush money (NDAs), for self-controlled investigations, and for public relations schemes intended to cover up judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. The pattern and practice continues to wrongfully cost taxpayers tens of millions of dollars.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I HEREBY CERTIFY I AM THE ABOVE LISTED INDIVIDUAL AND I HAVE REVIEWED THE PRECEDING INFORMATION AND IT IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE. I ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE COLORADO

ATTORNEY GENERAL MAY SHARE MY COMPLAINT WITH OTHERS, INCLUDING THE ABOVE LISTED BUSINESS AND/OR ITS AGENTS AND SEEK A RESPONSE FROM THE BUSINESS REGARDING MY COMPLAINT. I AUTHORIZE THE BUSINESS AND ITS AGENTS TO DISCUSS THE DETAILS OF MY COMPLAINT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COLORADO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE.

Created By: Christopher Gregory
Created On: 1/21/2026, 6:17 PM
Submitted via: complaints.coag.gov
Reference: C-000055316

Thank you for contacting the Office of the Attorney General with your report about a government actor that deprived someone of his or her legal rights.

What Can I Expect to Happen Next?

The Colorado Attorney General may open a civil investigation when a governmental authority may have a pattern and practice of depriving persons of their legal rights. Pattern-and-practice cases address widespread misconduct by government entities, not isolated instances.

As a result, we will review the information contained in your report as part of our work to collect data and identify patterns or practices of unlawful conduct. We cannot respond to every report we receive. If we need further information about your complaint, we will contact you.

What If I Need Help with My Individual Case?

The Attorney General's Office does not have the legal authority to investigate or prosecute your individual case. If you seek a criminal or civil investigation or another remedy for your case on an individual basis, please contact your local law enforcement agency, district attorney's office, the United States Department of Justice, or a private attorney. The Colorado Bar Association provides assistance to people who are seeking attorneys at this website: https://www.cobar.org/Licensed-Lawyer (https://www.cobar.org/Licensed-Lawyer).

We appreciate the time and effort you took in bringing your concerns to our attention. Information from the public is vital in helping us document trends and, when appropriate, pursue investigations and file lawsuits on behalf of the public.

Office of the Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Building
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
(720) 508-6000
(tel:+17205086000)

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EXHIBIT 8

Phil Weiser
Colorado Attorney General

YOU'VE SUCCESSFULLY SUBMITTED COMPLAINT #C-000055313.

PRINT OR DOWNLOAD THIS SCREEN FOR YOUR RECORDS.

ABOUT YOU (COMPLAINANT INFORMATION)

YOUR NAME: Christopher Gregory
YOUR ADDRESS: 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont CO 80502
YOUR EMAIL: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
YOUR PHONE NUMBER: 9706480642

ABOUT THE COMPLAINT

COMPLAINT CATEGORY: Federal Agency (Police and Other Government Agencies)
DATE OF INCIDENT: January 14, 2026
LOCATION OF INCIDENT: Public (i.e., polling place, courthouse, street, etc.)
ADDRESS OF INCIDENT:
MATTER REPORTED TO ANOTHER AGENCY: Yes
REPORTED TO: The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
OUTCOME OR RELATED GUIDANCE: The misconduct remains ongoing.
OTHER KNOWN INCIDENTS:

ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT ACTOR

AGENCY:U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
TYPE OF AGENCY: Federal Agency
OTHER AGENCY TYPE: No other law enforcement
CITY OF AGENCY: Denver
COUNTY OF AGENCY: Denver

COMPLAINT NARRATIVE

PHYSICALLY PRESENT DURING THE INCIDENT?: No
OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT PRESENT OR INVOLVED?: No
I have filed affidavits under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 that require the disqualification of U.S. District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico from cases assigned to him due to personal bias and/or prejudice. The affidavits require automatic disqualification under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 and prohibits the judge subject to disqualification from taking further action. Judge Domenico, however, continues to preside over the cases and to issue order(s). The two cases are Case No. 1:25-cv-00190--DDD-STV (D. Colo.) (sealed) and Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., 1:25-cv-03361--DDD. Attorney General Phil Weiser is a defendant in Gregory, named in both his official and individual capacities. Despite the inherent conflicts of interest involved, the Colorado Attorney General's Office is representing Weiser and all of the other Defendants in Gregory. The Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 (ECF No. 26) is a temporarily restricted filing, but already in the possession/actual knowledge of the Colorado Attorney General's Office. The attorneys involved and the Defendants they represent are facilitating Judge Domenico's judicial misconduct by allowing him to remain assigned to Gregory despite indisputable evidence of his actual bias.

I hereby certify I am the above listed individual and I have reviewed the preceding information and it is true to the best of my knowledge.

Created By: Christopher Gregory
Created On: 1/21/2026, 5:41 PM
Submitted via: complaints.coag.gov
Reference: C-000055313

Office of the Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Ralph L. Carr Judicial Building
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
(720) 508-6000
(tel:+17205086000)

Contact the Office of the Attorney General

CONTACT (https://complaints.coag.gov/s/contact-us)

ACCESSIBILITY STATEMENT (https://coag.gov/colorado-office-of-the-attorney-general-accessibility-statement/)

DECLARACION DE ACCESIBILIDAD (https://coag.gov/declaracion-de-accesibilidad/)

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(https://www.instagram.com/coag_philweiser/)
(https://www.youtube.com/@coloag)
(https://bsky.app/profile/coattnygeneral.bsky.so

CORA (https://coag.gov/media-center/colorado-open-records-act-cora/) | WEBSITE PRIVACY POLICY (https://coag.gov/website-privacy-policy/)
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Senate Ethics Complaint
Exhibit 2

Proffer of oral testimony of Christopher Gregory to be read into the record of the Senate Judiciary Committee's February 9, 2026 hearing on the confirmation of former Senator Robert Gardner to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon committee members. I am Chirstopher Gregory. I testify in my individual capacity as a former member, Vice-Chair, Chair, and Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (or the CCJD). I was retaliated against and fired as Executive Director because of my refusal to participate in a conspiracy to cover up a more than 25-year pattern of ongoing public fraud and public corruption orchestrated by the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court. Despite my efforts to publicly expose this pattern, I have been deliberately disregarded and marginalized, including by this Committee. I testify today in opposition to former Senator Bob Gardner's appointment to the CCJD as an attorney member. I have further submitted extensive written materials explaining the reasons for my opposition to Senator Gardner's appointment. In addition to opposing Senator Gardner's appointment, I urge this Committee to do the right thing and give meaningful consideration to my request for a joint resolution referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and to direct Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her discretion to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General or SAAG capable of independently and impartially representing the objective interests of the State of Colorado.

When I last spoke with Senator Gardner on April 26, 2023, he described meeting with then-Chief Justice Brian Boatright. In the described meeting, Senator Gardner explained that he confronted Chief Justice Boatright with why Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates still had a job after her documented interference with and intimidation tactics against this Committee's former Chair, Senator Pete Lee, and against the attorney and judge members of the CCJD. Spurred on by inappropriate lobbying by the Justices' legislative liaison, Terry Scanlon, Senator Gardner immediately proceeded to block amendments to HCR23-1001 and HB23-1019 that would have stopped the Justices' from stacking the CCJD and the Rulemaking Committee with their cronies. The result was that the Justices, in coordination with Attorney General Phil Weiser and Governor Jared Polis, corrupted the CCJD and the rulemaking process with impunity.

In my last conversation with you, Chair Weissman, you explained that everyone had expected that the Justices would remove Commission Vice-Chair District Court Judge David Prince. When I raised the culture of indifference and enforced

silence found in the Colorado Judiciary to this Committee on April 28, 2025, however, you ignored me and voted to confirm Commission Chair Mindy Sooter and Vice Chair Jim Carpenter's reappointments. My question is simply why won't you and this Committee meaningfully consider my legitimate concerns?

Christopher Gregory

From: Christopher Gregory
Sent: ednesday, February 25, 2026 :02 PM
To: ames.coleman.senate@coleg.gov
Subject: upplement to enate Ethics Complaint Filed February 11, 2026
tt chments: 260225 C PG JRC tr upp Ethics Complaint re JC.pdf

Good e ening President Coleman,

Please accept the attached letter as a supplement to the ethics complaint that pre iously submitted to you on ebruary , . Additionally, please confirm receipt and pro ide an update as to the status of my complaint, as supplemented.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law
cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net

February 25, 2026

Senate President James R. Coleman
Colorado State Senate
200 E. Colfax Ave.
Denver, CO 80203
Via E-Mail: james.coleman.senate@coleg.gov

Re: Supplement to Ethical Complaint Against the Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee Brought According to Senate Rule 43; Exhibit 1

Dear President Coleman:

On February 11, 2026, I submitted an ethics complaint against all involved members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Inexplicably, your Office has not provided any acknowledgment of receiving my complaint. Since the submission of my complaint, however, there have been some material developments that should be considered as you proceed with the process defined and required by Senate Rule 43.

According to § 24-31-1204(1), C.R.S., Attorney General Phil Weiser is obligated to "diligently investigate" violations of the Colorado False Claims Act (the CFCA) regardless of whether allegations are brought by a direct complaint to the Attorney General's Office, through the Office of the State Auditor's (the OSA) Fraud Hotline, or through a *qui tam* action. The State Auditor similarly has authority and obligations to investigate alleged false claims independently, in conjunction with the Attorney General, or otherwise. § 24-31-1204(2), C.R.S. Under the Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S., the State Auditor is further tasked with investigating reports of "occupational fraud." Occupational fraud is defined as "the use of one's occupation for personal enrichment through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the employing organization's resources or assets." § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Although the State Auditor's investigations of false claims and Fraud Hotline complaints are ordinarily performed in conjunction with and through the support of the Attorney General's Office, § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. provides a mechanism through which the State Auditor can directly appoint a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) when there are conflicts of interest and the Attorney General's Office cannot perform such functions.

In addition to Attorney General Weiser's statutory obligations to investigate false claims and fraud, Attorney General Weiser is also obligated to investigate and civilly prosecute patterns of constitutional and civil rights violations within Colorado State Government. § 24-31-113, C.R.S.

Instead of performing his statutory and ethical obligations by stepping aside to allow the appointment of a SAAG by the State Auditor, Attorney General Weiser and his Office entered

their appearances to ***defend*** against the legitimate allegations of public fraud, retaliation, and civil rights violations pled in *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm.*, 1:25-cv-03361—GPG (D. Colo.). Attorney General Weiser's use of his own Office's resources to defend against civil claims brought against him and the other Defendants individually meets the definition of occupational fraud provided in § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Such conduct and the Defendants' (including Attorney General Weiser's) persistent refusals to disqualify themselves also satisfies the elements of First Degree Official Misconduct. § 18-8-404, C.R.S.[1]

Essentially, Attorney General Weiser's strategy has been to obstruct and prevent litigation of the merits of *Gregory*, including avoiding the Defendants' obligations to timely and directly respond to the allegations of their unlawful conduct pled in the Verified Complaint. This obstruction has now culminated in the entry of a default against all Defendants. Exhibit 1. Until and unless the default is set aside under F.R.C.P. 55(c), the allegations of the Verified Complaint are treated as admitted / proven. *See, e.g., Dickinson v. Lincoln Building Corp.*, 2015 COA 170M, ¶¶ 22-23 ("[A]n entry of default establishes a party's liability. . . An entry of default, however, is not an admission regarding damages."). Despite these significant developments in court, the Senate Judiciary Committee has refused to confront Attorney General Weiser, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, Governor Jared Polis, and the members and staff of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline with their persistent refusals to disqualify themselves and the allegations made against them personally. In other words, there is no legislative oversight of our State's highest-ranking elected officials.

With these additional facts, the Senate Judiciary Committee's refusal to allow me a full opportunity to petition for grievances, its deliberate disregard for the legislative record that I created (including as to SB26-084), and its refusal to consider my request for a joint resolution directing the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado perpetuates ongoing public fraud and civil rights violations rather than providing meaningful accountability. Again, I respectfully submit that the conduct of the Senate Judiciary Committee substantially breaches the ethical standards enforceable through Senate Rule 43. I renew my request that you take action on my February 11, 2026 complaint, as supplemented by this letter.

---

[1] § 18-8-404, C.R.S. provides:

> (1) A public servant commits first degree official misconduct if, with intent to obtain a benefit for the public servant or another or maliciously to cause harm to another, he or she knowingly:
> (a) Commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official function; or
> (b) Refrains from performing a duty imposed upon him by law; or
> (c) Violates any statute or lawfully adopted rule or regulation relating to his office.
> (2) First degree official misconduct is a class 1 misdemeanor.

According to § 18-1-901(3)(o), C.R.S., a "'Public servant' means any officer or employee of government, whether elected or appointed, and any person participating as an advisor, consultant, process server, or otherwise in performing a governmental function, but the term does not include witnesses."

Sincerely,



Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq.
Enclosure

EXHIBIT 1

Christopher Gregory

From: COD_ENotice@cod.uscourts.gov
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2026 3:50 PM
To: COD_ENotice@cod.uscourts.gov
Subject: Activity in Case 1:25-cv-03361-GPG Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The et al Clerk's Entry of Default

This is an automatic e-mail message generated by the CM/ECF system. Please DO NOT RESPOND to this e-mail because the mail box is unattended.
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U.S. District Court - District of Colorado

District of Colorado

Notice of Electronic Filing

The following transaction was entered on 2/23/2026 at 3:49 PM MST and filed on 2/23/2026

Case Name: Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The et al
Case Number: 1:25-cv-03361-GPG
Filer: Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The
Ingrid Barrier
David Beller
Maria Berkenkotter
Brian D. Boatright
Jill Brady
Gina Cannan
James Carpenter
Nancy Cohen
Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, The
Colorado Supreme Court, The
Meredith Patrick Cord
Richard Gabriel
Robert Gardner
Sara Garrido
Kirsten Grooms
Melissa Hart
James Hartmann
Amanda Hollander

William Hood III
Alison Kyles
Bryon Large
Anne Mangiardi
Monica Marquez
Bonnie McLean
Colleen McManamon
Kristen Mix
Emily Tofte Nestaval
Reed Owens
Jared Polis
Jared (I) Polis
Carlos Samour
Mary V. Sooter
Aubrey C. Sullivan
Courtney Sutton
Jeff Swanty
Stefanie Trujillo
MaryAnn Vielma
Vincente Vigil
Jeffrey M. Walsh
Philip (I) J. Weiser
Philip J. Weiser

Document Number: 46(No document attached)

Docket Text:

Clerk's ENTRY OF DEFAULT as to Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, The, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian D. Boatright, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, The, Colorado Supreme Court, The, Meredith Patrick Cord, Richard Gabriel, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, Melissa Hart, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, William Hood III, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Monica Marquez, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Reed Owens, Jared Polis, Jared (I) Polis, Carlos Samour, Mary V. Sooter, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Stefanie Trujillo, MaryAnn Vielma, Vincente Vigil, Jeffrey M. Walsh, Philip (I) J. Weiser, Philip J. Weiser, by Clerk. Text Only Entry (ccuen,)

1:25-cv-03361-GPG Notice has been electronically mailed to:

Ingrid J. DeFranco ingrid.defranco@gmail.com, defrancoi@yahoo.com

Daniel Mitchell Combs dan.combs@coag.gov, LaTasha.Carter@coag.gov, danmcombs@gmail.com, lindaruth.carter@coag.gov

Katharine J. Brown katharine.brown@coag.gov, carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov, felicia.rei@coag.gov

Christopher Sydney Philip Gregory cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net, cspgregory@hotmail.com

Clayton Jeffrey Ankney clayton.ankney@coag.gov, Denise.munger@coag.gov, LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov

1:25-cv-03361-GPG Notice has been mailed by the filer to:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-GPG

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

APPLICATION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT

To the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado:

As provided by Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory requests that this Court enter the default of the following Defendants for failure to plead or otherwise defend against this action in a timely manner:

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE,
The COLORADO COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE,
The COLORADO SUPREME COURT,
MARY V. SOOTER, individually,
PHILIP J. WEISER, individually, and in his official capacity as the Colorado Attorney General,
JARED POLIS, individually, and in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Colorado,
MARIA BERKENKOTTER, individually,
BRIAN D. BOATRIGHT, individually,
RICHARD GABRIEL, individually,
MELISSA HART, individually,
WILLIAM HOOD, III, individually,
MONICA MÁRQUEZ, individually,
CARLOS SAMOUR, individually,
INGRID BARRIER, individually,
DAVID BELLER, individually,

JILL BRADY, individually,
GINA CANNAN, individually,
JAMES CARPENTER, individually,
NANCY COHEN, individually,
ROBERT GARDNER, individually,
SARA GARRIDO, individually,
KIRSTEN GROOMS, individually,
JAMES HARTMANN, individually,
AMANDA HOLLANDER, individually,
ALISON KYLES, individually,
BRYON LARGE, individually,
ANNE MANGIARDI, individually,
BONNIE MCLEAN, individually,
COLLEEN MCMANAMON, individually,
KRISTEN MIX, individually,
REED OWENS, individually,
MEREDITH PATRICK CORD, individually,
AUBREY C. SULLIVAN, individually,
COURTNEY SUTTON, individually,
JEFF SWANTY, individually,
EMILY TOFTE NESTAVAL, individually,
STEFANIE TRUJILLO, individually,
MARYANN VIELMA, individually,
VINCENTE VIGIL, individually, and
JEFFREY M. WALSH, individually.

As evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court, the above-named Defendants the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Supreme Court, Jared Polis, Philip J. Weiser, and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline were served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 12, 2025 and November 17, 2025. ECF Nos. 13 through 17. The remaining Defendants executed Waiver(s) of Service on December 1, 2025 and filed December 12, 2025. ECF Nos. 23, 23-1 through 23-34.

Originally, the applicable time limits for the above-named Defendants to appear and otherwise respond to this action were December 3, 2025, December 8, 2025, and January 30, 2026. Through an unopposed motion and order, the applicable time limits were first extended to

February 2, 2026. ECF No. 21. Through a second unopposed motion (but without issuance of an order confirming it), the applicable time limits were then extended to February 16, 2026, which has now expired. ECF No. 27.

The above-named Defendants have individually and collectively failed to plead or otherwise respond to the Verified Complaint and Jury Demand filed October 23, 2025. Accordingly, the Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Clerk of Court perform his mandatory and ministerial function in entering the default. F.R.C.P. 55(a).

This request is supported by the attached Declaration of Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory.

Dated: February 18, 2026

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq.
Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601
Telephone: (303) 641-6812
Email: Ingrid.DeFranco@gmail.com
Attorney for Plaintiff Christopher S.P. Gregory

/s/ Christopher S.P. Gregory
Christopher S.P. Gregory, Esq.
The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
201 Coffman St., #1822
Longmont, CO 80502
Telephone: (970) 648-0642
E-mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net
Pro Se Attorney for Plaintiff
Christopher S.P. Gregory

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on February 18, 2026, I filed the above filing via email to the Clerk of the Court, who will docket it in CM/ECF. CM/ECF will send notification of this filing to any party who has entered an appearance in this matter to the e-mail addresses provided in CM/ECF.

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-GPG

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY

Christopher S.P. Gregory, Colorado Atty. Reg. No. 37095 / U.S. Dist. Ct. Colo. Atty. No. 2136213, ("Declarant") being of lawful age, of sound mind, and first dually sworn upon oath, deposes and says the following:

1. Declarant is the Plaintiff in this action and this Declaration is based upon Declarant's personal knowledge and made in good faith.
2. Defendants the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, the Colorado Supreme Court, Colorado Governor Jared Polis, and Colorado Attorney Philip J. Weiser were served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 12, 2025, as evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court. ECF Nos. 13 through 16.
3. Defendant the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline was, likewise, served pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on November 17, 2025, as evidenced by the proof of service on file with this Court. ECF No. 17.

4. The remaining Defendants Mary V. Sooter, Maria Berkenkotter, Brian D. Boatright, Richard Gabriel, Melissa Hart, William Hood, III, Monica Márquez, Carlos Samour, Ingrid Barrier, David Beller, Jill Brady, Gina Cannan, James Carpenter, Nancy Cohen, Robert Gardner, Sara Garrido, Kirsten Grooms, James Hartmann, Amanda Hollander, Alison Kyles, Bryon Large, Anne Mangiardi, Bonnie McLean, Colleen McManamon, Kristen Mix, Reed Owens, Meredith Patrick Cord, Aubrey C. Sullivan, Courtney Sutton, Jeff Swanty, Emily Tofte Nestaval, Stefanie Trujillo, MaryAnn Vielma, Vincente Vigil, and Jeffrey M. Walsh executed waivers of service on December 1, 2025 that were filed with this Court on December 12, 2025.
5. The Defendants have collectively failed to serve or file a pleading or otherwise respond to the complaint. The applicable time limit for responding to the complaint, even as repeatedly extended upon agreement of the parties, has expired.
6. None of the Defendants are minors or incompetent persons.
7. None of the Defendants are currently in the military service, and therefore the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply.
8. I have attached to this declaration true and correct copies of the proofs and waivers of service on file for the above-named Defendants.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made in this Declaration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on February 18, 2026, in Longmont, Colorado.

Christopher S.P. Gregory

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Hannah S. (Front Desk Receptionist), who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

No last name provided.

STATE OF COLORADO
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF LAW
1300 BROADWAY, 10TH FLOOR
DENVER COLORADO 80203
(720)508-6000
AG@COAG.GOV
WWW.COAG.GOV

Hannah S.
FRONT DESK RECEPTIONIST

RECEIVED
NOV 12 2025
1:19 pm
Office of the Attorney General

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* The Colorado Supreme Court was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Magdalene (Judicial Clerk III) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* The Colorado Supreme Court on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

Magdalene refused to provide last name.

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* Colorado Governor Jared Polis was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____, and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Tyler Goldstein (Staff Assistant), who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* Colorado Governor Jared Polis on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH

Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator

Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633

Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* The Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Judge Bryon M. Large , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* The Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee on *(date)* 11/12/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/12/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH
Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator
Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

Judge Large stated that he wasn't sure he was authorized to accept service for the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee but did accept service.

AO 440 (Rev. 06/12) Summons in a Civil Action (Page 2)

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

PROOF OF SERVICE

(This section should not be filed with the court unless required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (l))

This summons for *(name of individual and title, if any)* The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline was received by me on *(date)* 11/12/2025 .

❒ I personally served the summons on the individual at *(place)* _____ on *(date)* _____ ; or

❒ I left the summons at the individual's residence or usual place of abode with *(name)* _____, a person of suitable age and discretion who resides there, on *(date)* _____ , and mailed a copy to the individual's last known address; or

☑ I served the summons on *(name of individual)* Scott Sosebee (Court Executive) , who is designated by law to accept service of process on behalf of *(name of organization)* Judge Jill Brady Member of CCJD The Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline on *(date)* 11/17/2025 ; or

❒ I returned the summons unexecuted because _____ ; or

❒ Other *(specify):*

My fees are $ _____ for travel and $ _____ for services, for a total of $ 0.00 .

I declare under penalty of perjury that this information is true.

Date: 11/17/2025

CONNIE MAYHUGH

Server's signature

Connie Mayhugh, Investigator

Printed name and title

HSH Investigations, LLC
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633

Server's address

Additional information regarding attempted service, etc:

HSH INVESTIGATIONS

Connie Mayhugh
HSH **Investigations, LLC**
P.O. Box 337265
Greeley, CO 80633
Mobile: 970-580-0779

DATE: 11/19/25

MEMORANDUM

On November 12th, I, Investigator Connie Mayhugh, arrived at the Ralph Carr Colorado Judicial Center to serve a Summons and Complaint to the following parties:

- Colorado Attorney General Philip Weiser
- Justice Monica Marquez, Chief Justice, Colorado Supreme Court
- James Carpenter, Chair, Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline
- Kristen Mix, Chair, Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee

Upon arrival, I spoke with the receptionist, who contacted Hannah S.. Hannah S. confirmed she could only accept service for Philip Weiser, but could accept courtesy copies for others. No response was received from the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline.

At the Supreme Court office, the clerk, Magdalene, accepted service for Justice Monica Marquez but declined for others.

Efforts to serve the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline at their official office were not successful.

At the Governor's office, Tyler Goldstein, staff assistant, accepted service for Governor Jared Polis without issue.

Later, Hannah S. advised me to visit Suite 210, but again, no response was received. I then proceeded to the Office of the Presiding Disciplinary Judge, where I spoke with the receptionist. The receptionist consulted with Judge Bryon Large, who subsequently met with me in person. Judge Large clarified that he was not authorized to accept service on behalf of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, as he was not a member of the Commission. When asked about the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, Judge Large acknowledged his membership but expressed uncertainty regarding his authority to accept service for the Discipline Rulemaking Committee. After further discussion, Judge Large ultimately agreed to accept service for the Judicial Discipline

HSH INVESTIGATIONS

Rulemaking Committee, while reiterating his reservations about his authorization to do so. He refused to accept service on behalf of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline.

Upon returning to the reception area to inquire on whether Hannah was able to reach anyone with the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, she was in communication via phone with a female individual whose name was not provided. Hannah handed me the phone, and I spoke with this individual who identified herself as working within the Office of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline. She informed me that there was no one present in the office that day who could accept service but indicated that someone would be available the following day to accept service. I inquired if there was anyone available who could accept service on behalf of the Commission, explaining that I would not be able to return at a later time. The response was that there was no one present who was authorized to accept service.

On November 17th, I served Judge Jill Brady, a member of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline, at the El Paso County Court House. Scott Sosebee, Court Executive, accepted service on Judge Brady's behalf.

This report was provided by Connie Mayhugh, Investigator at HSH Investigations, and is a true and accurate representation of information gathered.

Signature: Connie Mayhugh Date: 11/19/25

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Ingrid Barrier
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

David Beller
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

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"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jill Brady
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Monica M. Márquez
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Gina Cannan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Carpenter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Nancy Cohen
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Robert Gardner
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Sara Garrido
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kirsten Grooms
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Hartmann
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Amanda Hollander
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Maria E. Berkenkotter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Brian D. Boatright
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Richard L. Gabriel
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Melissa Hart
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

William W. Hood, III
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Carlos A. Samour, Jr.
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Alison Kyles
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bryon Large
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Anne Mangiardi
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bonnie McLean
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Colleen McManamon
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kristen Mix
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Reed Owens
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Meredith Patrick Cord
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mary V. Sooter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Aubrey C. Sullivan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Courtney Sutton
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeff Swanty
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Stefanie Trujillo
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mariana Vielma
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Vincente Vigil
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeffrey M. Walsh
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Emily Tofte Nestaval
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

David Beller
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jill Brady
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Monica M. Márquez
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Gina Cannan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Carpenter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Nancy Cohen
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
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(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Robert Gardner
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Sara Garrido
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kirsten Grooms
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

James Hartmann
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Amanda Hollander
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Maria E. Berkenkotter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Brian D. Boatright
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Richard L. Gabriel
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Melissa Hart
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

William W. Hood, III
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

Christopher S.P. Gregory
Plaintiff

v.

