

Boulder County Court--Longmont, State of Colorado 1035 Kimbark St., Longmont, CO 80501	DATE FILED October 1, 2026 1:02 AM FILING ID: 286BB9A402641 CASE NUMBER: 2026C30766 ▲ COURT USE ONLY ▲
Petitioner: Christopher S.P. Gregory v. Respondent: Philip J. Weiser	
Counsel for Christopher S.P. Gregory: The Gregory Law Firm, LLC Christopher S.P. Gregory, esq. 201 Coffman St., #1822 Longmont, CO 80502 Phone: (970) 648-0642 Fax: (970) 648-0643 E-Mail: cspgregory@thegregorylawfirm.net Atty. Reg. # 37095	Case No: Division: 11
DECLARATION OF CHRISTOPHER S.P. GREGORY TO COMPEL PROSECUTION UNDER § 16-5-209, C.R.S.; EXHIBITS 1 THROUGH 21	

State of Colorado)
)
 County of Boulder)

Christopher S.P. Gregory, Colo. Atty. Reg. No. 37095 (“Declarant”) being of lawful age, of sound mind, and declaring under penalty of perjury,¹ deposes and says the following:

INTRODUCTION

1. Declarant has exposed a more than 25-year ongoing pattern of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, Attorney General Philip Weiser, Governor Jared Polis, and many other public officials abusing their offices and misusing taxpayer funds as a coercive means of covering up serious judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. This pattern of public corruption includes the misuse of tens of millions of taxpayer dollars annually to cover up public fraud through hush money contracts, self-controlled investigations, and public relations schemes. Declarant’s allegations have been largely

¹ This unsworn declaration is presented in lieu of an affidavit, as allowed by C.R.C.P. 108, Crim. P. 57(b), and *People v. Ramcharan*, 2024 COA 110, ¶ 31 (unsworn declaration complying with § 13-27-106, C.R.S. may substitute for a sworn affidavit in a criminal proceeding).

admitted and proven. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44.² Declarant has attempted to report this systemic public corruption to the appropriate authorities, including but not limited to federal and state courts; federal, state, and local law enforcement; the Colorado General Assembly; the Colorado State Auditor; the Colorado Attorney General's Office; the Colorado Governor's Office; the Colorado Supreme Court's Office of Attorney Regulation Counsel (OARC); the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (CCJD); the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation (COJPE); the 8th and 20th Judicial District Attorney's Offices; the Colorado Civil Rights Commission; and the Colorado Independent Ethics Commission (IEC). When Declarant made these reports, individual public servants who should have disqualified themselves deliberately refused to do so. Beyond refusing to disqualify themselves, many Respondents have further retaliated against Declarant by requesting and/or imposing prior restraints on Declarant's right and mandated duty to report substantial judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. Although there is probable cause to suspect that those involved have committed a range

² The recent disciplinary order issued by a New Hampshire special tribunal requiring/accepting the retirement of Chief Justice Gordon J. MacDonald, confirms that the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, who collectively approved a \$2.66-\$2.75 million sole-source hush money contract with former Colorado State Court Administrator's Office (SCAO) Chief of Staff Mindy Masias, are subject to judicial disciplinary proceedings that should include their immediate suspension and ultimate removal from office. *Compare Coats* (publicly censuring former chief justice for collective approval of \$2.66-\$2.75 million hush money contract without discipline of the other involved justices) *with* Jesus Mesa, *New Hampshire Supreme Court Justice Resigns After \$50K Scheme Revealed*, NEWSWEEK, September 16, 2026 (describing resignation of chief justice following ethics probe into his allowing director of state court administrator's office to collect \$50,000 in sick and vacation benefits when she changed to a different governmental position within 48-hours of being laid off; referencing *Coats*); *see also Matter of MacDonald*, JD-2026-0004 (N.H. Sep. 15, 2026) (Order attached as Exhibit 1). Appropriate discipline, however, has not been possible due to the Justices', OARC's, and the CCJD's unconstitutional and unlawful refusals to disqualify. Also, unlike Colorado, the special tribunal in New Hampshire stopped one of its members from attempting to use the "confidentiality" of the judicial disciplinary proceedings as a means of shielding the remaining justices who were involved from public scrutiny. Nancy West, *2 Supreme Court Cases in Chief Justice Scandal Unsealed, Then Quickly Resealed*, INDEPTHNH, September 21, 2026; Exhibit 2 (article and related orders from special tribunal). In a striking similarity to Colorado, the documents released by the New Hampshire special tribunal reveal that Justices of the New Hampshire Supreme Court had collectively agreed to the \$50,000 scheme with the court administrator and, then, the Justices conspired to issue public statements concealing the fraud. Todd Bookman, *Behind the Scenes, a High-Stakes Struggle to Respond to NH Court Ethics Probe*, NH PUBLIC RADIO, September 21, 2026. Declarant has now filed a complaint with the New Hampshire Committee on Judicial Conduct against Justices Gordon J. MacDonald, Patrick E. Donovan, Melissa B. Countway, and Bryan K. Gould. Exhibit 3. Primary source documents are also posted on the New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee's website. *Available at:* <https://www.courts.nh.gov/resources/committees/judicial-conduct-committee/news>. Declarant respectfully requests that this Court take mandatory judicial notice of the official records and primary source documents under CRE 201(d).

of criminal offenses, Declarant understands that a legitimate investigation should begin with the prosecution of misdemeanor offenses, which fall within this Court's jurisdiction. Accordingly, and at least initially, Declarant requests an order directing the conflict-free investigation and prosecution of the following misdemeanor offenses:

1. Harassment (§ 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S.),
 2. First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.), and
 3. Conspiracy (§ 18-2-201, C.R.S.) to commit these offenses.
2. As provided by § 16-5-209, C.R.S., this Court, "upon affidavit filed with the judge alleging the commission of a crime and the unjustified refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute any person for the crime, may require the prosecuting attorney to appear before the judge and explain the refusal." Here, Declarant attempted to report his allegations of criminal conduct to the Longmont Police Department only to have 20th Judicial District Attorney Michael Dougherty, through his Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Kupfner, interfere with the police report and direct the Longmont Police Department not to open an investigation. Even after the matter was referred to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Kupfner, Dougherty, and Longmont Police Detective Sergeant Todd Chambers conspired to prevent an investigation based on arbitrary and capricious assertions that Declarant presented "insufficient evidence." According to § 16-5-209, C.R.S., "[if] the judge finds that the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute was arbitrary or capricious and without reasonable excuse, the judge may order the prosecuting attorney to file an information and prosecute the case or may appoint a special prosecutor to do so." Because of Mr. Dougherty's actual conflicts of interest, it is appropriate for this Court to appoint 13th Judicial District Attorney Travis Sides (whom Declarant believes can be fair and impartial) as a special prosecutor. Although the pool of potential defendants for prosecution is vast, at a minimum, Declarant seeks the prosecution of Governor Jared Polis, Colorado State Auditor Kerri Hunter, Attorney General Philip Weiser and his complicit subordinates, the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and their complicit subordinates, Attorney Regulation Counsel Jessica Yates and her complicit subordinates, 20th Judicial District Attorney Michael Dougherty and his complicit subordinates, Adams County Court Judge Leroy J. Kirby, Denver District Court Judge A. Bruce Jones, and the present and past members and complicit staff of the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline (most of whom are also defendants in *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.)).

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

3. Article VI, §§ 1 and 17 of the Colorado Constitution vest the county courts with subject matter jurisdiction over criminal offenses classified as misdemeanors or petty offenses. *See also* § 13-6-106(1)(a), C.R.S. County courts also have concurrent statutory jurisdiction to hear preliminary matters in felony proceedings, including "the issuance of warrants, the conduct of preliminary examinations, the conduct of dispositional hearings pursuant to section 16-5-301(1), C.R.S., and section 18-1-404(1), C.R.S., the issuance of bindover orders, and the admission to bail in felonies and misdemeanors." § 13-6-

106(1)(b), C.R.S. Case law has not addressed whether a county court has subject matter jurisdiction to compel prosecution of both felony and misdemeanor crimes. However, this Court clearly does have subject matter jurisdiction to compel the prosecution of misdemeanor crimes.

4. Moreover, this Court possesses statewide jurisdictional authority according to Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 17 and § 13-6-103, C.R.S. Declarant was present in the City of Longmont, Boulder County, where he resides and works, when one or more acts constituting elements of the alleged crimes occurred. Consequently, venue is also appropriate before this Court under § 18-1-202(2), (7)(a), C.R.S. *People v. Slattery*, 2023 WL 12047871, ¶ 21 (Colo. App. 2023) (unpublished) (“In pertinent part, the venue statute expands the situs of the offense to include any county where the victim was located at the time of the offense or any county where an individual criminal act occurred that was part of a broader criminal episode spanning several counties.”). Additionally, one or more of the potential defendants are also residents of Boulder County and committed one or more of the criminal acts while located in Boulder County. *See* § 18-2-202(2)(a), C.R.S. (at least one conspirator must have been present in the judicial district when the conspiracy was entered into or when an overt act pursuant to the conspiracy was committed for courts in the judicial district to have proper venue over a conspiracy charge). Declarant emphasizes that the decision to bring conspiracy charges is discretionary and can be abandoned if necessary to preserve venue in this Court.

BACKGROUND

5. Declarant has brought five primary civil actions to hold the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court accountable for their criminal and ethical misconduct.
 - a. *United States and State of Colorado ex rel. Gregory, et al. v. Masias, et al.*, 1:25-cv-00190-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.) (Sealed) (*Ex rel. Gregory*);
 - b. *Gregory v. Colo. Jud. Discipline Rulemaking Comm., et al.*, 1:25-cv-03361-KHV-GEB (D. Colo.) (*Gregory v. CJDRC*);
 - c. *Gregory v. Hunter*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV31374 (*Hunter*);
 - d. *Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval., et al.*, Denver Dist. Ct. Case No. 26CV32668 (*Gregory v. COJPE*); and
 - e. *In re Gregory v. Colo. Off. of Jud. Perform. Eval., et al.*, Colo. Sup. Ct. Case No. 26SA268 (denying Declarant’s requests for disqualification, formation of a special tribunal under Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II), suspensions of the Justices and Judge Kirby under Colo. RJD 34, and restoration of public access to case filings)³ (*In re Gregory*).

³ Aggravating the Justices’ refusal to disqualify themselves, their willful ongoing violations of the Code (including Canon Rules 1.1 (Compliance with the Law), 1.2 (Promoting Confidence in

Declarant incorporates by reference and requests that this Court take mandatory judicial notice of the records in these related proceedings according to CRE 201(d). As necessary, Declarant further requests leave to supplement the record in the present case with any case documents this Court may request and to which it does not have direct access.

6. In addition to court filings, Declarant has thoroughly developed a legislative record with many documents and materials relevant to this Declaration. The relevant legislative record can be found as follows:

- January 21, 2026 SMART Act Hearing for the Colorado Judicial Department and Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline—
<https://coleg.box.com/s/rjeotmshfl64jgs4d1sxxw1424873wghl>.

the Judiciary), 1.3 (Avoiding Abuse of the Prestige of Judicial Office), 2.10 (Judicial Statements on Pending and Impending Cases), 2.11 (Disqualification), 2.15 (Responding to Judicial and Lawyer Misconduct), 2.16 (Cooperation with Disciplinary Authorities), 3.1 (Extrajudicial Activities in General), and 4.1 (Political and Campaign Activities of Judges and Judicial Candidates in General)), and their deliberate dishonesty towards Colorado voters, Justice Richard L. Gabriel and his fellow Respondent in Declarant's federal attorney discipline complaint *infra* at ¶ 12, former AAG LeeAnn Morrill, will be giving the following presentation to the Minoru Yasui Inn of Court on October 7, 2026:

SPEAKER/PRESENTATION --

LeeAnn Morrill (she/her)

Senior Election Protection Counsel at States United Democracy Center, and Hon. Richard L. Gabriel, Colorado Supreme Court

The Colorado Ballot Process and Recent Ballot-Related Issues

Please join us for an engaging discussion about the Colorado ballot process and current election-related topics, presented by LeeAnn Morrill and Justice Richard Gabriel. LeeAnn will discuss the process for how ballot measures get on the ballot in Colorado and explain what is going on at the national level with the many legal challenges to the President's executive order and USPS final rule concerning mail ballot delivery. Justice Gabriel will discuss how Colorado's judicial retention system works and where voters can obtain information on judges who are standing for retention, so that the voters can vote in an educated way.