Colorado Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Committee, et al.
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from Dec. 1, 2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: Dec. 1, 2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Carlos A. Samour, Jr.
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway, 10th Floor
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

720-508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Alison Kyles
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bryon Large
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Anne Mangiardi
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
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Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Bonnie McLean
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Colleen McManamon
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Kristen Mix
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Reed Owens
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
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Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
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Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Meredith Patrick Cord
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mary V. Sooter
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Aubrey C. Sullivan
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Courtney Sutton
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
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Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeff Swanty
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Stefanie Trujillo
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Mariana Vielma
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Vincente Vigil
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Jeffrey M. Walsh
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.

AO 399 (01/09) Waiver of the Service of Summons

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

District of Colorado

CHRISTOPER S.P. GREGORY
Plaintiff

v.

COLO. JUD. DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMM. et al
Defendant

Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-DDD

WAIVER OF THE SERVICE OF SUMMONS

To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
(Name of the plaintiff's attorney or unrepresented plaintiff)

I have received your request to waive service of a summons in this action along with a copy of the complaint, two copies of this waiver form, and a prepaid means of returning one signed copy of the form to you.

I, or the entity I represent, agree to save the expense of serving a summons and complaint in this case.

I understand that I, or the entity I represent, will keep all defenses or objections to the lawsuit, the court's jurisdiction, and the venue of the action, but that I waive any objections to the absence of a summons or of service.

I also understand that I, or the entity I represent, must file and serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 within 60 days from 12/01/2025, the date when this request was sent (or 90 days if it was sent outside the United States). If I fail to do so, a default judgment will be entered against me or the entity I represent.

Date: 12/01/2025

/s/ Daniel M. Combs
Signature of the attorney or unrepresented party

Emily Tofte Nestaval
Printed name of party waiving service of summons

Daniel M. Combs, First Assistant Attorney General
Printed name

Colorado Attorney General's Office
1300 Broadway
Denver, CO 80203
Address

Dan.Combs@coag.gov
E-mail address

(720) 508-6625
Telephone number

Duty to Avoid Unnecessary Expenses of Serving a Summons

Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires certain defendants to cooperate in saving unnecessary expenses of serving a summons and complaint. A defendant who is located in the United States and who fails to return a signed waiver of service requested by a plaintiff located in the United States will be required to pay the expenses of service, unless the defendant shows good cause for the failure.

"Good cause" does *not* include a belief that the lawsuit is groundless, or that it has been brought in an improper venue, or that the court has no jurisdiction over this matter or over the defendant or the defendant's property.

If the waiver is signed and returned, you can still make these and all other defenses and objections, but you cannot object to the absence of a summons or of service.

If you waive service, then you must, within the time specified on the waiver form, serve an answer or a motion under Rule 12 on the plaintiff and file a copy with the court. By signing and returning the waiver form, you are allowed more time to respond than if a summons had been served.



From: Christopher Gregory
To: Kate Shiroff
Subject: Disqualification of the Colorado Attorney General"s Office
Date: Tuesday, March 10, 2026 12:26:00 PM
Attachments: image001.png
image002.png
220614 OSA Testimony.pdf
Proposed Joint Resolution.pdf

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Good morning Ms. Shiroff,

As relevant to my pending Fraud Hotline complaints, a hearing on SB26-084 is scheduled for March 12, 2026 before the House State, Civic, Military, & Veterans Affairs Committee. If enacted, SB26-084 would effectively legitimize the conditions that allowed the statute of limitations to lapse as to the OSA's February 4, 2022 referral of the Masias Controversy to law enforcement. The statute of limitations expired because the Justices and Attorney General Phil Weiser were allowed to control the investigations into their own suspected misconduct and to withhold information (particularly the existence of the Masias Memo) from the OSA and the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (CCJD) based upon bogus claims of governmental privilege and confidentiality. The Justices and AG Weiser were also allowed to control what information was provided to law enforcement, including their application of redactions. The attached transcript from the Legislative Committee on Judicial Discipline's June 14, 2022 hearing illustrates the basis for my concerns about SB26-084.

One point that I don't think I have made clearly enough is that the retaliation that occurred against me meets all the elements of the crime of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant. This is the same crime that Tina Peters and former SD17 Senator Sonya Jaquez Lewis were convicted of and the excuse voiced by Governor Jared Polis for his recent overtures to commute Tina Peters's remaining prison sentence. Put bluntly, there is an incontrovertible basis to conclude that Polis has himself committed the crime of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant by retaliating against me in my former official capacities. The Tina Peters controversy is nothing more than a repeat of a politician ingratiating himself with the Trump Administration to trade integrity for political leverage. This is exactly what happened with the aborted prosecution of former NYC Mayor Eric Adams.

For reference, Attempt to Influence a Public Servant (§ 18-8-306, C.R.S.) provides, in relevant part:

> Any person who attempts to influence any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence ***or economic reprisal against any person or property***, with the intent thereby to alter or affect the public servant's decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by the public servant or the agency or body of which the public servant is a member, commits a class 4 felony. (Emphasis added).

Despite my having filed my Fraud Hotline complaints with an express request for the OSA to appoint conflict-free counsel and investigation support from outside of the Colorado Office of the Attorney General (COAG), it remains unclear if the OSA instead communicated the substance of my complaints and communications to the COAG, the CCJD, and/or the Colorado Supreme Court. I am particularly concerned about circumstantial evidence of such communications whereby I sent you / the OSA Fraud Hotline a copy of the 28 U.S.C Sec. 144 Affidavit that I filed in my federal case. Shortly afterwards, the COAG informally

communicated with U.S. District Judge Daniel D. Domenico (who ultimately recused himself as required by the Affidavit / 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144) to suppress public access to the Affidavit. In turn, the suppression of the contents of the Affidavit has allowed the Justices, AG Weiser, and the members/staff of the CCJD to conceal material information from the Colorado General Assembly as part of hearings held earlier this session. I maintain that the contents of the Affidavit are sufficient to require the immediate resignations and prosecution of the Justices and other involved public officials. It is also unclear why the OSA has not referred these facts (including my most recently filed Independent Ethics Commission complaints) to law enforcement with a request for the appointment of a special prosecutor.

I am in the process of drafting motion to disqualify the COAG from further representation of the Defendants (to all of whom a default has now entered). Consistent with what I have requested directly and through a judicial discipline complaint filed with the Denver Judicial Discipline Commission, I am asking the Colorado General Assembly to introduce and pass a joint resolution formally referring the Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and to direct State Auditor Kerri Hunter to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado. In this context, it is important that I understand what, if any, communications have occurred between the OSA and the COAG, the Justices, and/or the CCJD regarding my Fraud Hotline complaints. Even if you continue to assert that such communications are "confidential," please confirm whether they have occurred. I would also appreciate an explanation of the origin of SB26-084 and why it was proposed by the OSA through the Legislative Audit Committee despite its relevance to/potential impacts upon my pending Fraud Hotline complaints.

Ultimately, I am still not understanding why the OSA has not responded to my request for the appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG, with such an appointment being authorized by Sec. 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. Any clarification you can provide is greatly appreciated.

Thank you for your assistance with the investigation of my complaints and for providing some transparency as the Fraud Hotline process continues to move forward.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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From: Christopher Gregory
To: "Clayton Ankney"; "Ingrid J. DeFranco"
Cc: "Dan Combs (He/Him)"; "Carmen Van Pelt"; "Linda Ruth Carter"; "Katharine Brown"
Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default
Date: Wednesday, February 25, 2026 3:33:49 PM
Attachments: image001.png
image003.png

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Good afternoon Mr. Ankney,

We saw that you proceeded to file your motion to set aside the default without reference to my email from earlier this afternoon. As part of our intended response to your motion, we anticipate filing a separate and additional motion for your Office's disqualification from this matter. Please let us know if you would like to meet and confer any further on the issue of disqualification. Otherwise, we will proceed to file the motion once it is drafted with a general explanation of our efforts to confer and a statement that you oppose the relief requested.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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From: Christopher Gregory
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2026 2:03 PM
To: 'Clayton Ankney' <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>
Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default

Good afternoon Mr. Ankney:

Just so that we have a clear record, it is our position that the grounds you assert are not good cause sufficient to set aside the default under F.R.C.P. 55(c). We do believe, however, that the disqualification of your office to resolve the conflicted representation that caused the default is good cause. We remain willing to meet and confer as to an agreement to set aside on that basis. If you proceed with filing a motion to set aside the default, please make this point clear in your conferral statement.

Sincerely,



Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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From: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 25, 2026 1:45 PM
To: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>; Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>
Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default

Good afternoon, Counsel:

Based on the information you have shared previously, we do not agree there is a valid basis for the Colorado Department of Law to be disqualified from representing the Defendants. By statute, the Department of Law appears and defends actions in which the state and/or state agencies are defendants. 24-31-101(1)(b), C.R.S. 24-31-111(1), C.R.S. If you would like to provide more information on the bases for disqualification, we would be happy to review. Again, if you wish to discuss more via a phone or video call, we are willing to discuss further.

We also take your prior response as opposing a motion to set aside default, and we will file it shortly.

Clayton J. Ankney
Second Assistant Attorney General
Tort Litigation Unit
Colorado Department of Law
Phone: (720) 508-6604
Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2026 4:24 PM
To: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>

Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default

Dear Mr. Ankney,

It is difficult to understand what value a telephone conversation or virtual meeting would have, particularly if it is not recorded and transcribed.

We are happy to expound on the plethora of reasons that require your Office's disqualification from this case, particularly its representation of the institutional Defendants and more broadly the need for impartial representation of the interests of the State of Colorado. The fact that the Defendants alleged to have respectively engaged in public fraud, retaliation, and constitutional violations are able to use state resources to defend their personal conduct meets the definition of occupational fraud under the Fraud Hotline statute. Indeed, the problematic nature of the representation was predicted in the Verified Complaint and its request for restitution from the individual defendants who rely upon state resources to defend against the allegations of their ultimately proven personal misconduct.

It is also difficult to imagine how the individually named defendants all share unified interests capable of consolidated representation. For example, Senior Judge James Hartmann is no longer a member of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee, being replaced by Senior Judge Michael Berger (who incidentally was District Judge Claude Appel's attorney in the 2003 civil action against the FBI). Judge Hartmann can explain why he left the Committee with the grounds for doing so potentially being the basis to agree on dismissing him from this case.

As we have expressed in a previous conferral and also in our response to your motion, ECF No. 44, we are receptive to recognizing the disqualification of your Office and the appointment of impartial counsel to represent the interests of the State of Colorado as good cause to set aside the default. Short of this, we do not believe that your intentional disregard for the previously agreed answer deadline is good cause sufficient to merit setting aside the default.

Please let us know if you would like us to provide a more detailed explanation of the grounds we perceive as requiring the disqualification of your Office from further litigation of this case.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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the information contained in or attached to this transmission is prohibited. If you have received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by e-mail and delete the original transmission.

From: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2026 1:46 PM
To: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>; Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>
Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default

Counsel:

We are willing to meet and confer, but any such discussion should include not only your issues but Defendants' motion to set aside entry of default as well. Please let us know if you and Ingrid are willing to talk via phone or video call on all the parties' issues and provide your availability for tomorrow. Thank you.

Clayton J. Ankney
Second Assistant Attorney General
Tort Litigation Unit
Colorado Department of Law
Phone: (720) 508-6604
Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2026 1:07 PM
To: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Cc: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; katherine.brown@coag.gov; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>
Subject: FW: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default

Dear Mr. Ankney,

I do not understand your continued insistence upon excluding me (as co-counsel of record in this case) from conferral emails.

As we expressed in our response (ECF No. 45) to your "Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss" (ECF No. 44), the reasons for entry of a default in this case are very much a result of your intentional gamesmanship and refusal to meet and confer in good faith concerning your Office's conflicted representation of the Defendants and your efforts to avoid/delay responding to the merits of the Verified Complaint. Before we meet and confer on a motion to set aside the default according to F.R.C.P. 55(c), we need to have a meaningful discussion regarding your Office's conflicts and continued representation of the Defendants, including whether it will be necessary to file and litigate a motion to disqualify you and your colleagues. In its plainest terms, there is a fundamental conflict when the Attorney General's Office, which is statutorily obligated to investigate and prosecute legitimate allegations of

public fraud and constitutional violations, instead, defends such continuing fraud and constitutional violations.

You and your Office's conflicted representation of the Defendants coupled with other obstruction (such as your opposition to Judge Daniel Domenico's mandatory disqualification, your refusal to discuss grounds for requesting appointment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit, your defense of Judge Domenico's order restricting public access to the 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit, and the interminable delay caused by your intentional refusal to abide by an agreed responsive deadline) are delaying consideration of the injunctive remedies that are the focus of the Verified Complaint. In sum, we dispute your assertions and the sufficiency of "good cause" to set aside the default until we can finally have a meaningful discussion about the underlying conflicts inherent in your representation.

In this context, we further request that you file notices withdrawing your pending "Defendants': (1) Opposition to Application for Entry of Default, ECF No. 39; and (2) Motion to Strike Same (ECF No. 40)," and "Motion for Leave to File Motion to Dismiss," ECF No. 44, as MOOT. We continue to invite and request meeting and conferral as to the preliminary issues of the assignment of a judge from outside the 10th Circuit and the disqualification of your entire Office from further representation of the Defendants (specifically, whether it will be necessary to file contested motions to address either or both these issues).

Please include me in your response and in all future meeting and conferral emails.

Sincerely,
Christopher Gregory

The Gregory Law Firm, LLC
Christopher S.P. Gregory
Attorney at Law

201 Coffman St., #1822, Longmont, CO 80502
● Phone: 970.648.0642 ● Fax: 970.648.0643 ●

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----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>; defrancoi@yahoo.com <defrancoi@yahoo.com>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2026 at 05:02:37 PM MST
Subject: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Setting Aside Entry of Default

Good afternoon, Ingrid:

In light of the Clerk's entry of default, Defendants plan to file a motion to set aside default under FRCP 55(c). Good cause exists to set aside default for all the reasons we outlined in the motion to strike affidavit of default and motion for leave to file motion to dismiss, including that (1) entry of default did not result from any culpable conduct by Defendants, but rather from the lack of clarity of deadlines from the various judge reassignments; (2) Defendants have meritorious defenses as outlined in the Motion to Leave to File Motion to Dismiss; and (3) Plaintiff will not be prejudiced if default is set aside given that the agreed-upon deadline for Defendants to file a motion to dismiss was February 16. Please let us know when you are available to discuss; we plan to get a motion to set aside default this week.

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Clayton Ankney
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him); Katharine Brown; Linda Ruth Carter; Carmen Van Pelt; Christopher Gregory
Subject: RE: Deadlines
Date: Friday, February 20, 2026 3:20:51 PM

Good afternoon, Ingrid:

Thank you for your email. As I stated in my February 13, 2026 email, I do not think further discussion concerning judicial reassignment outside of this district or disqualifying our office from representing the defendants would be productive.

If you believe more conferral is appropriate related to pending motions, please let us know and we will be happy to get on a call and discuss.

As to your request that Mr. Gregory be included in correspondence, I note that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is written in the disjunctive – a party "may plead and conduct their own cases personally ***or*** by counsel." Please let us know of any authority by which Mr. Gregory can personally participate as counsel while also having you represent him.

Thank you, and I hope you have a good weekend.

Clayton J. Ankney
Second Assistant Attorney General
Tort Litigation Unit
Colorado Department of Law
Phone: (720) 508-6604
Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2026 8:59 AM
To: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: Deadlines

Dear Mr. Ankney,

Thank you for your email.

As you are aware, this case has been pending since October 23, 2025 with repeated stipulations to extend the deadline for an answer or other responsive pleading. You seem to confuse the meeting and conferral obligations that would allow extension of the answer deadline. As documented through our correspondence last week, we have repeatedly sought a good faith conferral concerning the necessity of assigning this case to a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit as well as the conflicts that exist, which prevent your Office from impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado. At no time during our

discussions prior to the expiration of the previously agreed February 16, 2026 answer deadline did you request additional time to respond as might help meaningfully address our concerns about the fairness and impartiality of these proceedings. Indeed, as I explained to you in my email to you on Friday, February 13, 2026 at 7:49 a.m., our impression of your intended motion to dismiss and your response to our motion to strike is that both were being pursued for improper purposes. In reality, there was a hard deadline that you were fully aware of and which has now passed. Your unwillingness to engage in a good faith meeting and conferral as to underlying structural deficiencies in this case (namely Judge Domenico's extended assignment to this case despite his actual bias and your Office's conflicted representation of the Defendants) does not excuse or stay the deadline for answering the Verified Complaint.

As an application for the Clerk of Court to perform a ministerial and mandatory act under F.R.C.P. 55(a), the request for entry of the default does not require separate meeting and conferral. *See* F.R.C.P. 55(a) ("When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk ***must*** enter the party's default.").

If you choose to file a motion seeking to set aside the anticipated default according to F.R.C.P. 55(c), we remain willing to engage in a good faith meeting and conferral with you particularly as to the continuing need for a judicial assignment from outside the 10th Circuit and for the further representation of the State of Colorado to occur through an equally impartial attorney (whether it be another state's attorney general or otherwise).

Finally, Mr. Gregory is my co-counsel, and I respectfully request that he be copied on our communications. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion for Leave to File MTD and Motion for Additional Pages
Date: Wednesday, February 18, 2026 1:34:12 PM

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----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>
To: defrancoi@yahoo.com <defrancoi@yahoo.com>; ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 18, 2026 at 11:59:09 AM MST
Subject: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion for Leave to File MTD and Motion for Additional Pages

Good morning, Ingrid:

I hope all is well. The deadline for Defendants to file their motion to dismiss was previously stayed pending resolution of Judge Jackson's conferral/letter protocol. In light of this matter being reassigned from Judge Jackson to Judge Gallagher, the deadline for Defendants to file a responsive pleading is now unclear. As such, Defendants will be filing a motion seeking leave to file their motion to dismiss by February 27, 2026. Please let us know if Plaintiff has any objection to that motion.

Additionally, given the number of claims, Defendants, and legal theories presented in the complaint, Defendants will be filing a motion seeking leave to file a 45-page motion to dismiss. Please let us know if Plaintiff has any objection to that motion.

Thank you.

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Clayton Ankney
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
Cc: Christopher Gregory; Katharine Brown; Dan Combs (He/Him); Linda Ruth Carter; Carmen Van Pelt
Subject: RE: Preliminary issues
Date: Friday, February 13, 2026 6:54:04 PM

Good evening, Ingrid:

Thank you for your email; we respectfully disagree. I do not think further email or letter correspondence on these issues will sway either side at this time, and I do not think further conferral is necessary on the issues of judicial reassignment outside of this district or disqualifying our office from representing the defendants.

If you believe more conferral is appropriate under Judge Jackson's Practice Standards and/or would otherwise move these issues forward, please let us know and we will be happy to get on a call and discuss.

I hope you have a wonderful long weekend.

Clayton J. Ankney
Second Assistant Attorney General
Tort Litigation Unit
Colorado Department of Law
Phone: (720) 508-6604
Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, February 13, 2026 7:49 AM
To: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Cc: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Preliminary issues

Dear Mr. Ankney,

You acknowledged our last email requesting meaningful meeting and conferral on the preliminary issues of the voidability of District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's orders (particularly the withdrawal of your motions to restrict), the continuing need to have Mr. Gregory's cases assigned to a district court judge and magistrate judge from outside the 10th Circuit, and grounds for the disqualification of your entire Office.

Rather than address the issues we raised, your email merely reasserts that you still intend to file a FRCP 12 motion to dismiss. Moreover, you have now filed a response to our motion to strike that reflects your opposition to the rightful course of action, which is for Judge Jackson to vacate all of Judge Domenico's orders, including the order restricting access to ECF 26. Given your apparent refusal to meet and confer

on the preliminary issues, please explain how refusing to disqualify your Office and proceeding to file a motion to dismiss would not be for an improper purpose, such as harassing Mr. Gregory, unnecessarily delaying the commencement of discovery and Mr. Gregory's opportunity to seek preliminary injunctive relief in this case, and otherwise needlessly increasing the costs of litigation. *See* FRCP 11(b). More generally, your intended motion to dismiss is a blatant effort to delay and avoid responding to the merits of Mr. Gregory's otherwise well-pled Verified Complaint and Jury Demand. Not only is this a basis for seeking sanctions under FRCP 11, it also provides grounds to add you and your colleagues as individually named Defendants in this case. The frivolous refusal to disqualify from this matter also meets the elements of 1st Degree Official Misconduct, as provided by § 18-8-404, C.R.S.

As we previously discussed, the continued representation of the Defendants by your Office, including the threats made by Mr. Combs, further meets the definition of retaliation under § 24-31-1204(8)(b), C.R.S. Our consistent position in this case is that both having an impartial judge who is not enmeshed in the Colorado legal community and ensuring impartial representation of the State of Colorado's interests is necessary in order for Mr. Gregory to vitiate his right to fundamental fairness.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco <defrancoi@yahoo.com>; ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2026 at 03:21:49 PM MST
Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion to Dismiss

Good afternoon, Ingrid:

Thank you for your response. I appreciate your clarification about the intent to not sue official capacity defendants for money damages. However, we are not planning to move to dismiss on that basis. Instead, the grounds for our motion to dismiss are set forth in the January 12th email.

Based on our prior email exchanges and your client's concerns about recusal and my office's representation of the Defendants, I understand that you are not willing to confer on the substance of Defendants' planned motion to dismiss at this time. If I am wrong about that and you are willing to discuss the basis for our motion to dismiss, please let me know as soon as possible and before this Friday so we can confer as Judge Jackson requires. Thank you.

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <defrancoi@yahoo.com>
Sent: Wednesday, February 11, 2026 7:27 AM
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com; Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Cc: Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Re: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion to Dismiss

Dear Mr. Ankney,

I respond to your email of Friday, February 6, 2026. Although you express a willingness to further address our intentions of seeking the appointment of a district court judge from outside the 10th Circuit, as well as the conflicts inherent in your Office's representation of the officially- and individually-named Defendants, the balance of your email appears to obstruct such a discussion.

The basis for a motion to seek the appointment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit is addressed in detail in Mr. Gregory's 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 Affidavit and its survey of near-universal conflicts of interest within the 10th Circuit. The mechanism for the assignment of an objectively impartial judge in Mr. Gregory's cases is further complicated by the fact that Chief Circuit Judge Jerome A. Holmes was involved in efforts to excuse District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's actual bias and that there are friendships and conflicts between the Circuit Justice, Neil Gorsuch, and multiple Defendants or material witnesses in these cases. There should be temporary appointments of a conflict-free Chief Circuit Judge and conflict-free Circuit Justice to submit the certificate of necessity required to transfer the cases. Moreover, given the breadth of the conflicts (perceiveable or actual) surveyed in the Affidavit, none of the local Magistrate Judges should be drawn to support whichever district judge is ultimately assigned to these cases. Because of the complexity involved in the assignment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit, it is understandable that Senior District Judge R. Brooke Jackson has not yet issued any orders and is apparently acting as a placeholder for these cases.

The basis for your Office's complete disqualification from these cases is simply that the Department of Law exists to impartially represent the interests of the State of Colorado, not to be a personal resource for individual elected or appointed officials to use as a shield against legitimate allegations of public fraud and public corruption. The fact that the individual Defendants can hide behind your Office and oppose the remedies Mr. Gregory seeks (including injunctive relief) is another form of occupational fraud. Likewise, your efforts and the efforts of your Office to seek dismissal of this case before there is any opportunity for discovery are yet another example of retaliation intended to silence Mr. Gregory and deprive him of his constitutionally protected rights to freely report and seek remedies for ongoing instances of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. The need for your Office's disqualification was also addressed in the requested restitutionary remedy pled in the Verified Complaint—the individual Defendants should be personally responsible for the reasonable value of attorney's fees and costs provided to them upon Mr. Gregory's proving the pled civil rights and retaliation violations. Put more plainly, the resources of the Colorado State Government should not be used to facilitate further fraud and corruption.

Respectfully, Mr. Gregory satisfied his burden of submitting a formally sufficient 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 Affidavit that has established District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's actual bias and which required Judge Domenico's immediate and automatic disqualification. Instead of following the law, immediately recusing himself, and vacating his orders, Judge Domenico continued to hear the cases. As explained in the Motion to Strike, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 144 prohibited Judge Domenico from entering further orders, including the order restricting public access to the Affidavit. The order is voidable and supports your Office making the ethical choice of withdrawing your motions to restrict. The Affidavit does not contain confidential information and its restriction is being used by your clients to conceal material information from the public and the Colorado General Assembly, specifically through misleading testimony provided as part of the SMART Act hearings and a confirmation hearing for former Senator Bob Gardner's appointment to the CCJD. As we explained in our last email, once the Affidavit is made public, the indisputable facts stated therein merit the immediate resignations of the Justices and numerous other Defendants.

Ultimately, the administration of justice requires that Mr. Gregory have a fair opportunity to develop proof and present his case free from interference by a biased judge and biased government counsel. As a government lawyer, your duties are to impartially protect the interests of the State of Colorado and to ensure that justice is done. Your duties are not to represent the personal interests of the Justices, the Governor, the Attorney General, or their appointees (which is its own form of occupational fraud and judicial/attorney misconduct). In this context, you have obligations under the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct to stipulate to the assignment of a conflict-free district judge from outside the 10thCircuit, to the disqualification of your entire Office from these cases, and to vacating all substantive orders that Judge Domenico entered in these cases due to his established actual bias. Mr. Gregory, through communications with the Colorado General Assembly and the Denver Judicial Discipline Commission, has already proposed a simple solution whereby the Colorado State Auditor would exercise her discretion to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General or SAAG, as authorized under Sec. 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. Please explain why your Office is not agreeable to this proposed solution.

As to your anticipated FRCP 12 motion, the Verified Complaint was pled to make clear that Mr. Gregory does not seek damages from the State of Colorado, which would raise issues of sovereign immunity. Instead, all of the relief sought against the official capacity defendants is limited to injunctive relief allowed through *Ex Parte Young* or attorney's fees and costs provisions in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. The individually-named defendants do not have any immunity for their intentional violations of Mr. Gregory's constitutional rights or for their roles in the retaliation against him that has occurred / is occurring in violation of the Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA). Specifically, remedies for CFCA retaliation are defined / recognized under Sec. 24-31-1204(8)(b), C.R.S. to include:

> An employee, contractor, or agent is entitled to all relief necessary to make that individual whole if the individual is discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, intimidated, sued, defamed, blacklisted, or in any other manner retaliated against or discriminated against in the terms and conditions of the individual's employment, contract, business, or profession by the defendant or by any other person because of lawful acts done by the individual or associated others in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to this section or in furtherance of an effort to stop any violation, or what the individual reasonably believes to be a violation, of section 24-31-1203.

It is our position that your Office has engaged in various actions that conform to the above definition, including threatening, harassing, blacklisting, and discriminating against the terms and conditions of Mr. Gregory's business or profession because of his lawful reporting of false claims and other public fraud involved in the Colorado Judicial Scandal. The Colorado Attorney General's Office was also directly involved in the overall pattern of retaliation against Mr. Gregory that began with his non-reappointment as CCJD Chair and which continued through his wrongful termination and seizure of copies of his records as Executive Director. The inclusion of attorneys either currently or formerly employed by the COAG as individually-named Defendants reflects the inherent conflicts involved in your Office's continuing representation and participation in these cases. Willful and wrongful non-disqualification further meets the elements of 1st Degree Official Misconduct, as defined by Sec. 18- 8-404, C.R.S.

We will file the necessary motions to ensure that Mr. Gregory enjoys his rights to fundamental fairness in this case, both in appearance and in reality. Your Office's obstruction of Mr. Gregory's ability to receive a fair hearing and the threats made by Mr. Combs in this case are also a form of retaliation and witness/victim intimidation that creates a valid basis to expand the scope of named Defendants. Ideally, you will acknowledge the problems with continued representation of the Defendants by the Attorney General's Office and the need for a district judge and magistrate judge who do not have connections with the Colorado legal community to hear these cases. Again, please let us know how you would like to proceed.

Sincerely,

The Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128

Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303-641-6812; fax: 303.558.4294
www.atoughdefense.com

On Friday, February 6, 2026 at 03:07:37 PM MST, Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov> wrote:

Good afternoon, Ingrid:

I would be happy to meet and confer on all the issues raised in your email.

However, I request that the meet and confer include Defendants' motion to dismiss given the presumptive February

16, 2026 deadline for Defendants to file a responsive pleading. If Plaintiff would prefer this case not proceed until the Court addresses the issues raised in your email, Plaintiff is free to file an appropriate motion to stay. Alternatively, Plaintiff could dismiss the action without prejudice and refile but not serve Defendants until the action is assigned to a judge that Plaintiff believes is appropriate. Given the current deadlines, however, the parties have an obligation to meet the current court deadlines and to confer in good faith on Defendants' motion to dismiss. I am ready and willing to do so.

Based on your email, it appears you are planning to file a number of motions—to have this case assigned to a district judge outside the Tenth Circuit, to seek withdrawal of the Attorney General's office from representing Defendants, and a renewed motion for Defendants to withdraw the motions to restrict public access, ECF Nos. 29 and 30. To ensure that any meet and confer is both meaningful and efficient, please let us know the bases for each motion as we have done on the motion to dismiss.

As it stands, our positions are as follows:

(1) It is up to the judges in this district to determine whether any may preside over this action. As you recognized in your email, it is standard for the government to not take a position on recusal motions;

(2) We are not aware of any legitimate reasons for recusal of the attorneys assigned to this case, much less the Attorney General's Office as a whole; and

(3) We stand by the Motion to Restrict. On this issue, I appreciate your recognition that this case includes issues that are "extraordinarily sensitive." We again reiterate our request that you review filings for confidential information and, at a minimum, provide notice and meet and confer so that Defendants can file appropriate motions to maintain such confidentiality before they are filed publicly.

Given the upcoming February 16 deadline, we would appreciate scheduling the meet and confer as soon as you are able. Please provide us your availability, and I will make every effort to make myself available when you are. In the meantime, I hope you have a good weekend.

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <defrancoi@yahoo.com>
Sent: Friday, February 6, 2026 9:28 AM
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com; Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Cc: Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Re: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion to Dismiss

Dear Mr. Ankney,

Thank you for your email. Respectfully, we believe that a meeting and conferral on your anticipated F.R.C.P. 12 motion to dismiss is premature. As I explained in my most recent correspondence with Mr. Combs, the need for an objectively impartial judge and your Office's conflicts in representing the Defendants (some in both their official and individual capacities) must be addressed before there is further litigation in this case. The fact that you are now communicating with us is an indication that Mr. Combs understands this issue and further recognizes the legitimacy of our concerns about your Office's conflicted representation of the Defendants.

It deserves emphasis that Mr. Gregory's 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit, which precipitated District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's mandatory recusal, requested the temporary assignment of a non-conflicted Circuit Chief Judge and Circuit Justice to facilitate the appointment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit who is not enmeshed in the Colorado legal community. The conflicts of interest inherent in this case are both unique and extraordinarily sensitive. The assignment of this case to Senior District Judge R. Brooke Jackson occurred only days ago, and it can be reasonably expected that Judge Jackson is reviewing the two involved case files, including Mr. Gregory's Affidavit requesting the assignment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit. In addition, Judge Domenico failed to vacate orders that he issued in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 144, so we anticipate that Judge Jackson will take immediate action to address the temporary public access restrictions applied to Mr. Gregory's Affidavit as well as your Office's failure to meet and confer before seeking those restrictions. In this vein, we should be meeting and conferring as to your Office's position on a prospective motion to have this case assigned to a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit and a renewed request for you to withdraw your motions to restrict public access, ECF Nos. 29 and 30.

I think we can agree that it is in the parties' mutual interests to have this case heard by a district judge whose impartiality cannot be reasonably questioned (even if such questions arise merely through familiarity with other individuals within the Colorado legal community and public perceptions that arise from such connections). Likewise, the public should have confidence that the State of Colorado's interests are being represented impartially without state resources, including your work and the work of others in your Office, supporting the individual interests of the Defendants, who include your boss, Attorney General Phil Weiser, who is named in his individual capacity.

Neither you nor Mr. Combs has offered any explanation as to why your Office's continued representation of the Defendants does not create appearances of impropriety, is not consistent with the pattern of public fraud alleged in Mr. Gregory's Verified Complaint, and is not a violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(f) (which prohibits attorneys to knowingly assist judges to violate the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct). It is also important to recognize that as attorneys for the State of Colorado, it is your and your colleagues' obligation to do justice rather than to protect the individual and personal interests of public officials. It is extremely concerning that your Office opposed (or at least was not willing to stipulate to) District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's recusal and enforcement of Judge Domenico's mandatory and automatic disqualification obligations under 28 U.S.C. § 144. It is common for opposing counsel to take no position on recusal motions, especially when they represent government agencies. *See, e.g., Thompson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,* 425 F. App'x 98, 100 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). That is partly because government lawyers are in theory pursuing a just outcome, rather than simply a victory. *See Berger v. United States,* 295 U.S. 78, 99 (1935) (declaring that prosecutors are "representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done").

We are happy to engage in a meaningful meeting and conferral about the anticipated FRCP 12 motion once we have had a legitimate opportunity to meet and confer with you as to these other preliminary, yet fundamentally important, issues.

Again, please let us know how you would like to proceed.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

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On Thursday, February 5, 2026 at 08:55:53 AM MST, Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov> wrote:

Good morning, Ingrid:

I hope all is well. In light of Judge Domenico's recusal and the assignment of this case to Judge Jackson, I am following up on our January 12, 2026, and January 27, 2026 requests to confer on Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Judge Jackson's practice standards require a robust conferral process, including a meaningful discussion about (1) the issues that the defendants intend to raise in the motion to dismiss, (2) whether the parties could resolve all of some of those issues without a motion, (3) the reasons that the defendants believe those issues are legally meritorious, (4) the reasons that the plaintiff believes the motion should be denied, (5) whether there are any alternatives to the motion that would suffice (for example, could the plaintiff simply amend the complaint?), and (6) whether the motion could be resolved through a streamlined process (for example, letters instead of briefs, or in a conference with the court).
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Judges/RBJ/RBJ_Practice_Standards.pdf?ver=q6spqw4Ai1y_pQ7uMJQEyw%3d%3d.

I have considered and am prepared to meaningfully discuss each of these topics and look forward to discussing them with you.

I could be mistaken, but I do not believe we have received a substantive response from you concerning the issues we

intend to raise in our motion to dismiss and which are described in our January 12, 2026 email. For your convenience, I have attached that email, which provides an overview of our grounds for dismissal. I would be happy to review any substantive written response in advance of our conferral so we can have a more fruitful discussion.

Could you please provide some dates and times you are available to meet and confer? I am generally available 2/9, 2/10, and 2/11, but I can try to make myself available on another day if those dates do not work for you. Thanks!

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

Hello Ingrid,

I'm reaching out to confer on two motions: (1) Defendants' motion for two additional weeks to respond to Mr. Gregory's Complaint—from February 2, 2026, to February 16, 2026; and (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss.

- Please respond as soon as possible on the request to extend time and let us know times, after Wed. of this week, in which you're available to talk through the planned Motion to Dismiss.

Requested extension of time: As mentioned below in more detail, as a response to the Complaint, we are preparing a single Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all Defendants, on various grounds. We'll be asking the Court for two additional weeks to file that Motion. That request reflects the need to finalize multiple arguments and ensure the 40 Defendant clients have sufficient time to review.

Conferral on Motion to Dismiss: The following is meant to start the discussion about conferral on our motion, under Judge Domenico's Practice Standards. Below are the general bases for our motion to dismiss. We'd like to set up a call this week or next to answer any questions and discuss whether you think the asserted deficiencies in the complaint are correctible by amendment, as Judge Domenico requires.

Grounds for dismissal

1. Request to dismiss all claims against the CSC, CCJD, and CJDRC based on sovereign immunity. Additionally, these entities are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
2. Request to dismiss claims against individually named Defendants for violations of Colorado law, because such claims are barred under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and the Eleventh Amendment.
3. Request to dismiss claims against Director Sullivan, who, in addition to governmental immunity, has absolute immunity from the asserted claims.
4. Request to dismiss all claims for relief for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief, and failure to allege

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion to Dismiss
Date: Friday, February 6, 2026 3:47:20 PM

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco <defrancoi@yahoo.com>; ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Friday, February 6, 2026 at 03:07:36 PM MST
Subject: RE: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion to Dismiss

Good afternoon, Ingrid:

I would be happy to meet and confer on all the issues raised in your email.

However, I request that the meet and confer include Defendants' motion to dismiss given the presumptive February 16, 2026 deadline for Defendants to file a responsive pleading. If Plaintiff would prefer this case not proceed until the Court addresses the issues raised in your email, Plaintiff is free to file an appropriate motion to stay. Alternatively, Plaintiff could dismiss the action without prejudice and refile but not serve Defendants until the action is assigned to a judge that Plaintiff believes is appropriate. Given the current deadlines, however, the parties have an obligation to meet the current court deadlines and to confer in good faith on Defendants' motion to dismiss. I am ready and willing to do so.

Based on your email, it appears you are planning to file a number of motions—to have this case assigned to a district judge outside the Tenth Circuit, to seek withdrawal of the Attorney General's office from representing Defendants, and a renewed motion for Defendants to withdraw the motions to restrict public access, ECF Nos. 29 and 30. To ensure that any meet and confer is both meaningful and efficient, please let us know the bases for each motion as we have done on the motion to dismiss.

As it stands, our positions are as follows:

(1) It is up to the judges in this district to determine whether any may preside over this action. As you recognized in your email, it is standard for the government to not take a position on recusal motions;

(2) We are not aware of any legitimate reasons for recusal of the attorneys assigned to this case, much less the Attorney General's Office as a whole; and

(3) We stand by the Motion to Restrict. On this issue, I appreciate your recognition that this case includes issues that are "extraordinarily sensitive." We again reiterate our request that you review filings for confidential information and, at a minimum, provide notice and meet and confer so that Defendants can file appropriate motions to maintain such confidentiality before they are filed publicly.

Given the upcoming February 16 deadline, we would appreciate scheduling the meet and confer as soon as you are able. Please provide us your availability, and I will make every effort to make myself available when you are. In the meantime, I hope you have a good weekend.

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <defrancoi@yahoo.com>
Sent: Friday, February 6, 2026 9:28 AM
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com; Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>
Cc: Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Re: Gregory, 25-3361 (D. Colo.) - Conferral on Motion to Dismiss

Dear Mr. Ankney,

Thank you for your email. Respectfully, we believe that a meeting and conferral on your anticipated F.R.C.P. 12 motion to dismiss is premature. As I explained in my most recent correspondence with Mr. Combs, the need for an objectively impartial judge and your Office's conflicts in representing the Defendants (some in both their official and individual capacities) must be addressed before there is further litigation in this case. The fact that you are now communicating with us is an indication that Mr. Combs understands this issue and further recognizes the legitimacy of our concerns about your Office's conflicted representation of the Defendants.

It deserves emphasis that Mr. Gregory's 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit, which precipitated District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's mandatory recusal, requested the temporary assignment of a non-conflicted Circuit Chief Judge and Circuit Justice to facilitate the appointment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit who is not enmeshed in the Colorado legal community. The conflicts of interest inherent in this case are both unique and extraordinarily

sensitive. The assignment of this case to Senior District Judge R. Brooke Jackson occurred only days ago, and it can be reasonably expected that Judge Jackson is reviewing the two involved case files, including Mr. Gregory's Affidavit requesting the assignment of a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit. In addition, Judge Domenico failed to vacate orders that he issued in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 144, so we anticipate that Judge Jackson will take immediate action to address the temporary public access restrictions applied to Mr. Gregory's Affidavit as well as your Office's failure to meet and confer before seeking those restrictions. In this vein, we should be meeting and conferring as to your Office's position on a prospective motion to have this case assigned to a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit and a renewed request for you to withdraw your motions to restrict public access, ECF Nos. 29 and 30.

I think we can agree that it is in the parties' mutual interests to have this case heard by a district judge whose impartiality cannot be reasonably questioned (even if such questions arise merely through familiarity with other individuals within the Colorado legal community and public perceptions that arise from such connections). Likewise, the public should have confidence that the State of Colorado's interests are being represented impartially without state resources, including your work and the work of others in your Office, supporting the individual interests of the Defendants, who include your boss, Attorney General Phil Weiser, who is named in his individual capacity.

Neither you nor Mr. Combs has offered any explanation as to why your Office's continued representation of the Defendants does not create appearances of impropriety, is not consistent with the pattern of public fraud alleged in Mr. Gregory's Verified Complaint, and is not a violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(f) (which prohibits attorneys to knowingly assist judges to violate the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct). It is also important to recognize that as attorneys for the State of Colorado, it is your and your colleagues' obligation to do justice rather than to protect the individual and personal interests of public officials. It is extremely concerning that your Office opposed (or at least was not willing to stipulate to) District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's recusal and enforcement of Judge Domenico's mandatory and automatic disqualification obligations under 28 U.S.C. § 144. It is common for opposing counsel to take no position on recusal motions, especially when they represent government agencies. *See, e.g., Thompson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,* 425 F. App'x 98, 100 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011). That is partly because government lawyers are in theory pursuing a just outcome, rather than simply a victory. *See Berger v. United States,* 295 U.S. 78, 99 (1935) (declaring that prosecutors are "representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done").

We are happy to engage in a meaningful meeting and conferral about the anticipated FRCP 12 motion once we have had a legitimate opportunity to meet and confer with you as to these other preliminary, yet fundamentally important, issues.

Again, please let us know how you would like to proceed.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

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P.O. Box 128

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www.atoughdefense.com

On Thursday, February 5, 2026 at 08:55:53 AM MST, Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov> wrote:

Good morning, Ingrid:

I hope all is well. In light of Judge Domenico's recusal and the assignment of this case to Judge Jackson, I am following up on our January 12, 2026, and January 27, 2026 requests to confer on Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Judge Jackson's practice standards require a robust conferral process, including a meaningful discussion about (1) the issues that the defendants intend to raise in the motion to dismiss, (2) whether the parties could resolve all of some of those issues without a motion, (3) the reasons that the defendants believe those issues are legally meritorious, (4) the reasons that the plaintiff believes the motion should be denied, (5) whether there are any alternatives to the motion that would suffice (for example, could the plaintiff simply amend the complaint?), and (6) whether the motion could be resolved through a streamlined process (for example, letters instead of briefs, or in a conference with the court).
http://www.cod.uscourts.gov/Portals/0/Documents/Judges/RBJ/RBJ_Practice_Standards.pdf?ver=q6spqw4Ai1y_pQ7uMJQEyw%3d%3d.

I have considered and am prepared to meaningfully discuss each of these topics and look forward to discussing them with you.

I could be mistaken, but I do not believe we have received a substantive response from you concerning the issues we intend to raise in our motion to dismiss and which are described in our January 12, 2026 email. For your convenience, I have attached that email, which provides an overview of our grounds for dismissal. I would be happy to review any substantive written response in advance of our conferral so we can have a more fruitful discussion.

Could you please provide some dates and times you are available to meet and confer? I am generally available 2/9, 2/10, and 2/11, but I can try to make myself available on another day if those dates do not work for you. Thanks!

Clayton J. Ankney

Second Assistant Attorney General

Tort Litigation Unit

Colorado Department of Law

Phone: (720) 508-6604

Email: clayton.ankney@coag.gov

Hello Ingrid,

I'm reaching out to confer on two motions: (1) Defendants' motion for two additional weeks to respond to Mr. Gregory's Complaint—from February 2, 2026, to February 16, 2026; and (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss.

- Please respond as soon as possible on the request to extend time and let us know times, after Wed. of this week, in which you're available to talk through the planned Motion to Dismiss.

Requested extension of time: As mentioned below in more detail, as a response to the Complaint, we are preparing a single Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all Defendants, on various grounds. We'll be asking the Court for two additional weeks to file that Motion. That request reflects the need to finalize multiple arguments and ensure the 40 Defendant clients have sufficient time to review.

Conferral on Motion to Dismiss: The following is meant to start the discussion about conferral on our motion, under Judge Domenico's Practice Standards. Below are the general bases for our motion to dismiss. We'd like to set up a call this week or next to answer any questions and discuss whether you think the asserted deficiencies in the complaint are correctible by amendment, as Judge Domenico requires.

<u>Grounds for dismissal</u>

1. Request to dismiss all claims against the CSC, CCJD, and CJDRC based on sovereign immunity. Additionally, these entities are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.
2. Request to dismiss claims against individually named Defendants for violations of Colorado law, because such claims are barred under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and the Eleventh Amendment.
3. Request to dismiss claims against Director Sullivan, who, in addition to governmental immunity, has absolute immunity from the asserted claims.
4. Request to dismiss all claims for relief for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief, and failure to allege sufficient facts to support stated claims. This includes but is not limited to an argument to dismiss claims for failure to assert specific facts concerning individually named defendants, as well as arguments describing Mr. Gregory's failure to assert facts to plausibly state his enumerated claims for relief.
5. Request to dismiss all claims based on generalized grievances for the "fundamental right to be heard," equal protection, and due process rights for lack of standing.
6. Request to dismiss individual capacity claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
7. Request to dismiss conspiracy claims based on failure to identify agreement between defendants and concerted action (1983, 1985), racial bias (1985(3)), or intent to deter court attendance or retaliate based on court attendance (1985(2)).
8. Request to dismiss CFCA claim because it was not in effect when the alleged violation of the CFCA occurred. As such, Plaintiff cannot plead that he engaged in lawful acts in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to the CFCA or to stop a violation of the CFCA. Separately, Mr. Gregory's CFCA claim is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.
9. Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under any additional theory, and Plaintiff is not entitled to any form of relief based on the various grounds for dismissal.

We appreciate your consideration on these motions, and your response on the motion for extension of time as soon as you're able to.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2026 at 08:15:59 PM MST
Subject: RE: Your email and motion

Ingrid,

We disagree with your version of events or that restricting ECF No. 26 and Exhibits 1-10 is improper. We will not withdraw the Motion to Restrict Access, and further oppose any motion to strike. We also decline your demand for us to file a "a notice that [we] acknowledge Judge Domenico's mandatory judicial disqualification as required by 28 U.S.C. § 144, and that [we] and [our] Office withdraw from further representation of the Defendants in this case."

Regards,

Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, January 29, 2026 3:43 PM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Cc: Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: Your email and motion

Dear Mr. Combs,

Unfortunately, you appear to miss the point of this case. Mr. Gregory is suing to uphold his 1st Amendment, Colo. Const. Art. II, § 25, Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(g), and Colo. Const. Art. XIII rights to freely and publicly report judicial misconduct and other suspected crimes without fear of intimidation and retaliation (as further protected against through the Colorado False Claims Act (CFCA), the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act, § 18-8-115, C.R.S., and other laws). Through your motion, you seek to have an objectively-biased U.S. District Court Judge act as the equivalent of the Soviet Bureau of Censorship, exercising prior restraints to restrict public access to Mr. Gregory's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144," ECF No. 26, as well as all prospective court filings based upon generalized assertions of "confidentiality." In other words, through your threatening communications prior to filing your motion, you have engaged in exactly the types of intimidation and retaliation that are prohibited under § 24-31-1204(8)(b) of the CFCA. Moreover, you are now a participant and co-conspirator in the civil rights violations and retaliatory conduct averred in Mr. Gregory's complaint. Not only is your conduct and refusal to disqualify yourself and your Office constitutionally and civilly unlawful, but it is also unethical and an example of First Degree Official Misconduct under § 18-8-404, C.R.S.

It is understandable that you would take such unmeasured actions upon recognizing the reality and significance of the facts alleged in Mr. Gregory's Affidavit. Once those facts (which must be presumed as true for the purposes of Judge Domenico's disqualification) are proven and/or admitted to, your clients have no ethical choice but to immediately resign from their official positions and to concede the merits of Mr. Gregory's claims.

The intimidation tactics apparently intended by your motion, however, actually began with your failing to meet and confer before sending your *ex parte* email to Judge Daniel D. Domenico's chambers on January 16, 2026. Other than sending a contemporaneous email (which you attempted to recall), that threatened me and Mr. Gregory with allegations of breached "confidentiality," you made no efforts to discuss what 28 U.S.C. § 144 requires in this case. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 144 provides, in relevant part:

> Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, ***such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.***

It was improper for Judge Domenico to take ***any further action*** in this case, including issuing his order temporarily restricting public access according to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(a), (b), (e). Mr. Gregory's intentions in asking to temporarily restrict public access in the Affidavit itself was to allow a conflict-free replacement judge to immediately and impartially consider any objections (including any potential objections raised by Judge Domenico) to the public disclosure of *actual records* from the pending federal judicial discipline proceedings against Judge Domenico and 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jerome A. Holmes (i.e. the Affidavit's exhibits). The intention was never to condone Judge Domenico continuing to preside over this case and to issue further orders. Additionally, at no point have you identified specifically what you allege is "confidential" or non-public information and the reasons supporting your positions. Mr. Gregory categorically denies that evidence of judicial misconduct, particularly a victim's personal knowledge of judicial misconduct, is ever "confidential" and outside of an individual attorney's mandated reporting obligations and constitutionally protected rights to free expression (including communications relevant to independent exercise of the Colorado General Assembly's impeachment authority under Colo. Const. Art. XIII).

I do not consider that a meaningful meet and confer can occur without your having provided a specific basis for your contention that the Affidavit should be kept hidden from public view, or without an appropriate opportunity to respond. Your apparent "directive" that I shall respond to you immediately does not constitute an appropriate opportunity. I realize that attorneys in your office rarely leave it, but that is not the case for other trial lawyers, and I do not sit at my desk awaiting communications from opposing counsel. I believe the generally-accepted response period is twenty-four hours. Due to the failure to meet and confer, we will be moving to strike your motion. We assume you oppose but request your confirmation.

With regard to Judge Domenico's mandatory disqualification, I would request you to direct me to any statutory basis for Judge Domenico exercising discretion and continuing to hear this case. I can find none. Recusal is mandatory, whether you subjectively believe Mr. Gregory established a "valid" basis, or not. It is a violation of Colo. RPC 8.4(a-1), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (h) for you and your clients to frivolously disregard the law (i.e. 28 U.S.C. § 144) and support an objectively-biased judicial officer violating his duties under Canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the federal Code).

With this context, I respectfully request that you withdraw your motion to restrict public access to the Affidavit, that you file a notice that you acknowledge Judge Domenico's mandatory judicial disqualification as required by 28 U.S.C. § 144, and that you and your Office withdraw from further representation of the Defendants in this case. If you do not take these requested actions, we will respond accordingly by filing the above-mentioned motion to strike, by filing additional federal judicial discipline complaints against Judge Domenico and Chief Circuit Judge Holmes as allowed through 10th Cir. JCR 11(c)(2), and by petitioning the 10th Circuit for a writ of mandamus (*see Nichols v. Alley*, 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting writ of mandamus based upon application of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) disqualification standard)). Once an impartial judge is assigned to this case, we will proceed with filing the appropriate motion to disqualify you and your Office from further representation of the Defendants and to seek the injunctive relief otherwise pled in the Verified Complaint and Jury Demand, ECF No. 1. We will also refer your conduct (and the conduct of the other attorneys from your Office who are working on this case) to the U.S. District Court's Committee on Conduct, which is already investigating the attorney discipline complaint contained in ECF No. 1-1.

Please advise as to how you would like to proceed in this matter.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Your letter
Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2026 2:07:40 PM

The Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303-641-6812; fax: 303.558.4294
www.atoughdefense.com

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2026 at 02:03:43 PM MST
Subject: RE: Your letter

Thank you for the response.