As anticipated evanescent evidence of further violations of the Code and prospective criminal conduct, Declarant asserts that Justice Gabriel and Ms. Morrill are obligated to record their presentation, if they choose to go ahead with it.

- February 9, 2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Confirmation Hearing for former Senator Bob Gardner to the Colorado Commission on Judicial Discipline—https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/28938.
- February 11, 2026 Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on SB26-084—https://leg.colorado.gov/committee_meeting_hearing_summary/29188.
- March 12, 2026 House State, Civic, Military, and Veterans Affairs Committee Hearing on SB26-084—https://leg.colorado.gov/summary_attachments/44862/download.
- May 4, 2026 House State, Civic, Military, and Veterans Affairs Committee Hearing on HJR26-1029—<https://coleg.box.com/s/j8z8y4vfumdksla6dic0nd42zxw56tj>.

Declarant also incorporates these records by reference and requests that this Court take mandatory judicial notice of them according to CRE 201(d).

7. The Colorado Judicial Scandal and the pattern of public corruption trace back to at least 2001, when then-Chief Justice Mary Mullarkey and others allowed 3rd Judicial District Chief Judge Jesse Manzanares to quietly retire despite his having falsely accused fellow District Judge Claude Appel of being part of a cocaine ring. Then, in 2007, Chief Justice Mullarkey, with the assistance of SCAO, attempted to prevent the investigation and prosecution of Jesse Manzanares’s nephew, then-former Denver District Court Judge Larry Manzanares, for suspected theft of a Judicial Department laptop.⁴ Forensic analysis of the laptop revealed that Larry Manzanares had deleted thousands of pornographic images, including age questionable images. In response to being charged with three felonies, Manzanares committed suicide. The following year, then-CCJD Executive Director Rick Wehmhoefer was retaliated against and fired. Pending the hiring of Wehmhoefer’s successor, William Campbell, SCAO HR Director Mindy Masias and SCAO HR Deputy Director Eric Brown were appointed to administer the CCJD with unfettered access to the CCJD’s records. Through Declarant’s personal knowledge of the CCJD’s records, Declarant believes that Masias and Brown destroyed records, particularly those related to the Appel-Haeger-Manzanares matter and the Larry Manzanares matter.

⁴ Records detailing Chief Justice Mullarkey and SCAO’s efforts to abort the Manzanares investigation at its outset are in the possession and custody of the 1st Judicial District Attorney’s Office, which refuses to comply with Declarant’s request for inspection under the CCJRA, conditioning inspection upon payment of a \$1,000 deposit. The 1st Judicial District Attorney is withholding these records and Denver District Court Judge A. Bruce Jones has allowed the continued withholding even though the Jefferson District Court previously ordered disclosure of the same records to the *Denver Post* in 2007. “Omnibus Order,” *Hunter*, August 31, 2026; see also George Merritt, *Many Doubted Ex-Judge: Files Show Suspicions Remained After Office Declined Prosecution*, DENVER POST, September 5, 2007 (attached as Exhibit 4); *Denver Post v. Storey*, Jefferson Cnty. Dist. Ct. Case No. 07CV6425. Declarant also asks that this court take mandatory judicial notice of the records in *Denver Post v. Storey* according to CRE 201(d).

8. In July 2018, SCAO Controller Myra Dukes reported concerns that then-SCAO Chief of Staff Mindy Masias had altered a receipt attached to a personal reimbursement request. Internal and external investigations revealed further grounds to suspect financial misconduct by Masias. State Court Administrator Christopher Ryan notified Masias of her termination for cause, including the impact of her dishonesty on Colorado's federally mandated continuous single statewide audit. Rather than accepting the termination, Masias activated FMLA leave and, through then-SCAO HR Director Eric Brown, began negotiating a 5-year, \$2.66-\$2.75 million sole-source hush money contract. For over two years, the negotiation and nature of the bribe were concealed from both then-State Auditor Dianne Ray and the CCJD, on which Declarant served as a member, Vice-Chair, and Chair. The negotiation of the bribe, which would have paid Masias \$532,000 per year—approximately three times the salaries of the individual Justices—included a memorandum (the Masias Memo) in which Masias and Brown alleged that Masias was directed by superiors to conceal and/or destroy evidence of judicial, attorney, and employee misconduct. The existence of the Masias Memo was likewise concealed from State Auditor Ray and the CCJD for over two years.
9. Press reporting confirms Attorney General Phil Weiser's role in the more-than 25-year ongoing Colorado Judicial Scandal. Specifically, Attorney General Weiser has refused to answer questions about his Office's negotiation and approval of over \$4 million in taxpayer-funded NDAs between 2019 and 2022. *See David Migoya, Nondisclosures Under Fire: State Confidentiality Agreements Cost Millions, Silence Whistleblowers, DENVER GAZETTE, November 13, 2022.* Attorney General Weiser has also refused to answer questions about when and what he knew regarding his subordinates knowingly and willfully concealing the existence of the Masias Memo from State Auditor Ray and the CCJD for at least 18 months. *See David Migoya, Colorado Attorney General's Office's Lawyers Knew about Judicial Misconduct Memo, DENVER GAZETTE, February 12, 2021.*
10. Upon learning of the existence of the Masias Memo and the findings of the OSA's 2020 Performance Audit of SCAO (which recognized the Masias Contract as creating appearances of impropriety), Declarant, as CCJD Chair, began requesting records from then-Chief Justice Brian Boatright, custodian of records for the Colorado Supreme Court. Boatright and the other Justices stonewalled the records requests and Governor Jared Polis retaliated against Declarant by not reappointing him for a customary second term. However, the remaining members of the CCJD hired Declarant to return as the CCJD's Executive Director. Declarant continued investigating the Masias Controversy. The core facts—that the Justices had collectively approved the \$2.66-\$2.75 million Masias hush money contract and concealed material information from State Auditor Ray and the CCJD for over two years—were ultimately admitted and proven. *Matter of Coats*, 2023 CO 44.
11. When Declarant continued to pursue accountability for the other Justices' roles in concealing the nature of the Masias Contract, the existence of the Masias Memo, and

other examples of judicial,⁵ attorney, and official misconduct being covered up in violation of the Colorado Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code), including Canon Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.9(C), 2.10, 2.11, 2.12, 2.13, 2.15, 2.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 4.1, the Justices, Attorney General Weiser, Governor Polis, and their cronies appointed to the CCJD again retaliated against Declarant by wrongfully terminating his employment. As part of their retaliation, the CCJD and Attorney General Weiser, through his subordinates (AAGs Gina Cannan and Alison Kyles), threatened Declarant with criminal charges, a search warrant, and civil proceedings if Declarant did not surrender his copy of records as Executive Director (rather than depositing the records with the FBI). Declarant had a right to retain his records according to § 24-31-1204(8)(c)(I), C.R.S. Nevertheless, Declarant affirms that he was truthful when he signed the coerced affidavit. *See* Exhibit 5.

12. Attorney General Weiser, the CCJD, Governor Polis, the Justices, and the other Defendants in *Gregory v. CJDRC* are now doubling down on their prior retaliatory acts by falsely accusing Declarant of perjury when he signed the coerced affidavit and of wrongfully disclosing “confidential” information by revealing Adams County Court Judge Leroy Kirby’s disciplinary history and persistent dishonesty (which continues with Judge Kirby remaining on the bench).⁶ Despite having no factual or legal basis for their allegations, the conspiring Defendants have brought a grievance (which they will not

⁵ One example of Declarant’s efforts to report and seek accountability for judicial misconduct included Justice Brian Boatright’s awareness and concealment of Denver Presiding Juvenile Judge D. Brett Woods being a habitual drunk and retaliating against court staff when s/he internally reported Woods’s conduct to other staff and other judges (who included Boatright). *See Matter of Woods*, 2024 CO 72; David Migoya, *Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice and Others Aware of Colleague’s Drinking Problem, But Kept Silent*, DENVER GAZETTE, March 3, 2024. Declarant raised the issues in the *Woods* matter internally with CCJD Member Stefanie Trujillo immediately prior to the CCJD making its retaliatory decision to terminate Declarant’s employment. *See also Gregory v. CJDRC*, ECF No. 1-10, pp. 12-19 (detailing the chronology leading up to and following Declarant’s wrongful termination) (Excerpt provided as Exhibit 6). The CCJD’s willful non-disqualification from Declarant’s requests for evaluation of judicial conduct, including CCJD Case No. 25-310 (referenced in Exhibit 6 at p. 2 fn. 2, is verified by the dismissal letter sent by CCJD Executive Director Ann Mangiardi on August 13, 2026. Exhibit 7. Declarant emphasizes that he raised the CCJD’s willful non-disqualification as probable cause for the misdemeanor of First Degree Official Misconduct when his civil rights complaint was filed on or about September 17, 2025.

⁶ Declarant highlights an email (with attachments) that he sent to the press, to all candidates for statewide office, and to the entire Colorado General Assembly that discloses Judge Kirby’s ongoing misconduct and requests a special legislative session to consider impeachment prior to the 2026 general election. Exhibit 8. Notably, 20th Judicial District Attorney Michael Dougherty responded to the email on June 27, 2026 stating “Thank you for your email. If I have the honor of winning the primary election for Attorney General, I will circle back to you about this issue.” Exhibit 9.

disclose) to the Colorado Supreme Court's OARC with OARC and the Justices refusing to disqualify themselves from consideration and investigation of the grievance and Declarant's own request for an investigation based on the attorney misconduct complaint Declarant previously filed in *Gregory v. Berkenkotter, et al.*, 25-cc-3 (D. Colo. Comm. on Conduct, Sept. 30, 2025). See *Gregory v. CJDRC*, ECF Nos. 1-1, 1-4 through 1-11 (ECF No. 1-1 provided for the convenience of this Court as Exhibit 10). In what can be compared to a resurrection of the Star Chamber, Attorney General Weiser, OARC, and the Justices are seeking to have the attorney discipline proceedings against Declarant and his co-counsel, Ingrid J. DeFranco, occur in secret. Although Presiding Disciplinary Judge Bryon Large, who is also a Defendant in *Gregory v. CJDRC*, has recused himself from the proceedings, citing appearances of impropriety, PDJ Large referred the matter back to the Justices to directly appoint his substitute. The Justices, then directly appointed former Justice Alex J. Martinez⁷ as the special PDJ. Exhibit 11. OARC and the Justices, however, refuse to disqualify themselves or to appoint conflict-free special counsel and form a conflict-free special tribunal, as provided through Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II). Declarant asserts that the non-disqualification of Attorney General Weiser (and his entire Office), OARC, and the Justices satisfies the elements of Harassment and First Degree Official Misconduct. Declarant and his co-Counsel's correspondence with OARC and PDJ Large is attached as Exhibit 12.

13. Attorney General Weiser and the CCJD continue to refuse to return Declarant's unlawfully seized records (which include the Colo. RJD 14(a) notice letter that Declarant had drafted to send to Judge Kirby (who had previously received a stipulated "private censure") after discovery of his suspected dishonesty toward the 17th Judicial District Nominating Commission and his failure to file required annual personal financial disclosures under § 24-6-202, C.R.S.). Judge Kirby's misconduct is substantially similar to the also admitted misconduct of U.S. District Judge Eleanor Ross (i.e., an inappropriate and unreported relationship that included sex in the courthouse followed by a pattern of persistent dishonesty), who currently faces two resolutions for her

⁷ Former Justice Martinez is himself a material witness to the misconduct that Declarant alleges. Justice Martinez was appointed as a special master with current Justice Susan Blanco in *Matter of Scipione*, 2024 CO 23. Justice Martinez was also a member of the Colorado Supreme Court when the events in the Appel-Haeger-Manzanares and Larry Manzanares matters occurred. See Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) (status as a material witness grounds for disqualification of entire Colorado Supreme Court), (h) (judge may not hear cases involving his/her own discipline); Canon Rule 2.11; Colo. RJD 41 (former justice's status as material witness mandates disqualification of entire Colorado Supreme Court); C.R.C.P. 242.4(d)-(e) (provision for disqualification of the Legal Regulation Committee's members and OARC; procedure for appointing special counsel); C.R.C.P. 242.5(f) (OARC required to disqualify "when a similarly situated prosecutor would be required to disqualify"); C.R.C.P. 242.6(d) (disqualification of PDJ required when "a similarly situated judge would be required to disqualify"; and procedure for appointing special PDJ with PDJ having discretion to refer appointment directly to Colorado Supreme Court); C.R.C.P. 242.37.5 (applying similar standard for imputed disqualification as Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II) and Colo. RJD 41 to attorney discipline and disability proceedings).

impeachment in the U.S. House of Representatives. H.R. 1346, 119th Cong. (2026); H.R. 1351, 119th Cong. (2026).