We would prefer to talk through issues by phone, to allow for the back-and-forth we believe Judge Domenico's rules envision. In any event, the bases for our motion to dismiss are in the email dated Jan. 12, 2025, re-attached here for quick reference. We await your response by email, if that is how you wish to proceed.

As for the other two issues you raise, we do not agree Mr. Gregory has stated valid grounds to recuse Judge Domenico, and for that reason we won't be joining your recusal efforts. We also are not aware of any conflict of interest in representing the Defendants in this case.

Finally, we will be filing a Motion to Restrict the Affidavit of Judicial Bias (ECF No. 26 and 26-1 through 26-10) pursuant to Local Rule 7.2. That Motion will also request that Plaintiff be required to file all documents under Level 1 Restriction so that Defendants are provided an opportunity to ensure that Plaintiff does not file confidential information publicly in the future. Please advise today whether Mr. Gregory will oppose that motion.

Thank you,

Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2026 8:11 AM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Your letter

Dear Mr. Combs,

I respectfully disagree that Mr. Gregory's affidavit should remain hidden from the public, and that he has violated any ethical duty. I consulted with the clerk, who advised me that I could not properly restrict the filing, and that it was up to the judge to order it suppressed, if he believed it proper to do so. I am happy to discuss both that and your motion to dismiss, but I believe we need first to discuss why your office has not joined, or, at the very least, indicated that you do not oppose Judge Domenico's recusal. I believe we also need to discuss your clear conflicts of interest and why you have not raised those.

I think, given the tenor of your letter, and the multiple threats and improper admonitions it contains, that it would be unwise for me to speak with you by telephone. The Local Rules do not require telephonic meet and confer, nor do Judge Domenico's practice standards. Therefore, I would prefer to communicate with you in writing, so that there can be no disagreement about what was said.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Gregory v. CJDRC et al., No. 25-cv-03361 - conferral
Date: Tuesday, January 27, 2026 4:40:17 PM
Attachments: 26.01.27 Letter to DeFranco.pdf

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, January 27, 2026 at 04:19:23 PM MST
Subject: Gregory v. CJDRC et al., No. 25-cv-03361 - conferral

Dear Ingrid,

Attached is a letter dated 1/27/26. We await your immediate response.

Thank you,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

PHIL WEISER
Attorney General

NATALIE HANLON LEH
Chief Deputy Attorney General

SHANNON STEVENSON
Solicitor General

TANJA WHEELER
Associate Chief Deputy Attorney General

STATE OF COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF LAW

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COLORADO JUDICIAL CENTER
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Phone (720) 508-6000

Civil Litigation and Employment Law Section

January 27, 2026

Ingrid J. DeFranco
Law Offices of Ingrid J. DeFranco
P.O. Box 128
Brighton, CO 80601-0128

Sent via email to: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com

RE: *Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee et al.*, Civ. No 25-cv-03361(D. Colo.)

Dear Ms. DeFranco:

I write regarding *Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee et al.*, Civ. No 25-cv-03361(D. Colo.), and in particular your failure to respond to my requests to meet and confer on two separate, serious issues. See January 12, 2026, email, January 16, 2026, email.

First, I have sought, and continue to seek, conferral on Defendants' impending motion to dismiss. *See* January 12, 2026, email. Judge Domenico requires conferral on such motions, *see* DDD Civ. P.S. III(G), and the Complaint in this action is a perfect example of what this conferral requirement seeks to remedy—namely having Defendants and the Court spend time sifting through voluminous papers and legal conclusions to divine what Plaintiff is attempting to assert. The Complaint is a kitchen sink of legal conclusions asserted indiscriminately against all forty Defendants, with no factual allegations explaining what it is that each Defendant allegedly did to Plaintiff or how Plaintiff was harmed. On its face, it fails to provide a "short and plain statement" as required by Rule 8, and fails to assert a plausible claim for relief as required by Rule 12(b)(6).

Both the form and content of the Complaint, which you and Mr. Gregory signed as attorneys of record, raise serious questions whether this action and its claims are warranted by any existing law and have evidentiary support. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (outlining representations to court made by attorney when signing any filing). For example, the Complaint appears to allege that Director Sullivan retaliated against Mr. Gregory by dismissing his Charge of Discrimination based on his termination from the CCRD for lack of jurisdiction. But as the Complaint's own exhibits show, the Charge did not include any allegations that Plaintiff was

discriminated against based on membership in a protected class as required by C.R.S. § 24-34-402(1)(a)(I), or was discriminated against for opposing any practice made a discriminatory or an unfair employment practice by CADA as required by C.R.S § 24-34-402(1)(e)(IV). *See generally* ECF No. 1-10, pp. 12–19. As another example, Mr. Gregory complains about how the CCJD and CJDRC handling his various filings, but "nothing in the First Amendment or in [the Supreme] Court's case law interpreting it suggests that the rights to speak, associate, and petition require government policymakers to listen or respond to individuals' communications on public issues." *Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight*, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984). Your failure to engage in the conferral process has forced Defendants to prepare a lengthy Motion to Dismiss, which will outline multiple bases for dismissal.

Second, you publicly filed documents in this case which were in violation of your client's confidentiality obligations under Colorado law. *See* my January 16, 2026, email. In particular, Colorado Const. art. VI, section 23(3)(g) protects all files, investigations, proceedings, testimony, and notes of the CCJD, unless and until public disciplinary proceedings are filed, and even then, only certain documents become public. CJD Rule 3.5 imposes confidentiality obligations on all Commission staff and members, and both Section 23(3)(g) and Rule 3.5(c)(5) make clear that the confidentiality rules continue to apply post-employment. The Complaint includes allegations that refer to information that Mr. Gregory had access to only by virtue of his role with the CCJD. Mr. Gregory's Affidavit, ECF No. 26, and exhibits to that Declaration, go even further, including information regarding private discipline issued by the CCJD while Plaintiff was serving as the vice-chair of the CCJD, as well as details of investigative actions he took while serving as the CCJD's Executive Director. ECF No. 26, ¶¶ 43-44. Contrary to his assertions, Mr. Gregory does not have an "absolute privilege" to disclose the information under CJD Rule 6.5(d). CJD Rule 6.5(d) permits certain disclosures of otherwise confidential information by "the Commission or the executive director," but Mr. Gregory is neither the Commission nor its executive director – he was terminated on January 19, 2024. Mr. Gregory therefore possesses no right to disclose information that is subject to confidentiality provisions under Colorado law.

I asked you to confirm that you will take steps to restrict access to the Affidavit, and further review all filings drafted by Mr. Gregory prior to filing for confidential information, and take necessary steps to protect that information. You should be aware that pursuant to a settlement of claim with the CCJD, Mr. Gregory should not have any documents belonging to the CCJD. And he is violating his confidentiality obligations as a former employee of CCJD, by disclosing confidential documents and/or information from those documents in court filings, to legislators, the media or the public, which if continued may result in legal action against him.

Your failure to engage on these issues is causing Defendants to spend unnecessary time seeking dismissal of a Complaint which on its face fails to state a

plausible claim, and to monitor your voluminous filings for information that should be under seal and/or not in Mr. Gregory's possession. Your failure to engage also suggests that this action is not about actually litigating any specific claim that Mr. Gregory may be able to assert, but to flood the record with voluminous and sensational allegations. You are on notice that Defendants will vigorously defend themselves in this action and will seek fees, costs, and other appropriate relief under the law.

I am available to talk about these and other issues on Wednesday, January 28, between 1:00-2:00, and on Thursday, January 29th, between 3:00-4:00. Please let us know if one of these times work, or provide other available times to discuss.

Sincerely,

FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL



DANIEL M. COMBS
First Assistant Attorney General
Tort Litigation, Civil Litigation and
Employment Law
720-508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

cc: Clayton J. Ankney
Katharine J. Brown

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Recall: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26
Date: Friday, January 16, 2026 1:33:50 PM

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: 'ingrid.defranco@gmail.com' <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 at 01:13:13 PM MST
Subject: Recall: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26

Dan Combs (He/Him) would like to recall the message, "Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26 ".

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26
Date: Friday, January 16, 2026 1:33:20 PM

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 at 01:09:49 PM MST
Subject: Gregory (1:25-cv-00361) - confidentiality obligations and ECF No 26

Hello Ingrid,

It's come to our attention that recent filings may have been in violation of your client's confidentiality obligations under Colorado law. In particular, Colo. Const. art. VI, section 23(3)(g) protects all files, investigations, proceedings, testimony, and notes of the Commission on Judicial Discipline, unless and until public disciplinary proceedings are filed, and even then, only certain documents become public. CJD Rule 3.5 imposes confidentiality obligations on all Commission staff and members, and both Section 23(3)(g) and Rule 3.5(c)(5) make clear that the confidentiality rules continue to apply post-employment. The Local Rules concerning restrictions of filings is found at D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2.

Our clients take their confidentiality obligations seriously, and we ask that you review all filings drafted by Mr. Gregory prior to filing for confidential information, and take necessary steps to protect that information.

Most pressing is the need to review Mr. Gregory's Affidavit, ECF No. 26, and exhibits to that Declaration. As mentioned in the email I sent to Chambers (on which you were copied), Mr. Gregory acknowledged confidentiality of the contents of that filing, and its being filed publicly appears to have been inadvertent. Furthermore, the cited bases for disclosure would not apply, because Mr. Gregory is not the executive director of the Commission and may not act on the Commission's behalf.

Please confirm receipt of this email and let me know *as soon as possible* whether you will take steps to restrict access to ECF No. 26.

Thank you,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco
To: Christopher Gregory
Subject: Fw: 1:25-cv-00361-DDD filing matter - ECF No. 26
Date: Friday, January 16, 2026 1:33:41 PM

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: Domenico_Chambers@cod.uscourts.gov <domenico_chambers@cod.uscourts.gov>
Cc: Katharine Brown <katharine.brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <lindaruth.carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <carmen.vanpelt@coag.gov>; Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>; ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 16, 2026 at 01:04:00 PM MST
Subject: 1:25-cv-00361-DDD filing matter - ECF No. 26

To Judge Domenico's Chambers,

It has come to our attention that the Plaintiff's (Christopher Gregory) most recent filing in case 1:25-cv-03361-DDD, ECF No. 26, and exhibits 1-11, are available to the public through PACER.

After reviewing the filings, Defendants believe that ECF No. 26 contains information required to be kept confidential under state law. Mr. Gregory apparently recognizes that the affidavit contains confidential information as well, stating in footnote 2, Paragraph 5, of ECF No. 26, that "Affiant files this Affidavit into the present case as suppressed …."

Given the Plaintiff's statement, made under penalty of perjury, that ECF 26 and its exhibits were being filed as "suppressed," the public filing appears to have been made in error.

To protect the confidentiality of information contained in ECF 26 and to reflect the Plaintiff's stated intent to file it as "suppressed," would the Court be able to direct the Clerk to immediately change ECF 26's status to "sealed" or restricted?

Very truly yours,

Dan Combs

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Dan Combs (He/Him)
To: Ingrid J. DeFranco
Cc: Clayton Ankney; Katharine Brown; Linda Ruth Carter; Carmen Van Pelt; Christopher Gregory
Subject: RE: Gregory lawsuit conferral on motion to extend time and MTD
Date: Wednesday, January 14, 2026 8:42:42 PM

Thanks Ingrid.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)
First Assistant Attorney General
Colorado Department of Law
Tort Litigation Unit
Phone: (720) 508-6625
Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Ingrid J. DeFranco <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 14, 2026 5:22 PM
To: Dan Combs (He/Him) <Dan.Combs@coag.gov>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>; Christopher Gregory <cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net>
Subject: Re: Gregory lawsuit conferral on motion to extend time and MTD

Dear Mr. Coombs,

Apologies; I did not receive your earlier email. My Gmail address duplicates into a secondary address, and it's not in either one. We do not object to an extension.

Sincerely,

Ingrid DeFranco

Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco Pllc
PO Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601-0128
303.641.6812 fax: 303.558.4294

On Wednesday, January 14, 2026 at 04:28:35 PM MST, Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov> wrote:

Hello Ingrid,

I'm following up on the outreach from earlier in this week. Will you please confirm you received the email, and also please provide Mr. Gregory's position on the requested extension of time, when you're first able to?

Many thanks,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

From: Dan Combs (He/Him)
Sent: Monday, January 12, 2026 4:21 PM
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com
Cc: Clayton Ankney <Clayton.Ankney@coag.gov>; Katharine Brown <Katharine.Brown@coag.gov>; Linda Ruth Carter <LindaRuth.Carter@coag.gov>; Carmen Van Pelt <Carmen.VanPelt@coag.gov>
Subject: Gregory lawsuit conferral on motion to extend time and MTD
Importance: High

Hello Ingrid,

I'm reaching out to confer on two motions: (1) Defendants' motion for two additional weeks to respond to Mr. Gregory's Complaint—from February 2, 2026, to February 16, 2026; and (2) Defendant's motion to dismiss.

- Please respond as soon as possible on the request to extend time and let us know times, after Wed. of this week, in which you're available to talk through the planned Motion to Dismiss.

Requested extension of time: As mentioned below in more detail, as a response to the Complaint, we are preparing a single Motion to Dismiss on behalf of all Defendants, on various grounds. We'll be asking the Court for two additional weeks to file that Motion. That request reflects the need to finalize multiple arguments and ensure the 40 Defendant clients have sufficient time to review.

Conferral on Motion to Dismiss: The following is meant to start the discussion about conferral on our motion, under Judge Domenico's Practice Standards. Below are the general bases for our motion to dismiss. We'd like to set up a call this week or next to answer any questions and discuss whether you think the asserted deficiencies in the complaint are correctible by amendment, as Judge Domenico requires.

<u>Grounds for dismissal</u>

1. Request to dismiss all claims against the CSC, CCJD, and CJDRC based on sovereign immunity. Additionally, these entities are not persons subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.

- Request to dismiss claims against individually named Defendants for violations of Colorado law, because such claims are barred under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act and the Eleventh Amendment.
- Request to dismiss claims against Director Sullivan, who, in addition to governmental immunity, has absolute immunity from the asserted claims.
- Request to dismiss all claims for relief for failure to allege a plausible claim for relief, and failure to allege sufficient facts to support stated claims. This includes but is not limited to an argument to dismiss claims for failure to assert specific facts concerning individually named defendants, as well as arguments describing Mr. Gregory's failure to assert facts to plausibly state his enumerated claims for relief.
- Request to dismiss all claims based on generalized grievances for the "fundamental right to be heard," equal protection, and due process rights for lack of standing.
- Request to dismiss individual capacity claims under the doctrine of qualified immunity.
- Request to dismiss conspiracy claims based on failure to identify agreement between defendants and concerted action (1983, 1985), racial bias (1985(3)), or intent to deter court attendance or retaliate based on court attendance (1985(2)).

- Request to dismiss CFCA claim because it was not in effect when the alleged violation of the CFCA occurred. As such, Plaintiff cannot plead that he engaged in lawful acts in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to the CFCA or to stop a violation of the CFCA. Separately, Mr. Gregory's CFCA claim is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.
- Plaintiff fails to state a claim for relief under any additional theory, and Plaintiff is not entitled to any form of relief based on the various grounds for dismissal.

We appreciate your consideration on these motions, and your response on the motion for extension of time as soon as you're able to.

Best,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

----- Forwarded Message -----
From: Dan Combs (He/Him) <dan.combs@coag.gov>
To: ingrid.defranco@gmail.com <ingrid.defranco@gmail.com>
Cc: Clayton Ankney <clayton.ankney@coag.gov>
Sent: Monday, November 24, 2025 at 11:02:54 AM MST
Subject: Gregory v. Colorado Judicial Rulemaking Committee, et al., No. 25-cv-3361: conferral on motion to extend time and waiver

Hello Ingrid,

Clayton Ankney and I are reaching out to confer on a requested extension of time for the Defendants who have been served in Mr. Gregory's case. We will be asking the Court to set a Feb. 2, 2026 response deadline. That request is designed to ensure sufficient time for analysis and consideration of various claims, to permit a consolidated response on behalf of Defendants who are served or waive service, and to allow time for sufficient client and stakeholder review of a response. The request also reflects the limited work days in December, based on holiday and travel schedules for the defense team.

Please let us know today if you will object to that requested extension.

Also, please let us know if you would like to request waiver of service for the non-served Defendants. If so and waiver requests are sent, we'll confer with our clients and respond as soon as possible.

Many thanks,
Dan

Daniel M. Combs (he/him/his)

First Assistant Attorney General

Colorado Department of Law

Tort Litigation Unit

Phone: (720) 508-6625

Email: Dan.Combs@coag.gov

The statements and opinions in this email do not represent the statements and opinions of the Attorney General.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

Civil Action No. 25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB

CHRISTOPHER S. P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE COLORADO JUDICIAL RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.,

Defendants.

OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S "VERIFIED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL," ECF NO. 50

Plaintiff brings this action against 40 Colorado state entities and individuals, asserting a broad, undefined conspiracy spanning years and/or decades, to deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional rights and violate federal and state law. *See generally* ECF No. 1, Compl.; *see also* ECF No. 12 (asserting that conspiracy dates back to a 2007 criminal action). In his latest motion, Plaintiff seeks to disqualify the *entire* Colorado Office of the Attorney General ("COAG") on the basis that it is conflicted from representing Defendants due to its alleged participation in this conspiracy, because the COAG attorneys in this action are now somehow material witnesses due to the entry of default, and because one of the attorneys once procured a Special Assistant Attorney General ("SAAG") for Plaintiff. Plaintiff fails to set forth a legitimate basis for seeking disqualification, much less satisfying the high bar necessary for disqualification of a government attorney under State and federal law. This Court should deny Plaintiff's Motion.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

As Plaintiff recognizes, motions to disqualify opposing counsel are highly disfavored. ECF No. 50 at 12-13. Indeed, "courts are wary of motions to disqualify opposing counsel because they have the potential for misuse to gain a tactical advantage or to harass opposing counsel[.]" *O'Hanlon v. AccessU2 Mobile Sols., LLC*, 2018 WL 3586395, at *5 (D. Colo. July 26, 2018). Motions to disqualify government counsel are even more disfavored, with disqualification of government counsel considered "a drastic measure" which "a court should hesitate to impose . . . except where necessary." *United States v. Bolden*, 353 F.3d 870, 878-79 (10th Cir. 2003). Given this high burden placed on the movant, establishing grounds for disqualification is a "significant task." *Wisehart v. Wisehart*, 2018 WL 11182736, at *2 (D. Colo. Oct. 16, 2018). "Specific facts must be alleged and counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture." *Evans v. Dep't of Hous. & Urb. Dev.*, 2024 WL 3520142, at *1 (D. Colo. July 12, 2024) (citations omitted). Motions to disqualify counsel rest within the sound discretion of the trial court. *Fed. Deposit Corp. v. Isham*, 782 F. Supp. 524, 528 (D. Colo. 1992).

The Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct govern attorneys practicing in federal district courts in Colorado. D.C.Colo.L.Atty.R. 2; *Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs.*, 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994) (Motions to disqualify are governed by local professional rules and federal motions standards). Some courts also look to the ABA model rules, but here, the Colorado rules cited are identical in relevant parts to the ABA model rules. *See* ABA Model Rules 1.7, 1.18, 3.7, 1.10, 1.11;[1] *Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schs.*, 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994).

[1] Parts of ABA Model Rules 1.10 and 1.11 differ from the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, but those portions of the rules do not appear relevant or applicable here.

ARGUMENT

Plaintiffs' arguments for disqualification of the COAG are legally and/or factually wrong.

I. State Law Requires the COAG to Represent Defendants.

Plaintiff argues that the COAG has an "inherent conflict of interest" because Plaintiff is asserting claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, including claims under the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act, which allegedly preclude COAG representation of Defendants. ECF No. 50 at 8-9. Plaintiff is wrong as a matter of law.

Colorado state law requires the COAG to represent Defendants in this action. Under state law, the COAG is required to represent all executive and judicial branch agencies, which include each of the entities named as Defendants. §§ 24-31-101(1)(a), (m), 24-31-111, C.R.S. The Attorney General also has authority to "appear for the state . . . and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the state is a party or is interested when required to do so by the governor." §§ 24-31-101(1)(b), (c), C.R.S.

The COAG also represents the individual Defendants in this action because they are indemnified from Plaintiff's claims under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"). Specifically, the CGIA provides that a public entity is liable for the costs of defending its public employees and officials when claims arise from acts or omissions occurring within the scope of their official duties, except where the conduct is willful and wanton.[2] §§ 24-10-102, -110(1), C.R.S; *see also* § 24-10-103(4)(a), C.R.S. (defining "public employee" to include public officials

[2] Neither the Complaint nor the Motion to Disqualify includes any allegations of willful and/or wanton conduct. Regardless, even if Plaintiff included such allegations (which Defendants would vigorously dispute), that would be a matter of liability coverage between Risk Management (the State's self-insurer) and that Defendant. § 24-10-110(1), C.R.S. It is not a basis for disqualification that may be raised by Plaintiff.

and authorized volunteers of public entities, whether paid or unpaid). Claims indemnified by the CGIA include, broadly, liability claims and expenses, claims arising under federal law, and claims for compensatory damages, and the CGIA makes no distinction between employees named in their official or individual capacities. § 24-30-1510(3)(a), C.R.S.; *see also* 24-30-1507, C.R.S. (Obligating Risk Management to pay for legal services "for the defense of claims brought against the state."). Applied here, the COAG is properly representing the individual Defendants because the Complaint's allegations all pertain to actions taken pursuant to Defendants' official duties. *Compare* ECF No. 50 at 14 *with* ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff's assertion that he may seek to have a Whistleblower Act claim, which he apparently has already asserted in a sealed case, refiled as part of this action, would not disqualify the COAG. *See* ECF No. 50 at 9 & n.5. Speculation about future claims falls far short of the standard for disqualification. *O'Hanlon*, 2018 WL 3586395 at *5 (motions to disqualify "must be supported by more than speculation or conjecture"). Moreover, Plaintiff's assertion that the COAG is not permitted to represent Defendants if he brings a *valid* Whistleblower Act claim is false. ECF No. 50 at 9 (citing § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S.). Subsection 24-31-101(1)(m) applies only to the representation of employees within the State Personnel System[3] in claims arising under the Whistleblower Act, § 24-50.5-101, C.R.S., which Defendants are not. And in any event, in the sealed case the Court has apparently entered final judgment against Plaintiff. ECF No. 61. Put plainly, the Attorney General's Office is required to defend state institutions, employees, officials, and representatives against Plaintiff's claims. *Id.* § 24-31-101.

[3] The State Personnel System, created by Art. XII, Sec.13 of the Colorado Constitution, does not include employees of the judicial branch, assistant attorneys general, division directors like Director Sullivan, or members of boards and commissions.

II. Plaintiff's Generalized and Speculative Allegations Fail to Set Forth a Basis for Disqualification.

Plaintiff makes a number of generalized, unsupported arguments for disqualification. None come close to meeting Plaintiff's significant burden.

First, Plaintiff argues that his allegations of a broad-ranging conspiracy involving numerous state entities serve to disqualify the COAG because many COAG attorneys represent these entities, purportedly creating some unspecified conflict. ECF No. 50 at 10-11. Plaintiff ignores that the COAG is generally required to represent state entities, employees, and officials,[4] and Plaintiff offers no specific facts demonstrating a conflict based on COAG's compliance with its statutory duty to represent state entities and employees. *See, e.g., People ex rel. Woodard v. Brown*, 770 P.2d 1373, 1375-76 (Colo. App. 1989) (COAG may represent both prosecutor and decision policymaker, consistent with internal policies designed to separate functions).

Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendants' attorneys cannot represent Defendants because they are now fact witnesses regarding the entry of default and subsequent motion to set it aside. ECF No. 50 at 7. Plaintiff does not explain how the motion to set aside entry of default would require the testimony of COAG attorneys as fact witnesses. Regardless, an attorney is not disqualified if named as a fact witness unless the attorney is a necessary witness *at trial*. *See* Colo. RPC 3.7; *People v. Honstein*, 549 P.3d 970, 976 (Colo. 2024); *Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell*, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 (D. Colo. 2003) (Even where attorney was

[4] Plaintiff suggests that in the alternative, a SAAG could be appointed. ECF No. 50 at 2, 4. The attorney general has "sole discretion" to appoint SAAGs, except in circumstances where the governor, chief justice, or state auditor determines that the attorney general is unable, has failed, or has refused to provide legal services. §§ 24-31-101(1)(g), 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. Opposing parties play no role in that decision, and Plaintiff has alleged no legal basis for such demand.

disqualified as a material witness at trial, he could participate in pretrial activities). Moreover, attempts to disqualify opposing counsel by calling them as a witness are heavily disfavored. *Chapman Engineers, Inc. v. Nat. Gas Sales Co., Inc.*, 766 F. Supp. 949, 959 (D. Kan. 1991) ("Where the party seeking disqualification is also the one wanting to call the attorney as a witness, the court must be especially sensitive to the potential for abuse." (internal quotation and citation omitted)). Plaintiff has not articulated a basis for calling each of Defendants' attorneys as fact witnesses, much less as fact witnesses at trial. *See* CBA Ethics Op. 78 at 1[5] ("[A] lawyer should not routinely or lightly subpoena, identify as a potential witness, or call as a witness an opposing party's trial counsel . . . Doing so solely as a contrivance to disqualify opposing counsel (whether or not combined with a motion to disqualify) violates the Rules.").

Third, Plaintiff argues that counsels' arguments in this case constitute grounds for disqualification. ECF No. 50 at 11-12. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' attempts to restrict one of Plaintiff's filings that included details about confidential judicial discipline proceedings *in violation of state law* amount to "intimidation [] and retaliation." *Id.* The record of that Motion to Restrict Affidavit, ECF No. 30, speaks for itself and need not be relitigated here. Plaintiff also asserts without basis that "Defendants' Counsel supported the assignment of this case to District Judge Domenico and, then, opposed the Plaintiff's repeated requests (ultimately granted) reassigning this case. . . ." ECF No. 50 at 11-12. Defendants do not control the assignment of cases, and Defendants submitted no filing challenging Plaintiff's disqualification motions. ECF Nos. 7, 26. As Judge Domenico recognized, his recusal was not required, but he recused to

[5] *Available at* https://www.cobar.org/Portals/COBAR/repository/ethicsOpinions/FormalEthicsOpinion_78_2011.pdf.

remove any shadow of a doubt of partiality. ECF No. 32 at 9. Regardless, Plaintiff does not explain how Defendants' litigation positions constitute grounds for disqualification.