14. Following his wrongful termination on January 19, 2024, Declarant responded by drafting a comprehensive request for evaluation of judicial conduct, which he submitted anonymously on October 20, 2024 pending the 2024 general election, in which Justices Maria Berkenkotter, Brian Boatright and Monica Marquez, and CCJD judge members Jill Brady and Bonnie McLean were subject to retention elections. Rather than calling for a meaningful, legitimate, and independent investigation of the alleged judicial misconduct, the Justices presented their conflicted hearing of *Anderson v. Griswold*, 2023 CO 63, as an example of judicial independence, rather than as an additional example of their willful misconduct under the Code.
15. Through the bogus “workplace culture initiative,” the Justices expanded the Colorado Judiciary through false claims of approximately \$14 million per year (as part of an overall \$800+ million per year budget). Declarant maintains that the lesser misconduct addressed in this Declaration is helping to conceal considerably more significant issues of public fraud and felonious misconduct.
16. In addition to seeking accountability through his civil actions, Declarant has also reported his allegations and supporting evidence to the CCJD, the Colorado State Auditor through the Fraud Hotline, the Colorado General Assembly (including by developing the legislative record referenced in paragraph 6), the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the Colorado Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, and the Colorado Independent Ethics Commission.⁸ As further explained *infra*, in paragraphs 29 through 36, Declarant made efforts to report these matters to state and local law enforcement. Invariably, individuals within those governmental entities willfully refused to disqualify themselves and, instead, actively opposed and obstructed Declarant’s requests for conflict-free investigation and enforcement.
17. With the present § 16-5-209, C.R.S. Declaration, Declarant is concurrently requesting that this Court grant temporary (and ultimately permanent) civil protection orders against the various Respondents to prevent further witness intimidation, retaliation, and tampering. For the sake of simplicity and expediency, Declarant summarizes probable cause for the various Respondents to be charged with Harassment, First Degree Official Misconduct, and/or Conspiracy as their willful refusals to disqualify themselves and to allow a legitimate and conflict-free investigation to proceed. The Respondents’ active participation in, and/or complicity with, retaliating against Declarant, as “retaliation” is

⁸ The IEC appointed attorney Jane B. Cox as a Special Assistant Attorney General (SAAG) to advise on the consideration of numerous complaints filed by Declarant. Ms. Cox, however, is law partners with attorney David Beller, who is an individual capacity defendant in *Gregory v. CJDRC*, at the law firm of Recht Kornfeld, P.C. Ms. Cox is also herself an official capacity defendant in *Gregory v. COJPE*. The IEC has now dismissed all complaints filed by Declarant on unexplained jurisdictional grounds after having received objectively conflicted advice from Ms. Cox. Exhibit 13 (complaints, dismissal letters, and Recht Kornfeld invoices).

defined under § 24-31-1204(8), C.R.S.,⁹ constitutes probable cause for further investigation and for a conflict-free prosecuting attorney to file information(s), complaint(s), and summons(es). Because the willful non-disqualification and harassment of Declarant is ongoing, the applicable statute of limitations does not impact prosecution. See § 16-5-401, C.R.S.

18. The elements of Harassment (§ 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S. (M2)) are:

- a. The defendant,
- b. In the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
- c. With intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person,
- d. Directly or indirectly initiates communication with a person or directs language toward another person, anonymously or otherwise,
- e. By telephone, telephone network, data network, text message, instant message, computer, computer network, computer system, or other interactive electronic medium,
- f. In a manner intended to harass¹⁰ or threaten bodily injury or property¹¹ damage.

⁹ § 24-31-1204(8)(b), C.R.S. provides:

(b) An **employee**, contractor, or agent is entitled to all relief necessary to make that individual whole if the individual is **discharged, demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, intimidated, sued, defamed, blacklisted, or in any other manner retaliated against or discriminated against in the terms and conditions of the individual's employment, contract, business, or profession** by the defendant **or by any other person** because of lawful acts done by the individual or associated others in furtherance of an action brought pursuant to this section or in furtherance of an effort to stop any violation, **or what the individual reasonably believes to be a violation, of section 24-31-1203.** (Emphasis added).

¹⁰ In their just-released email correspondence declining to investigate these matters, Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Kupfner and Detective Todd Chambers rely upon *People v. Moreno*, 2022 CO 15 (holding “intended to harass” to be unconstitutionally overbroad and vague as a standalone element).

¹¹ Notwithstanding the *Moreno* decision, the term “property” should be construed liberally to incorporate the intangible harms prohibited by § 24-31-1204(8)(b), C.R.S. The Colorado Revised Statutes and § 18-9-111, C.R.S. do not expressly define “property.” Instead, contextual definitions support its interpretation to include both tangible and intangible property interests. § 18-1-901(3)(r), C.R.S. defines a “thing of value” to **include**: “real property, tangible and

19. Here, these elements are satisfied by Attorney General Weiser’s coordination with the other Defendants in *Gregory v. CJDRC* to provide conflicted representation through his Office, seek sanctions and a contempt citation against Declarant in *Gregory v. CJDRC*, and further file an undisclosed grievance with OARC accusing Declarant of unethically revealing “confidential” information (specifically Judge Kirby’s disciplinary history) and, without any evidence, accusing Declarant of perjury when he signed his coerced affidavit. Others have assisted in harassing Declarant by refusing to disqualify themselves and by deliberately disregarding his reports of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct. Attorney General Weiser’s efforts to impose prior restraints on Declarant’s mandated reporting of judicial, attorney, and official misconduct, with judicial officers agreeing to impose such restraints, are also evidence of a pattern of repeated and coordinated harassment.

20. The elements of First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404(1)(c), C.R.S. (M1)) are:

- a. The defendant,
- b. In the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
- c. Was a public servant, and
- d. With intent,
- e. To obtain a benefit for him/herself or another or maliciously to cause harm to another, he/she,
- f. Knowingly,
- g. Committed an act relating to his/her office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his/her official function or Refrained from performing a duty imposed upon him/her by law or Violated [relevant statute, rule, or regulation] relating to his/her office.

21. Here, these elements are satisfied by various public duties, the most universal being the general fiduciary duty of public servants recognized by § 24-18-103, C.R.S., being

intangible personal property, contract rights, choses in action, services, confidential information, medical records information, and any rights of use or enjoyment connected therewith.” *See also* § 18-1-901(1), C.R.S. (“Definitions set forth in any section of this title apply wherever the same term is used in the same sense in another section of this title unless the definition is specifically limited or the context indicates that it is inapplicable.”). An inclusive definition of “property” is also consistent with the term’s plain and common usage, “Collectively, the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible.” *PROPERTY*, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The nature of the communications, including direct or implied threats to Declarant’s privacy, home, reputation, and professional interests and the similar interests of others connected to Declarant conforms with the definition of “property” and should satisfy this element of proof.

ignored or violated with the public servants intending to shield themselves or others from accountability for criminal and/or ethical misconduct. To the extent that any of the individual Respondents has participated in the repeated pattern of harassing Declarant, others connected to him, and/or his co-counsel, those individuals have done so with malicious intent to harm another. Public servants who are attorneys owe special duties according to Colo. RPC 1.1, 1.7(a)(2), 1.10(d), 1.11(c), 1.13, 3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.8, 4.1, 4.4, 4.5, 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4. Public servants who are judges or members of the CCJD owe the same special duties as attorneys with additional duties according to the Code. State Auditor Hunter is subject to the requirements of § 12-100-120(1)(d), C.R.S. and the Accountancy Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 C.C.R. § 705-1:1.12, *et seq.* Judicial employees (including judges) are also subject to the Judicial Department's Code of Conduct and the mandatory reporting required by § 13-5.3-106, C.R.S. Other members of boards and commissions are further subject to the rules and regulations of their respective governmental entities. The deprivation of Declarant's freedom of expression, due process, and procedures defined by Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3) and Colo. Const. Art. XIII is also sufficient to establish that the individual Respondents have violated laws relevant to their respective offices. Indeed, the requirements for disqualification of the CCJD and the Justices are expressly mandated through Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(f)(II), (h).¹²

22. The elements of Conspiracy (§ 18-2-201, C.R.S.) are:

- a. The Defendant,
- b. In the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
- c. With the intent to facilitate the commission of the crime of [Harassment or First Degree Official Misconduct],
- d. Agreed with another person or persons that they, or one or more of them, would engage in conduct which constituted the crime of [Harassment or First Degree Official Misconduct] or an attempt to commit the crime of [Harassment or First Degree Official Misconduct] or Agreed to aid another person or persons in the planning or commission of the crime of [Harassment or First Degree Official Misconduct] or an attempt to commit the crime of [Harassment or First Degree Official Misconduct], and
- e. The Defendant, or a co-conspirator, performed an overt act to pursue the conspiracy.

23. Here, these elements are satisfied by evidence that, at various times, decisions were made to deliberately disregard Declarant's reporting of misconduct, to not disqualify from these

¹² Although not directly related to the factual basis stated in this Declaration, the Justices and the CCJD's intentional disregard for their disqualification obligations is a pattern evident in their present hearing of and non-disqualification from *Matter of Grattan*, CCJD Case No. 26-317 / Colo. Sup. Ct. Case No. 26SA296, notwithstanding the allegations of misconduct that Declarant has and continues to raise.

matters despite known conflicts, and to intentionally harass Declarant and those connected to him. These decisions occurred by agreement and coordination. The overt acts involved include communications between the co-conspirators (many of which communications have not been disclosed) and directed to Declarant or others. *See People v. Randell*, 2012 COA 108, ¶¶ 64-65 (recognizing communication of material information, though not itself a crime, as an overt act sufficient to sustain a jury conviction for conspiracy).

24. As an alternative and direct basis for prosecution, the facts further support a complicity theory under § 18-1-603, C.R.S. The required conditions for complicity are:
 - a. Another person committed the crime of [Harassment or First Degree Official Misconduct], and
 - b. The Defendant, with the desire or the purpose to aid, abet, advise, or encourage the other person in planning or committing that crime,
 - c. Aided, abetted, advised, or encouraged the other person in planning or committing that crime.
25. When Declarant contacted the Longmont Police Department, he expressly requested an investigation of the crimes of First Degree Official Misconduct and Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim (§ 18-8-706, C.R.S. (F4)). If this Court orders the prosecution of the Respondents for misdemeanor offenses, an investigation of the Respondent's conduct will further support prosecution for the felony crime of Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim. The elements of this offense are:
 - a. The Defendant,
 - b. In the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
 - c. Used a threat, an act constituting the crime of harassment, or an act of harm or injury upon any person or property,
 - d. Directed to, or committed upon, a witness in any criminal or civil proceeding, a victim of any crime, an individual whom the defendant believed had been or would be called to testify in any criminal or civil proceeding or a victim of any crime, a member of the witness's family, a member of the victim's family, an individual in a close relationship to the witness or victim, or an individual residing in the same household with the witness or victim,
 - e. As retaliation or retribution against the witness or victim.
26. Here, the elements of Retaliation Against a Witness or Victim are satisfied by those Respondents who participated in Declarant's wrongful termination, those who have obstructed Declarant's ability to report underlying judicial, attorney, and official

misconduct through non-disqualification, and the latest retaliation through the “investigation” of Declarant and his co-counsel by OARC.