Finally, Plaintiff accuses Defendants' counsel of "committing various crimes" by representing Defendants. ECF No. 50 at 15. He then points to Independent Ethics Commission complaints that he filed against each COAG attorney that has entered an appearance in this case, arguing that "Defendants' Counsel have persistently refused to disqualify themselves and continue to do so even after they have received" copies of those complaints. ECF No. 50 at 12. At best, these allegations seek only to distract from the merits of this case, at worst; they are improper attempts at intimidation. *See Sequa Corp. v. Lititech, Inc.*, 807 F. Supp. 653, 659 (D. Colo. 1992) ("Motions to disqualify often pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process that they purport to prevent." (internal quotation omitted)).

III. Plaintiff Fails to Support Disqualification Based on Any of the Rules of Conduct.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendants' counsel have violated at least nineteen Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct, yet offers no specific facts that establish a violation of any one of them. *See* ECF No. 50 at 10. Indeed, beyond the facts of litigating this action, the *only* specific fact he alleges is a single exchange he had with one of Defendants' attorneys regarding an unrelated case, over two years prior to this action. ECF No. 50 at 14-15. Whether he is alleging a conflict as a current, former, or prospective client, the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct require much more to establish a disqualifying conflict.

Colo. RPC 1.7 provides that a conflict of interest between current clients exists if:

> (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

> Regarding duties to former clients, Colo. RPC 1.9(a) provides in relevant part:
>
> A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
>
> Regarding duties to potential clients, Rule 1.18 provides in relevant part:
>
> (a) A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client.
>
> * * *
>
> (c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter.

The facts do not support a violation of any one of those rules.[6] The case referenced by Plaintiff, *Dees v. Hood, et al.*, 1:24-cv-00848-PAB-NRN (D. Colo.), on appeal in Case No. 25-1274 (10th Cir.), was a *pro se* action that, at base, was a child custody dispute. Plaintiff was named as one of dozens of defendants based on his employment as the Commission on Judicial Discipline's executive director. *Dees*, ECF No. 1, Complaint, ¶ 24. The case was ultimately dismissed and is now on appeal. *Dees*, ECF No. 134, Order Accepting Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. As set forth in Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's Motion, Defendants' attorney Daniel Combs obtained a SAAG to represent Plaintiff, at Plaintiff's request, specifically because Plaintiff claimed he had interests adverse to the co-defendant judges or justices. ECF No. 50-1 at 3.

[6] For purposes of Plaintiff's Motion and so as not to insert any factual disputes, Defendants accept as true Plaintiff's allegations in his Motion regarding his interactions with Mr. Combs.

Mr. Combs never represented Plaintiff in *Dees*, *see* ECF No. 50 at 2, and there can be no conflict with Mr. Combs and the COAG now representing Defendants. By Plaintiff's own account, Plaintiff's interactions with Mr. Combs were limited to Plaintiff requesting an appointment of a SAAG based on a conflict perceived by Plaintiff. ECF No. 50 at 1-2. By definition, requesting a SAAG meant that Plaintiff did not want to be represented by the COAG. Colo. RPC 1.18, cmt. [2] ("a person who communicates with a lawyer for the purpose of disqualifying the lawyer is not a 'prospective client'"). Plaintiff had no reasonable expectation of attorney-client privilege with Mr. Combs. Moreover, the *Dees* matter was not "the same or a substantially related" matter within the meaning of Rules 1.9(a) or 1.18. *Dees,* which alleged a decade-long conspiracy related to a child custody dispute, is not arguably related to this case. *See Dees v. Hood et al.*, No. 1:24-cv-00848-PAB-NRN, ECF No. 1. Although both cases allege conspiracies between the judicial branch and dozens of defendants, the similarities end there.

Even assuming, *arguendo*, that Plaintiff had some expectation of attorney-client privilege in the information he conveyed to Mr. Combs as a *potential* client, he has not alleged that such information "could be significantly harmful to [him] in the same or a substantially related matter," as would be necessary to disqualify Mr. Combs. *See* Colo. RPC 1.18(c). Instead, he alleges merely that he "confided that he had been retaliated against in his role as Executive Director and that the current members and staff of the [Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline] were intentionally suppressing legitimate grounds for judicial discipline." ECF No. 50 at 1. That allegation is reflected in Plaintiff's Complaint and again in his Motion, so it is safe to say that "confidence" is not at issue. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 4, 7, 30-31.

Finally, Plaintiff's allegation that any conflict on Mr. Combs's part should be imputed to the entire COAG ignores the fundamental principle that conflicts of one member of a governmental entity are not imputed to other members of a government entity. *See* Colo. RPC 1.10(d), cmt. 11; Colo. RPC 1.11, cmt. [2]; *People v. Shari*, 204 P.3d 453, 459 (Colo. 2009) (The Colorado rules "make clear that a government attorney's individual conflicts are not imputed to the entire government agency for which he works."). Instead, the "generally accepted remedy" for a conflict is to disqualify a specific government attorney, "not all of the attorneys in the office." *United States v. Rodella*, 59 F. Supp. 3d 1331, 1348-49 (D. N.M. 2014) (discussing imputation of conflicts in a district of the U.S. Attorney's Office); *United States v. Williams*, 68 F.4th 564, 572 (9th Cir. 2023) (collecting cases demonstrating that "every circuit court that has reviewed an officewide disqualification [of the government] has reversed"). Plaintiff's request that this Court disqualify "the entire COAG", ECF No. 50 at 15, is an unwarranted, drastic remedy and without support.

CONCLUSION

Defendants respectfully request this Court deny Plaintiff's Motion and proceed to the merits of Defendants' motions to set aside default and dismiss.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of March 2026.

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Attorney General

s/ Nora Q. Passamaneck

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

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Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF HIS VERIFIED MOTION TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL

Comes now the Plaintiff, Christopher S. P. Gregory, for himself, and by and through his counsel, and hereby tenders his Reply in Support of his Verified Motion to Disqualify the Office of the Colorado Attorney General, stating as follows:

ARGUMENT

I. STATE LAW REQUIRES THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO PROVIDE LEGAL SERVICES IN ACCORDANCE WITH COLORADO LEGAL POLICIES.

Defendants' counsel argue that Colorado law requires them to represent the Defendants, citing §§ 24-31-101(1)(a), (m), 24-31-111, C.R.S. While this is accurate under normal circumstances, it is not without limitation. C.R.S. § 24-31-111(3) mandates that legal services provided to state

agencies be rendered, "in accordance with the legal policies of the state…" Subsection 5 further provides:

> Whenever the attorney general is unable, has failed, or refuses to provide legal services to a state agency, as determined by the governor if the agency is in the executive branch, or by the chief justice if the agency is in the judicial branch, or by the state auditor if the agency is the office of the state auditor, the agency may employ counsel of its choosing to provide such legal services. Any expense incurred due to the employment of counsel pursuant to this subsection (5) is a lawful charge against appropriations for this purpose made by the general assembly to the department of law.

Colorado's legal policies regarding attorney conduct are contained in the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provide, in pertinent part, at Rule 1.7:

> (a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:
> (1) the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
> (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
> (b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
> (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
> (2) the representation is not prohibited by law;
> (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and
> (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

The comments to the rule include:

> [2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the clients should be so advised.

[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be

> appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

Defendants' counsel ignore these highly-problematic rules, suggesting that they are trumped by the Attorney General's statutory authority. They are not: the statutes mandate that legal services be provided in conformity with these rules.

The Attorney General is, himself, a defendant in this case, and while many of his interests may align with other defendants', they are not co-extensive, particularly given his present gubernatorial campaign. The AAGs do not suggest that they have complied in any measure with their responsibilities to inform their clients fully of the perils of common representation, to inform any individual client of how his or her own interests may be compromised by those of another common client, or to seek the informed consent of each of their clients to those conflicts. Particularly given the malpractice which has occurred by causing and allowing a default to enter and the Plaintiff's expressed willingness to stipulate to setting aside the default on an individual basis provided that the AAG's conflicted representation is addressed, Rule 1.4 required that the AAGs inform their clients of the default and seek an informed consent and waiver from each.

> (a) A lawyer shall:
> (1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;
> (2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;
> (3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
> (4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
> (5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

> (b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

When, as here, it appears that the Office of the Attorney General, or its attorneys, cannot, consistent with Colorado's legal policies, provide legal services, there is a statutory provision which assures each defendant of counsel. Indeed, the office did precisely that with regard to Mr. Gregory. It provided independent counsel, because it could not proceed with conflicted representation.

II. THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL POSSESSES PRIVILEGED INFORMATION PROVIDED BY MR. GREGORY WHICH IT MAY NOT USE AGAINST HIM, BUT WOULD OTHERWISE BE COMPELLED TO USE IN DEFENSE OF ITS COMMON OR INDIVIDUAL CLIENTS.

Defendants' counsel erroneously assert that Mr. Gregory has identified no rules of professional conduct which they have violated or would violate by continuing common representation. They assert that Mr. Gregory's "interactions with Mr. Combs were limited to Plaintiff requesting an appointment of a SAAG based on a conflict perceived by Plaintiff." However, Mr. Gregory's communications with Mr. Combs were not simply limited to advising him that he needed separate counsel. He was necessarily obliged to provide sufficient information to enable Mr. Combs to make a determination of whether separate counsel was warranted (in compliance with Colorado's legal policies), and did so. In the process, he made Mr. Combs aware that a number of Combs's current common clients had violated his rights and behaved unlawfully, in material particulars, which he may not set forth here without waiving his claim of privilege. Moreover, and significantly, when Mr. Gregory requested the opportunity to provide input concerning selection of a SAAG (otherwise contemplated as the sole determination of the represented party), Mr. Combs denied the request and proceeded to directly appoint Andrew

Ringel of Hall and Evans, LLC, as Mr. Gregory's counsel. Mr. Combs denied Mr. Gregory the right to counsel of his choosing as contemplated by § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S.

In circumstances where a former client's communications are not at issue, an attorney must, consistent with his duty of advocacy, use damaging information against the opposing party and in support of his client(s). Here, the Assistant Attorneys General cannot satisfy their duty of advocacy and, but have provided no assurances that they are aware of this. Indeed, they argue that there was no attorney-client relationship between Mr. Gregory and Mr. Combs – and they also argue that any privilege has been waived – but they have not, apparently, advised their clients of this limitation on their ability to provide vigorous advocacy, nor sought their informed consent. Additionally, the AAGs unlawfully coerced the seizure of all of Mr. Gregory's records created while he served as Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline. It is critical to recognize that the Atty. Gen.'s Office had an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Gregory personally, as the CCJD's Executive Director, prior to his wrongful termination. Indeed, AAG and Defendant Gina Cannan advised Mr. Gregory as the CCJD's General Counsel on Mr. Gregory's efforts to develop personnel rules to protect himself against retaliation while simultaneously representing CCJD Chair and Defendant Mindy Sooter and CCJD Vice-Chair James Carpenter as they sought to retaliate against and terminate Mr. Gregory's employment. The Atty. Gen.'s Office is now representing Ms. Cannan and AAG and Defendant Alison Kyles for their part in Mr. Gregory's wrongful termination, the misuse of state funds to offer Mr. Gregory a non-disclosure agreement, and the coercive seizure of Mr. Gregory's records as Executive Director.

Further, Defendants' counsel do not address the fact that two of the attorneys who have entered their appearance in this case made themselves necessary witnesses when they permitted default to enter. The Defendants must present evidence of non-culpability in any attempt to lift the default. The meritorious defense prong is a legal question, and does not necessarily require evidence, but the issue of culpability is one of fact, for which evidence is required. Mr. Gregory, as the party opposing the motion, is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses who offer testimony of non-culpability, and may not be compelled, consistent with due process, to "confront" a motion which is not even verified.

The witnesses argue that they cannot be disqualified, because they are not necessary witnesses at trial, but they are mistaken. Mr. Gregory's claims are predicated on the knowing and intentional misconduct of the defendants over a number of years, and their refusal to receive or confront his complaints, or attempts to check their abuses, except to retaliate, and, as he has made clear, the deliberate decision to permit default to enter was a calculated action to avoid responding to his Complaint, or otherwise engaging the uncomfortable averments therein, and, fundamentally, more of the same. He intends to present that theory at trial, and will call the AAGs involved in order to establish the continual pattern of conduct by the Office of the Attorney General.

Finally, Defendants' counsel argue that they cannot **all** be disqualified, because Mr. Combs's conduct cannot be imputed to them. This is accurate, but not the issue. Certainly, the two witnesses could be ethically walled off from the case, and that is the typical practice. However, that device cannot serve its purpose here. Their boss's conduct is at issue, their chief is a defendant in this case, and they cite no case suggesting that when the chief is disqualified, his deputies are free to conduct business as usual. Mr. Gregory would not, were circumstances different, oppose

an ethical wall. However, when the decisionmaker, who is responsible for the actions of his deputies, is a defendant, an ethical wall is impossible. It cannot serve its purpose. With no practical means of walling off General Weiser, the office cannot continue to represent the Defendants.

III. THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL IS STATUTORILY PROHIBITED FROM REPRESENTING THE INDIVIDUALLY NAMED DEFENDANTS IN RESPONSE TO MR. GREGORY'S ALLEGATIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION.

The most objective basis for the disqualification of the Office of the Attorney General, however, is that it is statutorily prohibited from defending public servants against alleged violations of the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act (the CWPA). As Mr. Gregory noted in his motion to disqualify, a CWPA claim is included in his parallel sealed case, Case No. 25-cv-00190. At least some of the individually-named Defendants' violations of the CWPA have already been pled, and Mr. Gregory has the right to amend his sealed complaint in Case No. 25-cv-00190 to add all of the individually-named Defendants in this case. § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S.[1]

[1] § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S. states:

> Upon request of any employee in the state personnel system, shall represent such employee in any civil action or administrative proceeding instituted against such employee, either in the employee's official or individual capacity if the action or proceeding arises out of performance of the employee's official duties as determined by the attorney general and if the action or proceeding has not been brought by the state personnel director or the appointing authority of the employee seeking dismissal or other disciplinary action; except that the attorney general shall not represent any such employee in an action brought under section 24-50.5-105[(the CWPA)][.]

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, because the Office of the Attorney General is mandated by statute to provide legal services in accordance with Colorado legal policies, and cannot do so, because the office possesses privileged information which creates a conflict of interest, because at least two of the office's employees were directly responsible for the retaliation against Mr. Gregory and his conflicted representation as Executive Director, because two of the office's deputies have made themselves necessary witnesses, because its chief is a defendant in this case who is necessarily disqualified and cannot be walled off, and because § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S. mandates disqualification, the office is necessarily disqualified and must withdraw. Mr. Gregory's motion to disqualify the office should be granted.

Respectfully submitted this 25th day of March, 2026

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 25, 2026, I filed the above filing via email to the Clerk of the Court, who will docket it in CM/ECF. CM/ECF will send notification of this filing to any party who has entered an appearance in this matter to the e-mail addresses provided in CM/ECF.

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco

Ingrid J. DeFranco

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

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Civil Action No. 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB

CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY,

Plaintiff,

v.

The COLORADO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.

Defendants.

OFFER OF PROOF—MARCH 26, 2026 HEARING

The Plaintiff, Christopher S.P. Gregory, for himself and through his counsel, Ingrid J. DeFranco makes the following offer of proof in anticipation of the Court's scheduled March 26, 2026 hearing. The Court failed to provide notice of its intent to set the March 26, 2026 hearing and issued its setting order on March 17, 2026. An agenda for the hearing was not provided until 4:19 p.m. on March 18, 2026. As part of this Agenda of Issues, the Court requires the Plaintiff to respond to an order to show cause as to why he should not be sanctioned for quoting the text of F.R.C.P. 55(a), "otherwise defend," in his application for and declaration supporting a default successfully entering against all Defendants in this case on February 23, 2026. The Agenda of Issues specifically requires that: "The parties shall be prepared to present evidence." The expectation of an evidentiary hearing is stated as to the Plaintiff's response to the order to show cause and the Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel.

According to D.C.COLO.LCivR 45.1, subpoenas "shall be served no later than seven days before the date specified in the subpoena." Without a hearing agenda or a pre-hearing order

setting deadlines for witness lists, exhibit lists, motions deadlines, and other pre-hearing disclosures, the Court has failed to provide the parties and the Plaintiff specifically with a reasonable or meaningful opportunity to participate in a full and fair hearing. Moreover, when the Plaintiff requested that the March 26, 2026 hearing be continued because of the impossibility of serving witnesses with subpoenas according to D.C.COLO.LCivR 45.1, Judge Vratil responded, as follows:

> First, plaintiff could have issued subpoenas on short notice and fully complied with the applicable rules. Second, and much more importantly, plaintiff has not identified a single witness who will be unavailable to testify without a subpoena. Finally, plaintiff bases his motion to disqualify counsel on the fact that the Colorado Attorney General is providing a defense to individual defendants under the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act. This argument appears to present a legal issue which can be resolved on the face of the pleadings, without a need for fact witnesses. ECF No. 69.

Based upon the Court's Orders, the Plaintiff will participate in the March 26, 2026 hearing with the understanding and objection that the Court is denying him his basic due process rights to cross-examine adverse witnesses, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel. *Pointer v. Texas*, 380 U.S. 400, 405 (2005).

In order to preserve error for appeal and the pursuit of other extraordinary relief, including seeking Writs of Mandamus, the Plaintiff submits the following offer of proof as to the testimonial evidence he would present, if allowed to do so.

1. **Mary V. Sooter**--As an individually named Defendant and former Chair of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD), Ms. Sooter would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the Colorado Attorney General's Office (the COAG) as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Sooter would be cross-examined as to

why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Ms. Sooter can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) while simultaneously advising Ms. Sooter and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Sooter would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Sooter would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Sooter was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Sooter would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

2. **Philip J. Weiser**-- As Colorado's Attorney General and the supervisory head of the COAG, Mr. Weiser would be cross-examined as to the conflicted representation that was simultaneously provided to the Plaintiff and the CCJD by AAG Gina Cannan, his subordinates roles in the Plaintiff's wrongful termination, his awareness of his subordinate Kristen Grooms's suppression of the Plaintiff's public comments as part of the judicial discipline rulemaking process, and his approval of the consolidated representation of all Defendants in this case, including himself personally. This cross-examination would include questioning Mr. Weiser as to why having the public resources of his office used to defend against allegations of public fraud and whistleblower retaliation by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Mr. Weiser would also be asked about the procedures that were followed and communications that occurred when a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) was appointed to represent the Plaintiff in response to *Dees, et al. v. Hood, et al.*, 1:24-cv-00848-PAB-NRN (D. Colo). With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Weiser would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Weiser would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties (through his subordinate attorneys) had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire

without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Weiser was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Weiser would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. Finally, Mr. Weiser would be cross-examined as to why he has allowed the COAG to continue representing the individually named Defendants in this case when he is expressly and statutorily prohibited from doing so according to § 24-31-101(1)(m), C.R.S.

3. **Jared Polis**-- As Governor of the State of Colorado, Mr. Polis would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Polis would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Polis would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Polis was informed that the Plaintiff would

consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Polis would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

4. **Maria Berkenkotter**--As a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Berkenkotter would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Berkenkotter would be cross-examined as to whether she and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Berkenkotter would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Berkenkotter was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Berkenkotter would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

5. **Susan Blanco**-- As the Justice appointed by Governor Jared Polis to replace Justice Melissa Hart on the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Blanco is not individually named as a defendant in this case. Nevertheless, as a member of the Colorado Supreme Court and a judicial officer, Justice Blanco has administrative authority that includes overseeing the legal representation of the Colorado Supreme Court as an institution. Justice Blanco would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against (rather than prosecute) allegations of public fraud by the individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Justice Blanco would be cross-examined as to whether she has been informed of the Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel as it relates to the COAG's continuing representation of the State of Colorado and, specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court in these proceedings. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Blanco would be cross-examined as to whether she and the other Justices were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Blanco would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the Justices that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Blanco was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Blanco

would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individual Justices consenting to continuing representation of the Colorado Supreme Court as an institutional defendant. Finally, Justice Blanco would be cross-examined tends to her knowledge of the Plaintiff's request that the Colorado Legislature refer the overall Colorado Judicial Scandal to conflict-free federal law enforcement and to direct the Colorado State Auditor to appoint another state's attorney general as a SAAG capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado (apart from the personal interests of the Justices, Governor Polis, Attorney General Weiser, and the other individually named Defendants).

6. **Brian D. Boatright**--As a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Boatright would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Boatright would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Boatright would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice

Boatright was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Boatright would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

7. **Richard Gabriel**-- As a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Gabriel would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Gabriel would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Gabriel would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Boatright was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Gabriel would be further asked whether the COAG

has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

8. **Melissa Hart**--As a former justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Hart would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Hart would be cross-examined as to whether she and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Hart would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Hart was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Hart would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. The Plaintiff would specifically cross-exam Justice Hart as to the reasons for her taking a personal leave of absence and, then, resigning from the Colorado Supreme Court on December 19, 2025. Justice Hart would

be cross-examined as to whether her knowledge of the Plaintiff's federal attorney discipline complaint filed against her and her husband, DOJ-Denver Office Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos, and the public filing of the present action contributed to her leave and resignation. Finally, the Plaintiff would inquire whether Justice Hart's husband, Mr. Traskos, had informed her of the existence and substance of the Plaintiff's parallel sealed case, 1:25-cv-00190-KHV-GEB.

9. **William Hood, III**-- As a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Hood would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Hood would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Hood would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Hood was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Hood would be further asked whether the COAG has individually

obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

10. **Monica Márquez**-- As a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Márquez would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Márquez would be cross-examined as to whether she and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Márquez would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Márquez was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Márquez would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. Finally, Justice Márquez testified to the Colorado Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2026 as part of the Colorado Judicial Department's SMART Act presentation. Justice Márquez would be

cross-examined as to her awareness of the contents of the Plaintiff's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11" when she testified. The cross-examination will inquire as to why Justice Márquez failed to disclose the merits of the more than 25-year ongoing pattern of public fraud in public corruption described in the Affidavit.

11. **Carlos Samour**-- As a justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, Justice Samour would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Justice Samour would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Justice Samour would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys knowingly allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Justice Samour was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Justice Samour would be further asked whether the COAG has individually

obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

12. **Clayton Ankney**-- With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Ankney would be cross-examined as to whether he or his colleagues advised the individually named Defendants of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Ankney would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that he and his colleagues allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Brown or her colleagues informed the individually-named Defendants that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Brown would be further asked whether she and her colleagues have individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. If such waivers have been obtained, the Plaintiff would separately request that they be produced.
13. **Ingrid Barrier**--As an individually named Defendant, a former COAG employee, a current Colorado Department of Public Safety employee, and a current CCJD member, Ms. Barrier would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Barrier would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition

of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Ms. Barrier can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) while simultaneously advising Ms. Barrier and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Barrier would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Barrier would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Barrier was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Barrier would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

14. **Michael H. Berger**—As a not yet individually named defendant, a former Colorado Court of Appeals Judge, a senior judge, and a member of the CJRDC, Judge Berger would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his prospective

personal attorney in this case and as the attorney for the CJRDC as an institutional defendant. Specifically, Judge Berger would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Berger would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Berger would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Berger was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Berger would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

15. **David Beller**--As an individually named Defendant and a member of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee (the CJDRC), Mr. Beller would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Mr. Beller would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of

the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Beller would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Beller would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Beller was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Beller would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

16. **Jill Brady**--As an individually named Defendant, a current 4th Judicial District Court Judge, and the current CCJD Vice-Chair, Judge Brady would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Brady would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's

Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Judge Brady can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) while simultaneously advising Judge Brady and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Brady would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Brady would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Brady was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Brady would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

17. **Katherine J. Brown**--With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Brown would be cross-examined as to whether she or her colleagues advised the individually named Defendants of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally,

Ms. Brown would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that she and her colleagues allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Brown or her colleagues informed the individually-named Defendants that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Brown would be further asked whether she and her colleagues have individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. If such waivers have been obtained, the Plaintiff would separately request that they be produced.

18. **Gina Cannan**--As an individually named Defendant, a current COAG employee, the CCJD's assigned general counsel, and the Independent Ethics Commission's assigned Counsel, Ms. Cannan would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Cannan would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud and retaliation by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Ms. Cannan can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when she provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) while simultaneously advising the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. Additionally, Ms. Cannan can be

questioned as to her coercive actions (in concert with AAG Alison Kyles) used to unlawfully seize the Plaintiff's records as Executive Director of the CCJD. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Cannan would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Cannan would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Cannan was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Cannan would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

19. **James Carpenter**--As an individually named Defendant, the former Chief of Staff for Governor Bill Ritter, a professional lobbyist, and the current CCJD Chair, Mr. Carpenter would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Mr. Carpenter would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S.

Moreover, Mr. Carpenter can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the CCJD while simultaneously advising Mr. Carpenter and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Carpenter would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Carpenter would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Carpenter was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Carpenter would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. Finally, Mr. Carpenter testified to the Colorado Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2026 as part of the CCJD's SMART Act presentation. Then, on February 9, 2026, Mr. Carpenter testified before the Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee in support of Governor Jared Polis's appointment of Bob Gardner to the CCJD. Mr. Carpenter would be cross-examined as to his awareness of the contents of the Plaintiff's "Affidavit of

Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11" when he testified. The cross-examination will inquire as to why Mr. Carpenter failed to disclose the merits of the more than 25-year ongoing pattern of public fraud in public corruption described in the Affidavit.