27. If prosecution of the Respondents is ordered based on their suspected commission of misdemeanor offenses, the investigation will also likely provide a basis for charging and prosecuting one or more of the Respondents for the felony offense of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant (§ 18-8-306, C.R.S. (F4)). With the notable difference of “economic reprisal” rather than “property damage,” the elements of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant are:
- a. The Defendant,
 - b. In the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged,
 - c. With the intent,
 - d. To alter or affect any public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which was to be considered or performed by the public servant or the agency or body of which the public servant was a member,
 - e. Attempted to influence the public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal¹³ against any person or property.
28. Here, these elements are met by evidence that Declarant was retaliated against and wrongfully terminated for continuing to seek accountability for judicial, attorney, and official misconduct, particularly the misconduct of the Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court, former presiding Denver Juvenile Court Judge D. Brett Woods, Adams County Court Judge Leroy Kirby, and those who have aided in covering up the misconduct. Prior to Declarant’s termination, members of the CCJD threatened that his tenure was in jeopardy if he continued to investigate the Justices and oppose intimidation tactics by ARC Jessica Yates.¹⁴ The retaliation and Declarant’s wrongful termination as Executive

¹³ Declarant emphasizes that “economic reprisal” is consistent with the definition of retaliation under the CFCA, § 24-31-1204(8)(b), C.R.S. and is also congruent with interpreting “property” under the Colorado Penal Code to include intangible property and expected future property interests.

¹⁴ These intimidation tactics included the fabricated and wrongful criminal prosecution of Colorado Senate Judiciary Committee Chair Pete Lee and the February 6, 2023 disciplinary letter that ARC Yates personally sent to CCJD Vice-Chair / District Judge David Prince, to Declarant, and to the other judge and attorney members of the CCJD. The Justices and ARC Yates continue to retaliate against Declarant by refusing to disqualify themselves from their own initiation of a disciplinary “investigation” of Declarant and from the investigation and hearing of Declarant’s September 30, 2025 attorney discipline complaint filed with the U.S. District Court’s Committee on Conduct. The Justices’, Attorney General Weiser’s, ARC Yates’s, and the members/staff of

Director followed prior methodical efforts to stop an investigation of the Justices through the non-reappointment of Declarant as Chair of the CCJD. The September 15, 2026 disciplinary resignation of New Hampshire Supreme Court Chief Justice Gordon J. MacDonald confirms that Declarant had and has asserted sufficient grounds to seek the immediate suspension of the current Justices of the Colorado Supreme Court and their ultimate removal according to Colo. Const. Art. VI, § 23(3)(d), Colo. RJD 5(a), and Colo. RJD 34.

GROUND FOR PROSECUTION AND THE 20TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL TO PROSECUTE

29. Following an exchange on 20th Judicial District Attorney Michael Dougherty's Facebook campaign page, Declarant emailed Mr. Dougherty on October 8, 2025 to request an investigation of the Colorado Judicial Scandal, including crimes committed against Declarant. Dougherty did not respond to the email or to a follow up email that Declarant sent on October 9, 2025. Copies of the Facebook posts and emails are attached as Exhibit 14. After not receiving a response, Declarant proceeded to make a police report with the Longmont Police Department on November 3, 2025. Using an upload link, Declarant submitted his Verified Complaint and supporting exhibits from *Gregory v. CJDRC*. Subsequently, Declarant also provided copies of the emails he had sent to DA Dougherty. When there was no response from the responding officers, Declarant submitted a letter on November 18, 2025 to Longmont Public Safety Chief Zach Ardis. Exhibit 15. Following receipt of the letter, Longmont Detective Todd Chambers responded by calling Declarant and explaining that, after consultation with Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Kupfner, a determination was made that the Longmont Police Department did not have jurisdictional authority to investigate. Detective Chambers, however, agreed to refer the case to the Colorado Bureau of Investigation where it was assigned to Special Agent Joni Tangeman. From the evidence log Declarant later obtained, it appears his phone calls with Detective Chambers were recorded.
30. Declarant recalls having two primary conversations with Special Agent Tangeman. During the first call, Declarant discussed an overview of the facts and where Special Agent Tangeman could find relevant information in the materials provided to the Longmont Police Department. In the second call, Special Agent Tangeman contacted Declarant to inform him that CBI would not be investigating the case further, citing the lack of a viable prosecution option (with both the Denver and Boulder District Attorney's Offices having conflicts). Declarant called Special Agent Tangeman a third time with some factual updates only for Special Agent Tangeman to again affirm that CBI would not investigate.
31. On May 7, 2026, Declarant submitted a CCJRA request seeking a copy of the CAD report. Declarant also requested additional records, excluding the materials he had already submitted with his original police report. The Longmont Police Department's

the CCJD's conduct not only provides grounds for issuance of a permanent civil protection order, their collective conduct supports criminal charges.

Records Division produced the CAD report, an evidence log, and emails. However, **32 emails** were withheld on the basis that, “Disclosure of these records would violate attorney-client privilege.” Exhibit 16.

32. On May 14, 2026, Declarant followed his CCJRA request to the Longmont Police Department with a CCJRA request to CBI. On May 18, 2026, CBI responded by producing records that included the incident/action report from Special Agent Tangeman. Exhibit 17. Despite the more than 3,000 pages of documentation that Declarant provided to the Longmont Police Department, Special Agent Tangeman closed the case due to “insufficient evidence to open a criminal investigation.” Special Agent Tangeman’s notes also include her November 20, 2025 conversation with Detective Chambers, which she describes as follows:

Sergeant Chambers explained that Gregory believes he is a victim of victim/witness retaliation and filed a case in Longmont because that is where his (Gregory’s) physical reside[nce] is. Sergeant Chambers did not find sufficient evidence to file a case, which was corroborated by the Boulder County District Attorney’s Office.

33. On May 19, 2026, Declarant filed a further CCJRA request with the 20th Judicial District Attorney’s Office. Declarant’s request stated, as follows:

Records Requested: **All communications with me (Christopher Gregory) regarding this police report and crime reporting to the Longmont Police Department and its consideration by the 20th Judicial District Attorney's Office. This request includes Facebook postings on District Attorney Michael Dougherty's Attorney General campaign page, email correspondence with Mr. Dougherty through his campaign email address, and communications between the 20th Judicial District Attorney's Office and other law enforcement agencies, including the Longmont Police Department and the Colorado Bureau of Investigation. In particular, I am requesting all records of communications between Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Kupfner and Longmont Police Department Detective Todd Chambers regarding my police report and the refusal to investigate. These records are relevant to whether additional crimes have been or are being committed, including the federal crime of Obstruction of Justice (18 USC Sec. 1505). I have attached the letter that I sent to Longmont Police Chief Zach Ardis when I had submitted my police report and requested investigation without receiving a response from the originally assigned officers.**

After an initial 15-day delay, the DA’s Office responded: “We must deny the following portions of your request as we are not the custodian of the records: **"Facebook postings on District Attorney Michael Dougherty's Attorney General campaign page, email correspondence with Mr. Dougherty through his campaign email address[.]"** Two days later, after Declarant helped to focus the search for relevant materials, the DA’s Office sent an email stating: “The request I submitted yesterday returned a significant

number of results, many of which may not be relevant to your request. We can begin reviewing the results, if you would like, but it would require a significant monetary deposit.” Declarant, again, responded with a willingness to narrow the search.