20. **Nancy Cohen**--As an individually named Defendant and a member of the CJDRC, Ms. Cohen would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Cohen would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Cohen would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Cohen would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Cohen was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Cohen would be further asked whether the COAG has

individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

21. **Daniel M. Combs**—As the lead counsel in this case for the COAG, Mr. Combs would be cross-examined as to his prior receipt of attorney-client information from the Plaintiff and the procedures that were followed and communications that occurred when a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) was appointed to represent the Plaintiff in response to *Dees, et al. v. Hood, et al.*, 1:24-cv-00848-PAB-NRN (D. Colo). Mr. Combs can respond to questions as to the conflicts involved in providing representation to individually-named Defendants, who include other former and current COAG employees within the COAG. Such conflicts are particularly acute regarding AAG Gina Cannan and AAG Alison Kyles, who were directly responsible for the coerced seizure of the Plaintiff's records as Executive Director of the CCJD. Mr. Combs can be questioned as to the problems with the COAG controlling and not returning material evidence relevant to the Plaintiff's claims in both the present case and the sealed *qui tam* case. The Plaintiff would also cross-examine Mr. Combs as to the COAG's strategy of intimidation and threats relied upon to suppress public access to the Plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. § 144 Affidavit filed in this case. Additionally, the Plaintiff would cross-examine Mr. Combs as to the COAG's opposition to the Plaintiff's requests for District Judge Daniel D. Domenico's recusal and for the Plaintiff's cases to be re-assigned to a district judge from outside the 10th Circuit. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Combs would be cross-examined as to whether he or his colleagues advised the individually named Defendants of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend"

this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Combs would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that he and his colleagues allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Combs or his colleagues informed the individually-named Defendants that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Combs would be further asked whether he and his colleagues have individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. If such waivers have been obtained, the Plaintiff would separately request that they be produced.

22. **Bryan Fields**-- As the Chief of the US DOJ-Denver Office Transactional Organized Crime and Money-Laundering Section, Mr. Fields would be cross-examined as to why he refused to communicate with the Plaintiff after an initial October 19, 2023 conversation in which the Plaintiff discussed the overall Masias Controversy and the need for further Federal investigation. At that time, the Plaintiff was still employed as the Executive Director of the CCJD. Additionally, the Plaintiff would cross-examine Mr. Fields as to the reasons why the US DOJ-Denver Office did not disqualify itself at the outset and transfer the Masias investigation to another office because of the marital relationship between Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos and then-Justice Melissa Hart. The Plaintiff would further inquire as to who made the no file decision and the decision to close the investigation into the Colorado Judicial Scandal.

23. **Robert Gardner**--As an individually named Defendant, a former Colorado State Senator, and a current CCJD member, Mr. Gardner would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Mr. Gardner would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Gardner would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Gardner would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Gardner was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Gardner would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. Finally, Mr. Gardner testified to the Colorado Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2026 as part of the CCJD's SMART Act presentation. Then, on February 9, 2026, Mr. Gardner testified before the Colorado

Senate Judiciary Committee as part of his confirmation hearing. Mr. Gardner would be cross-examined as to his awareness of the contents of the Plaintiff's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11" when he testified. The cross-examination will inquire as to why Mr. Gardner failed to disclose the merits of the more than 25-year ongoing pattern of public fraud in public corruption described in the Affidavit.

24. **Sara Garrido**--As an individually named Defendant, a current Jefferson County Court Judge, and a current CCJD member, Judge Garrido would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Garrido would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Judge Garrido can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the CCJD while simultaneously advising Judge Garrido and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Garrido would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Garrido would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that

the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Garrido was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Garrido would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

25. **Kirsten Grooms**--As an individually named Defendant, a current COAG employee, and the CJDRC's assigned general counsel, Ms. Grooms would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Grooms would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud and retaliation by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Ms. Grooms can testify to her advising the CJDRC to reject / refuse to publish the Plaintiff's public comments as to proposed rule changes, which is the primary basis for the Plaintiff's civil rights claims in the present case. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Grooms would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Grooms would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the

awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Grooms was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Grooms would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

26. **Jeremy Gross**--Mr. Gross is the Special Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned in the Plaintiff's parallel sealed *qui tam* case. Mr. Gross would be cross-examined as to his refusal to complete the customary initial relator interview with the Plaintiff and to otherwise coordinate an investigation of the public fraud alleged in the Plaintiff's complaint within the DOJ and through the assistance of the FBI. Additionally, Mr. Gross can respond to why he has sought the dismissal of claims in the sealed *qui tam* case without first having the opportunity to investigate the case in conjunction with a another state's attorney general appointed as a SAAG and capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado. The Plaintiff will further question Mr. Gross as to his opposition to the mandated disqualification of District Judge Daniel D. Domenico from the Plaintiff's cases, the government's position and opposition regarding the Plaintiff's pending FRCP 59(e) motion, and Mr. Gross's present opposition to Plaintiff's request for assignment of his cases to a district judge from outside of the 10th Circuit. The Plaintiff

will directly question Mr. Gross as to whether he had any conversations with President Donald J. Trump's personal attorney, Peter Ticktin, or with U.S. DOJ—Denver Office Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos.

27. **James Hartmann**-- As an individually named Defendant, a former 19th Judicial District Court Chief Judge, a senior judge, and a former member of the CJDRC, Judge Hartmann would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Hartman would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Hartmann would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Hartmann would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Hartmann was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Hartmann would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the

other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. Finally, Judge Hartmann could respond with the reasons and timing of his resignation from the CJDRC.

28. **Amanda Hollander**--As an individually named Defendant and a member of the CJDRC, Ms. Hollander would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Hollander would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Hollander would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Hollander would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Hollander was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Hollander would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

29. **Alison Kyles**-- As an individually named Defendant and a current COAG employee, Ms. Kyles would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Kyles would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud and retaliation by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Ms. Kyles can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (the CCJD) while simultaneously advising the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. Additionally, Ms. Kyles can be questioned as to her coercive actions (in concert with AAG Cannan) used to unlawfully seize the Plaintiff's records as Executive Director of the CCJD. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Kyles would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Kyles would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Kyles was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis,

if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Kyles would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

30. **Bryon Large**-- As an individually named Defendant, the Colorado Presiding Disciplinary Judge, and a member of the CJDRC, Judge Large would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Large would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Large would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Large would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Large was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Large would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC

1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

31. **Anne Mangiardi**--As an individually named Defendant, a former COAG employee, a member of the CJDRC, and the CCJD's current Executive Director, Ms. Mangiardi would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Mangiardi would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Mangiardi would be cross-examined as to whether she and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Mangiardi would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Mangiardi was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Mangiardi would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation. Finally,

Ms. Mangiardi testified to the Colorado Legislative Joint Judiciary Committee on January 21, 2026 as part of the CCJD's SMART Act presentation. Then, on February 9, 2026, Ms. Mangiardi testified before the Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee in support of Governor Jared Polis's appointment of Bob Gardner to the CCJD. Ms. Mangiardi would be cross-examined as to her awareness of the contents of the Plaintiff's "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11" when she testified. The cross-examination will inquire as to why Ms. Mangiardi failed to disclose the merits of the more than 25-year ongoing pattern of public fraud in public corruption described in the Affidavit.

32. **Colin McDonald**--Mr. McDonald is the recently confirmed First Assistant Attorney General in charge of the newly created Justice Department's National Fraud Enforcement Division. On January 1, 2026, the Plaintiff communicated directly with Mr. McDonald to inform him of the Colorado Judicial Scandal and the overall claims of public fraud alleged in the Plaintiff's pending actions. The Plaintiff did not receive any response. The Plaintiff would cross-examine Mr. McDonald as to why there has been no response to his repeated reports of public fraud, notwithstanding that such reports have been submitted to multiple federal agencies and to Mr. McDonald personally.

33. **Caitlin McGovern**--Ms. McGovern is a Special Agent assigned to the FBI's Denver Office. Starting in April 2024, Ms. McGovern received reports of fraud from the Plaintiff, including the Plaintiff's anonymously filed October 20, 2024 request for evaluation (RFE) of judicial conduct. Ms. McGovern would be cross-examined as to

why the FBI has taken no action in response to the Plaintiff's reporting of public fraud and the more recent filing of the sealed *qui tam* case.

34. **Bonnie McLean**--As an individually named Defendant, a current 18th Judicial District Court Judge, and a former CCJD member, Judge McLean would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge McLean would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Judge McLean can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the CCJD while simultaneously advising Judge McLean and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge McLean would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge McLean would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge McLean was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the

default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge McLean would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

35. **Colleen McManamon**--As an individually named Defendant, a member of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Adjudicative Board (the CJDAB), and a member of the CJDRC, Ms. McManamon would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. McManamon would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. McManamon would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. McManamon would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. McManamon was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms.

McManamon would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

36. **Kristen Mix**-- As an individually named Defendant, a former U.S. Magistrate Judge, a member of the CJDAB, and a member of the CJDRC, Judge Mix would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Mix would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Mix would be cross-examined as to whether she and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Mix would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Mix was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Mix would be further asked whether the COAG has individually

obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

37. **Reed Owens**--As an individually named Defendant, a 5th Judicial District Court Judge, and a current CCJD member, Judge Owens would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Owens would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Owens would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Owens would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Owens was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Owens would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

38. **Nora Quinto Passamaneck**—Ms. Passamaneck entered her appearance as counsel of record for the individual Defendants on March 23, 2026. Because Ms. Passamaneck was aware of the Plaintiff's motion to disqualify counsel and its grounds at the time of her entry of appearance, the Plaintiff would cross-examine Ms. Passamaneck as to the reasons for her entry into this case.

39. **Meredith Patrick Cord**--As an individually named Defendant, a current El Paso County Court Judge, and a current CCJD member, Judge Patrick Cord would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Patrick Cord would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Patrick Cord would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Patrick Cord would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Patrick Cord was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for

disqualification of counsel. Judge Patrick Cord would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

40. **Kate Shimroff**-- Ms. Shimroff is the Legislative Audit Manager in charge of the Colorado State Auditor's Fraud Hotline. Ms. Shimroff would be cross-examined as to whether the OSA has disclosed otherwise confidential information relating to the Plaintiff's Fraud Hotline complaints to the Defendants. Moreover, Ms. Shimroff can testify to the OSA's refusal to discuss the Plaintiff's request for Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to appoint another state's attorney general as a SAAG through her authority under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S.

41. **Aubrey C. Sullivan**--As an individually named Defendant and Executive Director of the Colorado Division of Civil Rights, Ms. Sullivan would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Sullivan would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Sullivan would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Sullivan would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to

extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Sullivan was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Sullivan would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

42. **Edward P. Sullivan**--Mr. Sullivan is a Senior Litigation Counsel assigned to the US DOJ's Public Integrity Section. In October 2023, the Plaintiff spoke with Mr. Sullivan and discussed the overall Masias Controversy. Mr. Sullivan referred the Plaintiff to Bryan Fields in the US DOJ-Denver Office. Although the Plaintiff would later inform Mr. Sullivan of his retaliatory termination and other information, Mr. Sullivan did not respond to communications following the initial exchange. The Plaintiff would cross-examine Mr. Sullivan as to who is responsible within the DOJ and the FBI for deliberately disregarding the Plaintiff's reports of public fraud.

43. **Courtney Sutton**--As an individually named Defendant and a current CCJD member, Ms. Sutton would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Sutton would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S.

With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Sutton would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Sutton would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Sutton was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Sutton would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

44. **Jeff Swanty**--As an individually named Defendant, a 19th Judicial District Court Judge, a member of the CJDAB, and a member of the CJDRC, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's

malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Vigil was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Vigil would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

45. **Peter Ticktin**-- Mr. Ticktin is President Donald J. Trump’s personal attorney and is currently representing former Mesa County Clerk Tina Peters, who is currently seeking a commutation of her prison sentence from Governor Jared Polis. The Plaintiff would cross-examine Mr. Ticktin as to whether he has had any conversations with SAUSA Jeremy Gross, Civil Division Chief Kevin Traskos, or other individuals in which he was asked to stop or otherwise prevent further investigation into the Plaintiff’s allegations of public fraud and public corruption through the DOJ, the FBI, or any other Federal agency.

46. **Emily Tofte Nestaval**--As an individually named Defendant and a current CCJD member, Ms. Tofte Nestaval would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Tofte Nestaval would be

cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Tofte Nestaval would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Tofte Nestaval would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Tofte Nestaval was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Tofte Nestaval would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

47. **Kevin Traskos**—Mr. Traskos is the Civil Division Chief of the U.S. DOJ—Denver Office. Mr. Traskos is also former Justice Melissa Hart's husband. Mr. Traskos would be cross-examined as to his receipt of the complaint and other filings in the parallel sealed *qui tam* case, 1:25-cv-00190-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.). Specifically, Mr. Traskos would be cross-examined as to whether he has violated the seal in the parallel qui tam

case, including providing information of its existence and contents to his wife. The Plaintiff will directly question Mr. Traskos as to whether he had any conversations with President Donald J. Trump's personal attorney, Peter Ticktin, with the intent of undermining the Plaintiff's cases. Additionally, the Plaintiff will cross-examine Mr. Traskos as to why (with his marital relationship to Justice Hart) the US DOJ-Denver Office did not disqualify itself when the Colorado Judicial Scandal /Masias Controversy was first investigated by the FBI in 2020. Moreover, the plaintiff will cross-examine Mr. Traskos as to who in his office were involved in making no file decisions and closing the investigation into the Masias controversy.

48. **Stefanie Trujillo**--As an individually named Defendant and the current CCJD Secretary, Ms. Trujillo would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Ms. Trujillo would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Ms. Trujillo can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the CCJD while simultaneously advising Ms. Trujillo and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Ms. Trujillo would be cross-examined as to whether her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or "otherwise defend" this

action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Ms. Trujillo would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Ms. Trujillo was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Ms. Trujillo would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

49. **MaryAnn Vielma**--As an individually named Defendant, a current Adams County Court Judge, and the former CCJD Secretary, Judge Vielma would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as her personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Vielma would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by herself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Judge Vielma can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the CCJD while simultaneously advising Judge Vielma and the other Commissioners to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Vielma would be cross-examined as to whether

her and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Vielma would be cross-examined to confirm her awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Vielma was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Vielma would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from her and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

50. **Vincente Vigil**--As an individually named Defendant, a 19th Judicial District Court Judge, a member of the CJDAB, and a member of the CJDRC, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely

motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Judge Vigil would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Judge Vigil was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Judge Vigil would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

51. **Jeffrey M. Walsh**--As an individually named Defendant, a member of the CJDRC, and the CCJD's Special Counsel, Mr. Walsh would be cross-examined as to the disqualification of the COAG as his personal attorney in this case. Specifically, Mr. Walsh would be cross-examined as to why using the public resources of the COAG to defend against allegations of public fraud by himself and the other individually-named Defendants does not itself meet the definition of "occupational fraud" under Colorado's Fraud Hotline statute, § 2-3-110.5(1)(d), C.R.S. Moreover, Mr. Walsh can testify to the conflicted representation that was provided by the COAG when AAG Gina Cannan provided legal counsel to the Plaintiff as Executive Director of the CCJD while simultaneously advising the Commissioners and Mr. Walsh to facilitate the wrongful and retaliatory termination of Plaintiff's employment. With regards to the issue of sanctions against the Plaintiff, Mr. Walsh would be cross-examined as to whether he and the other

individually named Defendants were advised of the COAG's malpractice in failing to answer or “otherwise defend" this action by filing a timely motion under F.R.C.P. 12. Additionally, Mr. Walsh would be cross-examined to confirm his awareness and the awareness of the other individually named defendants that the parties had agreed to extending the answer deadline to February 16, 2026, but that the COAG's attorneys allowed even that agreed deadline to expire without first seeking a further extension from the Plaintiff.. The Plaintiff would further inquire whether Mr. Walsh was informed that the Plaintiff would consider stipulating to setting aside the default on an individual basis, if the COAG were willing to address the need for disqualification of counsel. Mr. Walsh would be further asked whether the COAG has individually obtained Colo. RPC 1.4 waivers from him and the other individually-named Defendants consenting to continuing representation.

Dated: March 26, 2026

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on March 26, 2026, I filed the above filing via email to the Clerk of the Court, who will docket it in CM/ECF. CM/ECF will send notification of this filing to any party who has entered an appearance in this matter to the e-mail addresses provided in CM/ECF.

/s/ Ingrid J. DeFranco
Ingrid J. DeFranco

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

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CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

CHRISTOPHER S. P. GREGORY,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	**Case No. 25-3361-KHV-GEB**
	)	
THE COLORADO JUDICIAL DISIPLINE RULEMAKING COMMITTEE, et al.	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	
	)	

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel ("Motion") (ECF No. 50). Plaintiff seeks an order disqualifying the entire Colorado Department of Law/Colorado Attorney General's Office ("COAG") from representing Defendants in this case. After reviewing the parties' briefing, hearing the arguments of counsel, and a through discussion, the Court orally **DENIED** Plaintiff's Motion **(ECF No. 78).** This Order memorializes the Court's rulings from the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion.

I. Procedural Background[1]

Plaintiff, a former member and the Executive Director of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline ("CCJD"), filed his Complaint on October 23, 2025. Defendants include: 1) the Colorado Judicial Discipline Rulemaking Committee ("CJDRC"); 2) the CCJD; 3) the Colorado Supreme Court; 4) the Colorado Attorney General and Governor of the State of Colorado, both individually and in their official capacities; and 5) over 30 additional Defendants, including appointed members of the CCJD, employees of the CCJD, Colorado Supreme Court Justices, appointed members of the CJDRC, appointed members of the Colorado Judicial Discipline Adjudicative Board ("CJDAB"), Colorado District Court Judges, Colorado County Court Judges, and directors of Colorado state government divisions, all in their individual capacities.

Plaintiff's claims include interference with the legislative, administrative, and judicial discipline processes in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; conspiracy to interfere with civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; negligence in preventing the alleged conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986; retaliation in violation of the Colorado False Claims Act - § 24-31-1204(8); and other claims for equitable relief or reimbursement of the State of Colorado. He alleges certain Defendants covered up financial misconduct of then Chief of State for the State Court Administrator's Office, Mindy Masias and they conspired to suppress his reporting of judicial and other official misconduct. He further

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, the information recited in this section is taken from the Complaint (ECF No. 1). This background information should not be construed as judicial findings or factual determinations.

alleges he was terminated from the CCJD for seeking accountability for the alleged misconduct.

Since Plaintiff filed his Complaint in October 2025, this case has struggled to move forward in a substantive way. The parties have been mired in discussions and motion practice related to disqualification of judges. A certain District of Colorado District Judge recused themself,[2] a Senior District Judge exercised his option to have the case reassigned,[3] and a second District Judge granted Plaintiff's Motion to Reassign Case.[4] After the case was reassigned to District Judge Kathryn H. Vratil and referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff sought to disqualify the newly assigned judges from the District of Kansas.[5] Both District Judge Vratil and the undersigned denied Plaintiff's motion.[6]

Defendants sought two unopposed Motions for Extension of Time to answer or otherwise respond.[7] The second motion was not ruled on prior to the assignment of Judge Vratil and referral of the undersigned. With the second motion still pending, but admittedly two days after the requested extension of time had run, Plaintiff filed his Application for Entry of Default on February 18, 2026.[8] In response, Defendants filed a Motion to Strike

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[2] District Judge Regina M. Rodriguez - ECF No. 5.
[3] Senior District Judge R. Brooke Jackson - ECF No. 37.
[4] District Judge Daniel D. Domenico - ECF No. 34 finding Plaintiff's allegations do not create any actual bias or need for recusal under Section 1144 or Section 455(b)(1). But because Plaintiff's allegations include events which took place within the Attorney General's Office while he was a senior member of the office, there was some risk a reasonable person might question his impartiality. Therefore, out of an abundance of caution Judge Domenico recused himself pursuant to Section 455(a).
[5] Motion to Disqualify Judge Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455, ECF No. 78.
[6] Orders, ECF Nos. 82 and 83.
[7] ECF Nos. 19 and 27.
[8] ECF No. 39.

the Application for Entry of Default the following day.[9] With the Motion to Strike pending, a Clerk's Entry of Default was entered on February 23, 2026.[10] The Clerk's Entry of Default has since been set aside.[11]

Between the time the Clerk's Entry of Default was entered and when it was set aside, Plaintiff filed the current Motion. Judge Vratil set a hearing to address multiple issues, pled in a flurry of motions, including the current Motion, on March 26, 2026. Defendants filed their response to the Motion on March 23, 2026 and Plaintiff filed his reply on March 25, 2026. Without advising the Court it was forthcoming and during a break in the hearing, Plaintiff filed a fifty page Offer of Proof.[12] The Court found the filing untimely and declined to consider it.[13] Plaintiff, however, as his own counsel was heard on the Motion.

II. Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Disqualify Counsel (ECF No. 50)

Plaintiff argues defense counsel of record and the entire COAG must be disqualified from their representation of Defendants for the following reasons: 1) Plaintiff established an attorney-client relationship with Assistant Attorney General Daniel Combs when they met to discuss the appointment of a Special Assistant Attorney General for Plaintiff in *Dees, et al. v. Hood*, *et al.*, 24-cv-00848-PAB (D. Colo); 2) defense counsel will be necessary witnesses regarding Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default, an anticipated Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and at trial; 3) the COAG may not represent public employees

[9] ECF No. 40.
[10] ECF No. 46.
[11] Courtroom Minutes, ECF No. 90.
[12] ECF No. 87.
[13] Courtroom Minutes, ECF No. 90.

named as Defendants in an action brought under the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act ("CWPA"); and 4) it is a conflict of interest for the COAG to use the resources of the office to defend Attorney General Philip Weiser and the other Defendants in this matter where Plaintiff alleges public fraud and the COAG has the obligation under state statue to investigate and prosecute claims of public fraud.

a. Legal Standard

The legal standard regarding this issue, although not simple, is well established. A motion to disqualify counsel lies within the sound discretion of the Court.[14] Plaintiff as the moving party has the burden to establish the grounds for disqualification.[15] "Motions to disqualify opposing counsel are generally disfavored."[16] "[C]ourts have historically been highly cynical of motions to disqualify opposing counsel, noting that such motions are often dilatory or tactical devices."[17] "Specific facts must be alleged and counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture."[18]

And, Motions to disqualify counsel in a federal case are substantive motions which affect the rights of the parties and must be decided by applying federal law.[19] "[A]ttorneys in federal cases are not only 'bound by the local rules of the court in which they appear,'

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[14] *Banks v. Jackson*, No. 20-2074-NYW, 2022 WL 1451904, at *9 (D. Colo. May 9, 2022) (citing *Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Sch.*, 43 F.3d 1373, 1383 (10th Cir. 1994)).
[15] *Id.* (citing *Quark, Inc. v. Power Up Software Corp.,* 812 F. Supp. 178, 179 (D. Colo. 1992)).
[16] *Id.* (collecting cases).
[17] *Id.* (quoting *Fognani v. Young*, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005) (collecting cases)).
[18] *Id.* (quoting *FDIC v. Sierra Res., Inc.*, 682 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D. Colo. 1987)).
[19] *Id.* (citing *Helmer v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,* No. 12-0685-RBJ, 2013 WL 328951, at *3 (D. Colo. Jan. 29, 2013)).

but also by 'the ethical rules announced by the national profession and considered in light of the public interest and the litigants' rights.'"[20] The District of Colorado has "adopted the Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct as its standards of attorney responsibility."[21] "As a general rule, courts do not disqualify an attorney on the grounds of a conflict of interest unless the [ ] client moves for disqualification."[22] "The rationale of this general rule is to prevent the Rules of Professional Conduct from being used as a procedural weapon by opposing parties and thereby subverting the purpose of the rules, which is to protect clients…."[23] "Nevertheless, a motion to disqualify opposing counsel may be granted where 'the interests of the public are so greatly implicated that an apparent conflict of interest may tend to undermine the validity of the proceedings.'"[24]

b. Discussion

Plaintiff has gone to great lengths to disqualify the COAG from representing Defendants regarding the issues raised this matter. He has repeatedly sought to have the issues raised herein referred to "conflict-free federal law enforcement" and to have the Colorado General Assembly direct the Colorado State Auditor to appoint an other state's attorney general as a Specially Appointed Attorney General ("SAAG"). His efforts began well before he filed this action and continued through the filing of this Motion. On April

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[20] *Id.* (quoting *Cole*, 43 F.3d at 1383).
[21] *Id.* (citing see *Cope v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,* 437 F. Supp. 3d 890, 894 (D. Colo. 2020)).
[22] *Id.* (quoting *Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus.,* 855 F. Supp. 330, 334 (D. Colo. 1994) and collecting cases).
[23] *Mercantile Adjustment Bureau LLC v. Flood*, 278 P.3d 348, 353-54 (Co. S. Ct. 2012).
[24] *Banks*, 2022 WL 1451904, at *9. (quoting Kirzhner v. Silverstein, No. 09-2858-CMA, 2010 WL 2998792, at *4 (D. Colo. July 28, 2010)).

28, 2025, Plaintiff raised the issue before a Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing.[25] He drafted a proposed joint resolution regarding the appointment of a SAAG and testified regarding same at the Joint Judiciary Committee January 21, 2026 SMART Act hearing regarding Colorado Judicial Department presentation; the February 9, 2026 Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearing regarding the appointment of former Senator Robert Gardner to the CCJD; and the February 11, 2026 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing regarding SB26-084.[26] On March 4, 2026, Plaintiff made formal complaints to the Colorado Independent Ethics Commission against Assistant Attorneys General and counsel of record in this matter Clayton Ankney, Katherine Brown, and Daniel Comb.[27] Not having success in the other venues, Plaintiff sought relief here.

With defense counsel entered in the case, ongoing discussions between counsel on several issues, and a motion for extension of time to answer or otherwise respond pending, as previously stated, Plaintiff filed his Application for Entry of Default; a Clerk's Entry of Default was entered within a few days; and the day default was entered, defense counsel began to confer with Plaintiff regarding their proposed motion to set aside default.[28] Plaintiff declined to confer regarding the default until they conferred regarding his allegations of conflicts of interest, including the necessity to file the current Motion.[29] Plaintiff indicated his position is the only good cause to set aside the default would be if

[25] ECF No. 50, p. 2-3.
[26] ECF No. 50, p. 3, n 2.
[27] ECF No. 50-5, pp. 1-4, 9-12, and 21-24.
[28] ECF No. 50-7, p. 6.
[29] *Id.*, p. 4.

defense counsel were disqualified.[30] Plaintiff's Motion indicates defense counsel refused to disqualify themselves even after he filed ethics complaints about them with the Colorado Senate and Independent Ethics Committees.[31] The next statement in his Motion says "[t]he non-disqualification of Defendants' Counsel is the principal reason for the entry of default."[32] It is clear to the Court Plaintiff has endeavored to use every tactical device available to him as leverage to disqualify defense counsel. Nonetheless, the Court will address each of Plaintiff's arguments in turn.

i. Attorney-Client Relationship with Assistant Attorney General Daniel Combs

Plaintiff was a named defendant in *Dees, et al. v. Hood*, *et al.*, 24-cv-00848-PAB (D. Colo). He was sued after he was no longer employed by the CCJD, but the allegations against him related to his official functions as its former Executive Director. Therefore, Mr. Combs contacted him about arranging representation for Plaintiff in that matter. Plaintiff alleges during this conversation he told Mr. Combs details regarding his allegations he had been retaliated against in his position as Executive Director of the CCJD and the current members of the CCJD were suppressing legitimate grounds for judicial discipline. After Plaintiff's discussion with Mr. Combs on July 26, 2024, Andrew Ringel of Hall and Evans, LLC was appointed as a SAAG to represent Plaintiff in *Dees*. Mr. Combs advised Plaintiff by email on July 29, 2024 he would be arranging representation by a SAAG.[33] Just three

[30] *Id.*, p. 3.
[31] ECF No. 50, p. 12.
[32] *Id.*
[33] Motion, ECF No. 50-1, p. 4.

days later on August 1, 2024, Mr. Combs advised Plaintiff by email that Mr. Ringel would be acting as SAAG and would be in contact about representing him.

At the March 26th hearing, Plaintiff acknowledged neither Mr. Combs nor anyone from COAG entered an appearance on his behalf in the *Dees* matter.[34] The only other interactions Plaintiff alleges between him and Mr. Combs regarding the *Dees* case relate to his request he have some say in who should be appointed as the SAAG. Based upon the one discussion and limited email correspondence about the appointment of a SAAG, which Plaintiff attaches to his motion,[35] and considering Mr. Ringel represented Plaintiff in the *Dees* matter, as further discussed below the Court finds Plaintiff has not shown that he entered into an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Combs.

"A person who consults with a lawyer about the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client."[36] Defendants argue Plaintiff's communications with Mr. Combs were for the purpose of disqualifying him as counsel. A "person who communicates with a lawyer for the purposes of disqualifying the lawyer is not a "prospective client."[37] The Court disagrees. It does not find the communications between Plaintiff and Mr. Combs were for the purpose of disqualifying Mr. Combs from representing him in *Dees*. Plaintiff must be provided the protections given to a prospective client under Colo. R. Prof. Conduct Rule 1.18. "A lawyer…shall not

[34] Transcript, ECF No. 91, p. 16, ll. 14-17.
[35] Motion, ECF No. 50-1, pp. 3-5.
[36] Colo. R. Prof. Conduct Rule 1.18(a).
[37] Rule 1.18, cmt. 2.

represent a client with interest materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or substantially related matter…."[38]

The Court takes judicial notice of the Complaint in *Dees*[39] and finds the *Dees* case and the instant case are not the same or substantially related matters. In the *Dees* case, Ms. Dees sued her ex-husband; his current wife; and twenty-four additional defendants, including Mr. Gregory, various judges, law enforcement officers, and personnel from the district attorney's office regarding issues related to her divorce, custody, termination of parental rights, and adoption case, as well as her criminal prosecution. Her claims against Mr. Gregory are related to the CCJD's dismissal of complaints she made against members of the judiciary. Defendants allege "[a]lthough both cases allege conspiracies between the judicial branch and dozens of defendants, the similarities end there.[40] The Court agrees. Mr. Combs is not disqualified from representing Defendants based upon a claim of an attorney-client relationship between he and Plaintiff.

ii. Defense counsel will be Necessary Witnesses Regarding Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default, an Anticipated Motion for Preliminary Injunction, and at Trial

Plaintiff alleges Daniel Combs, Clayton Ankney, and Katharine Brown will collectively be necessary witnesses regarding: 1) the circumstances regarding the entry of the Clerk's Entry of Default at a hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Default; 2) an

[38] Colo. R. Prof. Conduct Rule 1.18(c).
[39] *Buhendwa v. Reg'l Transp. Dist.,* 82 F. Supp. 3d 1259, n. 2 (D. Colo. 2015) (District court may take judicial notice of other cases filed in the same court.)
[40] Response, ECF No. 71, p. 9.

anticipated Motion for Preliminary Injunction; and 3) at trial, regarding the amount of damages awardable as reasonable attorney's fees and costs associated with the representation of any individually named Defendants found to be liable; the alleged misconduct of Defendants, including Attorney General Philip Weiser; and counsel's conferral and meetings with Plaintiff regarding the handling of this matter which are allegedly relevant to his retaliation claim. Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment has been decided.[41] District Juge Vratil did not require additional evidence, beyond that in the parties' briefing, to decide the motion.[42] No witnesses were called in support of Defendants' motion. Thus, defense counsel were not necessary witnesses regarding the Motion to Set Aside Default. The Court will address the claim defense counsel will be called as a necessary witness in the future.

"Colo. RPC 3.7(a) is directed at the lawyer's courtroom activity, preventing the lawyer from acting as an 'advocate at trial.'"[43] "Before an advocate will be disqualified under Colorado Rule 3.7, it must be 'likely' that the lawyer will be a 'necessary' witness."[44] "It has been held that the advocate's testimony must be necessary, and not merely cumulative, and that the court may delay ruling on a motion to disqualify until it can determine whether another witness can testify."[45] "Thus, a lawyer is a

[41] Minute Entry, ECF No. 90, p. 3 (ORDERED: [47] Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Entry of Default is SUSTAINED. Clerk's Entry of Default [46] is VACATED. Plaintiff shall respond to Defendants' motion to dismiss by April 1, 2026—14 days after the date of its filing.).
[42] Transcript, ECF No. 91, p. 39, ll. 20-25.
[43] *Fognani v. Young*¸ 115 P.3d 1268, 1276 (S. Ct. Colo. 2005).
[44] *World Youth Day, Inc. v. Famous Artists Merchandising Exchange, Inc.,* 866 F.Supp. 1297, 1302 (D. Colo. 1994) (quoting *CBA Ethics Committee Opinion, Formal Opinion No. 78: Disqualification of the Advocate/Witness*, 23 The Colorado Lawyer 2087 (September 1994)).
[45] *Id.*

'necessary' witness if his or her own testimony is relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere."[46]

Plaintiff has not identified any issues that defense counsel would be called as a witness at an anticipated Motion for Preliminary Injunction, much less proved such testimony relevant, material and unobtainable elsewhere. He has failed to meet his burden that defense counsel would be a necessary witness regarding such a motion should it be filed.

Plaintiff raises three issues which he alleges defense counsel would be necessary witnesses regarding at trial. First, is the amount of damages owed to the State of Colorado for providing legal services to any individual Defendant who is found liable. Colo. R. Prof. Conduct Rule 3.7(a)(2) specifically permits a lawyer to advocate at trial in which he or she is likely to be a necessary witness regarding "the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case." Second, is regarding the alleged misconduct of Defendants, including Attorney General Philip Weiser. Plaintiff provides few specifics. Testimony regarding the Defendant's alleged misconduct is very likely relevant. But Plaintiff has neither shown the generalized areas of testimony are material or unobtainable elsewhere. In fact, Plaintiff admitted during the hearing that where discovery in this matter has not begun, he does not know whether there are other witnesses or documentary evidence on these topics.[47] Third, Plaintiff raises defense counsel's conferral and meetings with him and general handling of this matter. Plaintiff alleges counsel's actions such their position on his Motions to

[46] *World Youth Day, Inc.,* 866 F.Supp. at 1302.
[47] Transcript, ECF No. 91, p. 36, ll. 1-25.

Disqualify judges in this matter or as filing a Motion to for Leave to Restrict Plaintiff's Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel amount to intimidation and censorship which he alleges is relevant to his retaliation claim. The Court has decided all such motions. Daniel Combs, Clayton Ankney, and Katharine Brown are not defendants in this case. Plaintiff has not shown counsel's filing of motions or their position on Plaintiff's motions after his Complaint was filed is relevant to his claim that Defendants retaliated against him by harassing, wrongfully terminating, blackballing, or defaming him in violation of the Colorado False Claims Act. His claims are speculation and counsel cannot be disqualified on the basis of speculation or conjecture.[48] Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden to prove defense counsel should be disqualified as necessary witnesses.

iii. Colorado Attorney General may not represent public employees named as Defendants in an action brought under the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act

Plaintiff alleges C.R.S. § 24-31-101(1)(m) expressly prohibits the Attorney General from using the resources of his Office to represent the public employees named as Defendants in this action on any claim against them personally brought pursuant to the CWPA at C.R.S. § 24-50.5-101, et seq. First and foremost, it must be noted Plaintiff raises seven claims in this matter none of which is a claim under the CWPA. Plaintiff, in a footnote indicates he includes a claim for violation of the CWPA in the "parallel and related

[48] *Banks v. Jackson*, 2022 WL 1451904, at *9 (quoting *FDIC v. Sierra Res., Inc.*, 682 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D. Colo. 1987)).

sealed case" and "with the **possibility** of the refiling of that claim into the present case, the COAG is statutorily prohibited from is continued representation of Defendants."[49] The Court will not disqualify defense counsel based upon this speculation.[50] Plaintiff is warned the Court, while taking into consideration the applicable law, will not look favorably on a motion for leave to amend to add a claim under the CWPA as a further tactic to disqualify defense counsel.

Next, comparing C.R.S. § 24-50.5-101 with C.R.S. § 24-31-1204(8), Plaintiff endeavors to analogize the anti-retaliation provisions of the CWPA and CFCA. Based upon their purported similarity, Plaintiff argues the COAG should be disqualified from representing the individual Defendants on his claims under the CFCA. But regardless of whether the two provisions are analogous, C.R.S. § 24-31-101(1)(m) only prohibits the COAG from representing an employee in the state personnel system in an action brought under § 24-50.5-105, the CWPA. Plaintiff cites no caselaw, and the Court is aware of none, which enlarges the prohibition against the COAG representing employees in the state personnel system in an action brought under the CWPA to such employees in an action brought pursuant to the CFCA. Therefore, the Court will not disqualify defense counsel on this basis.

[49] Motion, ECF No. 50, p. 9 (emphasis added).
[50] *Banks v. Jackson*, 2022 WL 1451904, at *9 (quoting *FDIC v. Sierra Res., Inc.,* 682 F. Supp. 1167, 1170 (D. Colo. 1987)).

iv. It is a Conflict of Interest for the COAG to use the Resources of the Office to Defend Attorney General Philip Weiser and the Other Defendants in this Matter where Plaintiff Alleges Public Fraud and the COAG has the Obligation under State Statue to Investigate and Prosecute such Claims

Plaintiff alleges the State of Colorado has no legitimate interest in protecting the individual capacity Defendants from personal liability and damages arising from his legal claims. To the contrary, Plaintiff argues that Attorney General Philip Weiser, as Colorado's chief law enforcement officer, is obligated to investigate and prosecute allegations of civil rights violations, public fraud, false claims, and other forms of official misconduct. Thus, Plaintiff alleges it is a conflict of interest for Attorney General Weiser to use the resources of his office to represent himself, his current and former subordinates, and friends against Plaintiff's claims.

Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, state law requires the COAG to represent the state entity Defendants. The Attorney General "[s]hall act as the chief legal representative of the state and be the legal counsel and advisor of each department, division, office, board, commission, bureau, and agency of state government…."[51] He or she "[s]hall appear for the state and prosecute and defend all actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, in which the state is a party or is interested when required to do so by the governor."[52] Only when "the attorney general is unable, has failed, or refuses to provide

[51] C.R.S.. § 24-31-101(1)(a).
[52] C.R.S.. § 24-31-101(1)(b). *See also Anderl v. Dept. of Human Servs*, No. 25CA0117, 2026 WL 965362, at *4 (Colo. App. April 9, 2026) (Finding no "appearance of bias, undermining the integrity of the proceedings" when "Attorney General's office represent[ed] [the Department]

legal services to a state agency,…the agency may employ counsel of its choosing to provide such legal services."[53] "Any expense incurred due to the employment of counsel pursuant to this subsection (5) is a lawful charge against appropriations for this purpose made by the general assembly to the department of law."[54] Plaintiff argues the COAG is unable to represent, i.e., provide legal services to the state agencies. He bases this argument on his allegation that he is a concurrent client of AAG Daniel Combs. But as discussed, *supra* in section II(b)(i), the Court finds Plaintiff has neither shown that he entered into an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Combs nor that *Dees* and this case are the same or substantially related matters. Where the Court finds Mr. Combs is not disqualified from representing Defendants based upon a claim of an attorney-client relationship between he and Plaintiff, this is not a basis for finding the COAG is unable to provide legal services to the state agencies which are Defendants herein.

Turning to the individual Defendants, the COAG argues it may represent them in this action because they are covered by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA") C.R.S. § 24-10-101, et seq. "It is also recognized that public employees, whether elected or appointed, should be provided with protection from unlimited liability so that such public employees are not discouraged from providing the services or functions required by the citizens or from exercising the powers authorized or required by law."[55]

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while also having received previous complaints from [her] on related issues, raising concerns about impartiality.)

[53] C.R.S. § 24-31-111(5).

[54] *Id.*

[55] C.R.S. § 24-10-102.

‘“Public employee’ means an officer, employee, servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity, whether or not compensated, elected, or appointed….”[56] “A public entity shall be liable for: (a) [t]he costs of the defense of any of its public employees, whether such defense is assumed by the public entity or handled by the legal staff of the public entity or by other counsel, in the discretion of the public entity, where the claim against the public employee arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, except where such act or omission is willful and wanton.”[57] Although Plaintiff’s claims against the individual Defendants are made against them individually,[58] they are related to the Defendants’ performance of his or her duties within the scope of their employment.[59] Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege the willful or wanton conduct of any Defendant.[60] In the discretion of the Defendant public entities, the representation of the individual Defendants is being undertaken by the COAG. Where the COAG is required under state statute to represent the state entity Defendants, state statute requires a public entity be liable for the costs of the defense of any of its public employees, and where COAG has undertaken the representation of the individual Defendants, in the discretion of their public entity employers, the Court finds it is not a conflict of interest for the COAG to represent Defendants though the COAG is obligated to investigate and prosecute allegations of civil

[56] C.R.S. § 24-10-103.
[57] C.R.S. § 24-10-110(a)(a).
[58] Plaintiff’s claims against Philip Weiser and Jared Polis are also made against them in the official capacities as the Attorney General and Governor of Colorado, respectively.
[59] *See* Complaint, ECF No. 1, generally.
[60] *Id.*

rights violations, public fraud, false claims, and other forms of official misconduct. Where the Court finds no basis for disqualification of defense counsel of record, there is, of course, no basis to disqualify the COAG office as a whole.

For the reasons discussed during the hearing as set forth above, **IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED** Plaintiff's Motion **(ECF No. 50)** is **DENIED.** The Court declines Plaintiff's request to direct Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her authority under C.S.R. § 24-31-111(5) to appoint another state's attorney general to represent the interests of the State of Colorado as a Special Assistant Attorney General.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated the 20th day of April 2026.

s/ Gwynne E. Birzer
GWYNNE E. BIRZER
United States Magistrate Judge

Denver County District Court, **State of Colorado** 1437 Bannock Street, Room 256, Denver, CO 80202	DATE FILED April 24, 2026 2:38 PM FILING ID: 257140076E75B CASE NUMBER: 2026CV31374
Plaintiff(s): CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY, *Qui Tam* Relator. v. Defendant(s): KERRI HUNTER, in her official capacity as Colorado State Auditor.	▲COURT USE ONLY▲
Counsel for Christopher Gregory: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq. 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont, CO 80502 Phone: (970) 648-0642 Fax: (970) 648-0643 E-Mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net Atty. Reg. # 37095 Law Office of Ingrid J. DeFranco, PLLC Ingrid J. DeFranco, esq. P.O. Box 128 Brighton, CO 80601 Telephone: (303) 641-6812 Email: Ingrid.DeFranco@gmail.com Atty. Reg. # 31206	Case No: 26CV031374 Division: 209
DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY RE: C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5; EXHIBIT 1	

State of Colorado)
)
County of Boulder)

Christopher S.P. Gregory, Colo. Atty. Reg. No. 37095 ("Declarant") being of lawful age, of sound mind, and declaring under penalty of perjury, deposes[1] and says the following:

[1] This unsworn declaration is submitted in lieu of an affidavit, as allowed by C.R.C.P. 108 and § 13-27-101, et seq.

1. Declarant is the Plaintiff in this action and this Declaration is based upon Declarant's personal knowledge and made in good faith.

2. This action, brought under C.R.C.P. 106, arises from the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court knowingly concealing material information and evidence from then-Colorado State Auditor Dianne Ray (who was performing federally mandated functions) and from the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline for over two years (from December 2018 through February 2021). Specifically, the Justices concealed their roles in collectively approving a $2.66-$2.75 million hush money contract with then-Colorado State Court Administrator's Office Chief of Staff Mindy Masias, which was to be paid using taxpayer dollars and which was negotiated through a memorandum detailing numerous examples of unreported judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. The Justices' collective misconduct has been admitted to and proven through *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44.

3. Declarant seeks relief in the form of mandamus and/or prohibition requiring Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter to exercise her authority under § 24-31-111(5), C.R.S. to appoint another state's attorney general as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) capable of accepting service of Declarant's sealed *qui tam* complaint and impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado. Declarant recognizes that in order for this Court to be fully informed as to the issues before it, this Court must have access to and a full understanding of the current procedural status and background of Declarant's underlying *qui tam* case. *United States and State of Colorado ex rel. Gregory, et al. v. Masias, et al.*, 1:25-cv-00190-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.) (Sealed). Accordingly, through a separate Notice of Deposit, Declarant will submit the complete court file from *Ex rel. Gregory* to this Court, under seal. According to CRE 201, Declarant requests that this Court take judicial notice of the submitted sealed court file. Declarant further notes that, in immediate response to the filing of the present C.R.C.P. 106 action (and without allowing any input from the State of Colorado through the requested appointment of another state's attorney general as a SAAG), U.S. Senior District Court Judge Kathyrn H. Vratil dismissed Declarant's federal *qui tam* claims in *Ex rel. Gregory*. Declarant intends to appeal and to separately seek judicial disqualification through a petition for mandamus and/or prohibition.

4. With his "Amended Verified Complaint for Relief Under the Colorado False Claims Act, § 24-31-1204, C.R.S., and for Mandamus and Other Injunctive Relief Under C.R.C.P. 106," Declarant filed the "Affidavit of Judicial Bias or Prejudice According to 28 U.S.C. § 144 and Certificate of Counsel; Exhibits 1-11" from Defendant's related federal case, *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.* (*Gregory*), 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.) as suppressed. The Affidavit of Judicial Bias was filed as suppressed because the U.S. District Court has, over Declarant's objections, applied a Level 1 Restriction under D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2(b) (allowing access to "the parties and the court").

5. Because the federal EM/ECF system does not allow filers to restrict access to documents, the Affidavit of Judicial Bias was originally available to public access. Only

after the *Gregory* Defendants, through the Colorado Attorney General's Office, emailed U.S. District Court Judge Daniel D. Domenico's Chambers directly was a Level 1 Restriction applied to the Affidavit of Judicial Bias without an opportunity for Declarant to object. When Judge Domenico later recused himself from Declarant's pending cases, he did not vacate his order restricting public access to the very document that mandated and caused his recusal.[2] After the Declarant's cases were directly reassigned to U.S. Senior Judge Kathyrn H. Vratil and Magistrate Judge Gwen E. Birzer by 10th Circuit Chief Judge Jerome A. Holmes and Chief District Judge Philip A. Brimmer, Declarant's arguments to vacate Judge Domenico's order restricting public access were ignored and, upon the Colorado Attorney General's motion, the restrictions were maintained with additional requirements that Declarant submit future case filings under similar restrictions.[3] The censorship imposed by the Colorado Attorney General's Office is perhaps the best example of why the relief requested through the present C.R.C.P. 106 is necessary. Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser (as an individually-named defendant in *Gregory* and with knowledge that *Ex rel. Gregory* contains claims brought under the Colorado Whistleblower Protection Act[4]) cannot feign that the Office he controls and the attorneys whom he supervises are capable of impartially representing the interests of the State of Colorado in investigating and prosecuting the alleged public fraud, including false claims.

6. Declarant maintains that he has an absolute privilege, an ethical duty, and a constitutional right to publicly report the judicial, attorney, and official misconduct

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[2] In conjunction with the filing of the Affidavit of Judicial Bias in *Gregory*, Declarant filed a substantially similar Affidavit of Judicial Bais into his parallel sealed *qui tam* case. *Ex rel. Gregory*, ECF Nos. 66 and 68. For background and this Court's benefit, a copy of the Affidavit of Judicial Bias in *Ex rel. Gregory*, Judge Domenico's original recusal order, and Judge Domenico's amended recusal order are included with the separately filed sealed court file.

[3] Just as it is necessary for this Court to have the full context of *Ex rel. Gregory*, it is necessary for this Court to understand the context and status of *Gregory*. Accordingly, Declarant is providing a copy of the court file in *Gregory* (excluding the suppressed Exhibit 3) through submission of a Notice of Deposit and a separate USB drive. As with the court file in *Ex rel. Gregory*, Declarant requests, under CRE 201, that this Court take judicial notice. In order for this Court to fully understand the unlawful nature of the U.S. District Court's orders restricting public access, this Court should consider the grounds through which Declarant has moved for the recusal of Judge Vratil and Magistrate Birzer as well as Judge Vratil's response of threating Declarant with sanctions for having raised the issue of judicial disqualification. *Gregory*, ECF Nos. 77 through 83, 92. Declarant emphasizes that it is attorney misconduct for the Colorado Attorney General's Office and the U.S. Department of Justice to withhold knowledge of grounds for judicial disqualification and to oppose Declarant's request for disqualification when the standards for mandatory recusal have been satisfied under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455(b)(1). *See generally* ABA Formal Opinion 522 (April 8, 2026) (attached as Exhibit 1).

[4] According to § 24-31-101(1)(m), the Colorado Attorney General is statutorily prohibited from using the resources of his office to defend state employees against claims of whistleblower retaliation brought by a current or former state employee.

described in the Affidavit of Judicial Bias. *Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia*, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). In order to avoid any possible arguments that the U.S. District Court has authority to censor or prevent the public reporting of judicial, attorney, and/or official misconduct, it is necessary to file Exhibit 3 to the Amended Complaint as suppressed with the opportunity for Declarant to brief and argue why this Court must exercise its independent authority to make the document publicly available. Publication of Exhibit 3 to the Amended Complaint is also consistent with this Court's mandatory reporting obligations and the prohibitions against retaliation provided according to § 13-5.3-106(4), (6)(b)(III), C.R.S.

7. On April 17, 2026, this Court issued its "Order to Supplement Motion to Authorize Suppressed Filing of Exhibit 3. Specifically, as to the basis for suppression under C.R.C.P. 121 § 1-5, this Court directed Declarant to address "the nature of the limitation, the duration of the limitation, and the reason for the limitation."

8. The nature of the limitation is the suppression of Exhibit 3 to the Amended Verified Complaint. The duration of the limitation is the time deemed necessary by this Court to determine whether Exhibit 3 should be made publicly accessible. The reasons for the limitation are otherwise detailed in this Declaration.

9. Through her "Recusal," dated April 24, 2026, Denver District Judge Heidi L. Kutcher has recused herself from this case and has stayed the Court's April 17, 2026 Order to Supplement. Denver District Judge Sarah B. Wallace has also recused herself from this case. Nevertheless, Declarant submits this Declaration to inform the Court's further actions while pending further judicial reassignment.

10. Additionally, and reflective of continuing official misconduct, the CCJD, through the Colorado Attorney General's Office has moved to intervene in this case for the purposes of maintaining the suppression of Exhibit 3. Through further briefing, Declarant will assert that the CCJD and the Colorado Attorney General's Office do not have standing to intervene in this action.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the law of the State of Colorado that the foregoing statements made in this Declaration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on the 24th day of April, 2026, at Longmont, Colorado.



Christopher S.P. Gregory

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

DATE FILED
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Formal Opinion 522 **April 8, 2026**

Lawyer's Obligation to Disclose Information About Grounds for a Judge's Disqualification

ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. When a lawyer in a proceeding possesses information that the lawyer knows is reasonably likely to give rise to a judicial disqualification obligation, Rule 8.4(d) requires the lawyer, as an officer of the court, to disclose that information to the tribunal. When the lawyer possesses the information only because it is "information relating to the representation of a client," then the lawyer's disclosure obligation is subject to the lawyer's duty of confidentiality under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6.

I. Introduction

ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct ("MCJC") Rule 2.11 outlines circumstances that require judges to recuse themselves from proceedings. Rule 2.11(a) begins by setting forth the general recusal standard: "A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned . . . ." It then provides a nonexclusive list of circumstances in which judges must be recused, subject in certain circumstances to the parties' waiver of disqualification.[1] Among the kinds of circumstances that may call for a judge's recusal are familial and significant personal relationships with parties or lawyers in an action, economic interests implicated by the action, and extrajudicial knowledge of or involvement in the events underlying the action.[2]

Judges are expected to raise recusal questions themselves, as they best know the relevant information. Comment [5] to Rule 2.11 instructs judges to "disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification." Comment [2] explains that "[a] judge's obligation not to hear or decide matters in which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion to disqualify is filed."

This Opinion addresses lawyers' obligations under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model Rules") when the lawyer represents a client in a matter before the tribunal and a judge fails to raise the possibility of recusal, but the lawyer knows information establishing that the judge

[1] MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 2.11(A)(1)-(6). Comment [1] to Model Code of Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11 explains: "Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of paragraphs (A)(1) through (6) apply. In many jurisdictions, the term 'recusal' is used interchangeably with the term 'disqualification.'"

[2] Although the rule itself does not contain expansive guidance on the types of relationships that may be perceived to compromise a judge's impartiality, judicial decisions and ethics opinions collectively give considerable guidance to lawyers who learn information that may be relevant to a judge's analysis on issues related to recusal and disqualification. For example, ABA Formal Opinion 488 examines three categories of relationships between judges and lawyers or parties: (1) acquaintances, (2) friendships, and (3) close personal relationships.

EXHIBIT
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must consider recusal because of the possibility that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.[3] This Opinion is limited to lawyers' ethical obligations under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and does not address substantive recusal law or standards governing judges' disqualification obligations under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct.