34. Without any further response from the DA’s Office, Declarant sent an email on September 1, 2026 inquiring about the status of the CCJRA request. The DA’s Office responded on September 3, 2026 stating that, with the clarifications provided by Declarant, it possessed **34 emails** responsive to the request. Despite Declarant’s request to expedite production, the DA’s Office delayed generating an invoice until September 16, 2026. Declarant immediately paid the invoice and provided a copy of his receipt. However, the DA’s Office did not produce the records until September 24, 2026, even after receiving a subpoena from the U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee seeking unrelated records, but involving a similar period of non-cooperation and stonewalling. Exhibit 18. Copies of Declarant’s correspondence regarding his CCJRA request are attached as Exhibit 19.
35. Without the 34 emails, Declarant was not provided with any explanation for Assistant District Attorney Kenneth Kupfner’s interference with Declarant’s efforts to make a police report with the Longmont Police Department. Moreover, neither the 20th Judicial District Attorney’s Office, the Longmont Police Department, nor CBI have explained their conclusions that there is “insufficient evidence to open a criminal investigation.”
36. On September 24, 2026, the emails withheld by the 20th Judicial District Attorney’s Office were finally produced. Exhibit 20. A review of the emails reveals that the only reasons provided for declining to investigate were Assistant District Attorney Kupfner’s incorrect conclusion that this Court and the 20th Judicial District Court lacked adequate jurisdiction and venue. Moreover, Assistant District Attorney Kupfner further asserted that the *Moreno* decision precluded prosecution of any potential crimes, including witness intimidation. The deliberate suppression of Declarant’s police report is most evident in the November 19, 2025 exchange between Detective Chambers and Mr. Kupfner:

Chambers: I referred him to CBI as they have state-wide jurisdiction if there ends up being a criminal act that was committed against him.

Thanks again for helping me through this one.

Kupfner: Better to refer him to CBI than me! Nice work!

37. Detective Chambers’ obstruction of Declarant’s CCJRA request is also revealed in the emails disclosed on September 24, 2026. In one specific May 6, 2026 email, Detective Chambers includes the Longmont City Attorney’s Office and Assistant District Attorney Kupfner. The email states:

Hi Liz [Lorina-Mills],

I'm putting this on your radar as it appears a lawsuit or other legal action against me and the PD may be in the works. I have not responded to Mr. Gregory and have no intention of doing so until after I've consulted with you.

FYI,

TC

Senior Assistant City Attorney Elizabeth Lorina-Mills responded:

Thanks Todd. I am familiar with him.¹⁵ I will reach out to you separately on how to respond.

If nothing else, Detective Chambers' email exchange suggests that there is additional documentation that is being intentionally and wrongfully withheld from Declarant. Specifically, there are material communications within the crime fraud exception to privilege that have not been disclosed by the City of Longmont.

38. Ultimately, there is a legitimate question as to why District Attorney Dougherty did not immediately disqualify himself from consideration of Declarant's police report when Dougherty has close personal connections with many of the defendants, including Attorney General Weiser. Dougherty also received campaign contributions from some of the other Defendants in *Gregory v. CJDRC*, including now-former CCJD Chair Mindy Sooter and her husband Monty Sooter (who worked on Weiser's previous campaigns as the "Director of Compliance"). Exhibit 21. Mindy Sooter and current CCJD Chair James Carpenter were the architects of Declarant's wrongful termination and would be primary defendants if felony charges of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant (§ 18-8-306, C.R.S. (F4) were ever brought.
39. Under these circumstances, District Attorney Michael Dougherty's refusal to investigate and prosecute is demonstrably arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise unjustified. Accordingly, it is appropriate for this Court to appoint a special prosecutor and order prosecution under § 16-5-209, C.R.S.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR

Ultimately, the facts raised in this Declaration arise from a categorical and coordinated refusal by the Respondents to disqualify themselves and to allow for a legitimate investigation of the criminal and ethical misconduct alleged by Declarant. Through this Declaration,¹⁶ Declarant


¹⁵ Declarant has never met Ms. Lorina-Mills and has no personal connections with her that would allow her to be "familiar" with Declarant.

¹⁶ In considering the sufficiency of evidence, this Court must accept the allegations of this Declaration as true and draw any inferences in the Declarant's favor. *See Schupper v. Smith*, 128 P.3d 323, 325-27 (Colo. App. 2005) (application of § 16-5-209, C.R.S. is focused on

has satisfied his burden of demonstrating probable cause to suspect the commission of various crimes within the jurisdictional authority of this Court, including but not limited to: Harassment (§ 18-9-111(1)(e), C.R.S.), First Degree Official Misconduct (§ 18-8-404, C.R.S.), and Conspiracy (§ 18-2-201, C.R.S.) to commit these offenses. Moreover, Declarant has sufficiently demonstrated that 20th Judicial District Attorney Michael Dougherty's refusal to investigate and prosecute these alleged crimes is arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise unjustified. Accordingly, Declarant respectfully requests, pursuant to § 16-5-209, C.R.S., that this Court appoint 13th Judicial District Attorney Travis Sides as a special prosecutor with direction for Mr. Sides to file charging documents based on the allegations of this Declaration.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Colorado that the foregoing statements made in this Declaration are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on the 30th day of September, 2026, at Longmont, Colorado.


Christopher S.P. Gregory

consideration of face of affidavit without opportunities for the affiant to engage in formal discovery and to request evidentiary hearing); *see also People v. McKay*, 2021 CO 72, ¶ 10 (court should presume validity of affidavit in criminal proceedings and confine sufficiency review to the four corners of the affidavit); *J.S. v. Chambers*, 226 P.3d 1193, 1205 (Colo. App. 2009) (§ 16-5-209, C.R.S. determination made upon “the competent evidence in the affidavit, the explanation of the prosecuting attorney, and any argument of the parties”).