II. Subject to the duty of confidentiality, Model Rule 8.4(d) requires a lawyer who knows information that is reasonably likely to give rise to a judicial recusal obligation to disclose that information to the tribunal.

Outside of ex parte proceedings, lawyers have no duty under the Model Rules to inform the tribunal of all material facts necessary to make informed judicial decisions.[4] However, in certain circumstances lawyers in judicial proceedings have a limited duty to disclose procedural or jurisdictional information, as distinct from evidentiary information. Although the obligation originates in judicial decisions, a failure to comply with the obligation may be the basis for professional discipline under Model Rule 8.4(d).

A. The Lawyer's Role as an Officer of the Court

Judicial decisions recognize that, as officers of the court, lawyers have an "overarching duty of candor to the Court,"[5] which requires certain disclosures of important procedural or jurisdictional information, even though no rule or law expressly requires such disclosure.[6] For example, in *Tiverton Board of License Commissioners v. Pastore*, 469 U.S. 238 (1985), the United States Supreme Court found that a party's lawyer was obligated to disclose that the party had gone out of business because that information made the case moot. The Court stated: "It is appropriate to remind counsel that they have a 'continuing duty to inform the Court of any development which may conceivably affect the outcome' of the litigation." *Id.* at 240.

Other judicial decisions have similarly recognized that lawyers must disclose circumstances and events with important procedural significance. These circumstances have included procedural deficiencies that, if unaddressed, could result in the denial of a fair trial and the reversal of a conviction.[7] These also include filings and decisions in other jurisdictions that may strip the court of jurisdiction, make further work by the court unnecessary, or be important to the scheduling of a

[3] The Model Rules define knowledge as "actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f). Knowledge in the Model Rules means more than a mere possibility or suspicion.

[4] In an ex parte proceeding, Model Rule 3.3(d) requires a lawyer to "inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse." That is because in an ex parte proceeding "there is no balance of presentation by opposing advocates"; therefore, to enable the court to achieve "a substantially just result," which is the object of the proceeding, "[t]he lawyer for the represented party has the correlative duty to make disclosures of material facts known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes are necessary to an informed decision." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3, cmt. [14].

[5] Eagan by Keith v. Jackson, 855 F. Supp. 765, 790 (E.D. Pa. 1994).

[6] The Committee recognizes that there are variations among jurisdictions on how disclosure would occur. Nothing in this opinion is intended to supersede jurisdiction-specific authorities on that issue.

[7] *See, e.g.*, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-86 (1978) ("[Criminal] defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem.").

case.[8]

In some circumstances, knowing nondisclosure will be prejudicial to the administration of justice because, for example, the judge is unaware that the court lacks jurisdiction to continue the proceedings, the court would be committing a procedural error that jeopardizes the fairness of the proceedings, or the proceedings are procedurally deficient in some other legal respect.

For example, in ABA Formal Op. 280 (1949), which predates the ABA's adoption of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, this Committee determined that, "An attorney should advise the court of decisions adverse to his case which opposing counsel has not raised if the decision is one which the court should clearly consider in deciding the case, if the judge might consider himself misled by the attorney's silence, or if a reasonable judge would consider an attorney who advanced a proposition contrary to the undisclosed opinion lacking in candor and fairness to him." This determination arose out of lawyers' duty, as officers of the court, "to aid the court in the due administration of justice" and their duties of "candor and fairness."[9]

To give another example, ABA Informal Op. 1169 (1970) concluded that it would be impermissibly deceptive and prejudicial to the administration of justice for the civil defendant's lawyer to fail to disclose the defendant's death. The Committee reaffirmed that conclusion in Formal Op. 95-397 (1995).[10] The Committee's 1995 opinion relied on *Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co.*, 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983), which found that the plaintiff's lawyer in a personal injury action had a duty to disclose the client's death to opposing counsel and the court. The ethics opinion quoted the District Court's opinion extensively and with approval, including the court's observation that, "Although each lawyer has a duty to contend, with zeal, for the rights of his client, he also owes an affirmative duty of candor and frankness to the Court and to opposing counsel when such a major event as the death of the plaintiff has taken place." *Virzi*, *supra*, 571 F. Supp. at 512.

In other contexts, this Committee has long reached conclusions that accord with the judicial decisions on lawyers' duty of candor to the tribunal. Although the Committee's opinions offer

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[8] *See, e.g.*, Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 200 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff's counsel had an obligation to disclose a parallel state lawsuit, because its "goal . . . was to cut off the federal court at the pass, a development that surely could have affected the outcome of the litigation pending in federal court"); *In re* Jones, 231 B.R. 110 (Bankr. Ct., N.D. Ga. 1999) (failure to disclose parallel bankruptcy filing was impermissibly deceitful and prejudicial to the administration of justice).

[9] This obligation was later codified in Disciplinary Rule 7-106(B)(1) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and it is currently codified in Model Rule 3.3(a)(2), which provides that: "A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) can be understood as a reminder that the role of an advocate is not purely partisan but also carries a responsibility to protect the integrity of the judicial process itself. Much like a referee in a game depends on players to play by the rules in order for the match to be fair, courts depend on lawyers to surface controlling adverse legal authority—even when it undermines their client's position—so the court can make a fully informed decision. The lawyer's ethical responsibility under Rule 3.3(a)(2) is not merely about avoiding falsehoods but is about actively ensuring the fairness, accuracy, and legitimacy of proceedings, even at the expense of short-term client advantage.

[10] The Committee relied on Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), which addresses the duty to avoid knowingly making false statements to the tribunal and omissions that are the equivalent. The Committee's 1995 Opinion did not call into question the earlier conclusion that failing to disclose the party's death is prejudicial to the administration of justice.

various explanations and cite various rules, the unifying theme is that lawyers must be forthcoming with procedural information that the tribunal needs to ensure that the proceedings are fair.[11]

In contrast, there is ordinarily no such disclosure duty under the Model Rules when the procedural information in question does not call the court's jurisdiction into question and is not otherwise important to the fair administration of justice. ABA Formal Op. 94-387 (1994) concluded that a plaintiff's lawyer has no obligation to disclose that the statute of limitations has run on the plaintiff's claim. The opinion explained: "The running of the period provided for enforcement of a civil claim creates an affirmative defense which must be asserted by the opposing party, and is not a bar to a court's jurisdiction over the matter. A time-barred claim may still be enforced by a court, and it will be if the opposing party raises no objection."[12]

B. The Source of the Lawyer's Knowledge

Lawyers may obtain actual knowledge about a judge's need to consider recusal from a range of sources. Some of these sources may include "information relating to the representation of the client," but there could be other sources of the lawyer's knowledge.

Illustration 1: Prior Employment Connection

A prosecutor is assigned to represent the state in post-conviction proceedings. The assigned judge previously served as a supervisor in the prosecutor's office. The prosecutor learns from the file that, while working in the prosecutor's office, the judge supervised the trial prosecutor in the case. The defendant's lawyer is evidently unaware of the judge's supervisory responsibility for an earlier stage of the case, and the judge may not recall it.

Illustration 2: Campaign Contribution

A lawyer representing a party in a civil case learns from the client that the client was a major financial supporter of the presiding judge's recent judicial election campaign. The client acknowledges having made a significant contribution to a political action committee earmarked for the judge's campaign, but there is no public record of the contribution, and it is uncertain whether the judge knows of it.

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[11] *See* ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 96-404 (1996) (a lawyer seeking appointment of a guardian for a client must disclose the lawyer's expectation of being retained by the guardian to provide future legal services); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Informal Op. 1386 (1977) (a lawyer must disclose to opposing counsel and the court that the client has entered into a "Mary Carter Agreement," under which the amount of the defendant's liability will decrease as another defendant's liability increases); ABA Comm. on Pro. Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 17 (1930) (if a party's lawyer moves for substitution of counsel without notice to the party's prior counsel, it would violate the duty of candor to the court to fail to disclose that notice was not given).

[12] *See also* ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 07-446 (2007) (a lawyer need not disclose the provision of assistance to a pro se litigant, because the court is unlikely to be misled or to provide unfair assistance). *But see* Duran v. Caris, 238 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 2001) (lawyer's failure to disclose the provision of substantial assistance in drafting a pro se litigant's brief is impermissible deceit and conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

Illustration 3: Spouse's Law Firm Involvement

A lawyer learns that co-counsel for another party in a consolidated civil action has engaged the judge's spouse's law firm for related consulting work on discovery strategy. The lawyer knows of this fact because an associate from the spouse's firm copied the lawyer on an email exchange related to scheduling depositions.

Illustration 4: Counsel's Business Relationship with Judge's Family Member

A lawyer for a party in a civil action recently became a minority shareholder in a local business. The lawyer knows that the judge's adult child is an executive and major investor in the business.

In each of these illustrations, the lawyer possesses actual knowledge of facts that may reasonably require the judge to consider recusal. Whether Model Rule 8.4(d) requires the lawyer to make a disclosure depends on whether (a) the information is reasonably likely to require recusal and (b) the disclosure can be made without violating the lawyer's confidentiality obligations under Model Rule 1.6 or Model Rule 1.9.

C. Limits on the Lawyer's Obligation to Disclose

Candor to the tribunal imposes obligations beyond what the Model Rules alone enumerate. As discussed above, courts may—and often do—require lawyers to disclose jurisdictional or procedural information essential to just adjudication. While the Model Rules codify some specific disclosure requirements, they deliberately leave room for courts to define others, and failure to meet those judicially recognized duties can amount to conduct prejudicial to justice. Information that is reasonably likely to give rise to a judicial recusal obligation, if not raised by the judge, is the sort of information that a lawyer must disclose to ensure procedural fairness.[13] The failure to make this disclosure constitutes conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice under Model Rule 8.4(d).[14] Unlike information relevant to an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, information that is reasonably likely to require a judge's recusal is important for the judge to consider, and, unless the judge recuses, to share with the parties. Otherwise, the judge's failure to recuse may deny the parties a fair trial and constitute the kind of procedural error that necessitates overturning the result of the proceeding.

As in the situation addressed by Model Rule 3.3(a)(2)—which requires a lawyer to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction that is both directly adverse to the lawyer's client and not disclosed by opposing counsel—the underlying concern is about the structural integrity of the proceedings. If the lawyer knows there is a procedural flaw in the proceedings that goes to their fairness and integrity—in this case, the judge's failure to consider the recusal obligation—the lawyer must rectify that procedural deficiency.

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[13] *See In re* Bernard v. Coyne, 31 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Counsel for a party who believes a judge's impartiality is reasonably subject to question has not only a professional duty to his client to raise the matter, but an independent responsibility as an officer of the court.").

[14] *Cf.* State Bar of Michigan, Opinions JI-79 (1994) and J-6 (1996) (concluding, based on Michigan's Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4, that when a judge fails to disclose facts that would require the judge's recusal, a party's lawyer who knows the facts must disclose them).

This is not the kind of evidentiary information relating to the court's rulings that one may leave to the opposing party to uncover; nor may a party fairly exploit the opposing party's lack of diligence in failing to uncover this sort of information. Parties have no reason to investigate the judge's financial and familial relationships and other circumstances in search of facts that may call for a judge's recusal. As noted, that is principally the judge's responsibility. But when the judge fails to make the requisite disclosure and that failure could result in a serious procedural deficiency that jeopardizes the justness of the proceedings, the judge's nondisclosure must be corrected by a lawyer who knows the relevant information.

The obligation to disclose information requiring a judge's recusal should take account of a lawyer's duty of confidentiality. Model Rule 8.3, which requires lawyers to report certain serious judicial misconduct as well as certain serious misconduct by lawyers, provides that these reporting obligations are limited by the duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6.[15] Although clients should generally be encouraged to give informed consent to their lawyer's reporting judicial misconduct pursuant to Model Rule 8.3(c), a lawyer may not disclose information relating to the representation without the client's informed consent unless there is an applicable exception to the confidentiality obligation. We conclude that the lawyer's duty to disclose a judge's possible recusal obligation is subject to the same limitation.

As this Committee recently discussed in ABA Formal Opinion 519 (2025), which addressed lawyers' disclosures in motions to withdraw from a representation, various provisions of the Model Rules may require or permit lawyers to disclose information relating to the representation to the court. When a lawyer knows information that is reasonably likely to give rise to a judicial disqualification obligation, either of two provisions may apply.

First, Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) permits a lawyer to "reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary . . . to comply with other law." As discussed above, judicial decisions recognize that, in some circumstances, lawyers' duty of candor to the court requires lawyers in judicial proceedings to disclose jurisdictional or procedural information relating to the representation. Insofar as the judicial decisions of the relevant jurisdiction extend this disclosure obligation to information regarding judicial recusal, Model Rule 1.6(b)(6) would permit disclosure to comply with other law.

Second, Model Rule 3.3(b) provides: "A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal." In some situations, such as when a client has an undisclosed personal, professional, or business relationship with the judge that is likely to require judicial recusal, the client's intent to exploit—rather than disclose—the relationship may amount to "fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding."[16] When the lawyer knows that the client plans to proceed without disclosure in order to secure an improper advantage, withdrawal alone will often be insufficient as a remedial measure. In those circumstances, the lawyer may be required to

[15] Model Rule 8.3(c) provides that the reporting obligation "does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." Comment [2] to Rule 8.3 further clarifies: "A report about misconduct is not required where it would involve violation of Rule 1.6."

[16] MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(b) & R. 3.3, cmt. [12].

disclose the grounds for recusal or take other reasonably available steps necessary to prevent or rectify the client's fraudulent conduct. Needless to say, the lawyer may not assist in a client's fraudulent conduct. *See* Model Rule 1.2(d) & 1.16(a)(4).

Absent the client's informed consent or an applicable exception to the duty of confidentiality, however, we conclude that the duty to disclose information reasonably likely to require recusal is subject to the duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6(a) when that information is "relating to the representation of a client."

III. Where Should the Lawyer Disclose the Information?

The lawyer should disclose information that is reasonably likely to require recusal to an authority capable of addressing that issue. In most instances, the lawyer may appropriately begin by disclosing the information directly to the judge, with notice to opposing counsel.[17] In other cases, disclosure to the chief judge or other designated administrative authority may be warranted, depending on the nature of the potential conflict.

It is important to remember that for many potential disqualification concerns, the judge would ordinarily be aware of sufficient information to recognize the need to engage in a disqualification analysis. Yet recent years have seen numerous reported instances in which judges failed to recuse when the circumstances warranted it. Lawyers, as officers of the court, should not only disclose information reasonably likely to require recusal that a judge may not be aware of, but also should not remain silent and allow a judge to knowingly refuse to acknowledge circumstances requiring recusal. Regardless of whether judges fail to meet their own ethical obligations, lawyers' obligations as officers of the court also require lawyers to do what they can to remedy the situation.

There can also be circumstances where a judge may not recognize the basis for disqualification as a result of procedural error or misunderstanding rather than volitional disregard of ethical duties. Judges are not infallible, and the disqualification provisions of MCJC Rule 2.11 can be complex in their application. For example, a judge might know that she owns stock in Alpha Corporation but not realize that Alpha is the parent company of Beta Corporation, a named party in the case, and thus fail to consider disqualification. If that information is reasonably likely to require the judge's recusal, the lawyer should alert the judge to the issue so that the judge can determine whether recusal or disclosure is warranted. In this way, the lawyer helps to safeguard the fairness and integrity of the proceeding, ensuring that inadvertent judicial oversights do not compromise public confidence in the impartial administration of justice.

As noted above, ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3(b) specifically addresses lawyers' obligation to disclose judicial misconduct in certain circumstances and requires the lawyer to "inform the appropriate authority."[18] Model Rule 8.3(b) will rarely require a lawyer to report a

[17] The opposing party should be notified to avoid the risk of an improper ex parte communication between a lawyer and the judge.

[18] Model Rule 8.3(b) provides that: "A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority." Comment [3] explains: "The term 'substantial' refers to the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware."

judge's failure to recuse as required by MCJC 2.11. The lawyer must disclose only if the lawyer personally *knows* (not merely suspects) each of three things: (1) that the judge had a recusal obligation under the MCJC Rule 2.11; (2) that the judge failed to comply with that obligation; and (3) that the judge's failure to recuse raises a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office.[19] Ordinarily, a judge's failure to recuse will not raise a substantial question about the judge's fitness for office unless the obligation to recuse is obvious and the judge is utterly indifferent to the obligation, so that the judge's recusal violation seriously erodes public confidence in the judge's fairness and commitment to ethical compliance in general, not just in the particular case.[20] A judge's failure to consider recusal in circumstances where the obligation to recuse is uncertain would not implicate Model Rule 8.3(b), because the failure to consider recusal in such circumstances would not "raise[] a substantial question as to the judge's fitness for office." Consequently, a reporting obligation will likely arise only if the facts necessitating the judge's recusal were called to the judge's attention during the case or it is otherwise obvious that the judge was aware of the relevant facts and deliberately disregarded their significance.

IV. Conclusion

When a lawyer in a proceeding possesses information that the lawyer knows is reasonably likely to give rise to a judicial disqualification obligation, Model Rule 8.4(d) requires the lawyer, as an officer of the court, to disclose that information to the tribunal. When the lawyer possesses the information only because it is "information relating to the representation of a client" then the lawyer's disclosure obligation is subject to the duty of confidentiality under Model Rule 1.6.

AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

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[19] *See* note 3, *supra*; *see also* Hon. Deborah L. Thorne et al., *Protecting the Integrity of the Profession*, 43-JUN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 24, 24 n.5 (2024) (citing Mont. Merch. Inc. v. Dave's Killer Bread Inc., No. CV-17-26-GF-BMM, 2017 WL 4246899, at *5 (D. Mont. Sep. 25, 2017)); S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Committee, Advisory Op. 05-04 (2005) ("Rule 8.3 requires actual knowledge of, or believing clearly that there has been a violation, which implies more than a suspicion of misconduct."). In ascertaining whether a lawyer has the requisite knowledge, the information of other lawyers in the lawyer's firm or of co-counsel is not "imputed" to the lawyer in question if they have not shared the information, and likewise, a lawyer's information is not "imputed" to other lawyers or to the lawyer's firm if the lawyer has not shared the information.

[20] *Cf.* Me. Board of Overseers of the Bar Op. 227, *Required Reporting M.R. Prof. Conduct 8.3* (2025) (explaining that lawyers must report if they know (or reasonably infer) that another attorney engaged in misconduct violating the Rules, creating a "substantial question" about that attorney's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice).

From:	márquez, monica
To:	yacuzzo, karen
Subject:	FW: Judge Bonnie McLean Retirement Effective 11/30/26
Sent:	8/18/2026 1:07:32 PM

DATE FILED
August 20, 2026 8:07 PM
FILING ID: 57E400F6E702B
CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268

From: mclean, bonnie <bonnie.mclean@judicial.state.co.us>
Sent: Wednesday, August 5, 2026 4:09 PM
To: márquez, monica <monica.marquez@judicial.state.co.us>; amico, michelle <michelle.amico@judicial.state.co.us>
Cc: turnidge, jenni <jenni.turnidge@judicial.state.co.us>
Subject: Judge Bonnie McLean Retirement Effective 11/30/26

Dear Chief Justice Marquez and Chief Judge Amico,

I am announcing my retirement from the bench effective November 30, 2026. This is bittersweet for me as November marks 20 years on the bench and 30 years in public service.
Over the last 20 years I have had the privilege of working with amazing staff and colleagues. My Administration has wholeheartedly supported my crazy Problem-Solving Court mission and I will forever be grateful for their backing.
After a little break, I hope to find a new avenue to continue serving the public, so perhaps this will be a “goodbye for now” kind of moment.

With gratitude,



Bonnie McLean
District Court Judge

Colorado Supreme Court 2 East 14th Avenue Denver, CO 80203	DATE FILED August 24, 2026 CASE NUMBER: 2026SA268
Original Proceeding District Court, Denver County, 2026CV32668	
In Re: **Plaintiff:** Christopher S.P. Gregory, **v.** **Defendants:** Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Colorado State Commission of Judicial Performance, 1st Judicial District Performance Commission, 2nd Judicial District Performance Commission, 3rd Judicial District Performance Commission, 4th Judicial District Performance Commission, 5th Judicial District Performance Commission, 6th Judicial District Performance Commission, 7th Judicial District Performance Commission, 8th Judicial District Performance Commission, 9th Judicial District Performance Commission, 10th Judicial District Performance Commission, 11th Judicial District Performance Commission, 12th Judicial District Performance Commission, 13th Judicial District Performance Commission, 14th Judicial District Performance Commission, 15th Judicial District Performance Commission, 16th Judicial District Performance Commission, 17th Judicial District Performance Commission, 18th Judicial District Performance Commission, 19th Judicial District Performance Commission, 20th Judicial District Performance Commission, 21st Judicial District Performance Commission, 22nd Judicial District Performance	Supreme Court Case No: 2026SA268

Commission, 23rd Judicial District Performance Commission, Kent Wagner, Bill Cadman, John D. Dailey, Zara Degroot, Casey Martin, Keith Massey, Thomas Neville, Eric Olson, Erin Pressler, Tanja Wheeler, Robin Beattie, Sean Conrecode, Judith Goeke, Janel Guerrero, Christine Jensen, Susan Nickerson, Mark Richter, Leslie Schaefer, Leah Varnell, Thomas Walsh, Kendra Beckwith, Clarence Burton, Fernado Guzman, Simone Montoya, Greg Movesian, Chris Reagen, John Simon, Adam Stern, Elise Topliss, Ashley Troxell, Antionette Gifford, Richard Ott, Mallory Revel, Mary Beth Searles, Gayle Young, Claude Appel, Alfredo Burciaga, Sheryl Hanisch, Lourae King, Azarel Madrigal, Sisto Maza, Lynette Robinson Bates, Keri Williams, Caitlin Young, David Blankinship, Sarah Brittain Jack, James Cara, Chineta Davis, Eric Hall, Ime Lopez, Aaron Salt, Anne Turner, Murray Weiner, Kathleen Brendza, Courtney Edwards, Erin Gigliello, Cipriano Gurrola Navarro, Jeffrey Huntley, Christopher Tomchuck, Sarah Vaine, Lisa Webster, Michael Wheeler, Jean Aaro, Frank Bowman, Molly Imber, Seana Lazur, Eric Naber, Todd Norvell, Kenneth Pace, Anthony Savastano, Avery Sheldon, Deborah Tully, Quinn Archibeque, Raymond Beck, Andrea Breiner, Julie Huffman, Katie Lewinger, Bo James Nerlin, Robert M. Ohayre, Mike Waters, Marketa Zubkova, Darin Atteberry, Taylor A. Clapp, Dana Englehardt, William Flowers, Brian Hardouin, Kevin Havelda, Lesley Osborn, Dianne Peterson, Braulio Rojas, Michael Ruttenberg, Mary Albaugh, Carrie Ford, Linda McKinley, Georgina Melby, Milton Mendez, Ben Rose, Samuel Rose, Michelle K. Schindler, Dana Charles, Christy Fidura, Tracy Gutierrez, Wesley Hassler, Cindy Lou Jones, Velia Rincon, Kate Shafer, Stacie Shirley, Michelle Wiseman, Laura Young, Jeanna Baitlon, Peter Hinga, Derek Irvine, Anne Jefferson, Lisa Kidwell, Ed Norden, Ehren Penix, Magdalena Rosa, Jim Stockbridge, George Dingfelder, Jesse A. Guerro, Anne Kelly, Micah Larson, Nicole Linder, Chelsea McNerney Martinez, Ava Paula Medina, Rebecca Rian, Michael Boyer, David Bute, Jeffrey Cure, Jake Hettinger, Dean Jarrett, Brian Landry, Greg Larson, Jarrod Munger, Natascha Drekonja, Ryan Dougherty, Zachariah Falconer Stout, Casey Quillen, Max Salazar, T. Wright Dickinson, Vicki Allen, Heather Nicole Gioffredi, Andrew Hayden, Nora Lindholm, Jennifer Mortimeyer, Jacob Peterson, Madeline Almond, James	

Bullock, Alex Egri, Randy Freed, Michelle Gardner, Lindsey Hart, Cris Menz, Donna Rohde, Caitlin Young, Harlan Bockman, Emily Fleishmann, Karl Hansen, Sara Haimidi, Penny Platnick, Jeffrey C. Ruebel, Logan Souder, Jacquelyn D. Stanton, Michelle Stermer, Dean Toda, Dan Deasy, Regina Edmondson, Torry Garland, Charles Gilford, Richard Holt, Annie Ollada, Don Sheehan, Linda Sunshine, Leanne Wheeler, Tommy Butler, Anthea L. Carrasco, Robert Casey, Tate Costin, Kirsten Daniel, Ashley Greene, Alicia Johnson, Syukar Manaf, Thomas Roche, Steve Wrenn, Elizabeth Callahan, Charlie Danaher, Renee E. Ezer, Rachel Friend, Jennifer Geiger, Dd Mallard, Mark Milliman, Michael Schreiner, Andrew Shoemaker, Sam Weaver, Tracy Badger, Matthew Breman, Damon Davis, William S. Deford, Cindy Enos Martinez, Beau Flores, Ken Haptonstall, Rose Moglia, Diane Schwenke, David A. Younger, Drew P. Buffington, Michael Costen, Michael J. Doyle, Jon L. Kelly, Valerie Maez, Sally Planalp, Shak Powers, Jeremy Reed, Drew Richman, Jane Cox, Michelle Fix Westfall, Paul King, Dan McMillan, Aaron Paul, Josefina Rapheal Milliner, William Smith, Kim Turnage, Denver County Court Commission on Judicial Discipline, Eric Artis, and Jeff Comstock.	
ORDER OF COURT	

Upon consideration of Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing Pursuant to C.A.R. 21(p) and C.A.R. 40(c)(2), and being sufficiently advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

Under C.A.R. 21(p) and C.A.R. 40(c)(2), a petition for rehearing may be filed only when the court has issued an opinion discharging an order to show cause or making the order absolute. The Court's August 18, 2026 Order denied Petitioner's Petition for Order to Show Cause. No order to show cause ever issued. The Colorado Appellate Rules do not allow a petition for rehearing under such circumstances. The Petitioner's Petition for Rehearing is therefore STRICKEN as improperly filed.

BY THE COURT, EN BANC, AUGUST 24, 2026